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THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Appeal for New Members and Donations

The Council appeals to members to do all in their power to introduce new members in order to extend the benefits of the Institute and to increase its revenue.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the JOURNAL, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from subscriptions of £1 is. per annum. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

Prof. HARIDAS BHATTACHARYYA.
GIFT.

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THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE
OF PHILOSOPHY

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JANUARY 1937

ON BEING A PHILOSOPHER¹

PROFESSOR H. F. HALLETT.

IN a very famous analysis and panegyric of the philosopher, Plato claimed that he is a man magnificent in mind and the spectator of all time and all existence. These are great words, and words made venerable by ancient repute and centuries of citation. Unfortunately, however, like many such utterances they can only be regarded as hyperbolic and rhetorical; and in an age that, failing in inspiration and fecundity of intuition, seeks at least to be precise, they must suffer limitation. For the *lumen siccum* of reason shows that the phrase "all time" involves a contradiction, and that the human mind, by nature limited both in amplitude and in profundity, cannot apprehend "all existence". That is a beatitude reserved for the creative intellect of Nature, where time gives place to eternity, and existence to essence: for time as an indefinite can only be summated by being consummated.

More restrained, and thus more easily defensible, though less impressive, is that other saying of Plato, that the philosopher claims to be not the possessor of wisdom, but only her lover: and that he endlessly pursues the beloved, enjoying only the rapture of pursuit, and never the beatitude of possession. But if the former claim was too magniloquent, the latter is far too slight; for it is not only the philosopher that seeks knowledge, but every man is so constituted as to pursue it in his own way and with his own special limitations. To live as a conscious being is to pursue knowledge, just as to live as an organic being is to develop vigilant response to an ever widening environment. So it would appear that for Plato in one

¹ Lecture delivered at the Evening Meeting of the Institute on October 13, 1936.

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of his moods we are all philosophers, while in another none of us can possibly be one.

It is not my business to-night to defend Plato against the censure invited by this seeming contradiction. We need not be just to famous men: they are as kings not to be moved or removed by the judgments of lesser men. Fellow-servants with the swans, they may be relegated to pigeon-holes; mouths that were filled with honey may be choked with the dust of commentators. But before we turn aside from Plato to meditations more in the idiom of our own epoch, let us glance at yet another picture of the philosophic life from the same great dialogue: *The Republic*. I do so because it brings us a step nearer to what I want chiefly to emphasize this evening. In the July issue of the *Journal* of this Institute, Dr M. B. Foster of Christ Church drew attention to a certain double standard of philosophic activity in Plato's account of the Cave. "In the *Republic*", he said, "all the acts in the life of a Guardian up to the point at which he is bidden to return to the cave are . . . determined as right or wrong according as they are or are not means to his highest good, which is the achievement of the best life. But the command to return to the cave both is and is clearly recognized to be a command to surrender a better life for a worse one. If this act therefore is right, it is right in a different sense from that of conducing to his highest good."¹ With Dr Foster's description of this second standard as a Platonic anticipation of Christian "revelation" I have neither concern nor sympathy: the interest for me lies in Plato's admission that the proper life for the philosopher is not the unmoved contemplation of all time and all existence, but a philosophic concern with the affairs of humanity; that the philosopher is not a God-fainéant but an active man, and his philosophy not an absorption in a mirage of totality, but an illumination and guidance of human life and feeling. No longer is the philosopher portrayed as the indifferent and rapt spectator of eternal essences far removed from the crudities of finite experience; no longer is he merely the learner, the seeker after knowledge; he is the man of ripe experience and godlike amplitude of vision, applying his principles to the affairs of human life: a man doing a man's work and finding his proper function therein, but doing it with insight and illumination, and thus doing it easily, intelligently, freely.

Now it is here, I think, that we find the most essential attributes of the philosophic life: its ease, its intelligence, its freedom; and with these as their essential condition its humanity, or to speak more broadly and more accurately its *sense of the finite*. Plato, indeed, seems to suggest that in this return to the Cave the philo-

¹ *Philosophy*, vol. xi, pp. 301-2.

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sopher, in the words of Dr Foster, surrenders "a better life for a worse one", but I shall say that he surrenders what never could be his, and that his best life is to be found in the Cave, but unchained and able to distinguish the shadows from the puppets, and the fire from the sun.

Far be it from me to minimize the importance in the philosophic life of the pursuit of ultimate truth, for this is the essential prerequisite of all properly philosophic activity and poise. I do not even think that perfect knowledge is for man an absolutely unattainable ideal. On the contrary, knowledge that is not in some sense perfect is not rightly called "knowledge" at all. It is because I have recognized this that I have sometimes risked the censure of my friends by drawing a distinction between knowledge *qua* knowledge, and knowledge *qua* human, by which I mean, not that human knowledge is distinguished from the knowledge of other beings in its general character of relation to the Real (for I have called it human *knowledge* and not opinion or faith or some other mode of the apprehension of objects), but by its special conditions arising from the place held by man within the Real. It is by reason of the variety of these conditions that every man's knowledge is peculiar to himself, and in fact constitutes his individual mind. Indeed, I only speak of human knowledge as distinct from the knowledge of individual men, because over considerable areas of humanity one species of conditions appears to prevail. But even this community must not be exaggerated: we must not overemphasize the importance of man's biological nature, for men are more alike in their superficial and anatomical contours and structure than in their mental characteristics. If the minds and hearts of all men became visible, what a jungle would human society appear!

My first point, then, is that the common, almost unconscious, assumption that there is a single unidimensional totum of knowledge about the Real, into which this or that man makes peripheral and temporary and fluctuating inroads, or which he inaccurately reiterates, so that his knowledge is only affected by his special status in the Real in so far as it never covers the whole ground,—this does not represent the essential situation. For though in the end there is, of course, only one system of knowledge in which all the individual systems of knowledge that constitute the individual minds of conscious beings find their undiminished place, yet that hierarchical system in its wholeness and synthesis constitutes only the conscious Real itself, and is thus probably not knowledge in the term's usual sense at all, but creative intelligence. Human thought does not merely rethink sections of the Divine Thought (to use the metaphor of Kepler), but holds its subordinate place in that Thought. Thus the epistemological situation is ruled by the

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unique status of the individual knower within the system of the Real, a status through which each is cut off from full knowledge of Nature, and yet is able to know it as it is, in his own degree and manner: that is, in the relative dissolution proper to the individual's level of synthesis and scope.¹

Something ought, perhaps, to be said by way of explanation of the apparent paradox that though there are many real individual minds with their many congruent real worlds of nature, there is yet but one indivisible Real which they express and partly constitute. This is a subject on which I have already so often written and spoken that I am a little shy of introducing it again to-night. Perhaps I can rapidly sketch the principles that lie at its basis: my excuse must be my judgment of its transcendent importance for the philosophic world-view. It is, indeed, as it seems to me, the great master-key to ultimate problems in many branches of philosophy; and it is certainly the basis of all I have to say to-night about the philosophic attitude to life and its problems. My hesitancy has not, I hope, prepared you for a principle remote and recondite, for it is neither; difficult as it may be, and is, in its precise formulation, baffling in its detailed analysis, in its broad outline it is extremely simple and even naïve. Yet it yields the essential solvent of many of the baffling antinomies that have obstructed philosophic speculation.

I refer to the macrocosm-microcosm structure of the Real, by the imputation of which it becomes possible to maintain the unity and indivisibility of Nature and also the reality of the finite individuals within it. The root-conception is that of an hierarchical structure in descending order from the creative One through the various stages of analysis and abstraction, giving rise to the false appearance of partition, down to the finest dust bordering on non-being. The principle of individuation is thus not subdivision but the emanation of infinite microcosms from the macrocosm, each in its own proper degree and abstraction reproducing the structure of its concrete source. And each of these infinite microcosms is itself a macrocosm in relation to infinite secondary microcosms; and so to infinity. These microcosms and microcosms of microcosms in their hierarchical order are the real individuals constituting the world of nature. In the most complete sense no one of them is a perfect individual, for only the original macrocosm can be so described: they are approximations to that perfection in infinitely various degrees and modes. And their imperfection implies their

¹ But this, too, involves some apprehension of the structure and content of the absolute Real, though an abstract one that can only be filled out *a posteriori*.

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degradation from the eternal poise of Nature to the instability of temporal process: they become and cease to be in a time-series.

Further, in addition to the real individuals of various degrees of perfection, there are also seeming individuals that reproduce, not their single macrocosm but factors and elements derived from several relative macrocosms, and thus appear in their time-series as formed from the more or less external aggregation and relation of real individuals. These seeming individuals, which are of all grades and removes of defect, are real in their elements rather than in their totalities, and find their explanation through processes of scientific analysis rather than by philosophical synthesis. As an intellectual discipline, it seems to me, philosophy is the elaboration in precise detail of such an hierarchical system of forms, and the attribution of empirical entities to their proper place therein. It is this that distinguishes it from science in its characteristic forms: the ideal objects for scientific investigation are, in fact, just those seeming individuals or aggregations of real or seeming individuals, that are real in their elements rather than in their totalities; because its method is analytical, and thus destructive of totality or wholeness. When scientific analysis is applied to real wholes or individuals its result is apt to be unsatisfactory, except when the analyst is himself philosophic and uses his method sceptically.

It is not, however, my business to-night to discuss the nature of science; let me next comment very briefly upon another important set of problems that, I think, find their only solution through recourse to some such principles of unity and individuation as those I have sketched. Again and again down the long history of philosophical inquiry and speculation great thinkers have arisen to recall vainglorious apriorism and unchecked dogmatism to the consideration of the limitation of human faculty, and the necessity of coming to terms with it in the elaboration of philosophical system. The names that come most readily to mind are the Bacons, Roger and Francis, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant. Again and again the would-be "spectator of all time and all existence" has had to be reminded that it is necessary to subject his visive faculties, his instruments, and his observatory to close inspection before, or while, making use of them to sweep the intellectual heavens. It was at one of the greatest points of philosophical development that Kant, having called a halt to both dogmatism and scepticism, made his famous distinction between the world of reality and the world of objective appearances, noumena and phenomena he called them, the world of freedom and the world of causal necessity. Not, I would remind you, that these were two separate and wholly unrelated worlds, for the former was the source of the causal necessity of the latter, while the latter suffered violence by the irruption of the

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'former in the sphere of human morality. When man is morally free, natural causes are moulded to the dictates of his noumenal will. This distinction of two worlds, and the recognition of the strain that exists between them, is the inevitable source of an ethical dualism such as has once again been emphasized in recent ethical thought: I mean the distinction, not merely between an immediate and an ultimate good, but more especially between that ultimate good and the morally right. We saw the introduction of this distinction by Plato in his account of the philosopher-ruler; it was quite central for Kant. A man is truly free only when he pursues the morally right, for when he pursues his own good he does so upon inclination, even when it is his ultimate good pursued upon a postponed inclination, for then reason is operating as no more than the servant of inclination—not as a universal legislator, which is the sole condition of genuine freedom.

These matters have been disputed often enough both as regards the ontological dualism of phenomena and noumena, and also the ethical dualism of right and good: the weight of the argument ever tending towards its resolution, and the weight of human experience towards its maintenance. Dr Foster's attempt to put the moral dualism past argument by tracing the incidence of the right to "revelation", and its appearance in Plato as a sort of "Christianity before Christ", does not seem to me to be very helpful or likely to impress his philosophical readers: "Even the Holy One of the Gospels", says Kant in a not unrelated connection, "must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognize Him as such."¹ But I fear that Kant too, when one comes to consider the ultimate unity and coherence of his ontology and morals, is equally lacking in principles to commend them to the reason and intellectual conscience. And it is because this is so that we find Hegel roundly rejecting the dualistic conclusions, and thus restoring the self-respect of the philosopher as a rational thinker at the expense of the philosopher as a humanist. But philosophy must solve this dualism in the philosopher's own soul, and explain the connection between the uncurbed intellect of all philosophic dreams and the mirage-haunted intelligence of the philosophic man, half blinded by the dust of time, sketching his map of the desert of finitude as he makes his way towards the oasis of vision where he would be. Plato, as we have seen, in his more optimistic mood spoke of the emergence of the philosophic soul from its Cave up the steep and rugged ascent into the blinding presence of the sun itself, and of its gradual acclimatization to that ethereal world of pure forms; and Francis Bacon, taking the figure of Plato and transferring its incidence, thought of the *eidola specus*,

¹ *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 31.

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and even of the *eidola tribus* that more properly corresponds to Plato's image, as serious but yet corrigible failings of human faculty. Far indeed be it from me to suggest that these great minds were wholly wrong in their supreme optimism, or that the human mind has no way out to the infinite and perfect; but this perfection coupled with this imperfection is precisely the dualism that philosophy must face and resolve.

It is because the macrocosm-microcosm theory of Nature offers us a credible clue out of this labyrinth, and also answers to many of the apparent facts of our experience, that I believe it to be the root-principle of all philosophy, capable of affording us guidance in dealing with the special limitations that determine human finiteness, and thus in laying down some of the typical reactions to human experience that may be expected from the philosopher as humanist, as the man with the true sense of the finite.

How then does philosophy transform the life of a finite individual? I put the question in this form in order to emphasize the exoteric nature of philosophy. A man does not need to be qualified to be a professional teacher of philosophy in order to be a philosopher: on the contrary, many professors of philosophy of unimpeachable scholarship have been far from philosophic. Any man can live his life in a philosophic spirit if he is so happy as to possess the right intellectual temperament. Doubtless the deeper his insight into the nature of things, the more effective will be his application of philosophic principles to the detail-impediments and issues of human destiny, but philosophers are not limited to those possessing "a good honours degree in philosophy", as the phrase goes. Socrates knew very little if we may believe his own estimate (as in some degree we may)—he knew that he knew nothing at all, but he was a philosopher in a supreme degree; not because he went about asking questions, but because he lived an ordinary human life, yet with that ease, that freedom, that intelligence, that true sense of the finite of which I have spoken. Knowledge is only of importance as it ministers to that.

What then is the philosophic attitude to life? What is it to be a philosopher? It is, I have said, rightly to recognize the nature of the finite and temporal and its relation to the infinite and eternal; rightly to distinguish the eternal finite from the transitory, and to understand the precise degree of the temporality of the temporal. And this is what I mean by a right sense of the finite. Let me elaborate this for a little:

Two main modes of limitation may be distinguished (though not symmetrically separated): (*a*) there is the *partiality* that characterizes every finite individual: it is never self-contained, self-subsistent, or independent, but always finds itself opposed by an

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environment against which it struggles with greater or less success, and by means of which it sustains its temporal life.

(b) There is the *multiplicity* that characterizes most of the finite entities of our experience: the physical things, both organic and inorganic, as well as the social entities which we ourselves partly constitute: the family, the state, the species.

I need not stop to discuss the precise relations of these two modes of limitation which correspond to the two directions in which individuality may vary in perfection, viz. in comprehensiveness and in coherence; it is sufficient to say that I shall make them serve to distinguish two main directions in which the philosophic spirit expresses itself in human life: the individual and the social. To be a philosopher implies a right sense of the finite in respect to both of these modes or directions of limitation. Let me consider them *seriatim*:

(a) *Human partiality.*

Here we can fruitfully make a further distinction between two senses in which the individual may be said to be limited, viz. as a microcosm of Nature, and as distributed over a duration so that at any moment it is only a part of its own total being.

Let me take these topics separately, though they are in themselves very closely related:

(i) That the finite individual is a microcosm of Nature, both as an extended being and as a conscious mind, implies defect as well as relative perfection, implies in fact, as I have sometimes tried to show, partial descent into time: birth, and death, and vicissitude. What in the macrocosm is eternal poise, in the microcosm is degraded into contrary and even mutually negating affections, the negation finding mitigation and solution only by the expansion of a time-dimension, and the consequent introduction of division within the seamless fabric of the Real. Thus we have passage in time; we were born in season or out of season, we live at issue with our contemporaries, enjoy a brief period of fruition, we age, we wilt, friends fail us in our need, while

some we loved, the loveliest and the best
That from his Vintage rolling Time hath prest,
Have drunk their Cup a Round or two before,
And one by one crept silently to rest.

And here surely there is place for philosophy if the heart will let the intelligence speak and not turn its brave words to idleness. Birth and death we may well take as the final symbols of human limitation, and as thus constituting the crucial test of the quality of the philosopher's sense of the finite. He will not, I think, attempt the

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ways of popular superstition, or put his faith in ancient or in modern creeds that will not stand the test of objective intellectual criticism. These are fashioned out of ignorance and propagated under the insignia of bondage. A pre-existence that can be no more than a barren hypothesis; an immortality that no man can really desire, or could support, and is no more than the shadow of the unvanquished sense of life in those who are not in the act of dying: these constitute no true sense of human finitude in its relation with the infinite. For pre-existence and immortality yield no true conquest of time, they represent rather the triumph of time. We need not offer the unborn and the dead more time in which to conquer time: the unborn are not under its dominion, and the dead have already escaped from it. They have "turned the bane to antidote", and added that touch of finality that eternalizes time. It is at least as certain that the dead are dead as that the unborn are unborn; in this world, in this time, they are not.

It has often been supposed that for the philosopher who thus rejects such self-contradictory superstitions nothing remains but the cultivation of indifference. Of death do we not often say, "Time cures all", and of life that is not yet, "Live in the moment"? When we do so we look to the mere lapse of time to make good time's thefts, to the mere oblivion of time to offset time's evil gifts. But this is no longer time's secret victory over the human spirit, it is the triumph of time *sans phrase*; and whatever value it may have for those whose reaction to experience is wholly affective, who can reach equanimity only by exhaustion or by vacuity, it is certainly not the genuine philosophic attitude: it is based upon no true sense of the finite, it involves no steady contemplation of our limitations, no free intelligence, no genuine humanity.

If then the way of philosophy is neither the way of superstition nor that of indifference, it must be the way of intellectual insight. It leads the mind to the contemplation of the very sources of the time that measures our finitude, to the knowledge that in the eternity of which time is a degradation necessitated by our partiality all that is of worth in our temporal experience is real but transformed, "awakened from the dream of life"—"made one with Nature". The philosopher triumphs over time by looking past it into its eternal source. That these are fine words and sometimes nothing more for even the most philosophical of men shows only the reality of our finiteness, and adds tragic import to life and death; but in so far as they have real weight in our estimate of temporal vicissitude they express, I think, the essence of the *religion* of the philosopher.

(ii) But, as I have suggested, the partiality of the finite individual as he develops in the time-series is even more abrupt than I have so far considered in what I have said about his microcosmic nature.

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For the true microcosm is not the temporary individual of this or that moment or epoch of his temporal development, but the total individual occupying his complete duration whether temporal or eternal. Thus the individual of this or that moment or period is a part only of his true and total finite self, which again is but a microcosm of extended and conscious Nature. And this partial divorce of the individual from himself that is involved in his occupation of a time-order is again a source of disunion and problem in human life; it is in fact the root of *moral obligation* and struggle. I have already commented upon the distinctions that have been drawn between the immediate good, the ultimate good, and the morally right, all of which make their specific calls on human conduct, and but rarely coincide in their demands. I shall say in this connection that the immediate good is something determined by the character of the individual taken as complete in the present; the ultimate good—a much more vaguely determined end—by the character of a foreseen individual of an enduring future taken as the real moral individual; the morally right answers to the real total individual, the microcosm of Nature, legislating more or less abstractly for the temporal truncated individual for whom morality has thus a strangely compelling import. The often attempted reduction of the morally right to the ultimately good must, it seems to me, be resisted. I do not, of course, think that it can be argued that morality is "eternal and immutable", to use the epithets of Cudworth, that morality as it urges the individual and provides the cutting edge of progress is, in the idiom of Kant, the formulation of absolutely pure practical reason; but neither do I think that it can be reduced to ultimate expediency. It has always been difficult to defend the Kantian view of a categorical imperative valid for all rational beings. Its universality seemed wholly dependent on its vacuity, for as soon as specific matter was introduced into it in the formation of a moral maxim applicable to actual practice, its sphere of application became correspondingly confined. "Act only on the maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law" gives only the empty form of morality to which no universal filling could conceivably be given. If a particular maxim is to be used as a universal law it can only be defended by the inclusion within the maxim of the strict conditions of its application. "Thou shalt not lie" cannot be universalized as it stands unless the term "lie" already implies its restriction to morally indefensible deviations from strict and complete correspondence with fact. If it does not, then the maxim can only be universalized by the distinct inclusion within it of the conditions under which lying is condemned. And these can never be completed. No reasonable moralist could either tolerate universal lying or condemn lying universally;

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morality lies in an infinitely fine adjustment of an abstract imperative with a concrete need. Moral principle requires, in fact, not exceptions in favour of this or that individual at this or that time, but exceptions in favour of certain specified classes of individual faced by certain specified classes of situation. Moral flexibility does not imply individual laxity; on the contrary it involves "fundamental brain-work", and morality, from being the more or less mechanical universalization of traditional moral maxims, becomes the aspiration of the truncated temporal agent after his full eternal reality.

For the philosopher, then, there is no action that can in itself be called moral or immoral universally, that is, under any and every circumstance; yet there is a right that transcends his immediate, and even his supposed ultimate advantage. His reaction to morals, therefore, is chiefly characterized by a sceptical attitude towards popular moral maxims, not because they are too difficult, too stringent, but because, like book-rules for making a good golf swing, they are too simple and general, too abstract, rigid, and ill directed; thus also by a natural inversion they come to be either too loosely or too zealously applied and too hypocritically professed. The greater part of popular morality as it vaguely occupies the human mind is a mass of taboo, prejudice, loose tradition, and use and wont; and though for the last-named there is, and perhaps always will be, some defence where human intelligence is limited in depth, and human foresight in scope, for primitive taboo, shallow-pated prejudice, and ignorant zeal, the philosopher has no toleration. For they are, with superstition, the main tools with which mankind has plagued and scared itself all up the ages.

Furthermore, the philosopher will be specially sceptical about such moral maxims as are plainly directed towards the special needs of society and political order, and are aimed at moulding the individual into conformity with this or that prevailing form of social order or political institution. For this reverses the proper order of precedence, the conscious individual being the real microcosm of Nature, while social and political entities are but the derivatives of their members. Morality is primarily individual; indeed, it is social only because it is primarily individual.

This reference to society and the State leads me very naturally to the second main type of limitation that I distinguished in relation to which the philosopher's sense of the finite is significant:

(b) The multiplicity of prevailing individual entities.

By this I mean not that there are many such individuals and types of individual (for they are infinite), but that each of the many,

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or perhaps I should say, many of the eaches, are individually multiplex, imperfectly unified, and thus lacking in coherence or rationality. What will be the attitude of the philosopher towards these intrinsically irrational entities? •

If, as I have said, the philosopher's sense of the finite leads him within the sphere of religion to eschew superstition on the one hand and indifference on the other, and to look for a solution to the problems raised by his microcosmic limitations to the eternalization of the values appearing in time, and thus to the knowledge that no empirical value can be derived or destroyed by the mere lapse of time; and if within the sphere of morality he puts aside taboo, conformity, and puritanism on the one hand, and on the other, philistinism and licence, and pursues only that infinitely fine adjustment of actions to the unique needs of this or that moral situation that is prompted by his own essential aspiration after his eternal character as a microcosm of the Real; his attitude towards the multiplex totalities that masquerade as microcosms of Nature is, I think, likely to be determined by an inverse correction. Take, for crucial example, his relation to social units or complexes, or political wholes—those seeming microcosms that so profoundly affect human life. That they are not true microcosms of Nature is sufficiently indicated by their lack of central consciousness. Even that most unified and perfect of social wholes, "the marriage of true minds" that does not "admit impediments", certainly retains that last impediment of separate consciousnesses. I do not at the moment discuss whether this is an imperfection to love, or whether its essential perfection is not out of impediment to fashion a new perfection. My point is that society does not even at its best constitute a true unity or microcosm, though it is the result of a well-founded effort of the finite individuals to pass beyond their limitations. In its more multiplex forms society recedes towards complete disunion. Somewhere between these limits of love and war there is the social and political world in which unity means ideally the mutuality and division of function of the well-knit society of free minds, but too often actually only the antagonism, subjectivism, and irresponsiveness of a mere congeries of geographically juxtaposed individuals, or the suppressed antagonism of a mass of slaves held together only by the will and power of a tyrant. But in no case has a society a unity comparable with that of the individual member, so that any theory that makes the State a foreshadowing of the Absolute, however inspiring it may be for the social reformer, is necessarily misleading in its scale of values. Society at its best is still a compromise between divergent individual wills, based, it is true, upon a general unity of type, and enforced by the common interest in self-preservation and improvement. The primary thing

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is not the perfection of the society, but individual needs, and freedom as the condition of their satisfaction.

It is by reason of this primacy of the individual that the philosopher's attitude to social and political organization and morality is marked by scepticism and a certain indifference, rather than by constructive imagination and the utopianism of smug conservatism or zealous reform. The philosopher with his sense of the finite has no belief in the perfect society, in the conscious reconstruction of social life, in the elaboration of principles of political organization, or the speculations of the reformer. He knows that a perfect whole must necessarily be prior to its parts, whereas in society it is *ex hypothesi* posterior to them. Do not mistake me, I am not arguing against social life and organization, but against the exaggeration of its possible perfection, and of the power of the human mind to lay down its principles. Even in love, that simple and nearly perfect society, there is need, as our Chairman Professor Macmurray has maintained, to adopt an objective attitude, and, I would add, an experimental attitude, to achieve the highest values.

Society is by nature a compromise, a compromise that aims at, and sometimes produces the good of the individual members. Man, we have often been told, is "a political animal"; seeing that he is finite, and also must share a finite superficies of the globe with millions of his kind, it is well, perhaps, that he is. It is well also that he is a hunting and killing animal, seeing that he must share the same superficies with millions of millions of living things that are an ever-present menace to his species. Let the analogy be my defence when I say that, in our own time at least, it would be a great improvement if man were a less political animal; we might then hear less of the opposing social and political -isms that so rend the world into warring peoples and classes that human life seems to some of us more like life on the side of a volcano in a colony of idiots, than the garden of Epicurus, the City of God, or the Kingdom of Ends. Social and political intolerance are the fruit of an excessive belief in unrealities, and of all unrealities perhaps the ideal society, the perfect State, is the most mischievous. In so far as political or social philosophy of any form implies a belief in any such thing, or in the power of any individual to approach a conception of it, it is wrongly called "philosophy". Call it "sophism" if you like. There is no philosophy of communism, of fascism, of *laissez-faire*, for the application of philosophical principles within social theory must always lead to scepticism which, however it may be mitigated for purposes of practice, will always remain too cool to breed the zealots, visionaries, and persecutors of our too politically minded species.

I have based my account of the philosophical attitude to politics

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and social theory upon the view that the relation of the individual to his society is not that of microcosm to macrocosm, but of microcosm to other microcosms so congruent with it as to constitute its most fitting environment, that is, the environment in response to which it realizes its most characteristic potencies. This being their relation we are unable to reason conclusively about the proper nature of the social whole from anything within our nature or experience. Unlike our speculations concerning the macrocosm of Nature, which can very largely be *a priori*, in politics our approach must be almost entirely experimental. Thus the special ends of social life are likely to be better advanced by the give and take of piecemeal organization and the semi-conscious development of customary and pragmatic principles, than by the speculative creations of even the most rational and far-sighted theorists. The complete, or even the relative, rationalization of society is an *ignis fatuus*, if that can be called "*fatuus*" that lies at the basis of so much human misery, or "*ignis*" that threatens at last to bring civilization down to a new Age of Darkness.¹

¹ Sometimes an even more radical argument in favour of the priority of society has been put forward, viz. that because the individual derives life itself and all the benefits and values of life from his social environment, there is no limit to the power rightly possessed by society over the life and activity of the individual, and that his duties towards his society must have priority over all his individual ends and even his conception of moral right. Plato himself comes very near to such a conception of the relations of the citizen and the State in the *Crito*: "Since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us (i.e. the laws of the State) can you deny . . . that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you?" (501^b). But such a view is based, it seems to me, upon a false analogy of the growth and dependence of the individual on his social environment; it is very like the argument of Hardy's reasoning yokel that because a mite is born in cheese and lives on cheese all his life, he is made of cheese. But even a crystal does not grow simply by accretion: much less does the individual absorb his social environment and compose himself of it. The environment is no more than his opportunity; by his response to it he evokes his individual potencies, but it does not constitute him: the individuals constitute it. Doubtless the society is one of the most useful types of environment for the evoking of the higher potentialities of human nature: *Homini nihil homine utilius* (B.D.S., Eth. IV, xviii, Sch.). Thus as in love a derived perfection is fashioned out of inevitable impediment, so also in general society a perfection is derived from the mutual assistance of the members. We need one another just as in a lesser degree we need all external things: because we are finite and must search unceasingly for completion in and by means of another, must find ourselves in response to the stimulus that wakens us from without. This is a power in society founded upon real weakness in the individuals, but it registers rather a potency in the individuals that in their weakness fashion for themselves a cure, than a power in society itself as an independent microcosm of Nature. Society, indeed, may so develop as to have ends, and to use means, that conflict with the good of the individual, or even with his judgment of right, for there is no axiom

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I have said enough, perhaps, in dealing with these three broad examples of philosophical reaction to human experience within the spheres of religion, morality, and sociality to substantiate the general character of the philosophic life that I laid down at the beginning of my discourse. The philosopher has too often been represented as one who has cultivated a toleration so comprehensive as to border on complete indifference to all that is of value and interest to ordinary men:

on the shore
Of the wide world I stand alone and think,
Till Love and Fame to nothingness do sink.

It has always been recognized, of course, that as a matter of fact philosophers are not really indifferent except when they speak *ex cathedra*: "There was never yet philosopher that could endure the toothache patiently", but these were regrettable defections from ideal philosophy. On the contrary, I have contended, concern with finite things and values is the central characteristic of the true philosopher, that he is, in fact, the man with the true sense of the finite; who does not let the finite cloud his vision of the infinite, nor his vision of the infinite, such as it is, take away from his experience its comedy and its tragic import. And it is because he strives ever to maintain a right scale of values that he appears to the zealots as indifferent or even cynical: for zeal is the offspring of a false scale of values, and is twin-brother to intolerance. If a man is zealous and intolerant you may be sure that he lacks conviction; his zeal is the unconscious expression of his doubt; he persecutes to encourage himself. But the philosopher, like the apostle, is "all things to all men"; he will "prove all things" and "hold fast to that which is good". Nothing is alien to him; there are no things that "are not done" or that he will not contemplate himself as doing, given the right circumstances. Thus he is, as I have said, the free man, for there is a way of freedom even in the crater of necessity, the way of understanding. To understand the necessity with which we are encompassed is to find liberty through our very bonds: through the self-imposed and the merely supposed obstacles, by violence; through the genuine obstacles by vision of the secret

that society and the individual must agree; it may even be necessary in such a case for society to coerce the individual: it will remain morally right for the individual to resist that coercion, and there are strict limits in the nature of things to the power of society or any external thing over the human will. And such a conflict between the individual and society will surprise the philosopher least of all men, for he recognizes the relative irrationality of social life, and knows that it is out of such conflicts that society is gradually brought to such perfection as it is capable of as a flexible instrument of human purpose.

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union of the finite and the infinite. It is because, and in so far as, the philosopher tests all things by the touchstone of eternity, sees the finite and temporal flood-lit and ghostly under the illumination of eternal values, that he is able to live easily, to keep his finite soul free in the transeuncy and wreckage of time, by setting his affections as far as may be on things that are eternal; not necessarily upon great and lofty objects of cosmic import, but even those simpler objects, more akin to the human heart and sense, which, though finite, yet hold their place firmly in a world viewed in its ordered hierarchy *sub quadam specie aeternitatis*.

GREAT THINKERS

(X) JOHN LOCKE

PROFESSOR R. I. AARON

LOCKE is the first English philosopher to be considered in this series, and that fact of itself is worthy of attention. Philosophy, of course, like science, knows no frontiers and no national boundaries. Yet it is true to say that Locke's contribution to philosophy is typically and peculiarly English. His moderation, his emphasis upon experience, his tolerant spirit of compromise, his dislike of mystical extravagance and of metaphysical speculation, even that elusive quality of his which people call his "common sense", are English traits. His very defects, illogicality leading to inconsistency and an awkward disorderliness of thought so abhorrent to the systematic thinker, are the defects which foreigners most frequently attribute to the English mind. Moreover, it is not so much a question of one or a few traits; the whole effect is English. Locke was, of course, influenced by non-English writers. No thinker appearing at the close of the seventeenth century could fail to be influenced by the new suggestions and new discoveries of that age of genius—least of all so attentive and receptive a thinker as John Locke. And many of these suggestions were made by Frenchmen and Dutchmen. None the less, it is still true to say that Locke is so English that it is difficult for one not steeped in English traditions to understand him. The remark of an eminent French philosopher that no Frenchman has ever understood John Locke and no Englishman Voltaire is doubtless an exaggeration, but it contains an element of truth. Locke is too English for the Gallic mind to comprehend. Yet for that reason, if for no other, he particularly deserves the attention of the English student.

I

The details of Locke's life need not long detain us. There is an excellent biography, written by Fox Bourne over sixty years ago, to which the reader may be referred. (Fox Bourne, however, is no longer authoritative. He made the best use of his materials and was very diligent in research, but unfortunately he failed to discover the most important batch of papers, namely, the Lovelace Collection. In this collection are all Locke's private papers, bequeathed to Peter King, the first Earl of Lovelace, and since retained in the

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family. Some of them were published in 1829 by Lord King in his biography of Locke, and Fox Bourne made good use of these; but many remain unpublished to this day. They will provide a fruitful source of information for the future biographer.)

Locke was born on August 29, 1632, at Wrington, Somerset, of a good Dorset and Somerset family. His father was a county attorney who fought on the Parliamentary side in the Civil War. The home was puritan, and although his later experiences broadened his outlook, the son never ceased to be puritan at heart. In 1646 he was sent to Westminster School. The education he received there, as he himself later tells us, was conceived on wrong lines, consisting almost entirely of interminable Greek and Latin exercises, but he did well enough in them to gain a junior studentship at Christ Church, Oxford, in 1652. Henceforth, for over thirty years he made Oxford his home. By 1652 the Puritans had taken over complete control of the university, although they wisely retained many of the Royalist teachers. But strangely enough they introduced little reform into the curriculum, much as it needed reforming. If Locke was dissatisfied with the training at Westminster he was still more dissatisfied with the rhetoric, grammar, logic, and moral philosophy of the university. None the less he persevered even to the point of becoming in due course tutor in Greek and rhetoric. Yet his real interest lay in different studies, in geometry, physics, and medicine. The Restoration of 1660 (which Locke at first welcomed) found him still uncertain as to what career to pursue. He was not anxious to remain a tutor at a college. Various other avenues opened out before him, the Church, diplomacy, and the profession of medicine. But he entered none of these. He continued to drift on at Oxford, a quiet student living a secluded life. Yet he was never idle. The private papers dating from this period reveal his industry and his ceaseless quest for a wider knowledge. He rapidly made himself one of the best-informed of all his contemporaries.

In 1666 an event occurred which changed the course of his life. He made the acquaintance of Lord Ashley, later the first Earl of Shaftesbury. Ashley interested himself in the young man and Locke soon became one of his advisers, living with him in his London home. The change from the seclusion of Oxford to the turmoil of affairs at the very centre of political life was a big one, but Locke applied himself with the same diligence to his new duties. They were varied in character—medical, domestic, and political. Locke carried out important missions for his patron and collected political and social information for his use. Meanwhile, he made many new friends in London who helped to mould his thoughts. The period from 1667 to 1675 is full of strenuous activity, so much so that his health suffered and he was compelled to take a prolonged rest of four

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years in France, where again he met many savants and philosophers. He returned to England in 1679, and throughout the troubled years which followed was the close associate and adviser of Shaftesbury. During the short periods in which Shaftesbury was in power Locke was given public offices, and when Shaftesbury finally failed in his purposes and had to flee to Holland, Locke followed him there in 1683. Here he found a peaceful retreat in which his health soon improved. He spent over five happy years in Holland in the company of many excellent new friends, and his enforced leisure enabled him to complete those philosophical works which he published shortly after his return to England.

The Revolution of 1688 brought victory to the cause for which Locke stood, and from his return in 1689 to his death he was regarded as the great prophet of the Whigs. He refused offers of important appointments, but served on various commissions. His indirect influence on affairs was very great, for many of his friends were well placed in the various administrations of William. These last years of his life were largely spent, however, in literary pursuits. His chief works may here be mentioned. In 1689 was published his *Letter on Toleration* (first published in Latin), followed by two further letters on the same theme in 1690 and 1692; the *Two Treatises on Civil Government* appeared in 1690; so also did his most famous work, the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*; the *Thoughts concerning Education* appeared in 1693; and finally in 1695 the *Reasonableness of Christianity* was published. Each of these works received much attention at the time of their publication, all of them gave occasion for discussion and controversy, and all were highly influential. They are the ripe fruit of a lifetime of reflection.

On his flight to Holland Locke had been deprived of his studentship at Christ Church, and when he returned he did not settle down again in Oxford. For some time he lived in London, but the London air did not suit him, and he retired to Oates, Essex, to the house of Lady Masham, the daughter of Richard Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist. It was at this pleasant retreat, in the care of this gentle lady, that Locke ended his days, October 28, 1704.

Locke was a wide reader, as the catalogue of his library in the Lovelace Collection and his journals show. He learnt much in conversation with men. Consequently it is impossible to give a complete list of the influences which worked upon him. But certain influences are more important than others and these should be noted. If one thinks of the *Essay*, the chief influences, undoubtedly, were Descartes, Sir Robert Boyle, and Gassendi. Descartes inspired him. He taught him that one might philosophize without philosophizing in the ways of the schools. He delivered him from the effete and arid scholasticism of the universities. But Locke regarded Descartes as an over-

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speculative and therefore unsound thinker. On most points he ranged himself with the opponents of Cartesianism. Sir Robert Boyle was a greater influence upon Locke. From him he learnt how to approach nature empirically and yet scientifically. Locke's physics is to all intents and purposes identical with Boyle's. His method is the latter's, the "historical, plain" method—even when he turns to the study of the mind. His outlook on life generally corresponds closely to that of Boyle, as is clear if the works of the two are compared. Certainly, Boyle was an important influence on Locke's development. But both men in turn were influenced by Gassendi (1592–1655). It is strange that the influence of Gassendi both on Locke and on English Empiricism has received so little attention. Here, undoubtedly, is a link—I would venture to say the most important link—between modern science in its beginnings in Boyle and Newton and the atomism of Greece. The empiricism of Locke is already present in Gassendi, and the criticisms which Locke makes of Descartes are almost always repetitions of criticisms already made by Gassendi. The people who stress Locke's rationalism regard him as "an English Descartes". If one must label him at all, it would be nearer the truth to call him "an English Gassendi". In the controversy that raged between Cartesians and Gassendists Locke was on the side of the Gassendists—a fact well known to the Europe of Leibniz's day. In forgetting it we have lost one important clue to the proper understanding of Locke's philosophy.

II

Locke's chief work is the *Essay*, and to it we propose to devote most of our attention. The study of it has been helped in this last decade by the discovery and publication of two early drafts of the *Essay*, written in 1671, nineteen years before the *Essay* itself was published, and of excerpts from Locke's journals between 1676 and 1688 bearing on the subject-matter of the *Essay*.¹ As we proceed we may be able to show some of the ways in which these drafts have proved useful.

The aim of the *Essay* is "to inquire into the original, certainty and extent of knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent." It seeks, first, to show the nature of knowledge in order to liberate men from false method; secondly, to establish the extent of human knowledge in order to save men from the scepticism which results when they attempt to know what lies

¹ *An Essay concerning the Understanding, Knowledge, Opinion and Assent*, ed. by Benjamin Rand, Harvard, 1931.

An Early Draft of Locke's Essay Together with Excerpts from his Journals, ed. by Aaron and Gibb, Oxford, 1936.

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wholly beyond their ken. Whether boundaries to human knowledge can thus be set up beforehand in a fixed, precise way is a question which Locke did not sufficiently consider. He obviously merely wished to determine in a rough, practical way the fields within which human endeavour was most likely to succeed in its quest for knowledge. It is also noteworthy that from the beginning a discussion of probability is part of his purpose.

Having stated his aims Locke proceeds at once in the *Essay* to an elaborate criticism of the theory of innate knowledge. It is interesting to note that the first draft (Draft A), does not begin with this criticism. The matter of innate knowledge is only introduced at the end of the draft, and then in a brief paragraph in which it is considered as a possible ground for objection to the thoroughgoing empiricism that had been set forth earlier in the work. But in preparing for the second draft, written a few months later, Locke came to the conclusion that innate knowledge required greater attention. He devotes to it thirteen sections at the opening of the draft, and in the *Essay* the discussion is still more elaborate. To understand the point of the polemic it is necessary to know the background. There is little doubt that minor writers, teachers, and preachers used this theory constantly in Locke's day. Man enjoys a mysterious, innate knowledge of God, of moral and of speculative principles. Locke's polemic cleared the air. Viewed from our own perspective, however, the polemic is a little tedious. It over-emphasizes the unimportant, the point about knowledge in the womb, and does not pay sufficient attention to what is of fundamental importance, the nature of *a priori* knowledge, if any such knowledge exists. Yet it is well to remember that Locke does give an answer to the fundamental question involved, although he does not discuss *a priori* knowledge in so many words. But he does hold that human knowledge can be explained in its entirety in terms of intuition, demonstration, and sensitive knowledge. This extra mystery, innate knowledge, is unnecessary.

Intuition, demonstration, and sensitive knowledge are described by Locke later. First he must establish another thesis which, in his opinion, is essential to his argument. This is the empiricist thesis that all knowledge depends ultimately on sense-experience or reflection (i.e. introspection) for its subject-matter, in other words, that whatever we think about is either given directly in sensation or reflection or else is derived in some way from what is so given. This is the main theme of Book II. In order to establish it he finds it necessary to carry out the complicated task of classifying and analysing ideas. For he believes that what we think about consists in ideas, and in order to show the empiricist origin of the object for thought it is necessary to show how all ideas come ultimately from

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sensation or reflection. This explains why his analyses of many ideas, such ideas, for instance, as 'space, time, number, and infinity, are frequently so inadequate. In the end all he wishes to show is that these ideas are either themselves given in sensation or reflection or derived from ideas so given. Frequently he goes beyond the minimum of analysis necessary for his main theme and discusses matters not strictly relevant. Indeed, a great part of Book II is slightly irrelevant in this way, although his irrelevancies contain some of his finest thoughts. But the purpose of Book II is to establish the view that the materials of knowledge are all empirical in their origin.

It is important to distinguish empiricism from certain other tenets with which it is confused. For instance, empiricism is not to be identified with sensationalism. Locke categorically denies the view that knowledge is sensation and that sensation is the only kind of knowledge. According to Book II sensation merely provides the *materials* for knowledge. It is in Book IV only that we begin to hear of sensitive knowledge as one kind of knowledge, and even then there are other and more important kinds. Empiricism is not sensationalism. Nor, again, should we identify Locke's empiricism with his "idea-ism" and representationalism. This is the garb in which Locke sets out his doctrine; the garb may be successfully criticized and yet the empiricism at its core remain untouched.

Locke used the term *idea* ambiguously. Sense-data are ideas. But so also are concepts or notions. The latter Locke holds to be meanings, but the former, sense-data, are very different. They are entities, having a representative capacity, existing not in the real physical world, for they represent what exists there, but in some semi-psychical realm between the mind and the object known. In a loose sense they are said to be "in the mind", a phrase which confused not only Locke but also Berkeley. *Mind* comes to mean two things, (1) the active percipient and (2) the place of ideas, and the two meanings are not compatible the one with the other.

Locke uses the term *idea* for "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks". In so far as the idea is the sense-datum he might, he acknowledges to Stillingfleet, have used the term *representation*. For he does accept the representationalist theory. That what we immediately perceive is merely a copy of the real object outside was the almost universally held opinion of Locke's day. Some doubted the perfection of the copy and Locke himself would not admit that our ideas of secondary qualities resembled those powers in things which produced them. Yet Locke accepts the representationalist and dualist view in general. His criticisms of the theory are from within. In the same way he accepted the compositionism of his day. Ideas are either simples or complexes, made up of such simples. It is true that this term *simple idea*

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was given many different meanings as Locke's thought developed. It is also true that in none of its forms was the classification of ideas according to simple and complex wholly successful. And it is highly significant that when he came to write the fourth edition Locke added a passage to II, xii, 1 which modified the basis of his division radically. II, xii, 1 in the fourth edition is Locke's last word on the problem. It teaches clearly that the compositional theory has been found to be unsatisfactory.

We must leave these matters undeveloped and merely repeat the central point, namely, that Locke's empiricism might be true even though his account of ideas, his representationalism, and his division of ideas into simple and complex were all shown to be defective. I remember listening to a lecturer devote a laborious term to the work of proving that Locke was a representationalist. Having then shown the defects of representationalism, he concluded triumphantly that he had completely refuted Locke. The fact was, of course, that what was most important in Locke's doctrine remained unconsidered by him.

III

The incidentals in Book II are so many and so important (in the light of their influence on subsequent English and European thought) that it is impossible to do justice to them here. We may point to a few of them in passing. There is first that subtle distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The ideas of secondary qualities have been given much consideration, but it may prove that the greatest significance attaches to what Locke tells us—or rather, perhaps, assumes—about the primary qualities. How do we know that these pertain to the *insensible* parts of matter? Clearly not by sensation. In searching for the primary qualities is he not analysing the concept of matter as used scientifically in his own day? If this is so, his account of primary qualities needs more attention than has been given to it. The whole discussion of primary and secondary qualities leaves us with three important conclusions: first, that secondary qualities are not what they appear; secondly, that ideas of primary qualities which necessarily pertain to matter are given in sense-experience; thirdly, that the primary qualities do pertain necessarily to all material existence (leaving it an open question whether "material existence", as the scientists of the seventeenth century conceived it, was real—as I believe Locke thought it to be—or merely a working hypothesis).

Again his treatment of the conceptions of space, time, number, and infinity is very revealing. In the *Essay* these are conceived modally. It will be recalled that ideas are divided into simple and complex, and the complex, again, into modes, substances, and

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relations. (I assume that the reader is acquainted with this division and do not propose to explain it.) In the case of space, something—although it is not clear what—is given in sensation. But any particular space is a simple mode. It is interesting to find from the drafts and the journals, however, that Locke first conceived space as a relation. Nevertheless, as the discussions of infinity in the draft and the accounts of space in the journals make clear, Locke came to see that it would be easier to prove the empirical origin of ideas of space and of infinity, of time, and of number, if they were regarded as simple modes, that is, as the outcome of the repetition of a simple idea. And since in the *Essay* the sole purpose is to show the empirical origin of these conceptions, he adopts this somewhat unnatural artifice. But in so far as one considers Locke's theory of space as such, the *Essay* is interesting rather from what it leaves unsaid than from what it says. Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible to understand his theory of space from the relevant passages in the *Essay* alone. With the aid of the journals, however, Locke's position becomes clearer and the opposition between him and Newton as to whether space is absolute or merely relative is revealed. In the light of this further knowledge the passages in the *Essay* take on a new meaning. But his treatment of these four concepts is very inadequate. He is content to show their empirical origin. Apart from these discussions little that he says about modes in Book II is important, but certain mixed modes become very important in Book III (although there it is very difficult to distinguish mixed modes from relations).

A concept that gave Locke a great deal of trouble was that of substance. It is the something-I-know-not-what which remains when one takes away from a complex idea of any substance all the qualities that pertain to it. But it is not known positively. We cannot but feel that some support for qualities is necessary, and we take any particular idea of substance to be a complex idea consisting of all the qualities perceived together with the further idea of that which holds them together. It is, however, no criticism of Locke's empiricism to say that we know substance although it is not given in experience, for Locke's point is that we do not know it in any positive way. It is a supposition arising from experience, although Locke cannot see on what experience it is grounded. May it, perhaps, be connected with the experience of togetherness which he recognizes? We do not merely perceive qualities, for instance, the redness, roundness, and hardness of the apple, but we perceive them, in Locke's words, as "going together". May not this be the empirical basis of the concept of substance? Locke himself is completely baffled by the concept. He almost wishes that there were, after all, innate ideas that he might explain it in that way.

The discussion of relations in the *Essay* is far from satisfactory.

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Practically all the major problems are left unconsidered, although hints are dropped from time to time which show that Locke was not unaware of many of them. The most important item under this head is causality, and no one who reads Locke on causality attentively and connects his statements with those of other contemporary writers such as Cordemoy and Malebranche, with whose theories Locke was well acquainted, will fall into the error of supposing that there was no problem of causality prior to Hume. Yet Locke's account of causality as of other relations is most incomplete.

Before leaving Book II a word should be added about Locke's treatment of the mind and of its operations. The drafts show that this was not a part of the original programme; but Locke must have felt that some account of ideas of reflection was necessary to complete his description of ideas. Accordingly he adds certain chapters in which are to be found the beginnings of modern psychology. His sources of information are introspection and the observation of behaviour, introspection being the main source. His discussions for the most part are crude, and interesting in the main to the historian of psychology only, but some of the points he makes (for instance, the distinction between mere sensation and perception involving judgment) are of the first importance. Moreover, he not only discusses the operations of the mind but also the mind itself, although his discussion in that particular is less psychological than metaphysical. His usual view was the orthodox, traditional one that mind is active, immaterial substance. But in IV, iii, 6 he made the bold and heretical suggestion that God may have superimposed the power of thinking upon matter in the case of the human being. Substantially man is material, but it is matter to which God has seen fit to add the power of thinking and perceiving. This materialist and Hobbist suggestion, making impossible, for instance, the traditional argument for the soul's immortality, later aroused a storm of controversy. More interesting, however, is the discussion about personal identity in II, xxvii. This chapter is, perhaps, the finest and closest piece of argument in the whole of the *Essay*.

IV

Book III and the opening half of Book IV, are the parts of the *Essay* which were written last. (The chapter on identity which we have just mentioned is still later, for it did not appear in the first but only in the second edition.) They also happen to be the most living parts of the *Essay*. The argument grows and develops as Locke writes. Book III is an essential propaedeutic to Book IV—how essential Locke had not at first realized. For it discusses words and language. Now the problem of words is the problem of the

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general word. And in describing the general word Locke is compelled to put forward a theory of universals which, though never free from ambiguity (largely because he fails to unravel the tangled skein of his own thought on this matter), yet enabled him to introduce the important distinction between real and nominal essences. It is this distinction in turn which makes possible the further distinction between the mathematical and the natural sciences and the all-important division of the sciences in the opening part of Book IV. The distinction between real and nominal essences is best understood in terms of our knowledge of substances in the external world. My idea of apple is a general idea, consisting of so many simple ideas, red, hard, sweet, and so on, together with the additional idea of substance. Now of these simple ideas I may choose a certain number as always present when I experience the apple and so regard them as essential. Here, then, is my essence—but it is merely a nominal essence. An apple, no doubt, has a real essence, in the mediaeval sense, but in its case the real essence is always hidden from me. For that reason my knowledge of physical objects and of the connections within and between them can never be certain. In the case of mathematics, however, the nominal essence of, for instance, the triangle is also its real essence. The definition of it as a three-sided rectilinear figure tells me not merely what I take it to be, that is, the nominal essence, but also what it essentially is. In Locke's language real and nominal essences are identical in the case of the mathematical idea, since it refers to nothing beyond itself, as does my idea of the apple, but is "its own archetype".

But it is not only this discussion of universals and of nominal and real essences which makes Book III important. It contains also a close analysis of language and an examination of its imperfections, together with suggestions how these might best be avoided. Locke identified logic with *σημειωτική*, the doctrine of signs, particularly those signs which are words, and in Book III we find the beginning in English philosophy of that close logical analysis of language with which we have since become so familiar. Again, Locke's account of definition deserves to be mentioned both for its penetration and for its striking modernity.

We must, however, hurry forward to Book IV. Here at last Locke comes to grips with his main problem, that as to the nature and extent of knowledge. The drafts once again prove to be exceedingly useful. Draft A, in particular, helps us to understand how Locke came to say such (apparently) contradictory things about knowledge in Book IV. The reader will find one theory of knowledge in IV, i and ii, the theory usually attributed to Locke, and another very different one in IV, ix and xi. The mystery, however, becomes somewhat less of a mystery if we follow the argument of Draft A.

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For there we also find these two theories, although now in the reverse order, and it is possible to see how the change from one view of knowledge to the other takes place. Locke began with the common-sense view that knowledge is the apprehension of real existent things. I know this table and this chair. But he also found himself accepting the current representationalism and coming to the conclusion that ~~since~~ I only know things through ideas I can never be quite sure that I do know the thing as it is. Very soon in the draft we find him having to admit that he cannot find any instance of certain knowledge in this sense of the term. To save himself from scepticism, he is driven to view knowledge from another angle. Can we find certainty if we confine ourselves to ideas and do not seek to go beyond them? The answer of the draft is not clear. But the *Essay* is quite explicit. Knowledge, says IV, i, is "nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas." And the example Locke has in mind in the opening chapters is mathematical knowledge. There we are concerned merely with ideas whose nominal essence is their real essence, and there is no limit to the knowledge possible.

He seems to have taken his account of knowledge in IV, ii largely from Descartes's *Regulae*. (Descartes, it will be remembered, also had mathematics in mind in setting forward his theory of knowledge.) Knowledge is either intuitive or demonstrative. Intuition is completely infallible and so wholly certain. Demonstration is also certain for it consists of a series of intuitions, but some shade of doubt may enter if we recall that it sometimes involves memory, a fallible faculty. So far Locke accepts Descartes's doctrine, and the resemblance between Descartes's *Regulae* and IV, ii of the *Essay* is very marked. But he does not agree with him as to the further point that the perception or intuition is of a purely intellectual object, a "simple nature." On the contrary, Locke holds that the intuition is of relations between ideas and that these ideas are empirically derived. Thus he accepts Descartes's intuitionism but does not give up his own empiricism. The opening chapters of Book IV do not contradict Book II.

Having set out the nature of human knowledge in the first two chapters, in the third he proceeds to consider its limitations. We are limited in the first place by experience itself; where we have no ideas we cannot have knowledge. Secondly, when experience provides us with ideas we cannot always intuit necessary relations between them. We can always know that an idea is identical with itself and that it is not another. We can also know necessary relations between ideas, if we can once identify nominal and real essences, that is, rid the ideas of any reference outwards and deal with them as ideas which are their own archetypes. This we have succeeded in doing

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in the case of mathematics, (Locke thinks that morals might make another instance.) There is then no limit to the knowledge we may attain in inquiries of this sort. But when we consider ideas as representing the external world the mind can know few, if any, necessary relations between them. No science (in the strict sense), no system of certain knowledge, of the natural world, nor again of human nature, is possible for us. In these spheres the human mind must perforce wait upon experience, and the utmost it can hope for is the probable inductively-established generalization.

Such, very briefly, is the account of knowledge outlined in the opening chapters of Book IV. But Locke cannot leave it as it stands. To IV, ii he adds that halting fourteenth section. We have sensitive knowledge of the existence of things. Such knowledge is certainly not a perception of a relation between two ideas. The defect of the theory of knowledge which Locke has set down in IV, i and ii is immediately revealed. It cannot account for existential knowledge. In IV, iv he tries to account for it within the framework of the epistemology of the first two chapters, but fails lamentably. In IV, ix and xi we find him returning to the first view of Draft A. We know our own existence and the existence of things directly. These chapters set forward, largely by implication, a new account of knowledge and Locke does not try to make it consistent with the first. He leaves both side by side without attempting a final synthesis. (A question which arises in connection with existential knowledge is this: Does its assertion contradict Locke's empiricism? It certainly contradicts the view that the materials of knowledge are always *ideas*. But Locke in reflecting on existential knowledge may have thought that it itself was part of experience. Experience need not be confined to the gaining of ideas, that is, to the seeing of colours, the hearing of sounds, and so on. The conviction or knowledge that this table before me exists may also be part of my experience. In that case the empiricism would still stand, although Locke's "idealism" could not be maintained.)

The remaining chapters of the *Essay* are devoted to the consideration of probability, of judgment, faith, and reason. Unfortunately, I have no space here in which to discuss them.

V

Nor have I left myself sufficient space in which to consider Locke's views on matters other than those referred to above. His moral theory is largely unwritten. From what he does say it is clear that no satisfactory work on ethics could be written by him until he had resolved the inner conflict in his thoughts between hedonism and rationalism. His account of Christian theology in the *Reasonableness of Christianity* is highly interesting as revealing the liberal point

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of view in the theological speculation of the late seventeenth century. His *Letters on Toleration* argue that, from its very nature, no church has the right to persecute non-members and no secular power has the right to punish in its name. *Some Thoughts concerning Education* is an admirable work. It reads best of all Locke's works, and its suggestions are eminently sane. But in this article I cannot consider any of these works in detail.

Apart from the *Essay* Locke's most important work is the *Two Treatises on Civil Government*. Locke here rejects two theories of government (1) that the monarch is absolute since he is the divinely ordained father of his people, (2) that the monarch is absolute since government is only possible where sovereignty lies undivided in the hands of one person. He easily overthrows the first view. The relation of monarch to people in a modern state is not comparable with that of father to child. But the second is not so easy to overthrow. Locke's task is to show that a strong government is possible in which the people shall yet be free. Moreover, he wishes to prove that, from the nature of civil society, government with the consent of the governed is not only possible but is also the sole form of government which is rationally justifiable.

Prior to the civil state is the state of nature in which all men were free and equal. Men were rational and regulated their conduct by the law of nature. They possessed powers of punishing other individuals who broke that law. The state of nature was a state of peace, but since men were not perfect, it was a state of precarious peace. A man might forget the law of nature, another might be hasty in judging and so might inflict punishment upon the innocent. Accordingly, men agreed to live together in a civil community, giving up to the state this one right of judging and punishing, and gaining in return a security which they had not known in the state of nature.

This picturesque theory is nowadays rejected in most of its details. But the essential point of the argument remains. If civil society is contractual, even though only implicitly, then the people are not powerless puppets in the hands of the ruler or rulers, but have rights of their own. Absolutism is unjustifiable. Government is a trust. When Locke proceeds to work out the details of the new constitution which shall safeguard the rights of the people and yet give strong government, the difficulties in his way prove to be very many. In particular his constitution lacks any explicit sovereign. In spite of its defects, however, the *Civil Government* is of first-rate importance. It gathers up into itself all that is living and vital in seventeenth-century radical thought, and its principles, it is not too much to say, have dominated liberal thought from that day to this.

In concluding this article a word should be added about the value of Locke's works. Undoubtedly he is still a considerable

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influence on the thought of this country. His political reflections count with us, though official liberalism is under a cloud. Mr. J. M. Keynes in a recently published work suggests that we still have something to learn from Locke's economic theories—I have not found space in which even to mention these. In education his views have long since been accepted in theory, but in practice we yet fall short of the ideal which he set before us. What of the *Essay*? Is it by this time out of date? Many interpretations of it are certainly out of date. Few books have been more misread. Its teaching has been distorted by historians of philosophy who were only interested in the way Locke influenced Berkeley and Hume, by sensationalists or critics of sensationalism who only studied a few pages of Book II, and by rationalists or critics of rationalism who were blind to everything in Locke except those points in which his position resembled that of Descartes. But the *Essay*, fortunately, survives such false interpretations. If one forgets the critics and turns to the *Essay* itself one finds it a deep well of living thought. Amongst its most valuable contributions we might select the discussion of personal identity, the emphasis on logical analysis, the account of definition, the highly important division of the sciences, and, finally, the belief that all knowledge is acquired, the inner core of his empiricism. And this list certainly does not exhaust the treasures which the *Essay*'s pages contain.

The greatness of Locke it must be admitted does not lie in his thoroughness, in his logicity, or in his consistency. He was not an eminently original writer. He was peculiarly sensitive to the intellectual movements of his day, and was eclectic in the best sense. He gathered into his works the more important findings of his own brilliant age. Throughout he was critical. The charlatan and the sham found in him an uncompromising enemy. He was extremely honest, even to the point of preferring honesty to consistency. He avoided the *high priori* methods of brilliant speculators, for such brilliance might lead one away from the truth. He was cautious in the extreme. He never forgot that reason in man has its limitations. He would not rashly pass to a conclusion because some one line of thought pointed that way. He did not distrust reason, but he wished to be sure first that he had the full evidence before him. Behind this attitude of caution and extreme prudence is an austere philosophy of life. Man is not meant to know everything. His is "a twilight state" and there are limits to what he can see. But he sees enough to find his way if he but use his eyes properly. Locke's greatness lies in this prudence, this wisdom, arising out of his insight into man's nature. Voltaire hardly ever refers to him except as "le sage Locke"—a fact which seems to prove that one Frenchman at least understood the key to his greatness.

SOME POINTS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE

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THE more elementary student used to be left with four main impressions of Locke. Firstly, he was an "empiricist"; secondly, he occupied an inconsistent intermediate position on the road to Berkeley and Hume; thirdly, he was pre-eminently the philosopher of common sense; fourthly, he committed the epistemological error of teaching that our only objects of knowledge were ideas in our mind which copied reality. All these dicta contain an important element of truth, but are misleading by reason of the excessive emphasis which has been placed upon them.

To take the first point, when we decide whether to call Locke an empiricist or not, we are confronted with the difficulty of defining the latter term. It is commonly defined in opposition to a *priori*, and I think the usual meaning of a *priori* is approximately rendered by saying that a *priori* propositions and inferences are propositions and inferences which are logically necessary. This is at any rate the sense in which I shall use the term a *priori* in this article. Now, if "empiricist" means somebody who denies the possibility of any a *priori* knowledge, Locke was certainly not an empiricist, but then it would be difficult to find any important philosopher who was. A promising definition of "empiricist" would be "somebody who denies, not all a *priori* knowledge, but all *synthetic a priori* knowledge," but in that case we seem to have the curious result that according to this definition the rationalists prior to Kant were empiricists, and Locke¹ and probably even Hume were not. Nor did Locke, like Hume, confine all such knowledge to our own ideas, at least in practice. Perhaps the chief reason why Locke is called an empiricist is because he denied innate ideas, but the difficulty is to discover any philosopher who would really have accepted them in the sense in which they are denied by Locke. However, I think that the only satisfactory course is to treat empiricism as a relative term applicable to those philosophers who lay special stress on the empirical side of our knowledge as opposed to "rationalists," who lay special stress on the a *priori* without attempting to define precisely where empiricism ends and rationalism begins, any more than we can define precisely in politics where, e.g., conservatism ends

¹ *Essay*, Bk. IV, Ch. 8.

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and liberalism begins. In that case Locke is, I suppose, an empiricist when judged by the standards of his own time, i.e. he laid more stress on the empirical element in knowledge than did most of his contemporaries, but on the other hand, if he were alive now and had produced a philosophy of the type which he did produce he could not reasonably have been called an empiricist, but rather the reverse, since, though he is not fond of the phrase *a priori*, he gave a more important place to the *a priori* in effect than do the majority of philosophers of the present day. For he held that ethics was or, rather, could become an *a priori* science like mathematics; he insisted against the rationalists of the time themselves, as I think, rightly, that synthetic *a priori* judgments were possible and indeed the only *a priori* judgments which were of much use; he claimed to establish the existence of God by a *a priori* metaphysical argument; he insisted that *a priori* knowledge was not limited to mathematics, but might conceivably occur with any kind of quality or relation. He even asserted that *all* knowledge was *a priori* in the sense defined above, a very extreme position, when he said that "knowledge seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas,"¹ for this means *logical* connexion, etc., but the statement is inconsistent with his admission of intuitive knowledge of the self, or indeed with any introspective knowledge of our own states, which Locke certainly meant to admit, let alone with the "sensitive" knowledge of physical objects asserted by him. Its exclusive wording must therefore be regarded as due to a "slip" on Locke's part. The non-empirical elements in Locke's philosophy have been very well brought out by Professor Gibson and others, so I need not dwell further on this point.

Locke's polemic against innate ideas is evidently regarded by himself as at once very important and very heterodox. In practice, however, it is almost entirely a polemic, no doubt valuable enough, against the confused use of certain vague words. His main object of attack was not really the theory that new-born babies had an innate conscious knowledge of the law of non-contradiction and other *a priori* principles, a view which perhaps nobody was ever silly enough to hold. What he is contending, I think, is that the theory of innate ideas, commonly accepted at the time, is not capable of any clear statement which does not make it *either* an absurdity *or* a commonplace tautology that everybody would have accepted. If the philosophers who talk of innate ideas really mean what they say, he contends, then, the absurd conclusions about new-born babies really follow, for babies are alleged to have the ideas in question, since these are innate, and they must be aware of the ideas if they

¹ IV, I, 2.

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have them, for an "unconscious idea" is a contradiction in terms; if the philosophers do not mean this, they must mean by "having an idea of x " having the "capacity to come to know x eventually," and in that case all our knowledge is innate, for we can have no knowledge which we have not a capacity to come to have. The theory of innate ideas could only seem at once tenable and useful because the word idea was used without anyone being clear what was meant by it. In order to give point to Locke's criticism we need not suppose that any important philosophers held the absurd view criticized by Locke, but only that they held views which, if thought out consistently, implied it. And it is now a commonplace that Locke's denial of innate ideas was combined with a whole-hearted acceptance of *a priori* knowledge. For, even though no ideas are innate, we may still have *a priori* knowledge provided one idea can imply (logically entail) another.

Locke, however, does not succeed in refuting the possible view that some ideas might be innate in the sense that our minds were so constituted as inevitably to form the ideas at a certain stage of our development, or *on the occasion* of certain experiences without the characteristics of which they were ideas ever being actually given in experience. In that case neither should we be conscious of the ideas from birth, nor would it have to be admitted that the word innate was being used in a sense in which all our ideas are innate, so that the dilemma mentioned by Locke would not arise, though it must be granted that it is an abuse of language to call an idea innate when only the capacity to form it is innate. Again Locke overlooks the possibility that there might be "simple ideas" which were neither innate nor derived from sensation and reflection (which term, as used by Locke, is practically equivalent to introspection), but stood for objective characteristics discovered by a mode of cognition other than empirical observation (Professor Broad's "non-perceptual intuition").

Locke has been charged with inconsistency because he asserted that all ideas were derived from empirical observation, i.e. either sensation or "reflection," and yet admitted the ideas of substance and cause which could not be so derived. But I do not think he is without a defence; he is not so crude as some take him to be. Now in two passages² Locke derives the idea of cause from observation of external objects, but this is obviously a very difficult position. I fear that Locke confused observation of succession with observation of causation. But the most important source of the idea of causation, and indeed the only source of the idea of *active* causing, was for him observation of the will, so that in its clearest form causation was

¹ The word idea is, of course, very ambiguous. I discuss the meaning of this term on top of p. 36 to end of article.

² II, 7, 8; 26, 1.

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an idea of reflection. Now it is certainly easier to suppose that we observe causation in ourselves than that we observe it in the external world, and it is a position that has been and still is widely held. Even if he had held that the idea of causation was derived from reflection alone Locke would have been justified in extending it to the external world on his premisses, since he believed that it was self-evident that every change must have a cause. There is no absurdity in supposing that we can see *a priori* that a certain characteristic *a* (causal activity), which is in fact observed by us only in minds, is entailed by another characteristic *b* (change) which we have observed in physical objects as well as in minds, and therefore concluding that *a* as well as *b* is present in all cases of physical, as well as psychological, change, although it cannot be observed by us there. Such a view is not inconsistent, whether it be true or not; and the same characteristic of causal activity might well be present both in entities which exercised will and entities which could not do so. Locke, however, does feel doubtful whether physical objects can be regarded as in the fullest sense causes, because we have no evidence that a physical thing can initiate motion, but only that it can receive it from something else, namely, another moving body, and so on till we reach the ultimate cause, God. Locke's alleged circular proof that everything which has a beginning has a cause by means of the argument that something cannot be caused by nothing¹ is not, I think, really intended as a *proof* of causation at all, but as an appeal to the established principle of causation (said to be itself "known by an *intuitive* certainty") in order to prove the existence of a first cause.

"Substance" presents more difficulty. There can be no doubt that Locke believed in substances despite his inclination to ridicule the emptiness of the conception, and that he differentiated a substance sharply from its qualities, and it is further clear that substance, at least as described by Locke, cannot possibly be an idea which is given in empirical observation. But Locke has a reply to this very obvious objection, which appears in the controversy with Bishop Stillingfleet. The latter says, "If the idea of substance be grounded upon plain and evident reason, then we must allow an idea of substance which comes not in by sensation or reflection; and so we may be certain of something which we have not by these ideas." Locke replies,² firstly, that substance is a general idea, and that he had always maintained that "general ideas come not into the mind by sensation or reflection, but are the creatures or inventions of the understanding." But this, as he quite realizes, is not a sufficient answer, for he also held that general ideas were derived by abstraction from what was *given* in experience, and could not be created

¹ *Essay*, IV, 10, 3.

² *Vide* Locke's First and Third Letters.

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out of material which had never been so given, and it remains difficult to see how substance, or any ideas of which it could be a generalization or combination, could be so given. By Locke's very definition the idea of substance could not consist of ideas given in experience, for any such ideas would be ideas of qualities, and substance is not a quality or combination of qualities. But he now propounds an analysis of the idea of substance which avoids this difficulty. The abstract idea of substance is said by him to consist of two elements. (a) There is the relation of inherence which is conceived as holding between any substance and its particular qualities. Now relations are, according to Locke's philosophy, in quite a different position from simple qualities. For Locke holds that the former are not given in experience as such, but "that the mind could *frame to itself* ideas of relation," though these must "terminate" in *given* simple ideas. He is not therefore committed to holding that this "inherence" is anything sensible, as he would have been if he had held the same view of relations as of qualities (including under "sensible" data of the inner sense), only that it is seen by the mind on examination to be somehow involved in data which are sensible in this wider signification. For, though he leaves his view of relations vague, he certainly does not hold that relations are merely the creation of the mind, but insists that they have "a foundation" in reality. And he thinks that on considering the nature of qualities we can see that they cannot subsist by themselves, but must stand in a relation of inherence to something which is not itself a quality. This is to admit *a priori* knowledge, as Locke always does, but not to admit a new simple idea undervived from experience or a relation not entailed by empirical data.

(b) Because a relation implies a second term, we cannot help supposing that, since all qualities stand in a relation of inherence, there must be something else to which they are related. But we can have no idea of the second term of the relation except the general one of "something or other." We suppose that there must be a second term to stand in the relation, but we do not know anything about it. The reason Locke gives for the belief in substance is that we cannot conceive how qualities should subsist alone, we see this to be impossible, and must therefore posit something other than a quality on which they depend. Now it is certainly not self-contradictory to suppose that we might be able to see that *abc* (qualities) could not exist by themselves without knowing what the other term *d* is which is required if they are to exist, and I cannot see anything here logically impossible in Locke's position or inconsistent with his view that all qualities are abstractions from what is given in experience, though I certainly do not think his view of substance a sound or plausible one. What is given in experience *might* always

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logically entail something other than itself, and we *might* be able to see that the entailment held, though we could say nothing about the nature of what was entailed except that it was something or other not itself a quality or collection of qualities. Locke had, however, asserted that relation always "consists in the referring or comparing two things one to another,"¹ and it may well be asked, how we could possibly compare two things if we did not know anything whatever about one of them. Hence his view of substance seems inconsistent with his view of relation. It is also not clear how the general idea of "something or other" originates, but I suppose Locke would regard it as that which all ideas of sensation and reflection have in common. In that case it would be an abstraction from experience applied to things (substances) which we had reason to suppose existed, but which were not direct objects of experience.

Locke holds both that we can reason *a priori*, and that all our ideas are derived from empirical observation. Are the two positions in general compatible? There is one fairly obvious objection against Locke's view that I have never seen stated, as far as I remember, namely, that if we can reason *a priori* at all we must have an idea of entailment, i.e. of the relation by which a conclusion logically follows from its premises, and that the idea of entailment itself is one which cannot possibly be derived from empirical observation. If the objection had been made to Locke he could, however, no doubt have answered it by saying that entailment was not a simple idea but a relation, as he did in the similar case of inherence, and that an idea of a relation need not be given in empirical observation. He could have added that the idea is only formed late in life, if at all, since we can argue without thinking of the relation of entailment as such; but all the same it is a great pity that he did not give a fuller and clear account of his view of ideas of relation. Certainly, if we can form ideas of relations that are not given, but only implied by experience, the assertion that all our simple ideas are given by sensation and reflection loses almost all its sting, and we have less justification than ever for calling Locke an empiricist.

The main reason why Locke was regarded as an empiricist is perhaps because he happened to have successors who developed his philosophy in an empiricist direction. Had he had successors who developed it in a rationalist direction, he might have been called a rationalist. But, just as critics no longer treat Kant as merely a stepping-stone to Hegel, so they are now less inclined to treat Locke as a mere stepping-stone to Berkeley and Hume: and this is a great gain, for such treatment prevented the adequate consideration of his philosophy on its own merits. As it was, critics

¹ *Essay*, II, 25, 5.

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who liked Berkeley or Hume tended almost to confine their account of Locke to blaming him for not having been consistent in carrying out the principles which led to his successors' doctrines, and critics who disliked them to blaming him for having originally committed the errors which ultimately led to such pernicious results. I admit that Locke was often inconsistent, but I very much doubt whether he was more inconsistent than Hume, though the inconsistencies the two commit are different. And I certainly think it very unfair to attach special blame to Locke for not having anticipated Berkeley's revolutionary discovery and seen the full strength of the case for the idealist view of the physical world, or whatever one calls the type of philosophy introduced by Berkeley. No doubt Locke would have an additional achievement to his credit if he had seen how good a case could be made out for it on certain lines, but to blame him specially for not doing so is like blaming specially a particular engineer of 1800 because he did not think of inventing a railway engine. This remark holds whether we substantially agree or disagree with Berkeley's treatment of the physical world. In either case we must admit that to work out such a novel and, later, enormously influential philosophy so plausibly was a great achievement, but in either case we must refuse to attach any special blame to Locke for not having anticipated this stroke of genius. If we must blame somebody, we should blame not Locke specially, but practically all the philosophers prior to Berkeley's time, for none of them saw the strength of the case against realism. (Locke certainly saw that some sort of case could be made out for idealism, but thought it too absurd to be worth serious consideration, and dismissed it on the strength of some rather superficial arguments.)

As I said earlier, Locke has been described as *par excellence* a philosopher of common sense. "Common sense" as a quality of mind Locke certainly possessed, but if this statement is more than an appraisal of Locke's personal qualities, and is meant to refer to the content of his philosophy, it is necessary nowadays to remember that there are different senses in which a philosopher can be said to be in accord with common sense. Thus the type of philosophy advocated by Professor Moore has often been called a philosophy of common sense, because he insists that the philosopher must, independently of philosophical argument, accept as absolutely true such statements as "there is a table in my study," "the table I see is the same as the one you see," etc. But, while Professor Moore accepts common sense so far as to take for granted without argument the truth of some such propositions, he insists that it is the business of the philosopher to analyse them, and that the correct analysis may be quite different from any that would ever have occurred to the plain man prior to the study of philosophy. But

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something rather different from this is meant when Locke is called a common-sense philosopher. It was not only that Locke accepted without argument the truth of common-sense beliefs about everyday matters, but also that he was inclined thus to accept the truth of common-sense beliefs about *philosophical subjects*. By common-sense beliefs here I mean those beliefs which men who have not previously made any special study of philosophy usually hold, or would hold if they were stated to them in words which they could understand. At any rate, this is what is usually meant by calling his a philosophy of common sense. In so far as Locke took this line he is open to a criticism which would not affect Professor Moore. For, while it may very reasonably be contended that a philosopher *qua* philosopher cannot legitimately contradict common-sense beliefs on subjects where he is no more entitled to speak than the plain man, as is the case if he denies, e.g., the truth of the proposition that Cambridge is north of London, or that it is fine here now, it is not by any means clear why the philosopher should attach great weight to the opinions of common sense on questions which fall within philosophy. "The opinions of common sense" here means "the opinions of those who have not studied philosophy," and why, it may be fairly asked, should experts in any field bow to the opinions of those who know next to nothing about their subject? This would only be a reasonable course if the study of philosophy instead of improving impaired our capacity for making right philosophical judgments, and if so why study it since we could be better philosophers without doing so? Locke would, however, reply that there are some things within the field of philosophy which we all know intuitively prior to any philosophical study, and that this must not be overlooked by the philosophers. And there *may* well be some common-sense philosophical beliefs (whether they rise to the level of *knowledge* or not) of which we cannot get rid, even after having studied them philosophically and seen their difficulties, and this continued intuitive conviction *may* justify their acceptance as truths about reality. But in anycase I think this tendency in Locke has been much exaggerated. He accepted the common-sense belief in causation and the common-sense belief in physical objects in a realist sense, but so did everybody in his day, and he does not hesitate consciously to disagree with what he thinks the common-sense view to be about secondary qualities. His belief in substance as an unknowable substratum quite separate from its qualities is also instanced in this connection, but is this "common sense"? However, we must admit that Locke at least thought it was. But besides the three cases just mentioned it is by no means easy to find other important instances where Locke is influenced by "common-sense opinion" rather than by philosophical arguments.

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Locke did not anticipate the present-day "Cambridge school" by distinguishing between knowing a common-sense proposition and knowing the analysis of it, so that to accept common-sense statements, whether about philosophical or about everyday subjects, was for him to accept them in what seemed at first sight to be their most obvious meaning. We are certainly not justified in concluding that what seems the most obvious way of analysis is therefore necessarily wrong, but neither are we justified in assuming without further discussion that it is necessarily right. We may note, however, that in one case Locke declares that our common-sense statements are true only in a sense other than that in which the man in the street would think them true. This is in the case of secondary qualities. Locke asserts expressly both on the one hand that men generally, i.e. till schooled in philosophy or science, think that the actual colour they see qualifies physical objects, and on the other that it does not really qualify them, but that physical objects are coloured only in the sense that they produce sensations of colour when we look at them. So common-sense statements about colour are according to Locke only true if the word which stands for the colour of the object is taken as signifying not the sensible quality seen, but the causal property (power) of the physical object to produce in us under suitable conditions the perception of that sensible quality.¹

Let us turn now to the fourth "stock examination answer" about Locke mentioned at the beginning of this article, and refer to his view that our only immediate objects of knowledge are our own ideas. Locke begins the fourth book of the *Essay* with this highly shocking statement: "Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no more immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them."² What does this mean? If taken literally it would seem to imply that we can know nothing about either physical objects or minds other than our own, or even about ourselves, for neither physical objects nor other minds nor ourselves are merely ideas of ours. However a new light is thrown on the statement if we realize that what Locke is considering here is a *priori* knowledge. In fact the definition he gives of knowledge in the next sentence as "the perception of the connexion and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas" is applicable only to a *priori* knowledge, since Locke is thinking here of logical connection, and not to knowledge derived from empirical observation, which kind of knowledge he seems to have forgotten in formulating his definition. And we find from its application that the purpose of this doctrine is not to assert a representative theory of knowledge

¹ II, 8, 24.

² IV, I, I.

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of existent objects, but to lay down a non-existential theory of *a priori* knowledge. For, though our ideas are existents according to Locke, it is not as existents that we thus perceive them to agree or disagree, but as qualities.¹ Locke is in fact giving a first imperfect formulation of the generally accepted modern doctrine that all *a priori* propositions are hypotheticalal, and can only be applied to existents if conjoined with an existential premiss established empirically, or something very like the doctrine in question. Whether he could have worked this conception out adequately while retaining his view of ideas as existents is another matter.

As regards knowledge of physical objects, Locke certainly held that we can *perceive* immediately only our own ideas, but it does not follow that we can *know* only our own ideas. Locke admits that we can know what we do not perceive immediately, i.e. the existence of physical objects, though he also admits that the certainty of this kind of "knowledge," "sensitive knowledge," is not quite absolute, so that it is "knowledge" only by courtesy, though its certainty is held by him to surpass mere probability.² He no doubt regards it as being as near certainty as does almost any modern realist philosopher. Locke also holds that we can know ourselves immediately without the intervention of any idea, though it is not quite clear whether he means to apply this only to knowledge of our existence, or also to knowledge of our particular present and past states through introspection and memory. Knowledge of or belief in the existence of other minds than our own he does not discuss. What Locke has maintained is not that we can only know our own ideas, but that we can only know the agreements or disagreements of our ideas, and he is enabled, verbally at least, to leave a place for knowledge of real objects other than ideas by including under the term agreement not only agreement between ideas, but agreement between an idea and real existence.³ I suppose, however, he would have held that we do not know the external reality *in the same sense* as we know connections of ideas, and he would certainly have held that we could not know it at all without the mediating help of ideas. But it does not follow from this that, when we have this mediating help, we do not really know the external object itself, but only our ideas.

There is no doubt, I suppose, that Locke held ideas to be mind-dependent, existent particulars. He did not, I think, ever mean to identify them with states of our mind or acts of awareness, but consistently regarded them as *objects* of the latter, though not as objects which could exist without our being aware of them. Their relation to images is very obscure. The term idea as used by Locke

¹ Locke often confuses an idea of a quality with the quality of which it is an idea.

² IV, 2, 14.

³ IV, 1, 7.

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is clearly wider than image, i.e. all ideas are not images, but he may have thought of images as a species of ideas, i.e. perhaps all images are ideas. Ideas seem to be for him entities which are capable of bearing the same kind of relation to all kinds of objects as images do to some. Now the objection arises that there is no evidence whatever for the existence of any such entities excepting images. We know by empirical observation of ourselves that acts of awareness exist, and that images exist, but we have no empirical evidence whatever for these mysterious third things, ideas, other than images, if we regard them as existents at all.

But this opens up another possibility. For Locke ideas are often component parts, or constituents, of propositions, and if we treat them in this way we shall have an account of them which agrees with most of what Locke says, and clears up many difficulties. I am here using the term "proposition" to signify what is meant by a statement, in distinction both from the verbal statement itself and the fact, if any, to which it refers. Propositions can (and must) be either true or false, while facts cannot be either and statements can only be so in the derivative sense of expressing true or false propositions. Locke distinguishes "verbal" and "mental" propositions. According to him they both consist in the "joining or separating of signs," only in the case of mental propositions the signs are ideas, not words. Verbal propositions normally stand for mental propositions, and in the case of *true* mental propositions the ideas constituting the proposition are "so put together or separated in the mind as they or the things they stand for do agree or not."¹ In what follows I shall be speaking only of "mental" not of "verbal" propositions, for the constituents of verbal propositions would obviously be not ideas but words. I had better add that I do not by any means approve the *ipsissima verba* of Locke's account of propositions.

Now we need not think of propositions as independent subsistent entities, as Meinong did, but it is clear that, whether we regard propositions as such independent entities or not, we must recognize some sense in which they can be considered in abstraction from the fact that any particular person is knowing, believing, asserting, doubting, or entertaining them. We are constantly thus considering them in logic, in science, and also in everyday life. We do not call them propositions in everyday language, but everyone is familiar enough with the thing if not the name. Whenever we discuss the question whether a "belief" or "assertion" is true or false, we are discussing the truth or falsity of the *proposition* believed or asserted, so that the idlest gossip deals with propositions as well as the subtlest philosopher. But all this need not necessarily imply that propo-

¹ *Essay*, IV, 5.

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sitions have a being independent of being thought, only that they can, as is undoubtedly the case, be considered in abstraction from any particular thought. Locke, however, returns no clear answer to the question what propositions are. It seems clear that neither they nor their constituents can be regarded as *existing*. Either they are separate entities which have being but not existence, or, as seems more reasonable to my mind, they are merely elements in acts of judging, doubting, etc., which can be treated separately only by abstraction, and therefore (like other universals) still cannot be said to be existents. The proposition "that the sun goes round the earth," or "that justice is better than injustice," is not an existent, nor is it made up of existents (even if, as in the first case at least, it is only about existents). Yet for Locke certainly ideas are existents.

I should thus suggest that Locke in thinking and writing about ideas usually really treated them as if they were constituents of propositions, but did not think fit to raise the question of their exact status, nor realize the problems involved in this inquiry. It did not occur to him that he was committing himself to the introduction of a class of non-existent entities by separating ideas both from images and acts of mind, and by treating them as logical contents, to use Professor Gibson's expression. I have called ideas "constituents of propositions" not "propositions," because Locke takes as examples of ideas, e.g. space, solidity, colours, numbers, horse, etc., and it is obvious that none of these could constitute a proposition by itself, while any might occur in various propositions as subject or predicate, or part of the subject or predicate, as is the case when, e.g., an adjective standing for a certain quality is attached to a noun so as to constitute together the verbal expression of the subject or predicate.

There are various points in Locke's account which seem most inconsistent and irrational at first sight, but are rendered intelligible if we look upon "ideas" in the way just suggested. In particular it is as constituents of propositions and not as existent particulars that ideas can be said to have a logical connection the perception of which constitutes *a priori* knowledge. "When he looked into his mind, 'to see how it wrought,' Locke neither looked for nor found a mere flow of subjective processes, but a variety of logical contents, essentially involving a reference beyond the momentary state of consciousness in which they are apprehended; and from this reference he never attempted to abstract. It never even occurred to him to treat our cognitive consciousness exclusively, or even primarily, from the point of view of subjective process. . . . The 'natural' connections of ideas were those non-temporal relations of content, the perception of which constitutes scientific or universal know-

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ledge."¹ It is a very curious fact that, while Locke affirmed that all ideas were particular, in the list of ideas given by him every one mentioned is a universal. He does not speak of, e.g., solidity as a kind of idea of which there are as many particular instances as there are ideas of particular solid objects, but as an (a single) idea.

✂ If we take "ideas" as constituents of propositions, there is a sense, it may be plausibly suggested, in which we can say quite truly that the only object of knowledge is their agreement or disagreement. For the "agreements and disagreements of ideas" are then propositions; and it may be argued that there is *one* usual sense of "know" in which anything we know immediately and indeed anything we know at all is always a proposition. What we know is always "*that* something or other. . . ." I am inclined to think that it would be better to make a slight amendment and say that what we know is not the proposition mentioned itself, but *that the proposition is true*. But at any rate it is certainly arguable that there is a usual sense of "know" in which we can be said to know only propositions. But in that case, since we certainly do know facts, we should have to distinguish another sense of know, in which we can be said to know facts, and in this sense we could not be said to know propositions. Whether there are two such distinct senses of "know" or not I am not at all clear, but the view that we can only know propositions seems not an impossible one if interpreted in this way. I cannot say I am very happy about this, but I go on the principle of letting Locke have as long a run as possible for his money. (There is certainly another sense of "know," often called "knowledge by acquaintance," in which we can be said to know particular objects as opposed to facts or propositions, but this is irrelevant here.)

But it is certainly not true that we know immediately only propositions if by this is meant either that facts can be known only by inference, or that "knowing a fact" is really merely an abbreviation for "knowing a proposition which corresponds to the fact." If it is the case that there is one usual sense of "know" in which we can know only propositions, this need not cut us off from reality, for it is not incompatible with its being the case that, whenever we know a proposition (in one sense of know), we thereby also know, and even perhaps know *immediately*, a fact in another sense of know, so that knowing (in sense 1) a proposition and knowing (in sense 2) the fact to which the proposition corresponds logically entail each other. We might compare "thinking" and "thinking of." I cannot think of anything without at the same time thinking thoughts, and I cannot think thoughts without at the same time thinking of something. Only in this case the two usages expressing different relations are distinguished by the insertion or omission

¹ Gibson, *Locke's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 22.

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of the word *of*, while with knowing propositions and knowing facts exactly the same word is used for both. Whether this view is ultimately tenable I am doubtful, but it seems at least a plausible suggestion, and one which resembles Locke's position, since he undoubtedly held that we do know real existence while yet in a different context saying that all our knowledge "is only conversant about our ideas."

The account of ideas as equivalent to constituents of propositions is certainly not a complete account of the meaning of the word for Locke, and is inconsistent with the fact that he certainly regarded ideas as existents. But I think it expresses the more important side of his thought on the subject. His view of ideas as the only immediate objects "of the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings" may be said to have had four sources. (1) The representative theory of perception, which practically all the philosophers of the period regarded as forced on them by the facts of illusion and the physiological explanation of sense-perception, naturally suggested a representative theory of knowledge in general, though the latter is not really a logical consequence of the former. (2) The "correspondence theory" of truth suggested similar conclusions, if ideas were viewed as constituents of the propositions whose correspondence constituted truth. (3) It seemed easier to handle *a priori* knowledge if we regarded the latter as a perception of connections between our "ideas." (4) Locke was probably also influenced by the metaphysical notion of substances as completely independent of each other. "Since a substance possesses an independent and exclusive existence, the mind and the remainder of the world of real being, which consists of other substances, stand over against each other in a way which renders impossible any direct relation between them in knowledge. It is upon this metaphysical theory that Locke bases the necessity of the mediating function of ideas, as at once belonging to the mind and referring beyond it."¹

I fear the present article has been rather too discursive in character, but it seemed to me that there were a number of scattered points on which there was a little that I might perhaps say with profit. And I hope this article may have suggested to readers that it is possible that Locke's theories possess some intrinsic merit, and that they may be capable of holding their own with those of other philosophers, all of whom, and not only Locke, are often guilty of inconsistencies, and so may possibly somewhat increase interest in the philosopher who has probably exercised more influence in the past than any other English thinker.

¹ Gibson, *Locke's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 13.

ERRORS OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM

A. D. RITCHIE, M.A.

POSITIVISTS have excelled at destructive criticism. This criticism has been useful for pruning away absurd and superfluous theories but it is liable to be used to prune away everything else. The latest exponents, the Logical Positivists, are no less adept at criticism than their predecessors. The doctrines of this school have been surrounded with an air of mystery and inquirers have been frightened off by alarming technical apparatus. We all know that the Logical Positivists had proved that everybody else talked nonsense, but we did not know what they themselves talked. Mr. A. J. Ayer's exposition of the doctrine, *Language, Truth and Logic*, is therefore welcome as it is simple, clear, and free from technical mystification. It gives the ordinary reader a chance of seeing what it is all about. When the fundamental assumptions of the theory are stated clearly, as they are by Mr. Ayer, it seems to me equally clear that they are wrong, so that it should not be surprising if some of the conclusions drawn from them turn out to be wrong too.

In what follows I shall be concerned only with the general statement of the doctrine and with its application to scientific theory; not with any other applications.

The first set of assumptions are, as the name of the school implies, logical. It is assumed that all alleged propositions, that is all sentences or linguistic forms which profess to convey information or to make assertions which could be either true or false, are of three kinds. These are (1) Factual Propositions or Empirical Hypotheses, (2) Tautologies or Definitions, (3) Meaningless or Metaphysical verbal forms. Only class (1) are significant or actually say anything about anything.

Class (1) are either themselves assertions as to matters of fact which can be verified by experience or else they can by purely logical analysis without change of significance be translated into such propositions (p. 19 seq.). A proposition is said to be verified by experience when it refers to or describes correctly actual or possible contents of somebody's sense experience. It is not clear whose experience is concerned, whether it is somebody specified, anybody, or only the speaker himself. I have put in "somebody," but I suspect that the upholders of this doctrine always mean themselves. There are difficulties connected with the method of verification, but Mr. Ayer deals with them and his treatment will be discussed later. One

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further brief comment may be put in here. Mr. Ayer recognizes (p. 135 seq.) that the same form of words may function as (1) a factual proposition and also as (2) a tautology, without apparently realizing that this admission will get him into trouble. The purely logical analysis of propositions becomes impossibly difficult if such initial ambiguities are allowed.

Class (2), Tautologies, are analytic in the sense that their contradictions cannot be asserted. For that very reason they do not assert any fact or inform us about facts. They have a legitimate use as definitions, to indicate what linguistic symbols are to be used as equivalent to what others. Mathematics consists entirely of such propositions; for instance $2 + 2 = 4$ defines (in part) how the symbols 2 and 4 are to be used. According to the Logical Positivists, philosophy ought to consist of such propositions, because its function is to analyse common assertions by substituting for them others which will display their true structure and significance, if any. There are propositions tautological in form, like "Business is Business," which have an emotional significance but no literal significance. Mr. Ayer disapproves of them.

This brings us to Class (3). Some propositions which are ostensibly factual or similar to factual ones have reference to entities which cannot from the nature of the case be experienced themselves or be displayed as logically constructed out of elements of experience. Alleged propositions of this kind are held to be strictly meaningless or "metaphysical." "Metaphysical" in Mr. Ayer's vocabulary is a term of abuse; that is to say it is an epithet applied to things he dislikes and not applied to things he likes, though possibly equally applicable.

This classification of propositions is the logical basis of the theory and distinguishes the "logical" from other positivists.

Perhaps it is a minor point, but it should be noticed that the term tautology is used in a loose and possibly misleading sense. Strictly tautology ought to mean an equation of identities, e.g. $2 = 2$, or Business is Business. Such equations, if intended seriously, are asserted to show that the terms are to be understood strictly according to definition and not figuratively. In the equation $2 + 2 = 4$ the two sides are not identical; they contain distinct and different symbols. These can, however, be substituted for one another without error for all mathematical purposes. We may say "Two sheep and two goats, that makes four animals" as long as it is only the numbers we are interested in and can afford to neglect their special characters as sheep or goats. This brings me to the next and more important point.

Everything the Logical Positivists say about language is based upon a theory of the mathematical logicians about mathematical

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language. This is probably excellent within its own sphere, but can it be extended to apply to all kinds of communication by language, that is by signs? Granted that, the symbols $2 + 2$ and 4 can be substituted for one another absolutely without error or change of meaning in all mathematical propositions, that is because the use of mathematical propositions depends entirely upon their form or structure and not at all upon their matter or content—if they have any. In other words, the propositions are used as definitions. In all ordinary language, including non-mathematical scientific language, form and matter cannot be readily distinguished. Even when they are distinguished the use of language depends upon the matter as well as the form, because the assertions are material; they point to what happens to exist, and are not purely formal like those of mathematics. The legitimate logical transformations that can be applied are limited to the formal or structural elements of language; in ordinary language what is expressed by signs such as “and,” “or,” “not,” “all,” “any,” “some.” Even then there are limitations. To say “The Nile is a great river” is not exactly the same as to say “The Nile is not a small river.” Nor even is “Edinburgh is north of London” quite the same as “London is south of Edinburgh” except for certain limited technical purposes such as map reading, when A and B could stand for Edinburgh and London, and the propositions are in effect mathematical.

It is only to a very limited extent that linguistic signs can be interchanged without alteration of meaning, as is seen from the notorious fact that every language possesses words and phrases that cannot be translated into a foreign language. As a lawyer once pointed out to me, Mr. Justice Stareleigh’s dictum, that “What the soldier said is not evidence,” cannot be translated into French, because in a French court everything is evidence, or into German, because in a German court it would be an insult to the army. Forms of words can be found in French and German which to the ignorant Englishman may seem equivalent. They are not equivalent for Frenchmen or Germans, because their different history and traditions have given their language signs different meanings; they are referred to a different background.

If it is objected that all this has to do with the emotional effects of language and not with its legitimate scientific use, I would point out first of all that the proposition just mentioned is a technical one used in a strictly technical sense and not for the purpose of exciting irrelevant emotions, quite the contrary. But even where emotions are aroused, why assume that the expression or arousing of emotions must be illegitimate and incompatible with the scientific use of language? When you make an assertion at least you desire (Emotion No. 1) your hearers to assent (Emotion No. 2). To express and arouse

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emotion is the essential and fundamental function of all linguistic intercourse between human beings, even mathematicians and logicians. If it were not for the emotions concerned nobody would say anything, and the emotions are as much a part of the meaning as anything else. Emotion of course may be and often is objectionable when it is misplaced or inappropriate, just as it is objectionable to tell lies or misunderstand what is said. The emotion is right and the proposition true when they fit the facts, wrong and false when they do not.

To give a general definition of language one would have to say something of this kind—Language symbolizes primarily an attitude or type of behaviour of the speaker which is directed towards things or persons, and it is used for the purpose of modifying the attitude or behaviour of other persons or possibly himself. These attitudes or behaviours are the external expression of what is internally an emotion of some kind. A command is perhaps a more elementary kind of speech than an assertion. But language symbols are concerned secondarily with symbolizing appearances which are themselves signs standing for the things or persons towards which the speaker's emotions, thoughts, or actions are directed. This applies to all types of language. Mathematical language is the limiting case where the symbols are emptied as far as possible of all content so as to apply to everything in general and nothing in particular. It is only in mathematics that terms are interchangeable absolutely without error. The Logical Positivists, however, treat the limiting case as though it were the typical case, with the results that might be expected.

So much for the logical part which seems to be simply a mistake; now for the positivist part which is a more serious affair. Mr. Ayer assumes that all valid propositions asserting matters of fact are logically equivalent to or can be reduced without change of meaning to propositions which assert nothing but that certain data of sense can be or are experienced under certain conditions. That is to say Positivists like Mr. Ayer are Phenomenalists. The chief use the Phenomenalists make of their assumption is to show that propositions they dislike cannot be so reduced and are therefore invalid. Propositions they like are treated more circumspectly. I am inclined to suspect that no proposition would come through the ordeal unscathed.

Consider an ordinary scientific law, say "The boiling point of benzene is 80.4°C ." This is a straightforward empirical generalization from experiment and can be verified (according to the scientific use of this term, not necessarily the positivist use) any day by anybody who can obtain the necessary apparatus and has the elementary knowledge and skill to use it properly. Let us see what this involves. In the first place Aristotle or Archimedes, though cleverer than you

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and I, could not do it. They could not obtain the necessary technical information and had no chance of acquiring the necessary technical skill. In the second place, Robinson Crusoe on his island could not do it even supposing he had the knowledge and skill. Though I say "could not," I am prepared to admit that if the necessary raw materials were present in the island and if he lived long enough and worked hard enough, it is just conceivable that he might manage it. He would not only have had to make glass and blow his apparatus—easy enough of course when you know how—he would have to construct a thermometer and a barometer. He would have to calibrate them and work out the various corrections to be applied to their use. Lastly he would have to prepare pure benzene.

You and I can buy the benzene in a bottle trusting to the knowledge, skill, and material equipment of the coal miners, gas workers, and chemical workers who prepare and purify it, and trusting too to the integrity of the people who bottle it and label it; whereas they might have filled the bottle at the nearest garage. We must either trust in its purity as purchased or else purify it ourselves. We shall buy our thermometer and probably trust to the maker's or somebody else's calibration; even if we calibrate it ourselves we shall do so against another thermometer taken as a standard and assumed to be trustworthy. Even if we read the barometer ourselves, we shall trust to somebody else for the accuracy of the scale and the corrections to be applied. The last and really the least part of the business is setting up the apparatus and distilling the benzene, but even here the complications are not at an end. In nine cases out of ten we shall not see the mercury thread in the thermometer creep up to the mark we have agreed to call 80.4 and remain steady there while the bulk of the liquid distils over, but we shall see it remain steady at some other mark. However, when we have applied corrections, which people have worked out and printed in books, for the barometric pressure at that time and place and for the cool portion of the thermometer stem, the corrected number will come to 80.4 or something very near. Still we may have the bad luck to do the experiment during a storm when the barometer is changing rapidly, and then the temperature will not keep steady at all and we may have to start all over again.

Positivists seem to imagine that all that happens is to read the name Benzene on the label and see the mercury thread coincide with 80.4 on the scale. If that was so, the assertion that benzene boils at 80.4° C. would be tautological. The name on the label is a linguistic sign; so also is the scale on the thermometer. If there was nothing else involved we should have to conclude that by definition "Benzene" was equivalent to "what boils at 80.4° C. as indicated by the position of the mercury thread on such and such a scale," and similarly that

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the significance of the 80.4 mark was that by definition it corresponded to the temperature of the vapour of boiling "Benzene."

There is a grain of truth in this notion that the law holds by definition, as can be seen from the result of a negative experiment. Suppose that when distillation began the thermometer reading was round about 60°C . and then gradually and steadily rose until by the end it had reached 120°C .; should I conclude that the law was false? Of course not, I should conclude that the stuff in the bottle was not benzene; in fact that it had been filled at the garage pump and the label was fraudulent. It is not fair to conclude, however, that the law is a tautology. We are not dealing here with mathematical terms which can be invented and defined at will, but with terms intended to describe natural entities and processes, that are largely independent of human volition. It may be part of the definition of benzene that it boils at 80.4°C . but it is only part. There is no complete definition of benzene; something unexpected may always turn up. Moreover, something else may be found to boil at 80.4°C ., in which case the definition would need to be modified.

For certain purposes scientific laws can be treated as equivalent to definitions, and so far as they are used in this way are not strictly true or false or liable to upset by observation. But the definition may always turn out to be inconvenient in use and have to be dropped and another put in its place. Moreover, the fact that for some purpose the same form of words is used as a definition does not prevent it being used in other ways simply as a summary of what has actually been found to happen. Every generalization is both a summary of past events and a method of defining terms for future use; the two functions are distinct but related. The propositions of natural science must themselves be examined to see how they are actually used. It is a grave error to assume off hand that they are just like mathematical propositions.

I fear I am digressing and going back to matters of logic. The main point to be emphasized here is that the verification of so simple and obvious a generalization as the boiling point of a substance is a matter of great complexity. It is not to be lightly dismissed as "an observer experiencing certain sense data under certain conditions." It is true that there are certain critical sense data which, if they are of one kind, verify the law, if of another, confute. But these critical sense data are a very small part of the whole story and they are meaningless by themselves without the rest of the story. The story even in this simple case is a long and complex one. It has behind it a vast structure of human effort and experience, a co-operative effort, and the experience of many generations. Countless men of science from Galileo on have worked out the knowledge needed for it. Cinnabar miners in Spain, coal miners in Yorkshire, and glass

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workers in Czechoslovakia have sweated for it. If the verification of this law really depended upon translating it into terms of a single man's sense experience, it would have to go by default; at the best his task would be insuperably complex and difficult, at the worst impossible. Can co-operative human effort be translated into sense data; and if so, whose? Berkeley would have had an answer to this question, but his modern imitators, who think they can have his phenomenalism without his God to hold it all together, have no answer.

No proposition that enters into the discourse of the natural sciences describes or refers directly to an immediate datum of sense experience. They refer to the general properties and relations of physical objects and in certain cases to general relations between physical objects and classes of sense data. (For confirmation of this, see any scientific textbook.) The classes of sense-data to which they refer are of a restricted and highly conventionalized type, mainly what Sir Arthur Eddington calls "pointer-readings." The function of the data is purely symbolic; they are nothing by themselves. They symbolize causal relations among physical objects, more particularly the operations the observer carries out upon physical objects. In fact "the observer," that famous figure in philosophical discussion, is more correctly described as "the operator."

Nobody has ever reduced any scientific proposition to propositions referring to nothing but actual or possible data or contents of sense experience. Failure to do so is concealed under a smoke-screen of phrases like "the necessary conditions for observations" and "logical constructions from sense data." The conditions, the observer himself, and the reason for logically constructing remain unexplained. The logical constructions are never constructed in any specific case; we are merely told they could be. In fact the positivist or phenomenalist account of the process of scientific verification is pure myth or, if you like, metaphysics. I should prefer to say that any possible account of the process of verification is metaphysical and the phenomenalist account is bad metaphysics.

This point is so important that perhaps I may be permitted to labour it further. The physical sciences as expounded by the investigators themselves have never been positivist. The positivists have always been armchair critics or else mathematicians. Meyerson has repeatedly emphasized this in his historical discussions of the matter, and it is no reply to Meyerson to say that though scientific investigation actually took this road, it ought to have taken another and positivist road. Science is what the investigators have actually done, and there is no "ought" about it. As Whitehead has pointed out (*Adventures of Ideas*, p. 161 seq.), if investigators had been positivists, they would in many cases have failed to make the discoveries they

did. Physical science has always been based upon a belief, possibly "metaphysical," that there are causal processes operating in a physical universe which does not consist entirely of sense data. This belief may give rise to difficulties but its abandonment gives rise to worse ones.

If sense data are the only things that exist, then the existing ones must be actual sense data somebody is experiencing. Possible sense data without something to render them actual are nothing, and what renders them actual cannot be other sense data unless we attribute to sense data hitherto unsuspected "metaphysical" properties. Again, the positivist to fill his universe has to resort to logical constructions from sense data, but these are not sense data themselves, any more than a class is one of its members. The theory that scientific entities are logical constructions from sense data is intended to provide a logical bridge between immediate experience and scientific theory. It cannot bear the additional burden of the doctrine that scientific entities are "nothing but" sense data. The plausibility of the positivist case rests upon his apparently appealing to actual sense data; the possibility of its being valid rests upon a concealed appeal to what are not actual sense data.

It is worth noticing that certain psychologists (e.g. D. Katz; *The World of Colour*) have endeavoured to describe the actual character of sense data, have found the task singularly difficult and are not all agreed as to the results. On the other hand, their difficulties and disagreements have no obvious relevance to the propositions of physical science, and throw no doubt upon them.

Admittedly there are difficulties on any theory in accounting for the relations between sense experience and the supposed real world, but ordinary common sense and most realist or idealist philosophies do not stultify themselves at the outset. They allow, for instance, for the existence of some machinery by which possible sense data may become actual even if they find it hard to give a coherent account of the machinery. Possible sense data without machinery to actualize them are myths. Berkeley's phenomenalism, as I have said before, was reasonable. You can say of the material world "*esse est percipi*" if there is some being whose *esse est percipere* always and everywhere. A world can be built out of actual sense data if they are all actual always. Otherwise it must be built out of sense data and other things which are not sense data.

Phenomenalism therefore seems to me to be definitely wrong. It is not so much that it asserts what is false as that it neglects what is true. Nevertheless, there does appear to be something of value in positivist criticism, and positivism is perhaps not necessarily bound up with phenomenalism. Before discussing this point, however, there are some further aspects of Mr. Ayer's exposition to be mentioned.

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In discussing the process of verification by observation Mr. Ayer decides, for reasons that appear to me sound, that absolute certainty is unattainable for any type of factual assertion and that probability is all that can be expected. As to the notion of probability, he does not attempt (perhaps wisely) to give a logical account of it, but contents himself with a pragmatic one. He says (pp. 143, 144), "Roughly speaking, all that we mean by saying that an observation increases the probability of a proposition is that it increases *our confidence* in the proposition, as measured by our *willingness to rely on it in practice* as a forecast of our sensations and to retain it in preference to other hypotheses in face of an unfavourable experience." Then he goes on to develop this notion of probability in more detail, and says later that what he says applies to all empirical propositions without exception, whether singular, particular, or universal. The whole of the discussion could hardly be bettered, but it introduces a terrible serpent into the positivist Eden. Notice the words I have italicized, whereby the truth or probability of factual assertions is made to depend upon value judgments based upon our emotional response. This conclusion will not worry most people, but it should worry Mr. Ayer, because in the next chapter he dismisses all ethical and aesthetic value judgments as mere expressions of emotion, of no factual significance and strictly meaningless. He holds (p. 158) that to say (1) "you acted wrongly in stealing that money" adds nothing to the literal meaning of the assertion (2) "you stole that money." It merely shows that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker. If this is so, he cannot also say that to assert his feelings of confidence in a proposition or his willingness to rely on it in practice add anything to its literal meaning. If to say that something is good, bad, right, wrong, beautiful, or ugly, is to say nothing, so also to say that something is probable is to say nothing.

It is worth noticing that the example is not quite fair because an ethical judgment is already implied in the word "stole." The origin of the curious dogma that sensations are essential constituents of factual propositions but emotions are not, is easily seen. It is the theory that the "subject" or "observer" is a purely passive recipient and not an agent or operator.

The sources of the dilemma are the fundamentally false logical theory of propositions and the positivism from which Mr. Ayer starts, and not his eminently reasonable views on probability and verification. Any theory of verification would be placed in the same difficulty given the same assumptions. Any type of assertion about truth, falsity, or probability is an assertion of value and will be meaningless if assertions of value are meaningless. I understand that some who incline to logical positivist views would admit that asser-

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tions about the truth of propositions are meaningless, but if so they had better give up philosophy and take vows of silence.

It is perhaps necessary to insist further that there is no escape from the difficulty by saying that assertions about the truth or falsity of propositions are definitions of terms or tautologies, because that is what they are not. They are either statements of fact or nothing. If you want to explain the meaning of "It is true that . . ." you can do so by substituting "It is a fact that, . . ." "It happens that, . . ." or "I expect that, . . ." or "I am confident that. . . ." It must be some phrase indicating an attitude of mind, or emotional state directed towards alleged facts or events. This is simply another way of saying what I have said already in defining language.

There is another dilemma for Mr. Ayer. It is not so vital perhaps, and I am not at all clear where the fallacy lies. He has an interesting argument (pp. 206, 207) against the common view that the contents of a person's sensations are entirely private and inaccessible to anybody else and that it is only the structure that is accessible. This is an argument which I should gladly subscribe to, but it involves the assumption explicitly stated by Mr. Ayer that it is a mistake to draw a distinction between the structure and content of sensations. But if the only factual propositions are propositions about sensations, how can it be legitimate to distinguish between structure and content in propositions? According to any theory, it must be admitted that there is some correspondence between propositions and what propositions are about; so that the difficulty is a real one. I do not profess to be able to see the way out.

The Logical Positivists have drawn attention to the problems of the character and functions of language and have shown that in some way the structure of language is or ought to be related to the structure of the world. We should be grateful to them for raising the question, even though their answers are wrong. They are wrong, as I have tried to show, in respect both of their logic and their phenomenalism. Their logic is a fallacious extension of theories applicable only to mathematics. In fact, the linguistic problems they raise cannot be solved by logic but need psychology too. To these fallacies they add the older one of phenomenalism.

Like Lucretius, the positivists conceive their role as that of destroyers of superstition. Most people are superstitious, and superstition takes many different forms, so that there is no lack of dragons for the slaying. To consider only scientific superstitions, there has been a tendency to include in scientific theory hypotheses or hypothetical entities which are superfluous in so far as no specific observable consequences can be deduced from them, or, at least, no consequences that cannot be deduced on other grounds. Criticism of such theories is a useful service, for they may be worse than

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superfluous, they may hinder the progress of knowledge by setting up barriers to observation.

Positivist criticism has, however, often been misdirected and ineffective because it was based upon misapprehensions as to the methods of scientific investigation, and because it was mixed up with phenomenalism. It has been assumed that science consisted of two parts, theories and facts. The theories were conceived as the most important part. They were essentially things written in books and capable of being criticized independently apart from "facts." It was forgotten that all statements of theory are metaphors (this statement is not a metaphor) and that metaphors are good or bad, helpful or unhelpful for purposes of communicating knowledge, rather than true or false simply. It was also assumed that the "facts" were simple collections of actual and possible sense data.

A correct statement is not easy to make in any simple way. The following is as near as I can get. Science is what scientifically trained persons do. Scientific training consists in acquiring technical skill, becoming a craftsman, as well as in learning what others are doing and have done by means of similar technique. The "facts" of science are not easy to disentangle from the theories because the ascertaining of facts depends upon the use of instruments, the construction and use of which depends in turn upon theory. It is, however, possible to make a rough distinction between that minimum of theory that is needed for experimental operations and the immediate results of the operations on the one hand, methods and data one might say, and theory in the stricter sense on the other, that is to say the formulation of abstract schemes intended to generalize the data as far as possible. These abstract schemes will by preference be expressed in mathematical form.

There is a tendency among theoretical physicists to say that the terms that are used for theoretical formulation need not have any "meaning" provided that all variables in the theoretical formulation can be translated into variables capable of direct observation by the use of appropriate methods. This tendency implies a partial acceptance of positivism.

Opposed to this modern tendency is an older one, still popular among experimental physicists and perhaps universal among experimentalists in biological science, the tendency to construct models as theoretical formulations. The models may be conceived in mechanical terms or be merely diagrams describing hypothetical geometrical relations. The experimentalist is generally not a mathematician by nature though he may have acquired mathematical technique, but is something more like a mechanic. That is to say he is good at handling things, and he likes to picture the world of scientific theory after the fashion of the things he handles. The

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model-making tendency has led sometimes to serious fallacies, because it allowed people to think the ultimate small-scale entities, atoms, electrons, protons, etc., were endowed with the same familiar properties as the instruments they handled and the things they looked at. The notion will not, of course, bear examination, for the familiar properties of what we see and handle depend upon the fact that these are aggregates of vast numbers of the ultimate units, which must themselves have quite different properties. As a parallel, the average age of the whole population of the British Isles remains constant (or nearly so), but that does not prevent each one of us growing older from year to year. It is easy to understand that an atom cannot be coloured and that colour is a property of aggregates. It is perhaps less obvious but equally certain that an atom has strictly no shape or size, because whatever has shape and size must have a surface, and only a large aggregate can have a surface. In fact, if Descartes was right in saying that the essential property of matter is extension, then atoms are not material.

An atom is best described as something happening round a centre. Sets of these centres tend to oscillate about certain mean distances when considered over long enough time intervals. To call this shape and size is at the best a figure of speech. That in fact is just the trouble; everything that is said about atoms must be said in terms borrowed from our knowledge of gross matter and must be metaphorical. These metaphors are liable to be taken literally. The formulae of the mathematician are also metaphors, but fortunately they have no literal meaning to deceive us.

In so far as theories depending upon models are liable to abuse, positivist criticism is justified. But there is no justification for sweeping them away altogether, because they have undoubtedly been useful. It may be instructive in this respect to consider the history of the atomic theory.

The atomic theory is one of those very general theories such that all possibilities can be stated as a simple dichotomy—either matter is infinitely divisible or not; if not, then there are atoms. No recent physicist, I believe, has ever taken infinite divisibility seriously. It is a difficult conception and its consequences obscure; but as far as any consequences can be made out it seems to contradict certain elementary facts, such as the expansion of gases, the reflection of light at surfaces, the existence of chemical elements and compounds. All these things are easy to understand on the atomic theory. It is true that classical hydrodynamic theory appears to assume that fluids are infinitely divisible, but this means no more than that their structure, if any, must be very fine relative to the volumes actually considered. At any rate, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century physicists seem to have been atomists simply because the theory clarified

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their ideas. There were in those days no consequences that could be deduced from it and directly checked by observation. On these grounds contemporary positivists might have condemned the theory. The fault, however, lay with the lack of the technique needed to make the right kind of observations. As soon as the technique developed, the deductions were made and verified by observation. Scientific observation does not consist, as many seem to believe, in sitting with your mouth open waiting for things to happen. It consists in going about and interfering with things. What needed to be discovered were the methods of quantitative analysis of chemical compounds, begun by Lavoisier and continued by his successors. The last necessary step was taken by Dalton, who deduced from the atomic theory and the law of conservation of weight in chemical changes that, whenever two kinds of atom combine, they must combine in constant proportions by weight. Further, if two can combine in different proportions to make different compounds, the ratios of these proportions must be as simple whole numbers. These deductions he tested by experiment and found to be about right in the small number of cases he could try and as far as his very crude methods would allow. Very soon others took the matter up and it was found that the deductions held in every case examined. The more the methods of analysis improved the more exact the agreement became.

Since then other types of deduction from the atomic theory have been made and confirmed. Nevertheless, even towards the end of the nineteenth century there were philosophers of positivist views who looked with suspicion at the theory, largely, I believe, because it had been abused. Because, as mentioned already, atoms were supposed to be literally hard round things, like billiard balls, only smaller and less highly coloured. Nowadays the atomic theory is very firmly established, even though atoms are not quite so hard and round. At any rate, the old fallacies are avoided and even positivist philosophers no longer murmur against them. They have discovered that after all atoms are only "logical constructions" and quite respectable.

I think we must agree to the "Principle of Observability"; namely that no hypothetical entity or process is to be admitted to scientific theory unless it leads to consequences verifiable by experiment or other kind of observation; though two provisos should be added. The first has been mentioned already, namely that what can at any stage of progress be verified by observation depends upon the technique available for the purpose. No observational consequences of a hypothesis may be immediately apparent, but it may be a good hypothesis all the same, though obviously not so good as if they were apparent and verified.

The second proviso is rather more complicated. The most general

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hypotheses of physics that cover all entities or processes whatsoever are often such that both from the hypothesis and its contradictory observable consequences follow, so that each is a definite hypothesis; the contradictory is not a mere blank. Thus, either matter is infinitely divisible or it is atomic; either there is absolute motion or not; either there is no limit to the precision with which the position and velocity of electrons can be determined or there is a limit. In each case observable consequences follow from either alternative, and if one is false the other is true. This is not so with more special hypotheses, from the contradictories of which nothing can as a rule be deduced. If the structural formula of a chemical compound is so and so, then the compound will have such and such properties. It does not have those properties, therefore its formula is not so and so. Here there is only blank negation except on the unlikely assumption that there is one and only one positive alternative formula. There may be no alternative thought of; there may be far too many. There are cases where it is best to compromise. A hypothesis may fail in some respects, but it may be better than nothing. Something unexpected may always turn up to solve the difficulty.

In conclusion, if positivism in its scientific aspect meant nothing more than this kind of critical attitude towards hypotheses, there would be nothing to say against it. But positivism has always meant much more. In fact it has meant phenomenalism too; the theory that the material world consists of nothing but sense data. Whatever the truth may be, this theory I am sure is false and the mother of a great family of fallacies. It is plausible because it appeals to what we imagine to be immediate, certain, and actual, and because we do not realize that the possible sense data it has to drag in are purely mythical.

SOME SIMPLE THOUGHTS ON FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

PROFESSOR H. GOMPERZ.

THE following considerations have been styled "simple thoughts" for two reasons.

In the first place I wish, at the very outset, to limit the field of discussion. Of course, a limited discussion is not likely to be recognized either as a complete or as a final one. But even at this price I wish to keep the question of Free-will clear of the great problems of Life and of Consciousness. The "mechanistic" or "physicalistic" view, according to which volition is only an epi-phenomenon attached to a physical process in the brain's cortex and therefore subject to the same necessity which determines every movement of an atom (although, maybe, not of an electron also), will not be discussed. The question whether biology may, or may not, be reduced to physics will remain entirely open. Atoms and molecules, the nerves and the brain, will not even be mentioned. Nor do I intend to enter upon a discussion of the "spiritualistic" view that holds volition to be a purely "mental," or "spiritual" phenomenon, not at all intimately bound up with any bodily processes, and therefore exempt from the laws by which these are determined. There will be no reference to states of consciousness, to laws of thought, nor even to motives (a most ambiguous term, in my opinion, apt to throw the whole subject into hopeless confusion). The question whether psychology may be deduced from physiology is supposed to remain open likewise. What I propose to do is to set aside the distinction between the psychical and the physical aspect of life altogether and to envisage man as a living unity, that is as an organism; volition as a function of that organism, namely as its reaction on, or response to, a given situation; and traits of character as habits of such reaction. In other words, I wish to take my stand on the point of view of biology, or behaviourism, or pragmatism, as you may be pleased to call it. Volition, then, will be considered as one of the phenomena of life. This, of course, entails a limitation of the field of discussion. Perhaps its limits will to many appear too narrow. But, anyhow, they are self-imposed and clearly recognized.

My other reason for confining myself to "simple thoughts" was my wish to reduce, as far as I could, things to their true proportions; to combat the one-sidedness of opposite and extreme theories and

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to bring out the modest nucleus of truth which they mostly encompass; but also to reduce the importance of the whole problem to its true standard. Indeed, outside of the schools nobody bothers about free-will at all. Everybody knows that when, and as far as, he is not coerced he can do what he wants to do; that is to say, he can act according to his inclinations, which, however, depend on his inherited character on the one hand, and on his education and his personal experience on the other; and that, if he, indeed, is held responsible for his conduct (as far as this is not due to coercion), yet the race from which he has sprung and the environment in which he has been brought up and lived, are believed to share in this responsibility. And that is all that we know, and, moreover, that we can know, and, indeed, that we need to know—about the matter. We are also perfectly aware of what goes on within us when we deliberate about some doubtful point and at last come to a decision. And what we are, perhaps, not aware of, as, for instance, the bodily conditions or the subconscious states that may influence our decisions, could come to be known only by persistent and dispassionate research in a laboratory of physiology or psychology, and will never be discovered by philosophers speculating in their arm-chairs or at their desks. Indeed, I suspect that, from one point of view at least, the case of the problem of free-will is very much the same as that of the problem of the reality of the physical world. Students approach both problems hoping to learn something about facts; and then it turns out that it is all a question of terms. Whether the world is “real” depends upon what we mean by reality; and whether volition is free depends upon what we mean by freedom. And if we happen to use the term freedom in more than one sense in one and the same discussion, our points of view may thereby indeed be multiplied and variegated, but our answer to the question at issue will necessarily be involved in obscurity and even in contradiction. Let me begin, therefore, by saying that we may, I think, distinguish at least three meanings of the term freedom, as applied to volition. Using that term in its “every-day meaning,” we shall have to ask: Are our volitions free, in the sense of not being coerced? Applying it in its “scientific” or “speculative meaning” we shall have to inquire: Are they free in the sense that they cannot possibly be predicted? And starting with its “moral meaning,” we shall wish to know whether they are free in the sense that we may reasonably be held responsible for them. And now let us consider these three questions one by one.

I

Is will free in the everyday sense of this term?

Not much discussion seems to be requisite on this point, since

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our volitions, when not due to coercion, are, in this sense, free by definition. Indeed, this is, no doubt, the original meaning of the term "freedom." It was devised to designate non-coercion; how, then, could volition not due to coercion be anything but free?

The only point to be emphasized just here is this, that freedom in this sense is absolutely compatible with determinism even in its strictest form. Determinists contend that volitions are necessarily determined by the situation and the character of the agent. Now it is coercion that does not permit us to act as our character, or our nature, would prompt us to do, whereas acting freely means acting in a way agreeing with, or in conformity to, our character. Indeed, it is free action, and free action only, that expresses character and enables it to manifest itself. How then could there be any incompatibility between our acting freely and our acting in the way determined by our character?

The notion that determinism might be incompatible with freedom in the everyday sense of that term rests on the assumption that determination always and everywhere implies coercion. Now this assumption seems to have sprung from a twofold misconception: it is likely to have arisen out of an untenable view concerning the nature of determination, and it may then have been corroborated by a wrong interpretation of a particular group of experiences.

"*b* is determined by *a*" simply means "*b* depends on *a* according to a general rule," and it means nothing else. The angles of a triangle are "determined" by the ratio of its sides; that is to say, they depend on it, according to the general rules of Trigonometry. In cases, indeed, in which it is essential to the relation of *a* and *b*, that is to say in which it is stated by the general rule that *a* must precede *b*, determination is called causation; *a* is styled the cause and *b* the effect. This is the scientific concept of causation, correctly, on the whole, explained by David Hume two hundred years ago. Yet Hume was wrong, I think, with regard to two minor points. He took the alleged connection between determination and coercion to be merely a psychological one; being accustomed to witness *b* taking place after *a*, we feel forced to expect it as soon as *a* has taken place, and then we falsely project this feeling of coercion or necessity into *b* itself, as if this were "necessarily produced" by *a*. But the "necessity" of *b* is not only psychological, it is—and this, I suppose, is much more essential—logical likewise; given the ratio of the sides, we "must" assume the angles to be such and such, "if" we wish to avoid error and provided the rules of Trigonometry are correct. And in the same sense, given a certain temperature, we "must" expect the quicksilver in the thermometer to rise to such and such a point of the scale. Moreover, Hume was of opinion that when we allege *b* to be "necessarily produced" by *a*, such a statement lacks

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an basis in experience, inasmuch as it is supposed to state anything over and above the fact that *b* regularly follows *a* and that we, therefore, feel forced to expect *b* to ensue every time that *a* has taken place. Hume thought that "to produce necessarily" really means nothing at all. But this was a mistake. Indeed, it means something, and the trouble is not that it means too little, but that it means too much, namely that it implies something not always clearly conceived when the phrase is employed. It implies that there is something in *a* (the antecedent) analogous to the effort experienced by us when we produce, or bring about, something ourselves; and that there is something in *b* (the consequent) analogous to the passivity experienced by us when some change is produced, or brought about, in ourselves against, or at least without, our will. Now, in all the cases in which *a* or *b* is the function of a living being, it is a perfectly legitimate inference that there must be something like effort connected with the cause, and something like passivity connected with the effect, and it is only in the realm of the Inanimate that the applicability of these concepts and the validity of that inference becomes doubtful. For, although a famous scientist once defined energy as what remains of the sensation of effort when the sensation of effort is abstracted from, it is not easy to see just what an unexperienced effort or an unexperienced passivity might be conceived to be. Certainly it is only natural to suppose that when the wind bends a twig there must be in it something analogous to the effort which I experience when doing the same thing, and that when it carries away a leaf there must be in the leaf something analogous to the passivity experienced by me when I suffer the same fate. Indeed, suppositions like these are fundamental in mythology and essential in poetry, and it is only in science that the question of their utility has to be raised. I do not mean to say, however, that even here the answer to this question must be absolutely negative. It seems to me that even in science effort and passivity may often be used very conveniently as symbols for regularity, and for a very simple reason. That *b* follows *a* according to a general rule means, of course, that *b* follows *a* in the same way in which b_1 follows a_1 , b_2 a_2 , and so forth. Now the analogy of *b*, *a* to b_1 - a_1 , b_2 - a_2 . . . is not in any way expressed in *b*-*a* itself, but must be stated separately and in addition to the mere fact that *b*, here and now, follows *a*, whereas the notion of effort may be incorporated in that of *a* itself, as also the notion of passivity in that of *b*. In other words, thinking of *a* as of an active cause and of *b* as of a passive effect saves us the trouble of adding, as a second thought, that the relation of *b* to *a* corresponds to a general rule, and this mode of conceiving that relation might therefore, speaking generally, be considered as a convenient and harmless symbolism, if only it

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were really harmless and did not, at one particular point, create the delusive semblance of a metaphysical problem where there is really no problem at all. This point is just free or non-coerced volition, or, to speak less technically, spontaneous effort. To state that I do something spontaneously, or of my own accord, let us say because I feel inclined, or because I deem it right, to do it; such a statement most certainly does not imply any opinion on the question whether this action of mine depends on my feeling of inclination, or on my ideas of right and wrong, according to a general rule, that is to say it leaves the question entirely open whether my action is "determined" in any way, or not. Let us assume, then, for a moment, and for the sake of argument only, that it were so determined. Such an assumption in itself entails no intellectual difficulty at all. Why should not spontaneous action depend on certain inclinations or ideas in the same way in which, for instance, the movements of a musician in an orchestra depend on those of the conductor? But as soon as you try to apply to this case of determination the symbolism of effort and passivity, you become involved in a most puzzling contradiction. To conceive my action as determined you must, according to that symbolism, consider it as passive or coerced; and yet, in itself, it is unmistakably experienced as spontaneous. And evidently it cannot be passive and spontaneous at one and the same time. No doubt, to a considerable extent, the so-called problem of free-will is only a conceptual expression of the feeling of embarrassment and perplexity of those who find themselves entangled in this apparent contradiction. But in truth this arises merely out of the improper use of the symbolism in question. Give it up, or use it only where it can do no harm, and the difficulty vanishes altogether. Volitions may be determined, that is to say they may depend on certain conditions according to certain rules, and yet they may be entirely free from all and every coercion. In other words, they may be "free" in the everyday sense of this term. Indeed, between "determination" and "coercion" there is no logical connection at all. When a storm throws me to the ground, my fall is both determined and coerced. When a planet revolves in a certain orbit, its motion is determined, but neither coerced nor free. When I act in conformity to my inclinations or to my convictions, my action may perhaps be determined, but it is most certainly free.

The arbitrary notion that determination involves coercion and that, therefore, it is incompatible with freedom in the everyday sense of that term would not, however, have come to spread so widely and to be engrafted so firmly on the minds of thinkers, if it had not seemed to be confirmed by a certain group of facts. There are, indeed, cases in which a man's mind is divided within itself and in

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which, therefore, the realization of one of its aspirations seems both to determine his action and to defeat other aspirations opposed to it, in a compulsory and even a violent way. Thus a man may, by habit or passion, be driven to do something repugnant to himself, and whereof he afterwards repents. Or his determination to achieve a certain end may force upon him some measure, indispensable as a means to that end, but most undesirable in itself. In both cases he is not unlikely to say later on that he had not been able to act as he would have been inclined to do, and that his will had, by the habit, the passion, or the consideration in question, been not merely determined, but coerced as well. But then, the man who expresses himself thus makes use of a fiction, and he does not do so without a definite end in view. He speaks as if his character had been all on the right side, or on the side agreeable to his wishes, and as if the habit, the passion, or his determination to attain to a certain end were alien forces by which his real self had been overpowered. But then this is nonsense. It was *his* habit, *his* passion, or *his* resolution to attain to that end, by which his act was determined, it was part of his own character that was at fault or that overruled his other aspirations, and since it was this part that prevailed we may even say that in these cases also it was after all his character that determined his volition and that, if there was any coercion going on, it was part of his own nature that was coerced by another, and not his will that was coerced by his inclination. It is quite true, of course, that no precise boundary line can be drawn between a case like this and that of intimidation from without. The end in view that forces a man to adopt a measure repugnant to him in itself may simply be his wish not to be shot, and the measure repugnant to him may be the delivering up of \$100,000 to a gangster. In such a case, indeed, the determining motive will also be a coercive one; but then, as far as this view of the case is correct, the act will be due to coercion and therefore will, by definition, not be a free act at all. Whether an act resulting from intimidation should be styled free or coerced, is a question of terminology. If we consider a man's wish to preserve his life as an ultimate fact not subject to any further conditions, we may, indeed, rightly say that the act was forced upon him; if we consider the preservation of a man's life as an end freely preferred by him to other ends, we may as justly style that same act a free one. It cannot be denied therefore that the boundary-line between freedom and coercion may be drawn differently according to the different points of view adopted. But this fact does not in any way affect the statement that determination, as long as it does *not* involve coercion, is perfectly compatible with freedom in the everyday sense of that term. How, indeed, could they be incompatible? Saying that a man's action is determined by his

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character is tantamount to saying that he acts as he wants to act; saying that he is coerced is tantamount to saying that he must act as he does not want to act. How, then, can the former of these statements be pretended to imply the latter?

II

Is will free in the scientific or speculative sense of the term? That is to say, is it true that volition cannot possibly be predicted? If determination does not in any way imply coercion, but merely conformity to general and immutable rules, then the only method to test the tenet of determinism is to inquire whether human volitions can be predicted when the conditions are given on which they depend. If they can, there is no pretext for denying that volition is "determined" and subject to "law" just like any other action or reaction in nature; if they cannot, there is no meaning in the assertion that volition is "determined" at all. The issue, then, seems clear. It may not, perhaps, be of any particular importance in practice, but it certainly does not appear to lack significance from a scientific or speculative point of view.

No question, however, admits of a definite answer, affirmative or negative, as long as its terms are not clearly defined. Now, the question whether something "can be predicted" is not free from a certain ambiguity. What this refers to can easily be shown by distinguishing the "scientific" from the "speculative" point of view.

By "scientific predictions" I mean real predictions, predictions actually made by real men in the world of real experience, in short, predictions in real life. Now when we consult the books on the free-will controversy we get the impression as if all parties were agreed on one point, namely, that prediction of human volitions and actions in this sense is impossible. And yet we make such predictions every hour of our waking life, nay, we even do still more, we act on these predictions. We ask people questions, expecting them to answer, we sell goods to them, expecting them to pay, and we pay them, expecting them to work; we offer them rewards and threaten to fine them, expecting them to look out for profits and, as far as they can, to avoid losses; and we try to fill positions of confidence with reliable men and to withhold them from the unreliable. Does not that look as if a first-sight case for determinism might indeed be made out?

The trouble, of course, is that our predictions very often do not come true. People will act unexpectedly and even unreasonably, they deceive our hopes and sometimes they do not even justify our fears. But then, such failures are not peculiar to behaviourist psychology. In meteorology, for instance, predictions that do not

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come true do not seem to be anyway less numerous. Yet that does not induce us to maintain that the weather cannot possibly be predicted nor to infer that the winds and the clouds are free agents and that that is just the grand thing about them. Now, why do we refrain from all such conclusions? Because we have not as yet given up all hopes of discovering laws that might enable us to predict the weather with greater precision. That is to say, we hope to be able to "measure" certain features of the meteorological situation and thereby to attach certain numbers to this situation, and then to find out whether certain "equations"—assumed at first as hypotheses, later on to be checked by experience—do not connect the numbers attached to the weather of the preceding day to those attached to that of the following, so that then we might, by calculation, predict to-morrow's weather from to-day's. Now this procedure which substitutes, for instance, for concepts such as "warm," "oppressive," or "damp," figures gathered from scales in thermometers, barometers, or hygrosopes, and then seeks to connect these figures by equations may, speaking generally, be styled a procedure of "quantification." And indeed the method of quantification is the only one adopted in all the sciences wherever a degree of precision higher than the one yet attained to is aimed at. Determinists also might therefore be expected to proceed in the same way with regard to the conditions and effects of volitions if seriously interested in the prediction of the latter. Nor is it anyway evident *a priori* that such an attempt must necessarily fail. Types, at least of character, of situations, and of conduct might perhaps be established, and numbers attached to them, and then hypotheses might be formed and checked by experience that might enable us to formulate a law stating, for instance, that "A character of type No. 13 in a situation of type No. 61 always posits conduct of type No. 260." If an attempt to formulate laws of this or eventually even of a more satisfactory nature succeeded, then, indeed, determinism might claim to be a scientific theory, on a par with other scientific theories established on a basis of experience. In fact, if predictions of any degree of precision, verified by the event, were forthcoming, the question would be settled once for all, and indeterminism would be silenced for all time to come. This is just the way in which other sciences proceed. Take Astronomy. The true way of proving that eclipses can be precisely predicted is to predict them. If an astronomer said that he, indeed, could do no such thing, but that he was sure an omniscient being could, nobody would pay special attention to him. And yet, so at least it seems to me, the attitude of most determinists is just this. Indeed, if determinism claims to be a scientific theory, the issue really hinges on the question of quantification. If and as far as quantification of the conditions and the effects

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of volition is possible, precise predictions with regard to volitions are, at least in principle, possible also. If and as far as it is not, precise prediction of volitions, too, is inconceivable, at least by human intelligences, and science can hardly be concerned with any other.

Now, whether quantification of this kind is possible, I know not; what I know is that it has hardly ever been tried and that determinists, in particular, do not seem to feel any obligation to attempt it. As long, therefore, as not even any serious effort is made towards this end, I feel entitled to suppose that there is no prospect of attaining to it. But this is tantamount to saying that determinism, considered as a scientific theory, must be given up. And we shall see presently that speculation will not come to its rescue, if science forsakes it.

Let us now turn to the problem of freedom in the speculative sense of this term, that is to say to the question: Could volitions be predicted by a being that knew all about their conditions, that is to say by a being omniscient with regard to the past and to the present, but ignorant of the future?

The determinist's answer, of course, is that if such a being knew all about a man's character and about the situation in which he finds himself, as also about all the laws that rule life and its phenomena, it would be able precisely to predict what he was going to do. Now, my contention is that this answer, analysed more closely, turns out to be unmeaning since the knowledge of the premises supposed to be given really implies the knowledge of the conclusion alleged to be inferred from them. In order to show this, let me begin by asking: What is meant by "knowing all about a man's character"? Evidently, knowing how he behaves in any given situation. But then, the present situation, I mean the situation in which the volition to be predicted is expected to ensue, is itself a given situation. In order to know "all" about a man's character, therefore, even an omniscient being would have to know not only how he had behaved in all past situations but, besides, how he was going to behave in the present situation also, that is to say just in that situation the effect of which on him that being is supposed to be able to predict. So that the theory of speculative determinism really amounts to saying that a being that knew how a man was going to conduct himself in a given situation would, indeed, know how he was going to conduct himself in that situation, or that if it knew all about a man's character, it would, indeed, know all about it—which is, of course, nonsense, or a truism, as we may be pleased to call it.

The determinist will, of course, retort that this is not what he meant. What he meant was that an omniscient being would be able to predict a man's future conduct with the utmost precision, if only it knew all about his present situation, his conduct in the past,

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and the laws of human conduct generally. Since knowing all this, it would be able to judge of what the man was going to do now by what he and by what other men of the same or of a similar character had done in the same situation or in similar situations. But then, these two terms, "the same" and "similar," refer, in truth, to two cases which, from our point of view, differ widely from each other.

To take the case of mere similarity first, it is, of course, quite true that in science "laws of nature" do not presuppose identity, but only similarity, of causes as well as of effects. When I say that the force of attraction is in the inverse ratio of the square of the distance of the objects attracted, I do not at all imply that there are, in nature, any two distances or any two forces, exactly equal: the distance may in the one case be 10 and the force $1/100$ and in the other case the distance may be 11 and the force $1/121$. But how is it that this satisfies me and that I do not postulate equality? It is because I do not stop at a vague similarity, but am able to attach to this term a meaning perfectly precise, namely that of an equal ratio. But equal ratios presuppose precise figures, that is measurement and quantification. Where these are not available mere similarity, without any more definite indication, does not enable us to make precise predictions. Perhaps we might, for all that, in some cases be entitled to say that where the causes are similar the effects are likely to be similar too. But that would leave an enormous latitude and would be absolutely incompatible with any degree of precision. Now, only one of two alternatives can be true. Either the condition of volition can be quantified; then, as far as they can, determinism is a scientific theory and can be tested by experience, and in the case all speculations about omniscient beings and what they can do or can not do are superfluous and idle; or those conditions can not be quantified, and then "similarity" remains a vague and indefinite term, and mere similarity, in this sense, could never enable even an omniscient being to predict anything with any degree of precision.

There remains, then, the case of identical characters and identical situations. Could an omniscient being predict what a man of a given character will do in a given situation by inferring this from what that same man or from what other men absolutely like him have done in that very same situation? To this I answer that there are no two men absolutely alike and that even one and the same man can never experience one and the same situation more than once. The first of these statements will hardly be controverted, since it is only another way of saying that every human being is an individuality or personality and can never be met with more than once. It is the second of the above statements that may deserve and even require some further elucidation.

Speaking generally, a situation recurring can never be quite the

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same situation over again, if for no other reason, for these two decisive reasons: (1) that having already been experienced before, it cannot have quite the same meaning to the agent now that it had when first experienced; and (2) that the agent's character having been exposed to the influence of the first experience, can now no longer be quite the same that it was then. Indeed, this statement does not apply to man alone. The significance of function on the one hand and of fatigue on the other is common to all animal tissue, and even, to some extent, to some inanimate bodies. A spring may seem to react on pressure in an absolutely identical way a hundred times. The day will come, nevertheless, when it will begin to react somewhat differently on the "very same situation," I mean the day when its elasticity will begin to relax and even that other day when it will break altogether. It might, perhaps, be argued that the difference between the hundredth and the hundred and first experience of the "same" situation will be very much less marked than that between the first and the second, and it might be added that, if habit makes any difference in a man's response to a situation, that difference could make itself felt in the sense of enhanced regularity and uniformity only, so that an inference from the thousandth to the thousand and first reaction ought to be so much the safer. But this would be a fallacy. For if it is true that we get accustomed to things, it is no less true that we also get sick of them. And experience amply proves that other forces, too, work in the same direction. As time goes on, even temptations lose their charm; passions cool down; the claims of reason and the pressure of facts may make themselves felt. A young man may have neglected his studies for years, but it does not follow that this must go on for ever; he very often sets to work at last. Even an old rake often settles down between forty and fifty and perhaps marries his housekeeper, and then the people say: Who would have thought so? Even habitual drunkards sometimes go to an asylum, and in religion also sudden conversions occur. What, then, is my conclusion? You can never tell what may be the possibilities latent in a man until they have had occasion to manifest themselves. Certainly a man will always act as he is bound to do, being the man he is; but just what kind of a man he is you can never infer from his past alone; there may be in him some things, some possibilities of reaction, that just show themselves for the first time now. Looking backward you will be perfectly right in saying: He could not act otherwise, it was his nature that manifested itself in his act. And yet, in a sense, when you say that, your thoughts move in a circle: you first infer the agent's character from his act, and then, conversely, his act from his character. For you could not have known "all about his character" before knowing how he would react in just this new situation also.

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This may be illustrated, I think, by a perfectly parallel case. Lagrange has proved that any curve whatsoever may be reduced to an equation. When, therefore, we are able to survey the curve as a whole, we can always consider it as the necessary expression of that equation. Every little section will be perfectly determined by it. But as long as only a section of the curve is given, we cannot predict how it is going to continue. If it continues one way, we shall have to refer it to equation 1; if the other way, to equation 2. In both cases we shall, on looking backward, be able to conceive it as the necessary expression of its law; but just which is "its law" we shall only know when it has reached its last point. So with life also. Character is its law, and of its law it will turn out to have been, in every single moment, the true expression; but what this law was even an omniscient being could only tell when life has reached its goal. And even then it might, perhaps, be contended that unexpected features of character might have come to light, if fate had steered that life through other seas. Anyhow, even an omniscient being could not predict future volitions with absolute precision from the knowledge of situations and characters, for there is no complete knowledge of character as long as this has not been observed reacting on all the situations through which it may pass.

Speculative determinism, then, moves in a circle; that is why it cannot come to the rescue of scientific determinism, if that breaks down.

III

A third question remains to be discussed. Is will free in the moral sense of that term? That is to say, Is it reasonable to hold men responsible for their volitions? Here, then, freedom is attached to responsibility by definition. If, and as far as, holding to account is rational, there is freedom also. If, and as far as it is not, we shall be entitled to speak, in the same moral sense, of determinism - which term, in this connection, however, will only point to an influence exempting volition from responsibility. To what extent, then, is responsibility reasonable?

Among philosophers there seems to be a widespread opinion to the effect that responsibility is something very sacred and very mysterious and closely bound up with freedom in the speculative sense of that term. But I, for one, cannot share in this view. To me responsibility appears to be rather a simple thing. Its nature as well as the conditions of its rationality may, I think, be easily ascertained, and it is bound up with freedom, not at all in the speculative, but exclusively in the everyday sense of that word. But first of all two questions must, here also, be carefully distinguished: What is

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the meaning of "holding a man responsible"? And when is it reasonable to do so?

Holding a man responsible or accountable, in the only sense that can be relevant to this discussion, seems to me to be only an abbreviating expression for three couples of terms, namely for Punishment and Reward, Blame and Praise, Self-reproach and Self-satisfaction. Now, psychologically, self-reproach is only blame projected into a man's own consciousness; blame is only punishment spiritualized; punishment is only revenge approved of by the community; and revenge is only defence prolonged. Indeed, if we picture to ourselves a man who has just succeeded in repelling an act of aggression and who now, having run after the aggressor, knocks him down and calls him names, we feel at once how closely defence and revenge, chastising and chiding are bound up with each other, and how the three last-named phenomena originate in a blind instinct of retaliation. And the same holds good with regard to self-satisfaction, praise, reward, and tenderness, the three first-named springing, all of them, from the no less blind instinct of requital. But when is it reasonable to give free vent to these instincts?

The first condition is, indeed, that the actions by which these instincts express themselves be just, that is to say, such as might proceed from an impartial judge, namely that they do not smite the innocent nor benefit the undeserving, that they keep up a due proportion between retaliation and offence, requital and merit, and that they proceed in an orderly manner in no way endangering the public peace. But this is not enough. If retaliation and requital were unreasonable in themselves, they would not become reasonable by being administered impartially and peacefully. Indeed, the main end of reasonable retaliation and requital is undoubtedly the promotion of desirable and the checking of undesirable conduct. Punishment, for instance, serves this end in more ways than one: by disabling the offender to inflict further harm, by tending to make him reform and by deterring him as well as others from offending again. If, however, to hold a man responsible for his acts is reasonable only when and as far as desirable conduct is thereby promoted or undesirable conduct checked, three remarkable consequences follow.

(1) Responsibility is not reasonable when the agent was not and could not have been aware of the moral significance of his act, nor when that act was not and could not have been influenced by such awareness, that is to say, in the cases of ignorance or coercion. In these cases, therefore, the will, too, is, by definition, not "free" in the moral sense of that term.

(2) Responsibility is more or less reasonable in proportion as the

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effects of retaliation or réquital can be more or less precisely foreseen and predicted. If, therefore, conduct could not be foreseen and predicted at all, responsibility would be utterly unreasonable and freedom in the moral sense would be non-existent. It cannot be true, therefore, that responsibility is anyway bound up with indeterminism—that is to say, with freedom in the scientific or speculative sense of that term. That it is not becomes manifest by another consideration also. If a man could not reasonably be held responsible for conduct that might have been foreseen and foretold, all purely reasonable conduct would be exempt from responsibility. For as far as conduct is prompted by reason only, it can indeed be predicted. All other things being equal, every rational being will choose the shortest or the easiest way as well as the better or the cheaper ware and the safer or the more profitable investment. In such a case the choice can indeed be predicted. But will anybody maintain that therefore the agent is not responsible for his choice? Moreover, speaking quite generally, why should not a man be held responsible for his conduct when this is the expression of his character and of his character only, so that it could have been predicted by anybody who "knew all about his character"—if only this phrase had any definite meaning at all? For the notion that he might have been coerced by his character has been considered long ago and had to be rejected as absurd.

(3) From our point of view, however, the most important consequence is another one. If to hold a man responsible is reasonable only when and as far as desirable conduct is thereby promoted and undesirable conduct checked, it follows that it will be more reasonable in proportion as that end is more fully attained to. Now this is very often the case when responsibility is divided among more persons than one. Take the case of instigation. B has acted, but A has instigated him to act. Evidently it would be unreasonable to hold only one or the other to account since we desire to check instigation as well as action. But now let us consider the case of one man instigating many others. B, C, D . . . have acted, but they have all of them been instigated by A—say, to spread a malignant slander or to indulge in the use of a pernicious dope. What will be the rational course to take? No doubt we may have to hold B, C, D . . . to account, since we wish to stop people from repeating slander and from indulging in the use of dopes. But the effect will in any case be a comparatively poor one, since in this way instigation itself will not be checked, but will go on all the same. The truly rational course therefore will be to lay the chief stress on the responsibility of A: if we succeed in stopping instigation, the evil as a whole will be stopped. But now let us pass from the instigator to the educator, the teacher, the father. If these exercise an influence

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on the young that we consider undesirable, it will indeed be indispensable to hold the latter responsible too, for being exposed to an evil influence they ought, as far as possible, to be subjected to beneficial counter-influences likewise. But by far the greater part of the forthcoming responsibility will have to rest with the educator, the teacher, the parent: if we can influence them, what we do will indirectly affect a whole generation. But what holds good for the educators will also be applicable to the environment as a whole: the preachers heard and the authors read by the young and, indeed, by the people generally will have to bear their share in the responsibility for what is done or omitted by their hearers and readers, and their share will certainly not be the smaller one. But we cannot stop short even at this point. What holds good for men, holds good for social conditions also. Take the case of the mother who steals food for her children in a time of distress. It may not be entirely unreasonable to hold her responsible to some extent, for even in times of distress we do not desire theft to spread. But the main responsibility will lie with those people and those institutions that have caused or that have not prevented distress; if we can stop these, a thousand cases of theft will automatically be prevented. And what has now been said about social conditions may even be extended to inherited proclivities. It may, indeed, be indispensable to punish the criminal himself, but the responsibility of the ancestor whose criminal instincts he has inherited will be at least as great.

And now let us remember that freedom in the moral sense of this term was attached to responsibility by definition. What follows? Every man whose conduct is not due to ignorance or coercion will indeed (in the moral sense of the word) be "free" to some extent: but his freedom may be relatively insignificant when compared with the "power of determination" acting upon him (that is to say, with the influences tending to exempt him from responsibility). On the other hand he will, it is true, never be able to emancipate himself completely from these "determining" forces, but he may succeed to some extent, and his freedom will never be completely annihilated. Man will always be free within a certain sphere, but this sphere may be larger or smaller and will never be wholly unlimited. Indeed, the individual in his relation to the influences to which he is exposed and that are due to inheritance and to environment, may be likened to a man swimming in a fast stream. His motion will in some measure always be due to his own will and to his own strength, and if he is a very skilful swimmer he may reach his goal in spite of the current, but to some extent his motion will always be due to the current also. What then? In the moral sense of these terms man is never entirely free and never completely

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determined. The extent to which he is free varies in proportion to the independence of his character. It is this that determines the measure of freedom allotted to him. But never is this measure as small as determinists, and never is it as great as indeterminists, would have it. Truth, in this case also, is a mean.

“ BOTH GOD AND MAN ”

J. C. GRAHAM

“ALL verbal forms of statement,” says Whitehead, “that have been long before the world disclose ambiguities, and sometimes the ambiguities strike at the very heart of the meaning. The effective sense in which a doctrine has been held in the past cannot be determined by a logical analysis of statements made in ignorance of the logical trap. . . . Religion collapses unless its main positions command immediacy of assent.”

In illustration of the first of these pronouncements Whitehead instances the Christian doctrine of Grace, but perhaps a more conspicuous example is the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. This doctrine is epitomized in the statement that Jesus Christ was both God and Man, a formula which, though not verbally consonant with the Nicene Creed, is held, on Ecumenical authority, to be what the Nicene Creed implies. The formula is susceptible of more than one interpretation, but the Catholic exegesis is that our Lord was at one and the same time God and Man in an identical sense—a sense, that is, which identifies Him with God, and simultaneously identifies Him with Man. “Our Lord claimed to be both God and Man; it is a mystery; I do not understand it; but I believe it.” These words, uttered with obvious sincerity by a popular preacher, may be regarded as typical of the orthodox attitude. The only relevant comment to be made upon it is that our Lord made no such claim, that we do not get rid of a contradiction by calling it a mystery, nor is it possible to believe what we do not understand. The orthodox doctrine, in short, is more than ambiguous, it is confessedly unintelligible; and we may well wonder how so strange a tenet could have originated. Let us, then, glance briefly at its history.

To His Jewish followers, Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah of prophecy. Whether or not He regarded Himself in that light is, as we know, the cardinal issue in modern Jesuology. Messiahship, however, did not imply Godhead. Our Lord’s apotheosis was a subsequent development due to the syncretism of Judaic and pagan ideas. The Pauline doctrine of the incarnation of the Holy Spirit, and the Johannine identification of the Messiah with the Logos of Greek metaphysical speculation marked definite stages of the process. The term “Logos” (the “Intelligence” or “Creative Activity” of God) had been already personified by Philo as a “Second God” or “Son of God.” The long controversy in the early Church concerning the

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relationship of the Son, or *Lógos*, or Incarnate Word, to the Father-God came to a crisis at the beginning of the fourth century when the teaching of Arius, that the Son was subordinate to the Father, was opposed by Athanasius, who taught that Christ was God in the fullest sense. The decision of the Council of Nicaea (A.D. 325) in favour of Athanasius did not, however, settle the question, and controversy continued to rage round the problem of the two natures in one person, until the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) declared the orthodox doctrine of the Church to be that Christ was both God and Man. "The history of the whole controversy," says Dr. Temple, "represents the bankruptcy of Greek patristic theology." Harnack said: "We cannot think realistically about the doctrine of the *deus factus homo* without thinking ourselves out of it." But *deus factus homo* is not the proper expression: it is *deus ipse homo* that is conceptually impossible.

In the light of historical criticism and research, it would be difficult, I think, for any unbiased mind to avoid the conclusion that our Lord neither foresaw nor desired the religion to which His life and teaching gave birth; "it never entered His head." Yet of that religion, in spite of its doctrinal vagaries, He has been the *omphalos*, the "seed"—in Dr. Major's metaphor—of all this flowering, and looking back across the centuries at the unique sanctity of that Life, we can still say, with Zacharias, "the day-spring from on high hath visited us."

But nothing can be farther removed from that day-spring than the Chalcedonian Decree. It cannot be too strongly insisted that this dogma violates the laws of thought, and is no more than a meaningless collocation of terms. The view that it is possible to "believe" it rests, we must conclude, upon a fundamental misconception of the meaning of belief.

On the other hand, we are faced with the indisputable fact that millions of human beings have professed to believe the dogma with passionate sincerity. How, then, it may be urged, is it possible to maintain that it is incredible? To any such criticism Newman has furnished the answer. Belief is one thing; the profession of belief, *however sincere*, is another. We are unfortunately able to persuade ourselves that we believe various doctrines, especially those involving ambiguity, by the simple process of misunderstanding them. While the will or desire to believe cannot enable us to really believe, it can certainly convince us that we do. A familiar example of this is afforded by the doctrine of what is called "Free-Will," which, having never really grasped its meaning, so many profess quite conscientiously to believe. But the affirmation, in good faith, of belief in propositions which admittedly we do not understand, can be due only to misapprehension of what Newman called "the grammar of assent."

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Nevertheless, the criticism is one to which the greatest possible weight must be attached. We are dealing with a formula held sacred by a great multitude. It would clearly be wrong to impugn it lightly, out of a mere love of paradox, or, indeed, from any other motive than zeal for religious truth. But given that motive, it would be still more wrong not to impugn it. “To acquiesce in discrepancy”—if I may again quote Whitehead—“is destructive of candour and of moral cleanliness. It belongs to the self-respect of the intellect to pursue every tangle of thought to its final unravelment. If you check that impulse you will get no religion . . . from an awakened thoughtfulness.” I believe that the doctrine of the Incarnation embodies a truth of fundamental significance and value. But I do not think we can fail to realize that, whatever may have been the case in the past, the form in which the doctrine is presented liturgically and homiletically by the Church is, to-day, one of the main reasons for the declining influence of the Christian religion among educated people.

The canonical doctrine of our Lord’s person is, in a word, contradictory; and in order that we may be perfectly clear about this, it may be well to recall the First and Second Laws of Thought:

(1) The Principle of Identity.

Everything is what it is, and not some other thing. (A horse is a horse and not an apple.)

(2) The Principle of Contradiction.

A thing cannot be both what it is and something else. (A horse cannot be both a horse and an apple.)

A contradictory proposition is *ipso facto* unintelligible, and since we are unable to predicate either truth or untruth of the unintelligible, belief is ruled out—*cadit quaestio*. But the matter is not so easily disposed of. It is not disputed that the Chalcedonian formula is logically contradictory, but it is held that it is not, or may not be, “metaphysically” contradictory; it is not disputed that it is unintelligible, but it is claimed that though unintelligible it is credible. The problem, therefore, resolves itself into the question of the credibility of the unintelligible.

Can we believe what we do not understand? To believe is to recognize as true, truth is an attribute of propositions that are accordant with fact, and propositions are statements or judgments consisting of subject and predicate—statements in which we say something about something. If anyone asks me whether I believe that rollochites constantly sibble, the logical reply is: “I do not know what rollochites are, nor do I know what sibbling is, and as I do not understand the proposition, I am unable to express any opinion about the truth of it.” The truth of the statement that we cannot

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'believe what we do not understand seems, indeed, obvious enough; but many people appear to have a difficulty in assenting to it. "I believe in God," they say, "but I do not understand Him." But "in God" is not a proposition. Truth, and therefore belief, let me repeat, are predicable only of propositions. The proposition implied by the phrase "in God" is probably "God exists" or "God is just and merciful," or some similar statement, and these propositions are quite intelligible. Every credible statement must convey at least some meaning to our minds, and it is this meaning that gains our acquiescence. Nobody, I presume, would argue in so many words that we can believe a proposition that conveys no meaning to us, but that is what the assertion that we can believe what we do not understand comes to. Possibly someone may still object that the proposition "God exists" is one that we do not understand, since we do not understand God. But, once more, we do not believe "God," "God" is not a proposition; the proposition is "God exists." If what is meant is that God is a being whose nature is beyond our comprehension, that is a perfectly intelligible proposition. We do claim, however, to understand Him to some extent, or the term "God" would be meaningless, instead of being, as it is to many of us, more pregnant with meaning than any other that we know.

Dr. Harris, in *Creeds or No Creeds*, says:

"Any doctrine that contains a plain contradiction must be false. On the other hand . . . the created universe is so mysterious and involves so many apparent contradictions that we ought not to be surprised if we find mysteries and apparent contradictions in God."

If it were not impossible to doubt Dr. Harris's sincerity it would be difficult to acquit him of sophistry. This is the kind of expedient that Whitehead likens to throwing a lighted match into a powder-magazine—you blow up the whole caboodle. The contention that propositions which present themselves to our minds as plain logical contradictions may be only "apparent contradictions in God" leaves us no means of distinguishing real contradictions. Can we really suppose that God would stultify us in this way?

The reader may, indeed, be puzzled to know what the phrase "apparent contradictions in God" can be supposed to mean. Certainly no one has ever discovered contradictions in God, real or "apparent," and we may be quite sure that there are none. Dr. Harris cannot mean that a thing might appear to be both what it is and something else—that a horse, for instance, might appear to be both a horse and an apple. That would be a real, not an apparent, contradiction. The appearance of a horse is as much a "thing" cognitively as the horse itself, and a horse-appearance could not be both a horse-appearance and an apple-appearance.

What then is Dr. Harris's real meaning? It is, I fear, that what is a contradiction to us may not be a contradiction to God, and if he

means that he is talking nonsense. The term “contradiction” is one of our own coining. It is the name we give to the infringement of a particular logical principle, and can have no other meaning, whether for God or for anyone else, than that which we give it. And if we believe, as we do, that our reasoning faculty is God-given we may regard the principle itself as divinely revealed.

Somewhat analogous to Dr. Harris’s contention is that of the Archbishop of York. Dr. Temple apparently holds that contradictions may be resolved by spiritualizing them. “The breakdown” (of patristic Christology) “was inevitable because the spirit cannot be expressed in terms of substance at all . . . the doctrine of substance is in essence materialistic.” But “spirit” and “substance” are as irrelevant to the problem as the song the sirens sang. The issue is concerned with “things,” i.e. objects of thought, and the question is whether a thing, be it spiritual, material, or even imaginary, can be conceived to be both what it is and something else. (Incidentally, I am sure that Dr. Temple is quite wrong in identifying substance with matter, but that is another story.)

In his great treatise, *Nature, Man and God*, Dr. Temple reaffirms his faith in the Chalcedonian dogma, and almost makes a virtue of not understanding it: “The psychology of the God-Man must necessarily be beyond our grasp; any theory which professed to understand it would be thereby condemned”—and, by the same token, we may add, any creed which professed to believe it. “The difficulty is no proof that the alleged event did not occur”—nor any proof that it did! The whole argument is a *petitio*—it assumes the very point at issue. The concept of the God-Man being logically untenable, it is idle to talk about his psychology.

The proposition that events may occur which we do not understand suffers from the ambiguity of idiom. Properly speaking, intelligibility and unintelligibility are predicable only of propositions. “This is a horse” is an intelligible proposition; “This is both a horse and an apple” is an unintelligible proposition. When we say that we cannot understand such statements we mean that we cannot make head or tail of them, they are nonsense to us. But when we say that we cannot understand an event, such as a noise, or a sudden light, or an action, we mean, not that it is nonsense to us, but that it is something of which we do not know the cause or do not know the purpose. And these propositions are intelligible enough, and may quite well be true.

If Dr. Temple means that propositions unintelligible to us may yet be true, that also we may assent to them, provided they do not violate the laws of thought. But the point is that if they are unintelligible they are outside the range of credence. There may be such things as rollochites and they may sibble, but if anyone tells us

that rollochites are both what they are and something else, we know that the statement is false: it violates the second law.

If, on the other hand, Dr. Temple means, as presumably he does, that contradictory propositions may be true, or that propositions contradictory to us may not be contradictory to God, then he falls under the same condemnation as Dr. Harris. God is not mocked, nor does He mock us. Few people are capable of thinking more profoundly than Dr. Temple, who, if he were not a great apologist, would be a great philosopher. He is no more capable of equivocation than Dr. Harris. They are both men of unimpeachable candour, but they have been misled by their predilections.

We see, then, that Dr. Temple's argument is, at bottom, the same as that of Dr. Harris, and it is very important that we should appreciate its true meaning. It illustrates once again the truth of McTaggart's dictum: "None ever went about to break logic but logic broke him." It is based, however unconsciously, upon the desire to serve the apologetic interest, and it has no other basis. If, indeed, it were possible to believe it, we should be plunged into utter scepticism and despair. How out of harmony it is with our deepest convictions may easily be seen by reflecting upon its consequences. It seeks to invalidate the universality of the Principle of Contradiction. But the Principle of Contradiction is a corollary of the Principle of Identity: they stand or fall together. If, therefore, the spiritual world posited by religion is a world where these laws do not run, a world where "things are not what they are," then there is an end of Theism. For God is the God of Truth, and Truth is meaningless apart from the Laws of Thought. That our values are God's values is cardinal to our faith, the very Ark of the Covenant. If God's truth is not our truth it is not truth at all. "There cannot," said Bradley, "be two orders of truth in diametrical and everlasting opposition." The divine Mind we conceive to be infinitely comprehensive, embracing all possible categories, all "universes of discourse." But this conception is clearly irreconcilable with the view that it is essentially alogical. On that view, indeed, it ceases to be mind at all, and God ceases to be God.

Can Faith, or Authority, enable us to believe what Reason denies? This is another way of asking whether we can believe what we know to be untrue. Faith has been defined as "spiritual apprehension of divine truth apart from proof." Not, be it observed, apart from disproof. Such apprehension is sometimes called "religious experience" or "revelation." "Revealed truth," however, like any other, must conform to the canons of reason, which are also the criteria of truth. We may think that we hear the voice of God speaking to us, but if what that voice tells us is contrary to reason, it is not the voice of God. The final appeal is always and inevitably to reason, "that Judge, universal, yet individual to each, before whom all

other authority must bow." When the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews defined faith as "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen," he meant that by faith (in its other sense of "passionate conviction") we can make our hopes come true; and so, no doubt, we can, if they are reasonable hopes. But there can be no compromise between faith and reason. The fervid asseverations of ecstasy are not evidence. Tertullian's "credo quia impossibile"—"I do not care whether it is true or not, I believe it"—this sort of thing is not belief, but mania.

If, then, no Christians have ever, in the canonical sense, believed that Jesus was both God and Man, what have they believed about Him? It is certain that they have believed something with very great intensity.

There would seem to be a trinity of possible conceptions. We may think of Him as God; or as Man; or as neither God nor Man, but a combination of both.

Many Christians, perhaps, think of Him consistently as God. Others, we know, think of Him consistently as Man. Others, doubtless think of Him as a kind of Logos or Demigod, part God and part Man, an Intercessor or Mediator between God and Man. Canon Brasnett's conception, for example, clearly comes under this latter head. His view is that Jesus comprised two selves, a "noumenal" self, of which He was unaware, and a phenomenal or psychological self. The former was the Divine Logos, and the latter the human Jesus.

It is probable, however, that most of us do not envisage Him consistently at all. We vacillate between these various conceptions, thinking of Him now in one way and now in another. We can think of things only in terms of their attributes, since, apart from their attributes they are nothing. When we think of Him as eating and drinking, or displaying violent anger, we are thinking of Him as Man. When we think of Him as exercising supernatural powers, or as impeccable, we are thinking of Him as God. As God He would be incapable of sin; as Man He would be capable of sin; as both God and Man He would be both incapable and capable of sin; to such nonsensical conclusions does the original misconception lead us. There are, we may believe, attributes common to both God and Man—there is, we say, a "divine element" in Man. If so, such attributes are part of the insignia of Man, without which he would not be Man at all. We cannot say, in short, that Man possesses both divine and human attributes, for his "divine" attributes are as human as his animal attributes—the term human connotes them both. Man is wholly Man, not part God and part Man, though he may be "part God and part beast."

Which, then, of the three possible conceptions, is the true one? There can surely be no doubt about the answer.

If we try to think of our Lord as a mystical being who was at

Once both Very God and Very Man we transform Him into a hieroglyph, a chimera, a phantom, that becomes more remote, unreal, and shadowy as we gaze upon it, and finally vanishes through the Ivory Gate into the land of false dreams from which it came.

But if we allow ourselves to contemplate Him as what indeed He was, a purely human being, He becomes at once intimate and real; a figure infinitely pathetic and winning. It is said that even when we have not deified Him we have made an idol of Him. He has become for us the Pattern Man, the Paragon of Humanity, "the Image of Good, to the beauty and perfection of which each succeeding generation has contributed its quota." But we could hardly have done this unless He had been, to begin with, a Being of unique spiritual loveliness. And such, in truth, He appears in the pages of Guignebert, most radical and ruthless of historians. He was not immaculate, not infallible, or He would not have been human. He pictured the relation of God to Man as that of a loving Father to His children. He believed that men grow to perfection by serving one another, and that they thus fulfil the will of their Father. His words were as balm to the souls of those who had ears to hear and hearts to understand, and the saying attributed to Him, "Come unto Me all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest," is one that He could have uttered with perfect humility and truth. "His religion was His whole life, and God was the breath of His being." And although the Apocalyptic Vision that obsessed Him and His disciples has long since faded from the earth, His Law of Love remains. Purity, truth, chastity, tolerance, kindness, humility, gentleness, pity, simplicity, forgiveness—these things He preached and these things He practised. Whatever deeper meaning the idea of the Incarnation may connote, it means, surely, at least this—as Rashdall expressed it—that "in human character at its highest we have a revelation, as nowhere else, of the inmost nature of the Divine." This is what St. Paul meant when he spoke of "the glory of God" reflected "in the face of Jesus Christ." And as He was beautiful with the beauty of holiness He became a Light to the world, "a pillar of fire by night, a pillar of cloud by day, guiding through the wilderness of life countless millions of our race." We may, indeed, call Him "Christ," for He was "anointed" with goodness; and we may call Him Lord.

It is hardly necessary to point the moral. Religion is man's search for God. The Archbishop of York, in his epistolary debate with Professor McBride, voiced, I think, the general sentiment of Christendom when he said: "What is wanted is co-operative study in which to help one another to build up the new synthesis for which the world is waiting, and in the meanwhile to present what many of us believe to be the essential Christian truth. . . ." The difficulty is that we differ so amongst ourselves as to what is the essential

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Christian truth. With this utterance of the Archbishop's we will venture to collate two others: one of Bernard Shaw's—"The difference between Religion and Science is that Religion is always right and Science is always wrong; that is why I can accept the creed of Science and cannot accept the creed of Religion"; and one of Whitehead's—"Religion will not regain its old power until it can face change in the same spirit as Science does." We must realize that the "new synthesis," when it comes, will not be final. Religion must eschew, once for all, the doctrine of dogmatic finality, the parent of obscurantism, bigotry, intolerance, and persecution.

On the other hand, while no religion is absolutely true, all religions are, as Herbert Spencer put it, "adumbrations of a truth"; all contain some germ or element of truth. On being asked by Professor McBride to indicate what he believed to be "the core of timeless truth" in Christianity, Dr. Temple replied that to do so *ex cathedra* would imply infallibility, but added: "as an expression of my own confident expectation I would point to the Nicene Creed . . . the crucial text is not 'God is love,' but 'God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son.'"

No, No, Dr. Temple! The heart and soul of Christianity, its "core of timeless truth," is to be found, if anywhere, not in the mythology of the Messianic Logos which has so unhappily become crystallized in the creeds and formularies of the Church, but in the vision of God as the personification of goodness, and in that ideal of love and selfless service which, as we believe, the "Pale Galilean" incarnated in His life. It is said that it was the belief in His resurrection that created the Christian religion—though I think it was rather the belief in His parousia—but we must remember that it was because of what He had been in life to His disciples, because of the so great love for Him that burned in their hearts, that He "rose from the dead" and appeared again before them in His habit as He lived; they could not let Him go. It was His life, not His death, that was the epochal thing; the rest we may leave to God. The human story of that life, divested of the syncretic trappings of obsolete philosophies and the tinsel decorations of romantic legend, will never cease to quicken and inspire all

. . . whose hearts are fresh and simple
Who have faith in God and Nature
Who believe that in all ages
Every human heart is human,
That in even savage bosoms
There are longings, yearnings, strivings
For the good they comprehend not,
That the feeble hands and helpless,
Groping blindly in the darkness,
Touch God's right hand in that darkness
And are lifted up and strengthened.

THE GREAT TAO

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AN understanding of the Chinese mind, and Chinese Art and Literature that are the expression of it, cannot be achieved without an examination of the fundamental elements that have gone to the building of Chinese mysticism.

The conception of "yang" and "yin" has become pretty familiar to the widening circle of those now taking an interest in Chinese affairs. It probably arose at a very early period of Chinese history. The antitheses of light and darkness, of male and female, of active and passive must obviously have influenced the primal thinkers who first sought for philosophical explanations of the Universe. Yet the Chinese mind did not, as some commentators have supposed, follow Persian dualism in attributing their apparently opposing manifestations to rival moral forces, or powers of Good and Evil.

Different forces there are, undoubtedly: the "yang"—male, positive, active, light-giving; the "yin"—female, passive, receptive, Queen of the Darkness. Doubtless more than one Chinese Socrates might have drawn from his own experience the unhappy generalization that connotes evil with the female principle, yet the Ancient Sages propounded a grander explanation. Contemplating the calm and even progression of night and day, of birth and death, of growth and decay, and all the certain and unerring processes of nature in the fruition of the crops, the habits of beast and bird and insect, the rotation of the seasons, they rejected, surely sensibly enough, any moral classification of those phenomena. Chinese thought, indeed, has always refused to see any intrinsic evil in Nature as a whole, or in the individual nature of man or beast. How could one say that darkness was evil, when from the very darkness of the womb came life itself? Yet evil there certainly was, though it was not an easy thing to define, for what was evil for one might be good for another. Seeming disaster was often the prelude to success. The cry of the mother meant the birth of the child. The Sages therefore defied the apparent moral antitheses. Instead of Good and Evil as opposing principles, they proclaimed Harmony and Discord. Good and evil were not intrinsically in "yang" and "yin" themselves, but only potentially in their interactions. So long as there was Harmony between the two, the sequences would be Good—good, that is, in a broad sense. The heavenly bodies would continue on their due courses, regulating the orderly process of the seasons; the rains would fall, the mists rise, the

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earth bring forth its appointed fruits. There would be neither floods nor earthquakes nor devastating storms. Every living thing would fit itself into its appropriate place, functioning smoothly in harmony with the divine purposes of gods and spirits and ancestors.

The directing force in the scheme is the Great Tao. It is something quite impersonal. Prayer, for example, to the Great Tao would be as incongruous as prayer to the Law of Gravity. It was before God or gods who are Beings created by the Tao. For the Tao is the primal source whence all came, gods and spirits and men, beasts, and all the phenomena of the Universe in the dual order of "yang" and "yin." "This is the Tao," says Kwang-tsu. ". . . It has its root and ground of existence in itself. Before there were heaven and earth from of old, there it was securely existing. From it came the mysterious existences of spirits, from it the mysterious existence of God (the Lord of Heaven). It produced heaven, it produced earth. It was before the primal ether. It was above all, and could not be considered high, it was below all and could not be considered deep. It was produced before heaven and earth, and yet could not be considered to have lasted long, it was older than the highest antiquity, and yet could not be considered old." It is the nature of the Tao to be harmonious, and in the divine scheme of things it is therefore intended that there shall be concord of "yang" and "yin." And sometimes, somewhere, the Poet and Dreamer could believe that he had achieved contact with an ideal Unseen World, where that mystic harmony really did exist, where the Tao really functioned without those ugly aberrations and discords that manifested themselves on earth as wars, floods, famines, earthquakes . . . marring its processes there. These were the evil things; their source, that lack of harmony, not Nature itself, not the nature of man or beast, not "yang" nor "yin." The lack of harmony arose from the perversions of Nature, that in Man's case made him proud, ambitious, avaricious, assertive, aggressive. . . . Let him, at least, abandon his resultant follies, and seek the simple, natural life, doing the task to hand, without any ulterior purpose than that of maintaining the pervading Harmony of the Great Tao.

The real world refused, and, one supposes, has always refused, to respond to the Taoist aspirations for Harmony. In China, as elsewhere, there arose a practical ethical school, whose chief exponent, of course, was Confucius. It sought Harmony, too, and accepted the general conception of "yang" and "yin," but it eschewed pure mysticism, and the Unseen World. It sought, like other ethical schools, and with much the same conclusions, to analyse man's actions into right and wrong, good and bad, to encourage the first and restrain the second by rule, precept, and admonition, and the discipline of propriety and ceremonial. Yet the Confucian, it should be noted, equally with the Taoist, refused to admit any intrinsic

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evil in the Universe. Evil was due to a falling away from the path of virtue as defined by the Confucian ethic.

On a first consideration there would appear to be little reason for conflict between these two schools. If there was any truth at all in the Taoist conception of that potential harmony of Nature, within itself, and with that mystic Unseen World, one might suppose that the Confucian ethical teachers would have been welcomed as allies for its achievement.

Yet in fact the two schools have always been in strong opposition, refuting in their activities the very harmony both claim to seek.

It is a common opposition, found wherever Mankind has begun to ponder on its destiny. It draws everywhere from common roots that lie deep in the fundamental problems of existence. Ideal or real; body or soul; works or faith; this world or the next; the letter that killeth or the spirit that giveth life . . . the sound of conflict about these things echoes down the ages, and there is no final solution of them—not yet, anyhow, and when there is there will be nothing left to dispute about!

The dispute in China, however, took a peculiar turn, with consequences correspondingly remarkable, that account for to this day those differences of outlook that sometimes make the Chinese difficult for the Westerner to understand.

The Taoists could put up a good case. In criticism of the efforts of the Confucians to define right and wrong, and regulate it by rule and precept, they could retort in the first place with that old argument, known to the Greek Sophists, and Socrates, and Pontius Pilate, on the impossibility of really defining the Good and the True. It was certainly a fact, consecrated by the experience of all the ages, that an action defined as "good" often brought trouble and misfortune. Clearly then, weighed in the light of basic Taoist principles, such an act, however "good" unseeing men might call it, could not be in harmony with the purposes of the Tao, could not therefore really be "good" if there were any transcendental meaning in that quality. On the other hand, strangely enough, that same, or a similar act, always "good" according to Confucian ethic, but performed under different circumstances, might equally, and often in fact did, bring its reward of well-being and honour as men counted such things, might even spread its effluence all around, and so properly, if unwittingly, further the supernal purposes. And yet again an act defined as evil might impartially bring either fortune or misfortune to its perpetrator. Even the most sincere and conscientious follower of the rule was continually in dilemma in his efforts to apply it to some particular ethical problem. As often as not the antithesis was not a simple obvious one of "good" and "bad," but the choice lay between two goods, or two bads, and the rule gave no guidance, or if it did,

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was at least as likely as not to propose the wrong solution. Often too the urge to the noblest act, the act we should call "quixotic," was condemned by cold consideration of the ethic. Often again a mysterious inner prompting—what some might call instinct, others influences emanating from Unseen Powers—provided a truer guidance to appropriate action than all the calculated wisdom of the Teachers; whilst the generous action done without thought of reward, often received it when the "bread" came back "after many days" across the waste of waters. Such conclusions, based on irrefutable observation, seemed clearly to expose the vanity of definition. To the sceptical judgment those varying and unaccountable consequences must come to be attributed to mere chance, and the consideration of them would inevitably breed a pessimistic despair, ending in the rejection of all ethical principle, and a fatalistic yielding to the crude promptings of circumstance. On the other hand, the Taoist, condemning ethical calculations, could marshal the mystic arguments, familiar in all ethical disputations, against utilitarian virtue based on the clear promise of a reward. The true Sage will have "no thought of self, merit, or fame . . . he will know how to bestow favours without seeking a return . . ." We discern the paradox propounded by every spiritualized religion.

But as with all paradoxes, whilst criticism of them is comparatively easy, a constructive solution is hard to find. The Taoists produced one that followed logically—too logically perhaps—from the basic conceptions of their philosophy. Its conclusions were to be pregnant, but by no means happy in their spiritual influences.

Since "good" and "evil" seemed undefinable, inextricably involved both in action and idea, productive of consequences having no ethical relations with cause or motive, consideration of those antitheses should be ignored. This fundamental conclusion accorded with those primal conceptions of the ethically "indifferent" nature of "yang" and "yin." The more extreme schools indeed bluntly denied any ethical distinction at all between good and evil. Action anyhow was not to be directed by consideration for either. There was only one idea for the Sage to keep fixedly before his mind, and that was Harmony; only one path for him to walk, and that was the Way of Harmony, harmony between Seen and Unseen, gods and men, in a quiet, disinterested, unpurposeful adaptation of oneself and one's doings to the unceasing processes of the universe. "The Sage is free from self-display, therefore he shines; from self-assertion, therefore he is distinguished; from self-boasting, therefore his merit is acknowledged; from self-complacency, therefore he acquires superiority." It is useless for a man to have a purpose, since the purposes of the supernal processes are clearly beyond his grasp. For: "It is the Way of the Tao to act without thinking of acting; to conduct affairs

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without feeling the trouble of them; to taste without discerning any flavour; to consider the small as great; the few as many . . ." One perceives the philosopher struggling to adapt inadequate human thoughts and experiences to the inchoate and inexpressible concepts of a Reality behind the Veil.

The mystic of all ages and climes must feel some instinctive sympathy for this negative, anarchistic attitude. It offers a longed-for freedom from man-made laws; eschews, or anyhow seeks to avoid, the dilemma propounded when virtue is promised a reward, and proposes instead the prospect—congenial to the mystic mind—of a reaching out towards the secret heart of things, and the achievement of a mystical harmonious union with its purposes. Perhaps the doctrine could have found some true and fruitful content with a God who was both First Principle and Person, One, a Father, and Love.

The Taoist never reached that basic conception, and all the aberrations of his creed, the ultimate unfruitfulness of his noble transcendental gropings, must be traced to that cause. The Great Tao was itself, of course, an impersonal Principle, but the conviction of an Unseen World and Unseen Powers, building on and gathering up the primitive animistic beliefs common to all peoples, approved the existence of gods and spirits—not One, but many, nor Love, though some might exhibit reflections of that ethereal quality. But generally, the gods, in accordance with basic Taoist principles, were neither good nor evil. A cynic might say they were both, like Man himself! More properly, they were "indifferent." Anyhow, it was not for man, unable to distinguish good or evil for himself, to presume to judge the ethical qualities of the gods. They might often be disagreeable, but they were a part of the scheme of things—a much more important part than Man, whose chief concern must be to win their favour if possible, or at least avoid giving offence to them. Properly approached and duly propitiated they might fulfil a useful function for helpless Man blindly groping through the mazy processes of the Great Tao. In a word, since there was no true ethical content in the Universe, since good and evil were but names whereby Man attempted to explain the unaccountable circumstances in which he found himself, the Sage would seek only to follow the Way of the Gods, to keep his thoughts and actions in tune with theirs, in the constant faith that they, being of a superior and more spiritual nature, would have a surer insight into the transcendent processes of the Great Tao. Thus we touch again the chords of every mystic's being.

No true mystic can be merely pragmatical, but it is in the nature of things that every creed must be judged by ultimate results. The Taoist, seeking harmonious concord with the unaccountable com-

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plications of existence, was necessarily pragmatic. There was ultimately no other test than that of achieving Harmony, and the proof that he had done so was obviously the avoidance of trouble, of discord in his relations with men and things, and the attainment of a quiet prosperity whereof the visible signs were respect, consideration, and a long life on earth. Inevitably, as in so many other creeds, the mystic aspiration for action without thought of reward proved empty. Taoism developed a cult based intrinsically on the principle of conciliation and propitiation of the vast hierarchy of gods and spirits that functioned under the mysterious direction of the Great Tao. And as is the way of cults, practice degenerated from the nobler implications of philosophy.

Temples and shrines became mere loci for the practice of propitiatory rites whereby the favour of the god could be won, and the required information received for the securing of harmonious consequences for all the actions, great or small, that go to make the sum of daily existence. It might be a mere matter of catching fish, graver ones such as warding off blight from the crops and fruit-trees, disease in beast or man, a journey, marriage, perhaps some portentous political decision. Good and evil . . . these were neither in things nor actions, but only in consequences that failed to achieve the essential concord. Needless to say, that there was infinite scope for the development of every superstition, for the employment of charms and magic, elixirs, astrology, and divination in all their wide and varied range. The experience of our time can assure us that the magic was not always vain, and that the Taoist belief in the intrinsic unity of things must often have received miraculous confirmation from their probings into the secrets of the inner nature of man and matter, and of their mystic relations to the courses of the heavenly bodies and the chance combinations of external circumstances.

One must not, therefore, be too severe on those responsible for these uneasy developments. The gods indeed already existed in the popular mind before the philosophers strove to account for them. The Taoists, by establishing the co-ordinating principle of the Great Tao, did do something to modify the crudities of primal superstitions, to give a higher, a more poetical, if not a more spiritual sanction to them. But certainly the cult, for educated and uneducated alike, came to be little more than a purposeful seeking of the assistance of a god, to win favour or to avoid misfortune. Success in this operation would bring reward, in this world and the next, and the reward became the end—on earth, in the form of long life; for those truly successful a place in the Abode of the Immortals.

It was not long then before those puzzling words "good" and "bad" crept back into Taoist vocabulary. They were a necessity of ordinary speech when considering the honours due to the successful

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achievement of Harmony. A "good" deed was one that was pleasing to the gods, and if contradictions arose, owing to the same deed bringing sometimes fortune and sometimes misfortune, then a new definition concluded that there were good and evil gods, thus announcing a fresh breakdown of the "indifferent" principles of the earlier philosophy. Moreover, practical considerations, the continuing conflict with ethical Confucianism, necessitated some scheme for checking the undoubted misdeeds of erratic men. So definition came in again, and Taoism outdid Confucianism with its long schedules of "things not done." But the schedules strangely preserved in their incongruities those earlier "indifferent" conceptions. It is not easy to perceive any consistent ethical content in such warnings as follows:

"... if he strides over the hearth; kills newly-born children; if he sings and dances on the last day of the moon . . . spits when fronting the north, sighs when fronting the fireplace, points at a rainbow, or kills a tortoise without reason . . ." he shall suffer a shortening of life. The periods vary from one hundred days to twelve years.

Obviously the compilers of the code are still chiefly concerned for the feelings of the gods over these matters. Even if some of the scheduled offences are truly bad according to our ethic, they, like the other trivial or "indifferent" ones, are only so because they are offensive to the heavenly beings. They are punishable again, not from any principle of justice, but because acts offensive to the gods upset the Harmony of the Tao, and bring misfortune on all. The lack of any real ethical relation between punishment and crime emphasizes the point. The penalties are reckoned in days or years deducted from life on earth, and the scale is based on the amount of offence given to the gods, not to the moral prejudices of men. Doubtless the philosopher could declare that in some ultimate Utopian consummation, when the last discord had been silenced, and the perfect harmony of all things within the Tao achieved, such differences of outlook would merge in a wider vision. It may well be so, but such a time still seems as far off as it was 2,500 years ago.

The Confucians, meanwhile, were steadily developing their moral and political theories, and the Confucian scheme was compendious enough in both respects. It laid down a complete ethic that displays no essential difference from other ethical schools. It propounded a political theory based on the analogy between the State and the Family, that echoes continually in our own Empire broadcasts of to-day. Yet Confucian ethic and Confucian political theory have always lacked the dynamic necessary to give them reality. The letter was there, but the spirit that giveth life was lacking. The cold pages of history supply the confirmatory commentary, whilst the very

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survival of Taoism, and the acceptance of the alien doctrine of Buddhism are impressive evidences of the inadequacy of any positivist utilitarian creed to satisfy the expansive aspirations of the human spirit.

Taoism (like Buddhism later) therefore held its own because, with all its pandering to gross superstitions, it could provide scope for mystical yearnings, because it gave assurance of some other kind of existence beyond this world of sin and sorrow. Paradoxical as it must seem, it was perhaps better for men to be more concerned with pleasing or humouring gods and spirits (even Chinese gods and spirits) than for their own mere material prosperity. And the best Taoist does seem to have conformed to some of the highest conceptions of the perfect gentleman, with perhaps an over-emphasis on the gentleness.

"The Sage will feel kindly towards all creatures. . . . He will make himself correct, and so transform others. . . . He ought not to vaunt his superiorities. . . . He will be gentle, frugal, and humble. . . ." For, says Lao-tsu, "With that gentleness I can be bold; with that frugality I can be liberal; shrinking from taking precedence, I can become a vessel of the highest honour."

Since Art is the expression of the spirit, we perceive that Chinese plastic art, architecture, poetry, and literature owe their highest inspirations to Taoism. The familiar dragon, clearly outlined, or lurking in some mysterious background, symbolizes the active "yang" principle. The Sage, brooding on the lonely mountain, whilst the cranes fly across the red glow in the evening sky, is pondering on the elusive secret of the Great Tao's harmony. The poet, seeking a theme to express his unaccountable transcendental yearnings, strives to create a picture of the mystical union of the Seen and the Unseen.

The changing shapes of wind-swept clouds,
The energies of flowers and plants,
The crags and cliffs of mountains,
All these are like mighty Tao.

SSU-KUNG TU (A.D. 834-908). *History of Chinese Literature*, H. A. Giles.

For all, gentle and simple, scholar and boor, the conception of the Great Tao brings with it an uplifting sense of a process higher than that concerned with the common destinies of ephemeral man. It declares

The unseen Power that moves, and guides, and stills
All animated nature's varied life
And law reveals where all seemed useless strife . . .

LU-TEH (nineteenth century). *Chinese Poems*, translated by Chas. Budd.

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Again, just as in Europe the anarchy of Gothic and Baroque styles defied the cold severity of classical forms, so, in China, the grotesque extravagances of temple and shrine continued to assert the Great Tao's freedom from line and logic. The Buddhist "pagoda" as it developed in China owes much to Taoism. There is Taoist as well as Christian and Buddhist inspiration behind the greatest of Buddhist artistic conceptions—the female Kwan Yin or Goddess of Mercy. The "Arhats" have close affinities with the Taoist Sages, and most of the gods of Chinese Buddhist art and cult have a Taoist origin, whilst the Chinese Buddhist monastery and temple preserve the Taoist style.

On the other hand, Taoism certainly took from Buddhism its forms of cult and ritual; and also the dubious conception of a Hell, where the wicked, inadequately punished on earth, whether by man or in accordance with the peculiar retributions of the Taoist schedule, could receive the fuller meed due to them. As with Buddhism, the women were, of course, in a majority there. The business apparently grew so much as to require a special judge, who was duly set up in the person of an Immortal Sage of the priestly family of Chang. He passed his earthly existence in the eleventh and twelfth centuries A.D., achieving the ripe age of 126 years.

It was inevitable that the Taoists should take the opposite side to the Confucians in the political conflict that outran many centuries. It was the one, familiar to all histories, between democracy and autocracy. China eventually achieved a workable compromise, but the seeds of discord were always there, and have, of course, come to fruit again in these days.

Confucian political theory, however it modified itself in practice, was fundamentally democratic. The root of all was the individual, and the personal character of that individual. The State was made for him, not he for the State. It was the misfortune and chief defect of Confucianism that, whilst positing this great truth, it failed to provide a sufficient foundation for the character necessary to give practical content to it.

For the Taoist, on the other hand, immersed in his conception of the Great Tao, it was natural to confer reality on political organisms that carried in them a suggestion of harmonious unity. The Taoist was thus an early Hegelian, or rather, to be true to chronology, Hegel, who in fact drew much inspiration from Chinese sources, was a Taoist! For these the State was the most important thing, as conforming most nearly to the processes of the Great Tao. It was claimed to have its parallel in the Unseen World, where a Supreme Ruler, set up by the Tao, autocratically guided the actions of lesser gods and spirits. By analogy the ruler on earth must be autocratic too. He, and he alone could bear the responsibility for maintaining

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the harmony of the State organism within itself and in relation to the spirit-world. He, and he alone could intercede with the Ruler on High for the general well-being. A subject, as individual, was of as little importance as he is declared to be in the Neo-Hegelian State concepts of our Western world of to-day. The Taoists, then, stood for autocracy and Divine Right of the Ruler, and the prevailing anarchy of tribal times provided a strong justification for that plea.

In the eventual compromise the Chinese Emperor drew attributes from both schools. As Supreme Ruler on Earth, reflecting the authority of the Ruler on High, he received divine honours. He was the Son of Heaven and he alone could commune with its Lord for the welfare of the great State family. He was the source of all earthly authority.

Yet Confucianism, in opposition to extreme Taoist political theory, imposed on this autocracy salutary checks that endured to the last days.

The Emperor's autocratic powers depended on a Mandate from Heaven. Failure to justify that Mandate gave the people, asserting their individual human rights, an intrinsic right of remonstrance, in the last resort, of rebellion. The frequent changes in Chinese Dynasties, even the imposed acceptance of foreign ones, derived from that fundamental if dangerous principle. Nor did the Taoists always stand aloof from revolutionary movements. It would be perfectly congenial to their theories to assume that the disorders in the State were due, anyhow in part, to the failure of the Rulers to maintain the Celestial concord. The morality or immorality of their actions, indeed, were not in question. They had displeased the gods, and the proofs were floods, famine, disease, brigandage, barbarian invasions. . . . Heaven's favour being withdrawn, it was right to seek a new ruler and the wisdom of a Sage; his insight into the processes of the Great Tao; in effect, his skill in charms, magic, the reading of signs, might well be employed for the purpose. Yet, significantly enough, on the occasions of *foreign conquest*, it was the Taoists who stood by the forlorn resistance of the Nationalists, when the Confucian bureaucrats in their worldly wisdom had made their peace with the conquerors. The Taoists, too, seemed to have inspired the subsequent nascent nationalism.

Broadly speaking, however, the Taoist would be classed as a greater reactionary and conservative than his Confucian opponent. Both were, indeed, tied to tradition and the ways of the ancestors, but whilst the Confucian, anyhow in theory, stressed the importance of the individual, approved education, and gave opportunity for it to the poorest through its admirable system of scholarships, Taoist political theory professed yearnings for a mythical Golden Age, where Harmony had been secured by keeping the people in a safe ignorance,

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employed from generation to generation on hereditary tasks and free from all ambitions for change and progress.

Then "the people had their regular and constant nature . . . they did not form themselves into separate classes . . . they were left to their natural tendencies. . . . Men walked with slow and grave steps and with looks directed steadily forwards. On the hills were no foot-paths . . . on the lakes no boats nor dams. . . . Birds and beasts . . . all lived as one family . . . How could men know amongst themselves the distinctions of superior and small? Equally without knowledge they did not leave the path of their natural virtue; equally free from desires they were in a state of pure simplicity; their nature was what it ought to be."

This is of course polemic, designed to confute the Confucian adversary, but behind the paradoxes we may still perceive the earnest gropings after the intangible Secret of the Great Tao.

The contribution of Taoist philosophy to the development of the Chinese mind and character thus becomes clear. The Chinese is essentially pragmatical, he judges by results. He is the reverse of quixotic, choosing the way of least resistance, as being, naturally, less likely to upset the harmony of things. He has an aptitude for management, accommodation, and compromise—good things in their place and degree—rather than for firm decision calculated to break down or burst through the obstacles to action. In a word, he makes an admirable politician, in the less estimable interpretation of that term! He is certainly superstitious to a degree far exceeding that of any other civilized people, though we may note that similar tendencies are not absent amongst the more backward peoples of Europe to-day. He is both sceptic and fatalist, for since his Taoism denies the possibility of any sure ethical guide to action, he must perforce surrender himself quietistically to circumstances, seeking only, with the favour of the gods, so to adapt himself to them as to escape the greatest possible amount of trouble. Yet with these negative qualities there is also scope in Taoism for "the larger heart the kindlier hand," to reprove, as ever, the sterner, harder attitude of the strict follower of ethical rule. The Way of the Sage is after all a Way of Harmony, of concord between gods and men and the forces of Nature. The discipline of ceremonial, the rigidity of law, the stern adherence to the dictates of tradition and duty—all these things are doubtless necessary for the making of a man; yet, such is the strange paradox of his nature, he must also temper them with humbleness, meekness, and occasional relaxations of the strict letter of the law, otherwise the disciplines provoke the qualities of harshness, tyranny, and cruelty.

In the conclusion of the whole matter we may recognize that neither Confucianism nor Taoism have proved adequate for Man's

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needs. It does not suffice—even if it can be done, as the Confucian proposes—to distinguish between good and bad by rule and line, or to refuse to contemplate a world beyond the senses. The Taoist had his justification in holding that there was such a world, and that Man's reason cannot be the final judge, as Emanuel Kant announced some 150 years ago. The Taoists were his forerunners, too, as they were the pregnant Hegel's.

For us in the West the conclusion should not be hard to find. We have long claimed to have a light, but are rather given in these days to hide it coily under a bushel. Yet there is no other solution that in any way meets the case than the conception of a single God, the Father, whose ways are indeed often inscrutable, but whose attributes are ultimately embraced in the all-concluding one of Love; who values each living soul for its own sake, and so assures us of our individuality, declaring it more important than any man-made thing or concept, ethical or political. Nor, if we are Christians, need we be ashamed to conceive of that Love as manifesting itself in the person of a Divine Son and the abiding presence of a Holy Spirit, who does, in sundry times and places, and moments of peril, difficulty, and hard choice, give us the grace to guide us along the Way of the true Harmony, a Way that is not the mere process of an impersonal Tao, directing a hierarchy in which gods and men and beasts, plants and matter, differ only in degree, but the Way of the One Living God.

EDITORIAL NOTE

IN the article which appeared in *PHILOSOPHY* of October 1936 on "Scholasticism" passages occur, without marks of quotation, transcribed from an article by Fr. John J. Toohey, S.J., in *The Irish Theological Quarterly* of July 1919. The writer of the article on "Scholasticism," on being communicated with, has written as follows in explanation:

"Originally the article was much shorter . . . and from time to time I added extracts which I had copied out from various sources without always knowing the authors. Unfortunately I lost the commonplace book . . . and therefore I could not verify any notes I had made; that was the reason I inserted the note at the end of the article—I am sorry that I could not be more precise. I am writing immediately to Fr. Toohey, S.J., to ask his forgiveness, and I give you full leave to make any apology you think necessary in the Journal.

"Yours very truly,

"FELIX HOPE.

"November 12, 1936."

The Surveys on "Philosophy in France" and "Philosophy in Germany" not having reached the Editor in time for the current issue, it is hoped to arrange for them to appear in the April or July numbers.

NEW BOOKS

Kant's Metaphysic of Experience. By H. J. PATON, D.Litt. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. Vol. I, 585; Vol. II, 510. Price 2 vols., 30s.)

It is a tribute to Kant's greatness as a philosopher that books about him, even when they are as good as Professor Paton's commentary, leave the reader with a slight feeling of disappointment. The range of the *Critical Philosophy* is so wide that any serious work about it is bound to raise questions which demand to be answered, but which no author could reasonably be expected to deal with even in two substantial volumes. Professor Paton has naturally faced this difficulty, and has firmly, perhaps too firmly, restricted himself to the task, which indeed is no easy one, of elucidating the *Critique of Pure Reason* as far as the end of the Transcendental Analytic. The method which he adopts is that of an exposition and commentary on the work, section by section, in the order in which it was originally published, and this method, though justified by the absence of any satisfactory commentary in English, has certain inevitable drawbacks. The professional student of Kant may complain that he is not offered any general appreciation of the critical position as a whole, but is told too often that, whether he likes it or not, so-and-so was Kant's view on a particular point, and that it is at least not a silly view. As to whether in the last resort the *Critical Philosophy* is the truth or not, Professor Paton strenuously refuses to commit himself, though the reader will probably have little doubt that he believes it to be sound in principle. But, however much we may regret this abstinence in respect of ultimate problems, we must recognize that the discussion of them would have carried the author beyond the limits which he set himself. In his own words, "a book of the type I have now written, if I could have read it when first I began the study of Kant, would have saved me from endless misunderstanding and much unnecessary labour; and I hope that I may have done something to make further progress more easy for my successors" (I, 18), and he is therefore writing not primarily for experts who already understand exactly what Kant meant in the *Critique*, but rather for the vast majority who are still trying to find out, and whose labour, though heavy enough, will be considerably lightened by the existence of this book.

A more serious criticism of the running commentary as a method of expounding the *Critique* is that it involves an unnecessary amount of repetition. The fault here lies with Kant, not with the commentator, for it is inseparable from the synthetic method which he himself deliberately chose to employ that it should involve constant references to what has gone before and anticipations of what is still to come. There is, therefore, a real danger that the reader of a commentary, as of the *Critique* itself, may from time to time feel that he is lost in a forest of problems with all too little guidance as to which of them are really of vital importance. No difficulty seems ever really to be dealt with at the place where it occurs in the text, but we are referred either back or forwards for further discussion of it. To overcome this defect entirely would be to achieve the impossible, but Professor Paton certainly gives the reader all possible assistance, especially by informing him from time to time that chapters and sections which are mainly repetitive may be omitted without detriment to his understanding of the complete doctrine.

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In view of the author's explicit statement of his purpose, the commentary must be judged solely by its success in explaining what Kant's view actually was, not what it ought to have been or might possibly have been if he had studied the works of his Hegelian successors. By this standard it is almost completely successful, and provides a thorough and comprehensive refutation of a view prevalent, especially in this country, "that Kant was grossly incompetent; that he had a wholly imperfect grasp of what he was trying to say: and that the *Critical Philosophy*, which in the *Critique* is partly embedded in a mass of non-Critical doctrine and partly not even expressed at all, is known in its full stature only to a few choice spirits of whom Kant certainly was not one" (II, 371). In contrast to this fantastic doctrine, Professor Paton persistently and rightly maintains that the *Critique* expresses a coherent and intelligible view with which we may disagree but which we ought at least to take the trouble to understand. "The modern tendency," he says, "to treat Kant with condescension seems to me based on no rational grounds; and, paradoxical though it may appear to the present age, I will venture to express the opinion—an opinion which grows ever firmer the more I study the *Kritik*—that Immanuel Kant had a far better understanding of the *Critical Philosophy* than any commentator who ever lived" (*ibid.*).

It is, of course, impossible to give any summary account of a work of this kind, and I shall do no more than indicate briefly the points in Professor Paton's exposition which I find especially helpful and interesting: I will then discuss at somewhat greater length the major issues on which I cannot accept his account of Kant's doctrine as wholly satisfactory.

As regards Transcendental Aesthetic, he is clearly right in maintaining that critics who have made much of the antithesis between space as logically and as psychologically *a priori* have done less than justice to Kant's view. The Aesthetic is a provisional (though not for that reason a pre-Critical) account of the nature of space and time which ought not to be regarded as complete in itself, and when it is taken in its relation to the Analytic, the supposed inconsistency is found to disappear. Kant's considered doctrine is that "space and time are not only necessary as universal conditions of experience. They have in themselves, even when abstracted from experience, a certain necessity and universality: for in knowing them, we know, apart from experience, what all their parts must be. Our intuition of them is pure inasmuch as it is intuition of a whole whose parts can be known independently of experience" (I, 105). Thus "the two senses of *a priori* are bound up. Space and time are known *a priori* firstly as wholes which necessarily determine the character of their parts, and secondly as necessary conditions of experience. If they were not *a priori* ideas in the first sense, they would not be *a priori* ideas in the second sense" (I, 154).

Of far greater interest and importance, however, is the distinction between General and Transcendental Logic which Professor Paton discusses at some length, and here, too, his view seems to me at least to be entirely correct. I have never been able to understand the doctrine that Kant invented a new mental process known as "synthetic thinking" subject to laws different from those of ordinary logical thought, which, I suppose, is what is meant by the assertion that formal logic gives us the forms of analytic judgments only, and not the forms of synthetic judgment. Professor Paton is unquestionably correct when he says (I, 213) that there is no evidence whatever that Kant ever held such a belief. It is its concern with the *origin* of our cognitions which gives to Transcendental Logic its peculiar character (I, 228), and while it is correct to say that Formal Logic by ignoring the matter of concepts fails to see that they may be of different kinds or that the analysis

on which they rest presupposes synthesis, it certainly does not follow that Formal Logic is for that reason either untrue or inadequate in its own sphere (I, 202). The fact is rather that synthetic judgments add to our knowledge *materialiter* and not merely *formaliter*, and for this reason formal logic gives no account of them so far as they are synthetic: but this does not imply that their form is not the form of all judgment or that logic gives no account of such a common form (I, 215). In dealing with the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in A, Professor Paton is mainly concerned to refute once and for all the patchwork theory evolved by Adickes and Vaihinger and further elaborated by Professor Norman Kemp Smith. He claims to show that the Deduction, while admittedly repetitive and prolix, really does state a single coherent point of view. Kant, for better or worse, saw fit to divide it into a subjective and an objective deduction, and to subdivide each of these into a provisional and an authoritative exposition. Hence it is not really very surprising that we can discover in it traces of a number of different arguments, and that some of these omit factors (e.g. the threefold transcendental synthesis) which are essential to the understanding of the whole. It is, as Professor Paton maintains, singularly perverse to ignore the avowed structure of this section of the *Critique* and then to claim that it must be a patchwork composed at different dates and from different points of view *because* some parts of it omit arguments which properly belong (and, in fact, are found) elsewhere. Two further points deserve especial notice. In the first place Professor Paton is, I believe, fully justified in the insistence with which he stresses Kant's conviction that both the Deduction and the Principles are primarily concerned with the actual objects of physical science; the latter in particular are intelligible only in the light of the views expounded in the *Monadologia Physica* and the *Metaphysische Anfangsgrund der Naturwissenschaft*; and, secondly, he is surely correct in emphasizing, though it should not be necessary to do so, that Kant neither abandoned nor qualified his belief in the existence of independent things in themselves in B.

There remain, however, two fundamental problems of Kantian interpretation as to which every serious commentator must be required to state and maintain a considered view. They are (1) what precisely did Kant understand by the phenomenon or empirical object? And (2) what was Kant's doctrine of inner sense and its relation to time? Professor Paton has much to say that is true and important on both these points, but on neither of them do I feel confident that he has completely solved the problems which the *Critique* presents or even (since he does not claim to have spoken the last word) that his account is as complete as might be expected from his handling of other topics.

In respect of the first, he is firmly of the opinion that the phenomenon is no *Zwischending* which intervenes between our mind and the thing in itself (II, 306). What distinguishes an object from a succession of subjective appearances is, he holds, just the necessary combination of those appearances imposed by the nature of our thought and by the transcendental synthesis of imagination working through the medium of time (II, 167). The object is, therefore, not to be regarded as one idea among others, but rather it is the combination of ideas in a necessary synthetic unity (II, 379), and therefore the distinction between an object and a mere subjective appearance lies in the fact that the latter is simply a partial or temporary aspect of the former (II, 440).

Now this doctrine, whether or not it is satisfactory as a view, is evidently in harmony with much of what Kant is maintaining, especially in the Deduction of the Categories (cf. in particular A 104-5). It is only when we attempt

to interpret the Analogies that it loses its initial plausibility as a complete account of the critical position. It is essentially a development of Kant's fundamental notion that the mind has *a priori* knowledge only of what it has itself contributed to its object by an activity of *a priori* synthesis or construction, and we may reasonably suppose that he himself reached this position by reflection on the function of the figure constructed according to a rule in Euclidean geometry. If this is the case, it is hardly surprising that the complete formulation of it in the Deduction is more satisfactory when the "object" under consideration is a triangle than when it is something to which the term "object" is more safely applied, i.e. a physical body. It is, of course, possible to interpret the Analogies on the assumption that the objects with which science attempts to deal really *are* our constructions in precisely the same sense that geometrical figures are; but Professor Paton does not hold this view. On the contrary, he rightly maintains that Kant believed in the existence of physical substances which exercise real causal efficacy and not merely in causality as a necessary sequence of ideas (II, 281, 282). He is thus faced, as was Kant himself, with the ultimate problem, namely, how can phenomena be at once products of our synthetic imagination and also in any intelligible sense causally operative physical substances. He does indeed admit that he is not prepared fully to discuss this problem here, and mentions that it involves the doctrine of double affection expounded in the *Opus Postumum* (II, 279). But surely it *must* be discussed unless we are prepared to admit that the whole critical theory rests on an assumption which we cannot reasonably be asked to grant. In his own words, "I do not find it difficult to suppose that our minds are such that to them reality must appear as physical bodies in space which must conform to the laws of geometry; but for some reason I do find it difficult to suppose—and I imagine that many share this difficulty—that our minds are such that to them reality must appear, not only as a succession of changes in time, but as a succession of changes in time which must conform to causal law" (*ibid.*). In other words, "the difficulty is to understand how it (the mind) can impose a causal order on my *actual* sense-perceptions" (II, 280).

When it is formulated in these explicit terms the problem is indeed a hopeless one, but I cannot help thinking that Professor Paton has involved Kant in it unnecessarily by his uncompromising rejection of all "phenomenalist" heresies in the interpretation of the *Critique*. I do not myself find his ground for such rejection very convincing; indeed, it seems to me to be primarily his belief that anything asserted by Vaihinger must necessarily be false. Apart from this, we have no evidence but the assertion that Kant was not a "representative idealist." But this amounts only to saying that he did not, as Descartes and Berkeley had done, maintain that the existence of our minds is immediately known to us, whereas that of physical bodies rests on an inference. What he maintained against this view, however, was, as Professor Paton himself explicitly recognizes, that our ideas *both* of objects *and* of the self were representative in character, i.e. were not intellectual intuitions. In view of this I can see no reason why Kant should not maintain (and I think he *does* maintain) the existence (a) of a world of things in themselves of whose character and relations, since they are *ex hypothesi* not spatio-temporal, we can *know* nothing. We can, however, *believe* that it consists of a plurality of self-subsistent entities related by a system of final, not mechanical causes. This seems to me to be clearly the view of the Appendix to the Dialectic and of the second and third *Critiques*. (b) Of a world of Newtonian bodies causally interacting in space and time. These are not actually perceived but are representations by imagination of world (a).

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Their *real* causal interaction is thus simply a representation of the real (but unknowable) nexus which exists in that world. This implies, of course, that the physical universe is not a "construct" of productive imagination in the literal sense in which triangles are the constructs of geometers, but such a doctrine is perfectly consistent with the Kantian thesis that imagination is both sensuous and intellectual, i.e. receptive and spontaneous in character. (c) Of an indeterminate aggregate of sensa which are representations immediately of (b) and therefore mediately of (a). If this were the case, it would be strictly inaccurate to use the word "causality" of anything except necessary connections within (b). It might, however, be applied by analogy to relations of representation between (a) and (b), (b) and (c), and also (a) and (c). I cannot here develop a case for maintaining that this was actually Kant's view. I merely wish to suggest that Professor Paton may perhaps have been led by his conviction that Kant was not a representative idealist to an underestimate of the importance of the doctrine that all cognition is somehow representative in character. That Kant in fact did hold this view is clear not merely from the evidence of the *Critique*, but also from his explicit statements in the *Anthropologie*. It is somewhat obscured by the translation of *Vorstellung* as "idea" rather than "representation," though the former has much to recommend it.

On the question of inner sense, and especially Kant's final exposition of it in § 25 of Deduction B, Professor Paton does not claim to have given a completely satisfactory account of what Kant had in mind. Perhaps no such account is possible, though I myself feel, as he does, that if I understood Kant better I should realize that the view is not as paradoxical and unpalatable as it appears to me at present to be. My only criticism under this head is that Professor Paton might have made more of the psychological theory formulated by Tetens¹ and adopted by Kant in the *Anthropologie*², that the activity of thinking actually causes a physical modification of the cortex, and it is this modification which produces the sensuous representations which are the matter of inner as distinct from outer sense. It is also, I think, to be noted that states of feeling and willing, because of their non-representational character, are not strictly data of inner sense at all. Thus the sole content of inner sense is the representation of my own thinking activity. This would, of course, account for the difficulty which Kant finds in the Analogies of getting the phenomena which are the data of outer sense into time, which is the form of inner sense—but assuming that this was really his view, I still do not see how it could be worked out in detail.

One of the great merits of this commentary is the stress which it lays on Kant's inevitable acceptance of the mathematical and physical theories which were generally held at the time when he wrote. In the nature of the case a philosophy which is closely concerned with the scope and limits of scientific inquiry must take science as it finds it, it would therefore be absurd to expect the *Critical Philosophy*, even if it is sound in principle, to require no modification in detail in the light of such scientific developments as non-Euclidean geometry and quantum mechanics. It must, however, be remembered that Kant was far less critical in his acceptance of contemporary psychology than he was in respect of physics where his own knowledge of the subject-matter was greater. He believed that what he fairly described as the "physiology of the human understanding" could be taken as firmly established, and therefore did not consider the imperfection of a psychology derived almost entirely

¹ Tetens, *Philosophische Versuche*, I, Chapter VII, "The Ideas of Inner Sense, etc."

² Kant's *Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie*. Edited by Starke, 1831 p. 93. Cf. *AK.*, Vol. VII, p. 140.

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from a rather crude physiological theory of perception. It is interesting to observe that modern Gestalt Psychology, which is based on assumptions similar to those of Kant, finds much the same difficulty as he did in accounting for our apprehension of an objective time order, and I suspect that the full explanation of Kant's perplexities though not of his attempted solution of them involves a more exhaustive criticism of those assumptions than Professor Paton has given.

These, however, are clearly problems which demand further and detailed inquiry. The real contribution which Professor Paton's work makes to Kantian studies in this country is that of providing a solid foundation on which further investigation can be based, and the very full documentation which it contains fully qualifies it as the standard work on this part of Kant's philosophy. It is greatly to be hoped that the author will extend it so as to cover at least the remainder of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

T. D. WELDON.

The Thought and Character of William James: as revealed in Unpublished Correspondence, together with his Published Writings. By RALPH BARTON PERRY. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1936. Two vols. Pp. xxxviii + 826 and xxii + 786. Price 42s. net.)

In 1920, ten years after James's death, *The Letters of William James* were published. They received wide attention; for all were interesting, some were fascinating, and the editor, James's son Henry, skilfully supplied a biographical framework that gave unity and charm to the collection. In the picture of 1920, however, the man, of set purpose, was made to dominate the philosopher, and those who wanted to see the philosopher gowned as well as gownless (to use a metaphor that may not be applicable to America) were left with a lively hope of favours to come. As the editor explained (*Letters*, I, viii): "I have not included letters that are wholly technical or polemic. Such documents belong in a study of James's philosophy, or in a history of its origin and influence. However interesting they might be to certain readers, their appropriate place is not here."

I should be conveying an entirely false impression if I suggested that Mr. Perry's ample pages in the present two volumes are a philosophical biography in the derogatory sense that they deal with their subject wholly or even primarily as a writer and thinker. James's character and personality is depicted here with loving and with leisurely care. His friends and his environment, including its changing skies, receive most adequate prominence, and although readers uninterested in philosophy would probably find it advisable to neglect a good many pages, those who have such an interest but have little technical equipment will be almost persuaded by Mr. Perry's art that they can follow the whole thing. On the other hand, Mr. Perry is certainly a philosophical biographer in the sense that he explores the origins of James's personality and attempts, in untechnical language but with great clinical acuteness, to diagnose both the benign and the morbid in James's spiritual state. Moreover, the book is philosophical in the further sense that it is by far the best account of James's philosophical and psychological views, their development, their aims, and their potencies that has yet appeared or (I should say) is ever likely to appear. Nothing is lost by the biographical form of presentation or by the choice (wherever possible) of a literary rather than of a technical vocabulary. Furthermore, James's many contacts with the Europe of his day as well as with the American continent, his polyglot

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acquaintance with the antecedents of the contemporary ideas that confronted him and that he did so much to improve; in a word, his intense professional sociality, make an account of his thoughts very largely an account of the thought of his times. Mr. Perry, half incidentally, has become the historian of all philosophy at the turn of the present century with rather extensive retrospects and prospects. There are very few living writers who could have done the job half so well.

Indeed, Mr. Perry's altogether peculiar opportunities for performing this immense task are only equalled by his competence to perform it. He enjoyed James's professional esteem as well as his friendship. Thus we read in the *Letters* (II, 121) that James, in 1900, regarded Perry as "certainly the soundest, most normal all-round man of our recent production" (i.e. in Harvard), and again, in 1907, that in James's opinion (II, 295) Perry "had written far and away the most important critical remarks on pragmatism (possibly the *only* important ones)." Again, Mr. Perry has studied and re-studied James's voluminous memoranda, marginal jottings, and the like for twenty years or more, had already completed a valuable bibliography, and long ago in his *Present Philosophical Tendencies* had given an admirable short account of James's philosophy and its intellectual atmosphere. He shares James's cosmopolitanism and appreciates James's artistic interests. He is too candid and too acute to be misled by the headier pieties, and although as a writer he is not such another as James was—for he writes to be read and not to be heard—this difference, judged by the standards of good biography, is on the credit and not on the debit side.

The book has six parts, each of them large enough to form a sizeable volume by itself, and together exceeding half a million words by a considerable margin. The first part is a study in heredity. In it little is said of James's mother, "our protecting spirit, our household genius," but the father's theologico-literary gifts and electric personality are elaborately portrayed, and the radiant intellectual vivacity of the home is made abundantly plain especially as regards James's brother Henry and his sister Alice. The second part is a biography of James himself, his medical studies, his artistic projects, the Brazilian expedition, his European travels, his chequered health, the salutary influence of professional work, the range and nervous alacrity of that work, the long, intermittent assiduity required for the *Principles of Psychology* (after success had been attained the pace of this part of the book is rapidly accelerated). The remaining parts are studies in the several departments of James's philosophy. The third deals with James's early philosophical orientation, its motives and sources, its debt to American and to European contemporaries, and the like. The fourth part examines James the psychologist, the fifth considers him as a moralist and semi-theologian, the sixth deals with his long and eager researches into epistemology and metaphysics. The book closes with a balanced and beautiful appreciation of his character and temperament.

It is hard to conjecture the proper length of a review of such a book as this, important, comprehensive, and abounding in varied interest, but clearly the review would be very long indeed if the major themes of the book were discussed with an intelligible degree of minuteness. Therefore if the reader clearly understands that (in the reviewer's opinion) there is no important correlation between the length of a review and the importance of the book reviewed, no great harm will be done if the reviewer advises the reader to make his own epitome of the various high matters that the book discusses so faithfully. Accordingly (although with some compunction) I shall confine myself to a few general reflections in the rest of what I have to say.

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The first part of the book seems to me to be rather longer than it need have been and to be less interesting than the rest. If it be replied that, architecturally, it would have been out of proportion had it been shorter, I should say that even architecture is not everything, and that although the first part certainly depicts James's *milieu* and has special interest for students of American letters in the last century as well as the quite special interest of the personality of James's father, the delay in coming to William James himself is a decided disadvantage. No such strictures can be levelled at the second part. Its blend of outward and inward is amazingly skilful, and its picture of a brave but mercurial spirit, eager, impatient, candid, and greedy for truth, with strong predilections very difficult to reconcile, nostalgic when abroad and restless when at home, enjoying and bringing vitality into professional routine (of the exacting American kind where varied subjects have to be offered by each University teacher in different years) yet groaning, not altogether philosophically at the steady burden of his profession, makes an ineffaceable impression. (The Appendices at the close of Vol. II, especially numbers VII and IX, are very illuminating on the professional side.)

In the other and more narrowly philosophical parts of the book I would call attention to certain special points. In the third part, the introductory chapter on "James the Empiricist" seem to me to deserve peculiarly high praise. It has brevity and point in a remarkable degree, and its attempt to show how empiricism (or the ultimate arbitrament of sensuous matter of fact) can be reconciled with the active questioning of an intellectually experimental method and also with the desire to leave room for voluntaristic belief in certain restricted spheres gives a more plausible unity to James's various aims in philosophy than many would have believed possible. The fourth part, on Psychology, is likely to arouse the widest general interest, for James's *Principles* was his only great book and will continue to be read and enjoyed long after it has become *démodé* (as it is, to some extent, even now). The fifth part is more difficult to assess. James's *Varieties* did what they were meant to do, and they still live. They were also his characteristic response (given 'the limitation that they were meant to be heard) to the science-and-religion theme of his home and upbringing. (To deflate the arrogance of science for love of science, and, where the bubble shrank, to discern the wild, the romantic, and the numinous was an integral part of his life's aim.) On the other hand, the *Varieties* was largely a *livre de circonstance*, and James's excursions into ethics, in any technical sense, do not seem to deserve much attention, although his practical talks rank very high indeed among the lay sermons of the world.

In his philosophy, I should say James, like most of his contemporaries, was more of an epistemologist than of a metaphysician. His pluralism, indeterminism, and practicalism, metaphysically speaking, are perfunctorily argued. His celebrated rejection of "consciousness" grew out of his attempt to deal concretely, in an "undesiccated" and "unsuperstitious" way, with the mind-body problem, and a large part of his essay on the subject is concerned with the status of an alleged *Bewusstsein überhaupt*. Many think, as Peirce did, that his pragmatism, metaphysically speaking, was pretty thin (but in this matter Mr. Perry's careful comparison of James's pragmatism with Peirce's and Dewey's is of great service). Again, it is not worth while inquiring whether James was or was not a realist, although Mr. Perry does his best to make such a question intelligible.

On the other hand, James's pertinacity in attacking these problems of mind and body, subject and object, concepts and percepts, neutral monism, quality, substance and relation, and the compounding of consciousness in an epistemological way (particularly in the way of a critical psychological

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interrogation) had always been apparent to those who knew his work. The present volume, however, is quite invaluable for the additional light it sheds on this question, and the cumulative evidence it supplies from James's papers and marginal notes, as well as from apposite quotations from his books, is of itself a liberal education in this important aspect of an important subject.

A feature of the book is the bulk of the correspondence from and to William James, a surprising bulk in view of the fact that very little use is made of the previously published *Letters*. Since James himself (although his letters are not quite so good as those that are printed here from his brother Henry's pen) seems to have been incapable of writing dully in his correspondence, there can be no complaints as regards his extensive participation in this aspect of the book; but the book certainly contains a great deal of what other people say, and these others did not always write very well. In this direction, as I opine, Mr. Perry has had to pay a stiffish price for the utility of his book. Different types of readers will be interested in different types of correspondents. I, for instance, have read the letters of B. P. Blood and of Thomas Davidson only because I was reviewing the book, and I have no intention of re-reading them. But James's friendship with these men was part of his authentic self, and many of Mr. Perry's readers will share James's taste and not mine. For myself I would not have the correspondence with Peirce, Ward, Bradley, Shadworth Hodgson, Croom Robertson, Renouvier, or Bergson shortened by a single line, but I allow that this judgment also is in part capricious. Nevertheless, I have been a little jealous of those readers who can skip a good deal and yet keep their consciences serene.

To sum up, Mr. Perry has produced a standard work upon a great man, and in doing so has illuminated the near-contemporary philosophy of two continents. The labour involved has been prodigious, but the benefit to present and future students of philosophy is commensurate with the labour.

JOHN LAIRD.

Philosophy and History. Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer. Edited by R. KLIBANSKY and H. J. PATON. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xii + 360. Price 25s.)

Ernst Cassirer was born in 1874. His fatherland having no further need of him, he has spent his sixtieth birthday in exile. The privilege of giving him hospitality and of collecting and publishing these *Festschriften* has fallen to this country. But only three of the contributors are British—Alexander Stebbing, and Webb. The remaining eighteen are from Germany, Holland, France, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and America, a far-flung cloud of witnesses to the range of Cassirer's reputation, and to its quality as well, for scholars like Brunschwig, Gilson, Bréhier, Lévy-Bruhl, Gentile, Calogero, and Ortega y Gasset cannot be called upon to honour mediocrity. In this country Cassirer is known chiefly by his monumental history of modern epistemology (it is really much more than a history), *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit* (3 vols., 1906–20), though he has recently come to our notice again through a short survey of *Die Platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge* (1932). Abroad he is known also as a systematic philosopher of the Marburg school, with a special interest in the philosophy of civilization. His chief systematic works are *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* (1910) and *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen* (3 vols., 1923–9). The complete bibliography appended to the volume under review reveals an impressive width of interest and

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erudition, humiliating to those of us who have been educated to more modest ideals of academic competence.

The essays naturally follow Cassirer's chief interests, the history of philosophy and the philosophical approach to history, and because the latter theme, which on the whole predominates, is rarely considered in this country, the volume has for us a considerable intrinsic value. Among so many voices we would not expect unanimity, but it is striking that the names that most often come up for discussion, usually for destructive criticism, are Descartes and Hegel, the one for setting up the mathematical ideal as the type of anything that deserves to be called science, the other for his over-speculative laws of history, and both for immobilizing the movement of first-hand reality in a merely logical order of concepts. Brunschwig dismisses the philosophy of history altogether as the "darling vice of the nineteenth century," but much of the rest of the volume tells against his addendum that "happily, it is to-day out of date." He observes, however, that the physical science which has inspired the prevailing conception of historical science has recently undergone a deep transformation by admitting into itself, through a belated clarification of the fact of irreversibility, the properly temporal aspect of time. This and other changes in the model science are noticed in several of the essays, and their bearing on the question whether history can or should be a science discussed. Most of the essayists who touch on this question agree that in historical investigation the personal factor is not only inextinguishable but indispensable, and offer various suggestions towards the justification, notwithstanding, of the objectivity of historical findings. Almost all believe that historical inquiry is or can be scientific, but in a sense different from physics, though one contributor, Herr Wind, finds several formal similarities between their respective methods. Bréhier leaves this problem in the background and instead traces the growth of the philological conscience from the seventeenth century onwards, seeing its effects not only in an insistence on detailed inquiries but also in a readiness, which he seems to share, to find in the succession of philosophies a fundamental contingency. Time scarcely receives the attention it deserves in a volume largely concerned with history. The only thorough treatment of it is in Stebbing's acute and helpful examination of McTaggart's theory. Unlike the logical positivists, with whom she is usually reckoned, she cannot bring herself to say that questions which cannot be answered should never be asked. I shall not be alone in welcoming her assurance that those of us who are incompetent really to understand the theory of relativity are not debarred from reflecting on the nature of time.

Since twenty-one essays cannot be even skimmed in a short review, I may draw special attention—the selection may be idiosyncratic—to the contributions of Calogero, Ortega y Gasset, and Alexander. Calogero's is a duel with Gentile, singularly interesting because the two have a great deal in common. Gentile's closely reasoned statement of his general position would be more acceptable if he did not make it so clear that anyone who differs from him must be utterly stupid. The Spaniard's thesis, that a human individual is not a thing or a nature but a happening, seems very like Gentile's, but is altogether different in intention, temper, and ground; the working out of it is wilful and brilliant. Alexander's summary of his own philosophy is delightful, whimsical, but sure-footed. Take a sample *obiter dictum*: "Freedom is an experience; determinism and indeterminism are theories, of which the first is verified, and the second not, by experience" (p. 18). I should add that two of the essays deal with the treatment of certain ideas of a quasi-historical character (*Veritas filia temporis* and *Et in Arcadia ego*) in the visual

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arts and are freely illustrated with plates which, though half-tone, are remarkably clear.

All the foreign essays are in translation, and the several translators must be praised (if this is not impudent) for the naturalness of their versions. The editors deserve our thanks for conceiving and preparing a really unusual and valuable book, and the Warburg Institute for helping to make its publication possible. The volume should delight the great scholar to whom it is presented, and will give the rest of us considerable guidance and instruction.

T. E. JESSOP.

Recent Philosophy. By JOHN LAIRD. (London: Home University Library; Thornton Butterworth, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 256. Price 2s. 6d.)

It was high time that somebody undertook the task of presenting an intelligible account of recent philosophy. Professor Laird, at all times a felicitous writer, is a master of the well-turned phrase. Of the realists who were reacting from the Idealism of the Hegelian school he says, "They also showed the need for attacking philosophical problems piecemeal instead of systematically neglecting every tree in the hope of discerning some traces of an invisible wood." Admirable! But the mistake is not one into which the epitomizer of recent philosophy is likely to fall. Nobody to-day even tries to discern an invisible philosophical wood, because nobody even suspects its existence; there are only the trees, and how multitudinous they are.

Professor Laird divides them into five groups.

First, Absolutism; generally idealist, but not always, since there are followers of Marx. Within this group Professor Laird includes all the philosophies which insist that "mind is the source and principle as well as the measure of all things."

Secondly, Positivism. Knowledge of the Universe, the Positivists maintain, is to be reached by accumulating and synthesizing the results of the sciences, nor is any other sort of knowledge available. The difficulty here is, of course, as Professor Laird points out, that the sciences have themselves become "distrustful of their own finality." Increasingly their leaders, finding themselves standing upon the brink of metaphysical precipices, cry out upon the philosophers to come and save them, and he whose name is most frequently upon their lips is no positivist, but Immanuel Kant. Or in their extremity they try to turn philosopher themselves. . . .

Thirdly, there is the modern school of Analysis, also known as that of Logical Positivism. This proposes a criticism and examination of the instrument of communication, language. What, it wants to know, is the pure *form* as opposed to the content of experience: what the most generalized logical syntax? But since, as Professor Laird very properly points out, "pure form can say nothing factual about fact," the analysts are driven to make some assertion about the nature of that which the instrument of communication, however pure and general it may have become, cannot avoid communicating. In other words, they have, sooner or later, to face the question of the nature of fact, and here their predilections are empiricist and pragmatist, or, as some critics have maintained, solipsist.

Fourthly, there is the phenomenological school founded by Husserl, whose distinguishing tendency is described by Professor Laird as "the attempt to let the larger generalities speak for themselves." There are structural essences in things; there is, indeed, one such essence peculiar to each of the sciences,

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and if we only attend closely enough, the essence will reveal itself to the thinker's attention. Together with Husserl, Professor Laird treats of Meinong and gives a valuable account of his philosophy including, in particular, the much misunderstood theory of subsistent objects.

Fifthly, there is Realism. This has fallen somewhat upon evil days, being to-day no longer a school of Realism so much as a company of individual realists marching out of step. We are warned, however, by Professor Laird against expecting too much of Realism. Its main purpose was epistemological; it sought to emancipate the object known from dependence on any mind or minds; it did not necessarily seek to make any statement about the nature of the object thus emancipated. Professor Laird conveys this voluntary limitation of Realism in one of his admirable phrases: "According to its own premises, epistemological realism has to go to the 'object' hat in hand. It begs for what it cannot give, the manifestation of that object as it really is. It is a permissive, not a declaratory theory, allowing the 'object' to declare itself to the mind but, for that very reason, renouncing the very idea of enforcing or instigating any particular sort of answer."

Let it be said at once that in his attempt to cover so many different fields of thought, Professor Laird has been remarkably successful. The scope and comprehensiveness of his work are wholly praiseworthy, nor can the reader resist a tribute of surprised admiration at the extent of a knowledge which seems to embrace every important work which has been written on philosophy in England, America, Germany, France, and Italy, not to speak of the smaller countries, during the last fifty years. If one were to permit oneself a criticism, it would be that Professor Laird has sought to put in too much philosophy and too many philosophers, with the result that he occasionally sacrifices clarity to comprehensiveness and assumes in his readers a knowledge that they cannot be supposed to possess. Volumes in the Home University Library are primarily intended not for the expert, but for the layman. Yet some part of what Professor Laird writes must be unintelligible to the reader not possessing a considerable prior knowledge of the subject. His sweeping surveys are at times bewilderingly allusive. What, for example, is a layman to make of the following: "Consequently there was much Teutonic influence in France, little of it Hegelian, with the exception (in some measure) of O. Hamelin's 'integral rationalism' and 'nöödicy' "? Nowhere else in the book are Hamelin and his 'nöödicy' mentioned. And unless one already knows what Moore stands for and what Husserl, what interpretation is one to place upon the following? Laird is talking of Moore's distinction between what is experienced and the act of experiencing: "In other words," he says, "Moore (unlike Bradley) held that this distinction was more than relative, and (unlike Husserl) that it was more than correlative in the sense that an object, somehow, required an act, as an act, plainly, requires its object." How is the layman to tell from this passage whether the view that the "object, somehow, required an act" is Moore's or Husserl's? I hoped and believed that I knew before I read it, but now that I have read it I am no longer so sure. As for the laymen, I have tried reading the passage to two or three of them, but none of them could tell me what it means.

On two general matters I found Professor Laird's views exceptionally helpful. There are some who say that modern philosophy is in a quite peculiar sense bewildered; that it is in fact distracting, because it is distracted. "Nonsense," says Professor Laird in effect, "philosophy never was anything else. There never is or was a 'central tradition' in philosophy." Secondly, the root objection to technical philosophical languages is that they are so many, so difficult, and so ephemeral, that the leaders hardly have time to learn any

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but their own, with the result that few of the philosophical analysts to-day know what it is that the other philosophical analysts are talking about.

C. E. M. JOAD.

An Early Draft of Locke's Essay, together with Excerpts from his Journals.

Edited by R. I. AARON and JOCELYN GIBB. (Oxford: Clarendon Press.
London: Humphrey Milford. Pp. xxviii + 132. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

The recent publication in 1931 by Benjamin Rand of a draft of the *Essay* written in 1671 showed that the work (finally published in England in 1690, when Locke was fifty-seven) had reached a relatively advanced stage nineteen years before it appeared. To parody Locke's language, several bulky and coherent parcels, quite neatly tied up, were ready at the earlier date, and many of these were enlarged rather than substantially altered in the later book. The fullest of them was the introductory account of innate ideas, but important sections of the second and third books of the *Essay* had been composed with care and some finish.

The present draft (in the Lovelace collection), now published for the first time, except for the opening sentences that had been quoted by Lord King, is an essential complement to the draft published by Rand. Belonging almost certainly to earlier months of the same year (1671), it gives a rapid foretaste of Books I-IV of the *Essay*, beginning with the ideas of sensation and of reflexion, and concluding with the theory of degrees of assent. In fact, it shows (what could not be inferred from Rand's draft) that Locke, in 1671, had a very adequate idea indeed of the course he had to traverse in the main argument of the *Essay*; and from the two drafts taken together we may conjecture that after the first draft was written Locke set himself to compose the prolegomena regarding innate ideas with some care and to rewrite certain small parcels of the principal argument.

This first draft pays much less attention to literary form than the second, and consequently in many ways reveals the workings of its author's mind a good deal more intimately. Its editors, by reproducing the original spelling and punctuation (apart from contractions), have deepened this impression in a fortuitous way, although they were right to print it so. They also provide an adequate introduction, and a very useful tabulated comparison of the topics treated in the two drafts and in the *Essay* itself. If I may be allowed to be churlish for a moment (when as a rather eager student of Locke I have so much cause for gratitude towards them) I should say that they tend in the ircomments to exaggerate (at least by emphasis and by selection) the extent to which Locke anticipated, and may perhaps be said in some degree to have met the criticism of later centuries; but if history, as some men appear to think, is always that portion of the past that is now alive, there is warrant even for this.

The editors also include some forty pages of excerpts from Locke's journals, and have made their book more useful and more representative by including among these excerpts some that had previously been published by Lord King. The most interesting of the excerpts, as they point out, refer to the theory of space. In the first of them (1676) Locke appears to be thinking of Hobbes's *Elements*, chap. vii, § 2. In others, he works towards the view that the pure relation of distance between two bodies does not itself contain *partes extra partes*, although it may be equated with the divisible extension of divisible bodies, and that vacuum (of the metaphysical kind) should be regarded as merely potential room. There are also characteristic discussions of the

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adaptation of human inquiry to what is useful in the human state of mediocrity, a pretty full account of the theory of relations (as also in the draft), and much else that is of interest, including a very useful bibliography of Descartes and his followers, expositors, and critics. This (which is in French) would appear, from internal evidence, to have been supplied to Locke and copied by him, but it suggests that he contemplated the necessity of making a pretty thorough investigation of Cartesian views, although it is not very likely that he ever did embark, very seriously, upon that particular course of study.

JOHN LAIRD.

George Berkeley. A Study of His Life and Philosophy. By JOHN WILD, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xi + 552. Price 6 dollars; 25s.)

This book is further evidence of the interest taken by Harvard University in Berkeley. Benjamin Rand's research, in particular his *Berkeley and Percival* and *Berkeley's American Sojourn*, is now followed by Professor Wild's book, which represents the fruit of research over a period of years. Professor Wild has made a valuable study of the Berkeley manuscripts, and prints in an appendix three hitherto unpublished sermons found among the Chapman MSS. in the British Museum. His work is an extremely thorough first-hand study, in which he has passed in review not only all Berkeley's works, but has also taken full account of the very voluminous literature on Berkeley. In this connection a word of praise is due for the admirable bibliography compiled by Professor Wild. It is by far the most complete bibliography on Berkeley hitherto published, and I have noticed only one omission, namely, G. W. Kaveeshwar's *The Metaphysics of Berkeley*.

Professor Wild's study of Berkeley's work includes interesting biographical material. He rightly points out that any account of Berkeley's intellectual development without some understanding of his life must remain as hopelessly artificial as any account of his life without some understanding of his philosophy. The "design and connection" of his works is the man himself.

The *Commonplace Book* is of course the main source of information on the genesis, evolution, and affiliation of Berkeley's thought. Begun early in 1706, the *Commonplace Book* contains a full and suggestive series of notes of what he was reading and thinking and planning during the earliest years of his philosophical development. In its vivid, disjointed and staccato jottings it reveals a mind pregnant with a great discovery. Professor Wild makes full use of the *Commonplace Book*, and throws new light on the meaning of some of the more obscure entries. He also rightly makes much use of Berkeley's letters. It is true that Berkeley did not have the qualities of the great letter-writer. Perhaps he was not sufficiently detached. His interest was always concentrated on some one scheme, and the great letter-writer must always be something of a dilettante. Berkeley's letters are rarely dull, but they cannot compare with those of Swift, of Cowper at Olney, Gray at Cambridge, or Fitzgerald at Woodbridge.

There is no doubt that the inclusion of biographical matter has greatly enhanced the value of Professor Wild's study of Berkeley's thought. He has studied life and work as a unity. This method is to my mind a much more satisfactory one than the usually adopted method of prefacing a study of a philosopher's work by a brief account of his life, and Professor Wild is to be congratulated on adopting it.

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This book falls into four parts: Part I, the Revelation of the Concrete; Part II, Concrete and Abstract Reason, the Early System; Part III, Scepticism and Faith, the Emergence of the Practical; Part IV, Philosophia Prima, the "System" of the Siris.

Professor Wild gives a careful critical analysis of all Berkeley's works, and his comments are usually enlightening and helpful. In a valuable chapter on "The Meaning of Berkeley," which concludes the book, Professor Wild emphasizes the underlying spirit of Berkeley's thought. He considers that the key to Berkeley's development is his theory of abstraction, or what he has called his "concrete logic." This is the constant method which, expressing itself in the various positions through which Berkeley successively passed, holds them together as an unified structure, finally philosophically realized in the Siris. While it cannot be denied, he thinks, that Berkeley's conception of the truly real underwent the most revolutionary changes during the course of his reflections, it must, on the other hand, be granted that the goal towards which he was striving remained essentially the same. The guiding motive of Berkeley's thought, from its earliest inceptions to the last pages of the Siris, is the attempt to understand reality concretely, or to think things together as they really are.

G. A. JOHNSTON.

The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea. (William James Lectures, 1933.) By Professor A. O. LOVEJOY. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1936. Pp. xi + 382. Price \$4; 17s.)

Histories of philosophy are usually so much occupied with detailed accounts of so many individual systems of philosophy and are apt to be so much concerned with emphasizing the uniqueness of these systems and justifying the attention paid to them that either there is a failure to bring out any continuity of idea or principle in the history of human speculation or else attempts are made to insist upon a continuity that is somewhat artificial in that it is dependent upon a particular reading of the connection between philosopher and philosopher. It is a refreshing and stimulating experience to come across, in Professor Lovejoy's *William James Lectures*, a method of approach not unusual to-day but not very frequent to the historical treatment of the issues dealt with by philosophers throughout the ages. Though he has to deal with individual philosophers, these and their intellectual systems are not his main concern. He singles out an idea—the idea of the Great Chain of Being, a complex of three distinguishable but historically associated ideas, the principle of plenitude (as the author names it), continuity, and gradation; and showing the genesis of this idea in Plato, traces it through the centuries down to the eighteenth, when, though it attains then its widest diffusion and acceptance, yet also meets opposition. Its history is followed with skill and very wide reading that transcends the boundaries of strict philosophy itself and penetrates into physical and biological science, theology, social organization, and the more extended field of general literature; and the discussion is supplemented with very copious notes that will help many other workers who wish to follow similar investigations. It is clear that, as the author says, the history of ideas is no subject for highly departmentalized minds.

Professor Lovejoy explicitly disclaims any intention to carry out a critical examination of the metaphysical notion in question or of its three constituent

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notions. His aim is historical, and the opening chapter, in which he explains what he understands by a study of the history of ideas and what is involved in such a study, deserves well-merited attention. The historical review is a long one, but then the idea, the history of which is being investigated, is a very significant one for Western thought, has exercised a wide influence in many fields, and has had many curiously happy consequences. In fact, as the author emphasizes, without acquaintance with the idea and its history no understanding of the movement of thought in the West is possible. That history is the history of an intellectual experiment, carried on for many years, which "constitutes one of the most grandiose enterprises of the human intellect." It is the record of Western man's effort to make the world he lives in appear to his intellect a rational one. Nevertheless, the experiment ends in failure, for the more fully and the more clearly the consequences of the idea were drawn out the more numerous became the difficulties and the more untenable the view that it could sustain the belief in the rationality of the universe. The main factor in the failure is the notion of *Time*, which, from the eighteenth century onwards, has been increasingly emphasized in scientific and philosophical theory—an emphasis which since then has obscured the significance of the issue discussed. All, however, whether students of literature, of society, of science, of theology, or of metaphysics, who study this book will find their own subjects illuminated as well as gain an understanding of human history.

B. M. LAING.

The Issue in Literary Criticism. By MYRON F. BRIGHTFIELD. (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press. 1932. Pp. xiii + 316. Price 22s.)

Professor Brightfield's argument falls into two parts: one polemical, one constructive. In the constructive part he is trying to work out an aesthetic theory of his own, an 'empirical' one based on the principles of 'orthodox pragmatism.' In the polemical part he is engaged in controverting something which he calls idealism: primarily the idealistic theory of beauty and the literary criticism based on it, but also the general idealistic philosophy from which this is derived. The adversary is introduced on p. 30, and thereafter seldom leaves the stage. Its psychological genesis is described. Men who lack the patience and perseverance to think scientifically, men incapable of rigid self-discipline, men who allow their data to become affected by their own wishes instead of allowing the data to 'speak to them' uninterrupted—such men, including (it seems) all savages and the majority of men in every age, finding that on their own terms they cannot get what they need for the fulfilment of their wishes out of their actual environment, construct for themselves another world, an imaginary world in which all their wishes are guaranteed fulfilment. This other world will not have the distressing qualities of the real world. Lying outside the reach of experience, it can be known without taking the trouble to observe and record. Being at rest, it offers a stationary target for man's aims. Being a complete whole, it has not the fragmentary, imperfect character which always belongs to the world of experience (pp. 30, 31). The search for this extra-experiential world of wish-fulfilment is the moving force of every religion, and it has been the occupation of every philosophy from Plato to the present age (p. 32). The search has been called by various names, but we shall designate it by the name of idealism (p. 33).

Idealism (to interpolate a word of commentary) is thus not a school of

thought. It is not a type of theory to be judged by the soundness of its principles, the validity of its inferences, and the verifiable accuracy of its conclusions. It is a kind of dream, a wish-fulfilment fantasy, generated by the moral weakness, cowardice, indolence, of those who accept it. It is not a tissue of errors, it is the expression of a perverted will. Therefore it is not amenable to argument: what it demands is not refutation but castigation. Hence the author is quite consistent with his own premisses when, throughout the book, instead of criticizing 'idealist' arguments, he treats them with ridicule, innuendo, and moral indignation. Had he raised the question how 'idealists' are to be converted from their evil ways, he must have concluded that the right method is persecution in some form—how violent the form shall be, must, of course, be dictated by the gravity of the social issues at stake.

In aesthetic, 'idealism' takes the shape of a distinction between beauty, as an absolute norm or standard, and utility as something concerned with men's conduct in the world of experience. Actually, beauty and utility are the same thing: the beautiful is that which is in a state of readiness for *immediate* assimilation to an individual's wishes (p. 74), or, in other words, the beautiful, a sub-class of the useful, is the *supremely* useful (p. 75). When Kant, Schiller, Schelling, Goethe, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Croce, and others deny this doctrine, they are merely adapting to the realm of aesthetic their idealistic mumbo-jumbo (p. 306) the absolute. All this has to be swept aside and the great principle laid down (p. 103) that a beautiful work of art is one which represents a portion of the environment in the state in which the artist wishes it to be—a state of complete subservience to his desires.

It is easy to see what kind of literary criticism will proceed from this "empirical definition of art." There are three classes of literary work: (I) those expressing desires which are so inordinate that they cannot be fulfilled within the environment (p. 119): in these a state of things is described which is impossible, and the value of these (for they have a value) is that of a complete refuge from facts, for people who simply cannot face them. (II) Those expressing desires which run counter to the normal workings of the environment (p. 121); in these a state of things is described which, though possible, is improbable. These too are a drug, a refuge from reality, but not a wholly harmful drug. (III) Those expressing desires whose realization seems probable and likely (p. 122). These, the works of literature which obey probability, are the highest and most beautiful kind: they serve as a guide to life itself.

The reader is not surprised, therefore, to learn that the lowest and ugliest type of literature is the lyric, the extreme case of impossible fiction. The fact that 'idealists' hold up the lyric as the type and pattern of all that is best in art is just another proof of their perversion (pp. 254 *seqq.*). For, by every relevant test, probable fiction is proved superior to every other kind of literature (p. 156).

Literary criticism consists in applying these tests. The necessity for it clearly exists (p. 161), because there must be some expert to decide, among the various competing works of art, which are the best. The 'idealist' denies the possibility of doing this (pp. 276 *seqq.*) and, strange though the admission may seem, he is right to this extent, that impossible and improbable fiction lie almost entirely outside the range of criticism (p. 279). Thus, if we arrange literary works in a scale, with pure lyrics at one end and the ordinary modern novel or film at the other, our author claims for his own critical methods just what, I suppose, the 'idealist' would not deny for them—that they apply at the latter end of the scale but not the former. The two differ only in one point: our author regards the lyric as a drug for perverts and

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neurotics, and the ordinary novel and film as mental pabulum for he-men and therefore as beautiful, while the 'idealist' regards the lyric as a serious work of art and considers the ordinary novel or film as not a work of art at all, but a mere wish-fulfilment fantasy.

Nor does our author really differ on this last point. Though he scolds the 'idealist' for regarding art as something other than economic toil, he explicitly regards it as such himself. On p. 141 he enumerates five classes of readers: (I) Those whose occupation is satisfactory but fatiguing so that they desire 'an intelligent and refined play' by way of relaxation. (II) Those whose occupation is so loathsome that they seek to escape from it as completely as possible. (III) Those who are trying to persuade themselves that it is satisfactory, and require a literature in which this is reassuringly expressed. (IV) Those who realize that it is unsatisfactory but wish to be persuaded that it may become gratifying. (V) Those whose occupation is satisfactory but leaves them still desiring new experiences, which they can obtain (perhaps we should read, imagine themselves obtaining) through literature. In every case, it will be seen, literature is a form of dope. And so most modern literature is. But it is disquieting to find an able and accomplished professor arguing that its dope-value is the only value it can ever have.

R. G. COLLINGWOOD.

What Can Philosophy Determine? Aristotelian Society. Supplementary vol. xv. (London: Harrison & Sons. 1936. Pp. 235. Price 15s. net.)

Besides the Inaugural Address of the veteran St. Andrews Professor, G. F. Stout, this volume contains the Proceedings of the Joint Meeting of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association which was held at St. Andrews in July, and in which the Scots Philosophical Club took part. There were present at it two new professors, Mr. H. H. Price and Mr. J. N. Wright, and a new Vice-Chancellor, Dr. J. L. Stocks. Both on this account and on account of the special importance of the subject set for discussion, the papers that were read ought to be of particular interest. I think that they certainly are, but of a somewhat restricted one owing to the fact that the first four of the Symposia have little direct bearing on the question indicated in the title, but are concerned with very special and to the general reader somewhat unattractive subjects: "Memory Knowledge"; "Is there a Problem of Sense-Data?" "Are there *a priori* Truths?" "Is Existence a Predicate?" For this reason and because in any case it would be impossible within my limits to give any adequate idea of the contents of so many exceptionally able papers, including besides those already mentioned important contributions by Professors John Laird, G. E. Moore, and C. D. Broad, and others, I propose to use the space I have at my disposal to notice more particularly the last Symposium on the question "Can Philosophy determine what is Ethically and Socially Valuable?" which, besides having the advantage of bearing directly on the problem set the Meeting, is very relevant to the subject of much recent discussion in this journal.

The previous papers both in their titles and in the way in which their subjects are treated are apt to give the impression of the spread among the younger writers of a certain spirit of defeatism regarding the scope of philosophy as hitherto interpreted, and of a desire to evacuate it of much of its traditional contents. It is therefore with some curiosity that the reader turns to the last to discover how far it tends to confirm this impression.

NEW BOOKS

Dr. Stocks starts with the frank acceptance of the view, stated twenty-five years ago by Bertrand Russell, of the rôle of philosophy as confined to the examination of "the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs," and of the extent to which they may be harmonized with one another. With regard to our theoretic beliefs, instinctive or other, Dr. Stocks does not seem to rule wholly out the question of their truth or falsehood: of what *ought* to be believed as well as what *is* believed. But with regard to moral beliefs he makes it quite clear that in his view "it is the philosopher's business to find out what is thought obligatory, not what ought to be thought obligatory; what is considered good, not what it is good to consider good" (p. 194). Mr. A. K. Stout, who follows on, protests against any such limitation of the task of philosophy. As in matters of theory it has to do not only with what men actually believe but with what is believable, so in matters of practice it has to do not only with what men actually desire but with what is desirable, supporting himself by appeal to the example of the great philosophers, among them Locke to whom Dr. Stocks had appealed as on the other side. Unfortunately, he seems to treat of these two kinds of judgment as though they were on all fours with each other, not observing that in the one case we are dealing with theoretic truth, in the other with value as such. To establish his point he would have to show that philosophy has a *de jure* claim to endeavour to determine both what is true and what is of real value. Mr. W. D. Lamont is not slow to perceive this weakness, but instead of coming to his aid he goes even beyond Dr. Stocks in arguing not only that, because philosophy is a theoretical inquiry and valuations are not theoretical assertions, they necessarily fall beyond its scope (p. 226), but that valuations are not properly judgments at all, "The verbal expressions of valuations are essentially exclamatory indications of volitional attitudes" (p. 225).

This is not the place to discuss the issue which Mr. Lamont's paper has the merit of setting so clearly. I do not think that there is any greater before philosophy at the present time. But I wish to ask the Editor to allow me to put two questions, the first to Mr. Lamont as to his special argument, the other both to him and Dr. Stocks. (1) Granting what Mr. Lamont says as to value judgments being camouflaged expressions of volitional attitudes, must not the attitude be based, if not necessarily on a *judgment*, yet on a *sense* of value? and if it is (as is surely obvious to any but a convinced behaviourist) is it not putting the cart before the horse to explain the valuation by the attitude instead of the attitude by the valuation? (2) With regard to the more general argument which he accepts from Dr. Stocks that because philosophy is itself theoretical it can only deal with theory, does it really rest on anything more solid than a play of words as little convincing as that "the driver of fat oxen should be fat"? Ought we not rather to fall back on Dr. Stocks's own admirable definition of philosophy as "essentially a reflective activity of thought in contact with reality," and (seeing that reality infeasibly includes, in at least a wide range of beings, an element of valuation), ought we not to reject the limitation of reflective activity to theory as a dogma, none the less scholastic because it has originated in a modern school? It may well be true that, as Russell has insisted, it is more difficult to exclude personal bias in considering valuational sentiments (to use a neutral word), and that the standard implied in them may be more difficult to determine than in the case of existential or logical, but is that any reason why philosophers should not claim the right to do their best and to be judged by the measure of their success?

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

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The Tradition of Boethius. By HOWARD ROLLIN PATCH, Ph.D., Litt.D.
(New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1936. Pp. viii
+ 200. Price \$2.75; 10s. 6d.)

Dr. Patch, impressed by the contrast between the immense reputation enjoyed by Boethius throughout the Middle Ages and even after the Renaissance and the comparative neglect of him in modern times, has given us in this pleasantly written and charmingly illustrated book an interesting study of that author's importance in mediaeval culture. He begins by surveying the life and legend of the man who, when the tradition of classical culture was threatened with submersion by the barbarian invasions, deliberately undertook and in no small degree accomplished the invaluable task of passing on the scientific masterpieces of Greek antiquity in a Latin dress to a generation doomed, as he appears to have foreseen, to Greeklessness. The second chapter describes his influence, which was very considerable, on mediaeval thought; and here more might perhaps have been said of the part played by his theological treatises in the development of the twelfth-century school of Chartres. Recent researches, especially those of Dr. Raymond Klibansky, are revealing to us the fact that this school was less of an isolated incident in the history of Western European culture than one has sometimes been inclined to suppose; and that the writings of Thierry, and in particular his commentary on Boethius, counted for much in the transmission of what may be conveniently called a neo-Platonic tradition to such later writers as Master Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa, who have exercised an important influence on the thought of the period subsequent to the decline of that scholasticism which for a time had thrust into the background the humanism of Chartres. Finally, leaving the subject of Boethius' writings in general, and concentrating on the best known of them, the *Consolatio Philosophiae*, Dr. Patch concludes his book by an account of the numerous translations, imitations, and echoes of this famous book, which are to be found in the vernacular literatures of modern Europe.

Dr. Patch's book is indeed not free (whose is?) from occasional slips. On p. 34 one is surprised to read that Gerbert of Aurillac used, in Boethius' version, the *Topics*—that is, one would gather from the context, the *Topics* of Aristotle. Dr. Patch makes this statement on the authority of a passage in Richer's *Historiae* quoted by Mr. Osborne Taylor in his *Mediaeval Mind*; and he implies that it shows a part of the "new logic," which he rightly tells us was introduced into the curriculum of the Western schools in the twelfth century, to have been already in the hands of a scholar in the tenth. But a reference to the original passage shows that nothing is said by Richer of Aristotle's *Topics*, but only of Cicero's, which Gerbert, we are told, read with the commentary of Boethius. No Aristotelian work is mentioned beside the *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*, which constituted the *Logica vetus*.

On p. 46, again, we find a misinterpretation of a remark of William of Malmesbury which, says Dr. Patch, "comes pretty close to a smile at the idea of translating Boethius at all. In Asser's time he (sc. William of Malmesbury) admits, one needed such a reason to interpret the text: 'in those days it was necessary, in our days ridiculous.'" But what William really says is that Asser *librum de Consolatione Philosophiae planioribus verbis elucidavit*, that is, put into an easier Latin. This is the proceeding which, according to the historian, would in his own days have been absurd. But Asser, he goes on to say, did this by King Alfred's command, in order to lighten the King's own task in translating, *ut levius ab eodem* (sc. rege) *in Anglicum transferretur sermonem*.

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Why does Dr. Patch attribute to Plato (p. 70; cp. p. 118) the Aristotelian doctrine that it is love that moves the stars? or suggest that "sic et non" (the title of Abelard's famous treatise) means "question and answer" instead of "for and against the same proposition"? Why, again, does he (on p. 110) spoil a familiar Miltonic verse by calling Virtue "it" instead of "she"?

May the present writer mention an extremely trifling matter? His Gifford Lectures on *God and Personality* were published in 1919 not in Aberdeen (as stated pp. 134, 190)—where they were delivered—but in London, by Messrs. Allen & Unwin.

C. C. J. WEBB.

Books received also:—

- C. J. BOND. *Biology and the New Physics. A Plea for a Consistent Philosophy of Life*. London: H. K. Lewis & Co. 1936. Pp. 67. Cloth 2s. 6d.; Paper 1s. 6d.
- A. H. KAMIAT. *The Critique of Poor Reason*. New York: Privately printed. 1936. Pp. 143.
- K. HOTSON and J. W. BENTON. *Valuation: Human and Financial*. Adelaide: The Reliance Printery. 1936. Pp. 52. 2s.
- G. J. CROSS. *Prologue and Epilogue to Hegel*. Oxford: Pen-in-Hand Publishing Co. 1935. Pp. 107. 2s. 6d.
- S. C. SOPOTE. *Sacrifice*. Oxford: Pen-in-Hand Publishing Co. 1935. Pp. 48. 1s.
- LORD DAVIES. *Nearing the Abyss. The Lesson of Ethiopia*. London: Constable & Co. 1936. Pp. xiii + 182. 3s. 6d.
- R. G. COLLINGWOOD. *Human Nature and Human History* (Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXII). London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 33. 2s.
- VARIOUS. *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* (Ed. by S. Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead). London: George Allen & Unwin. 1936. Pp. 375. 16s.
- V. PHELIPS. *Concerning Progressive Revelation*. London: Watts & Co. 1936. Pp. vii + 118. 1s.
- N. KAUSIKA. *The New Evolution*. Nemmara, S. India. N. G. V. Aiyer. Publishers of the New Evolution of Man series. Pp. 171. 3s. 6d. Rs. 1.8.
- E. W. BARNES (Lord Bishop of Birmingham). *Scientific Theory and Religion. The World described by Science and its Spiritual Interpretation* (Gifford Lectures, 1927-29). Cheap re-issue. Cambridge, at the University Press. 1933. Pp. xxiv + 685. 8s. 6d.
- V. PURCELL. *Problems of Chinese Education*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1936. Pp. viii + 261. 10s. 6d.
- N. ISRAELI. *Abnormal Personality and Time* (Foreword: I. J. Sands; Introduction: G. Murphy). Lancaster, Pa.: Science Press Printing Co. 1936. Pp. 123. \$2.50.
- S. RADHAKRISHNAN. *The World's Unborn Soul* (Inaugural Lecture, 1936). Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 31. 2s.
- W. F. ARMSTRONG. *Saving and Investment. The Theory of Capital in a Developing Community*. London: Routledge & Sons. 1936. Pp. x + 270. 12s. 6d.
- J. W. GOUGH. *The Social Contract. A Critical Study of its Development*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. vii + 234. 12s. 6d.
- RT. HON. J. C. SMUTS. *Holism and Evolution*. 3rd edition. London: Macmillan & Co. 1936. Pp. xiii + 358. 12s. 6d.

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- E. BARKER. *Education for Citizenship* (University of London Institute of Education. Studies and Reports X). London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 17. 1s.
- A. LAPAN. *The Significance of James' Essay*. New York: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. 1936. Pp. 69. 75 cents.
- R. E. M. HARDING. *Towards a Law of Creative Thought* (Psyche Monographs, 7). London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1936. Pp. 178. 6s.
- C. A. STRONG. *A Creed for Sceptics*. London: Macmillan & Co. 1936. Pp. ix + 98. 6s.
- Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique*. Sorbonne. 1935. Auteurs variés:—
- I. *Philosophie Scientifique et Empirisme Logique*. Pp. 80. Fr. 12.
 - II. *Unité de la Science*. Pp. 76. Fr. 12.
 - III. *Langage et Pseudo-Problèmes*. Pp. 59. Fr. 10.
 - IV. *Induction et Probabilité*. Pp. 64. Fr. 10.
 - V. *Logique et Expérience*. Pp. 79. Fr. 12.
 - VI. *Philosophie des Mathématiques*. Pp. 84. Fr. 12.
 - VII. *Logique*. Pp. 72. Fr. 10.
 - VIII. *Histoire de la Logique et de la Philosophie Scientifique*. Pp. 91. Fr. 12. Paris: Hermann & Cie. 1936.
- J. HERSCH. *L'Illusion Philosophique*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1936. Pp. 204. Fr. 10.
- VARIÉS. *Philosophie et Sciences* (Journées d'Etudes de la Société Thomiste). Le Saulchoir, Kain, Belgique: Société Thomiste. 1936. Pp. 210. Fr. 15.
- R. VERNAUX. *Les Sources cartésiennes et kantienne de l'Idéalisme française*. Paris: Beauchesne. 1936. Pp. 528. Fr. 40.
- J. GRENIER. *La Philosophie de Jules Lequier*. Paris: "Les Belles Lettres," 1936. Pp. 345.
- P. ANGEL. *Essais sur Georges Sorel (Vers un idéalisme constructif). De la notion de classe à la doctrine de la violence*. Paris: M. Rivière. 1936. Pp. 352. Fr. 15.
- J. IWANICKI. *Morin et les Démonstrations Mathématiques de l'Existence de Dieu*. Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 144.
- J. NOGUÉ. *L'Activité Primitive du Moi*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1936. Pp. 232. Fr. 20.
- L. CHESTOV. *Kierkegaard et la Philosophie Existentielle (Vox clamantis in deserto)*. Traduit du Russe par T. Rageot et B. de Schloezer. Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 384. Fr. 25.
- A. MITTERER. *Wandel des Weltbildes von Thomas auf heute. Band II.; Wesensartwandel und Artensystem der Physikalischen Körperwelt*. Bressanone: A. Weger's Buchhandlung. 1936. Pp. 227.
- M. BUBER. *Die Frage an den Einzelnen*. Berlin: Im Schocken Verlag. 1936. Pp. 124. Broschiert M. 2.50; Leinen M. 3.50.
- E. GRISEBACH. *Freiheit und Zucht*. Zürich und Leipzig: Rascher Verlag. 1936 Pp. 382. M.4.
- S. U. ZUIDEMA. *De Philosophie van Occam in zijn Commentaar op de Sententiën*. Hilversum: Schipper. 1936. Pp. 533.
- S. U. ZUIDEMA. *De Philosophie van Occam in zijn Commentaar op de Sententiën*. Supplement (Citaten). Hilversum: Schipper. 1936. Pp. 399.
- S. V. ROVIGHI. *L'Immortalità dell'anima nei Maestri Francescani del Secolo XIII*. Milano: Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero." 1936. Pp. vii + 385. Lire venticinque.
- F. OLGATI and F. ORESTANO. *Il Realismo*. 1936. Milano: Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero." 1936. Pp. viii + 150. Lire cinque.
- F. MIRABENT. *De la Bellesa. Iniciació als Problemes de l'Estètica, Disciplina Filosòfica*. Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans. 1936. Pp. xvi + 307.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

In No. 42, April 1936, of your journal, p. 230, I find an interesting review of my book *Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre*, by A. G. D. Watson. I am very much obliged to your journal and to the reviewer for the kind way my book is spoken of there, and for the profound analysis given. If I allow myself to express some criticism, this will be directed only against some details concerning the development of the discussion of the problem in Germany, as to which, it seems, the reviewer is not sufficiently informed.

Dr. Watson writes: "This work has been largely carried on under the influence of the philosophical school of Carnap, to whom the author expresses his indebtedness." This passage—which by no means may be based on an utterance from my side—reveals a deep-going misunderstanding of the development of our movement of "scientific philosophy" or "logistic empiricism," as we now call it, in Germany. This movement always concentrated round two centres and split accordingly into the Vienna Circle, whose members were Carnap, Schlick, etc., and the Berlin group in which I myself collaborated with some friends. The two groups combined later to common work, marked by the publication of the journal *Erkenntnis*, edited jointly by Carnap and myself, and by the organization of the congresses for scientific philosophy. Our collaboration was based on many common ideas; as to others, we learned from each other—but it never came to a perfect unification of ideas, the differences as to some fundamental problems being too great.

This difference neither disturbed the personal friendship between the groups, nor our collaboration. Only, whoever followed our discussions knows that just the question of probability was the point of bifurcation. Thus, I think, the idea that my theory of probability has been developed under the influence of Carnap's school not only contradicts the historical facts, but will also be rejected by my Vienna friends, who to-day hold a very different opinion on the problem. It may be added that the fundamentals of my theory of knowledge and of probability were developed and published at a time when there was not yet any Vienna school at all. For a nearer exposition of these historical developments, I may refer to my article "Logistic Empiricism in Germany and the Present State of its Problems" in the *Journal of Philosophy*, March 12, 1936, p. 747.

Allow me to add some words concerning some critical remarks of the review. Dr. Watson objects that the mathematical concept of infinity used in the mathematical theory of probability does not play any rôle as to physics. This idea does not contradict my theory. In an article, "Bemerkungen zu Carl Hempels Versuch einer finitistischen Deutung des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs," *Erkenntnis*, vol. v, 1935, p. 261, I have shown that it is the concept of "practically infinite" which stands at the basis of applied probability, and that my theory is applicable for this concept as well. In another objection, Dr. Watson asks whether there may be a world for which the induction rule leads to no success, whereas other methods such as "oracles" are utilizable. This objection has also been discussed in *Erkenntnis*; I have shown there that such a separation is not possible, that if any method of prophecy exists the induction rule will always lead to the same result. This is exposed in my article "Warum ist die Anwendung der Induktionsregel für uns notwendige Begingung zur Gewinnung von Voraussagen?", *Erkenntnis*, vol. vi, 1936, p. 32. Thus the discussion in *Erkenntnis* has already clarified some objections raised, for good reasons, in the review of Dr. Watson.

Please allow me to repeat that this letter is not to criticize the excellent analysis of Dr. Watson. It is only to direct your attention to some points well known to German readers, but which, on account of the separation by language, seem to have escaped Dr. Watson's investigations.

Yours very sincerely,

HANS REICHENBACH.

UNIVERSITY OF ISTANBUL (TURKEY),
August 1936.

THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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INSTITUTE NOTES

SUMMARY OF PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.¹

On November 17th Sir Herbert Samuel gave his Presidential Address to the Members of the Institute at University College, London. The title of his address was "Wars of Ideas."

Quoting from a recent utterance of the Foreign Minister of Spain, Sir Herbert said that "future wars are likely to be the conflict of two sorts of ideas, two mentalities, two different conceptions of life." "In the past," he continued, "... there have also been wars of ideas, e.g. the wars of the Reformation, and the wars of the sovereigns against France as propagandist of the principles of the Revolution." But on the whole, he thought, it would have seemed a generation ago as if these wars were a feature of bygone days.

At the present, however, he went on, "a possible alignment of nations to the Left and to the Right is gradually shaping itself, and it may be some event will suddenly cause that alignment to become definite, with disaster as the outcome. . . . In many countries the deep-seated and widespread unrest has assumed various forms—communist, revolutionary, anti-religious, internationalistic. This group of movements finds a philosophy ready to hand in that of Karl Marx. These evoke counter-movements and enlist powerful support. They bring together many of those who defend the principle of private property, or those who believe in a religion and are attached to a church, or those who regard a patriotic devotion to one's own country as

¹ The Address will shortly be published as an article in the *Nineteenth Century*.

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a higher virtue than internationalism, and of those who simply wish to preserve stability and the existing order." This second group, he added, "if they wish for a philosophy, find it in Hegel, Fichte, Nietzsche, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Croce, Bergson. It has taken definite shape in the creeds of Fascism in Italy and of National-Socialism in Germany."

"At the basis of Fascism and National-Socialism," he suggested, "is the depreciation of intellect and the exaltation of intuition" or "what has been called the 'Retreat from Reason'." The doctrine of both is "that it is not necessary to be sensible, but only to be strong."

Moreover, "Fascism and National-Socialism are frankly militarist. . . ." With them "it is no longer an agreed matter that war is to be regarded as in itself a bad thing. Rather the philosophy of Fascism and National-Socialism raises the question whether to rid the world from war is desirable in principle."

A third distinctive mark of both National-Socialism and Fascism is in Sir Herbert's view that they accept the Hegelian conception of the State, as the 'divine idea as it exists on earth.' "Italian Fascism in its Charter of Liberty asserts that the 'Italian nation is an organism with a being, and also a means of action, superior to those of the individuals, whether separate or grouped, of which it is composed.' In other words, the individual exists for the sake of the State, not the State for the sake of the individual." And "from this theory of the nature of the State, it is no long step to the principle of personal leadership and the cult of the hero."

"On the Marxist side," again, he continued, "there is at the base the revolt against social inequality and against penury in the presence of abundance and widespread luxury. The remedy is sought in the overthrow of private ownership in land and in all the means of production; in the abolition of class distinctions; in the destruction of liberal constitutions; and in the establishment of dictatorships in the hands of the leaders of the proletariat."

"Both schools," he concluded, "adopt much the same attitude with regard to Liberty." Sir Herbert then went on to distinguish four aspects of Liberty, viz. "(1) national liberty—the freedom of one's country from foreign rule; (2) political liberty—the freedom of society from government by a despot or an oligarchy; (3) personal liberty—the freedom of the individual to think, speak, and act as he wills, subject to the equal rights of others; (4) economic liberty—freedom for the ordinary man from the restrictions imposed by poverty, overwork, bad government"; and said that whereas, "to enjoy complete liberty one must possess all four," . . . "we see in Germany and Italy and other Fascist countries on the one hand, and in Russia on the other, vast numbers of people acquiescing without demur in the sacrificing of political and personal liberty: they do it with the hope of making secure their national independence, or lessening hard economic restrictions."

Having thus outlined this new alignment of warring ideologies, Sir Herbert proceeded to a critical examination of their underlying doctrines.

"This is not the occasion," he said, "on which to attempt a discussion of the relations between intuition and reason. Both reason and intuition are of the essence of the mental activity of man, and it is unprofitable to discuss which of the two is 'the higher.' . . . There is no sense in saying that 'Reason is sovereign' . . . and there is no sense in saying that 'In the last resort we are bound to follow our intuitions.' . . . "Intuitions in the province of morals are termed the dictates of conscience. But conscience may err. . . . Further, one man's conscience will give direction in one way, his neighbour's in the opposite." . . . "It is true, of course, that reason also may err. . . . But there is this difference between the mistakes of reason and those of

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intuition. The former can be detected and remedied by the processes of reason itself. . . . Intuition does not provide for its own revision."

Turning to militarism, Sir Herbert underlined that "the contention that the principle of evolution justifies it has been refuted again and again by Scientists as well by philosophers. . . . So far from promoting the survival of the fittest, it is precisely these that war kills off. The other contention that wars are inevitable because the fighting spirit is innate in human nature is again only a reversion to the irrational."

Of the conception of the totalitarian State Sir Herbert made short work. "The State," he declared, "is nothing, after all, but a number of men and women organized for certain purposes and common action."

"To surrender political and personal liberties" would mean that we had "to hear on the radio, or to see at the theatres or cinemas only such things as authority might think suitable . . . that our country at any moment could be thrown into war, without any of us being allowed to know the truth about the issue, or being able in any degree to influence the course of events in advance." . . . Moreover, "under a dictatorship whether Fascist or Communist . . . no one is free to speak out plainly. If anyone differs from the dictator, he runs the risk of being dismissed from office, or imprisoned or killed. . . . Intrigue takes the place of open discussion and decisive vote." That this suppression of free thought would be especially a threat to religion, Sir Herbert thought was obvious.

"There remain," he said, "the respective principles of Fascism and of Communism with regard to the ownership of property." This problem, he thought, "is at bottom a question of the right division between the functions of the individual and the functions of the State or other corporate bodies. Opinion," he suggested, "seems tending to the conclusion that it is impossible to lay down any definite rule *a priori*. Many considerations have led a practical people here in Great Britain to move cautiously step by step. Different methods have been adopted to fit different cases. . . . The solution need not be found in the application universally and rigidly of a single principle, whether individualist, socialist, or communist."

In the last part of his address Sir Herbert Samuel asked the question as to "what are the broad policies that should be pursued . . . such being the great issues that confront our times?" His suggestions were briefly the following. After having uttered a warning against a tendency to pessimism, which in his view would not be justified, since "all over the world there is a marked progress in social conditions," he stressed the fact that in the first place "there is no reason to limit ourselves to a choice between Fascism and Communism. In the second place," he continued, "we may reject the political philosophy that bases itself on intuition." "In regard to education," he maintained further that "it is clearly incumbent upon the Governments of those countries which enlist the support of the mass of the people, not to allow the education of the coming generation, and not to allow military preparation and efficiency to be the monopoly of the advocates of force, nor those who are the guardians of better ideas to be content with a high-minded unpreparedness, leading to a noble-hearted defeat. If all the force in the world is to be on the side of militarism," he said, "the cause of peace would be in a bad way." "To maintain a national spirit, sane, sober, unaggressive," he added, "is not to oppose internationalism, but to complement it."

Sir Herbert summed up his speech as follows: "The policy which may after all ward off the danger of wars of ideas is, then (a) a searching analysis of the conflicting ideas themselves, and the exposure of what is foolish in them; (b) an insistence upon persuasion rather than force as the ruling

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principle, and the maintenance of force sufficient to ensure that; (c) a sane nationalism, which should be the servant, and not the enemy, of an enlightened internationalism; (d) constructive measures of social progress; (e) finding a new inspiration in the equality of citizenship, in the achievements of science, and in a religion which (putting truth in the first place) will satisfy the spiritual emotions without offending the intellectual conscience."

LECTURE Courses for the Lent Term, Session 1936-37:—

"REASON AND UNREASON IN THE MODERN WORLD," a course of six weekly lectures by Professor W. G. de Burgh, on Fridays at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C.1, beginning January 22nd, 1937. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

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The EVENING MEETINGS for the Lent term of the Session will be held at University College, Gower Street, W.C.1., at 8.15 p.m., on the following dates:—

Tuesday, January 19th: "Progress and Spiritual Values." Professor Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan.

Tuesday, February 16th: "The Modern Gospel of Unreason." Professor W. G. de Burgh.

Tuesday, March 16th: "Should our Rulers be Biologists?" N. J. T. Needham, Ph.D., Sc.D.

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CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY AND FAITH¹

THE RT. HON. LORD EUSTACE PERCY, P.C.

THOUGH I have been a member of this Institute, I think from its foundation, I have been a steadily inactive member, and have resisted with what grace I could the blandishments of our Secretary when he has suggested that I should address my fellow-members. For I am not a philosopher, either by training or, I fear, by instinct; and, now that I have allowed myself to be inveigled into this place, I feel that I am brawling in church. I am the most ill-informed of laymen, and, if you feel any interest at all in what I am about to say, it will, I fear, only be the rueful interest that the expert sometimes takes in an exhibition of ignorance.

Yet, after all, in a sense the philosopher, unlike the scientist, is fair game for the layman. For there is no such thing as pure philosophy. The philosopher has a purpose beyond the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. He has, in fact, a social purpose, and his work can therefore be subjected, at least in some degree, to the test of success or failure. The pure scientist escapes that test, for he can claim that his experiments succeed even where they fail, that each hypothesis disproved is an advance in knowledge. With still more reason he can claim that a discovery which has to all appearance no practical utility is nevertheless a triumph. But the philosopher has staked his all, not only upon the truth of at least one central hypothesis, but upon, so to speak, its availability to mankind at large; and, where he fails to prove that hypothesis or, proving it, fails to demonstrate its practical utility, he must admit defeat.

¹ Address delivered to the British Institute of Philosophy at University College on December 15, 1936.

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The philosopher's purpose is indicated in Bacon's epigram: "The knowledge of ourselves . . . as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of men, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature." The philosopher represents this "intention of man." He has staked all on the hypothesis to which the whole human race has always felt itself committed: that the universe has a meaning for man which it has not for any other living creature, that man can only know himself by rightly judging his relation to the universe, that his manhood consists, not only in his growing knowledge of the "scheme of things," but in his appropriation of that knowledge to himself. To vary an old simile: every fact ascertained by science must be converted by man into life as the mulberry leaf is converted into silk. As knowledge grows this process of digestion becomes more difficult, but, on the other hand, its necessity is more insistently felt. Never, certainly, has it been more insistently felt than to-day; never has so severe a strain been placed upon the philosopher's powers of interpretation.

It is in that sense that the question may fairly be asked: Is the philosopher succeeding? And, as a guide to an answer, it is permissible to ask another question: How far has he succeeded in the past?

I suppose that, at the back of most men's minds in this age, there is a pretty picture of philosophy derived from nineteenth-century liberalism. According to this picture, man emerges in the dawn of time as a half-bestial being, moved partly by animal passions derived from the struggle for existence and partly by superstitious fears of the unknown. Those fears he has embodied in irrational rules of worship and propitiation, and he has then used these rules for the more rational purpose of controlling his animal passions in the interests of the community. From this rudimentary stage there thus emerges a human society where quite reasonable standards of duty and mutual obligation are based upon the irrational taboos of religion. These irrational taboos may contain an element of truth. Science has not yet abolished the unknown, nor is it probable that it ever will. There may be a God; there may be a life after death. Man may have duties towards that supreme power and with reference to that ultimate future which go beyond his duties to his neighbour. But his duties to his neighbour come first, and they do not need the support of any taboo. They can be shown to be necessary by a rational study of the laws of nature and the requirements of civilized society, and they are at least often distorted by the religious sanction which primitive man originally invented for them. So the function of the philosopher has been to wean men steadily from irrational to rational ethics; from the fervours of religion to

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a single-minded respect for their neighbour's human wants and rights. In a word, he has been the apostle of "civilization," and the ideal man whom he is gradually forming will be that type of humane and cultured sceptic so often pictured to us in the Utopias of Mr. H. G. Wells.

This is indeed a pretty picture, but is it anything like what has actually happened in history? Of man's actual beliefs before the dawn of history we know, in fact, nothing. Nothing is more crassly unscientific than the calm assumption that they can be identified with the beliefs which may be observed to-day in the mind of the King of the Cannibal Islands. Personally, I can see no reason for supposing that the experience of primitive man was any different from any of those cycles of experience which are so clearly marked in man's subsequent history. In any case, we know that as soon as we come to historical societies the cycle of man's ethical and speculative thought does not run from the irrational to the rational, but rather from the rational to the irrational.

A society begins with a religious faith and a code of social conduct as rational as the state of its knowledge and the development of its reasoning powers permit. If, in the early stages of its development, its members have to struggle too hard for mere livelihood, either in protracted migrations or settled on poor soil and in an unfavourable climate, the faith may ossify into a cult so rigid that further progress becomes impossible. These are the so-called "primitive" societies. In more fortunate societies, the same ossification takes place, but at a later stage and consequently with no such final results. Such a society becomes gradually more highly organized as its prosperity increases. The State succeeds the village community. The sanctions of religion are increasingly invoked for the purposes of the State--no longer for the mere regulation of village morality but for the preservation of public order and the building up of the community's material wealth and power. It is under the influence of these expanding ambitions, not (as in less fortunate societies) under the pressures of poverty and insecurity, that the process of ossification begins. Wealth and power are found to be more congenial spheres for the use of human reason than worship or speculations about man's ultimate destiny. And, as the community's system of religion has become the framework within which wealth and power can be attained, men come to feel that they had better not meddle with that framework. But, before very long, the hardening cult begins to interfere with men's search for wealth and power. A priesthood, for instance, becomes economically powerful; or it tries to use its taboos to restrain men from the pursuit of necessary knowledge. Then the worldly ambition that had used faith as a convenient protection begins to revolt against

it. The revolt may be violent or gradual, but in either case the cult begins to decay and men begin to look round for a more elastic framework for their community life.

It is at that point that the philosopher comes in. The decay of a cult commonly coincides with a new growth of knowledge and opportunity which the old religious faith can no longer digest and make available. The task is taken up by the rationalist. But surely philosophy has always followed the same cycle as faith. As religious faith has hardened into a cult, so philosophy has softened into a culture. It begins by making the most exacting claims on man's intellectual responsibility; it ends by sinking him in a sort of feather bed of other men's opinions where he may rest in assured respectability, certain that he believes nothing which he has not read or heard on good authority. In its prime, philosophy can be sterner than faith, the philosopher king a greater tyrant than any priest; in its old age it achieves an emancipation which men find more intolerable than the chains of any religious cult. And when that stage is reached the religious cycle begins again. A faith emerges which once more calls upon men to make the effort, both of reason and of will, involved in its acceptance or rejection.

It is here that our nineteenth-century fathers went wrong. Cults they hated and feared; but culture was almost their ideal. They did not see, what we can surely see to-day, that both are degenerations. They did not realize, what history teaches and what our contemporary experience demonstrates only too clearly, that if men have often revolted violently against a cult, they have, as often and with even more violence, revolted against a culture. For a culture is worse than a cult in that, while it is equally unreasoning, it is even more unmeaning. It abandons even the pretence of interpreting the universe in terms of man. A culture is superior to a cult only in that, being even more unsatisfying, it spurs men more surely to the revolt which is the indispensable condition of further progress. "*Malheur au vague; mieux vaut le faux*"—that cry of Kenan's may or may not please us as an expression of personal preferences, but it is historically true.

This tendency to degeneration of all human thought, philosophical as well as religious, has been obscured in the history of the Western world for the last thousand years or so by the close alliance between religion and philosophy. Christianity is the only religious faith which has been capable of such an alliance. (I will not pause to justify this generalization; I know it is risky.) For centuries, faith and philosophy have gone hand in hand; together they have emancipated and together they have tyrannized; cult and culture have merged into each other and, in the revolts they have provoked, it is difficult to disentangle the threads of free thought and new

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faith, of Renaissance and Reformation. Opinions will always differ, for instance, as to how far the revolt of the sixteenth century was a philosophic revolt against a cult, an appeal from dogma to reason, and how far it was a religious revolt against a culture, an appeal from Aristotelian scholasticism to the principle of justification by a living faith. But however we may choose to separate the threads, it is mere colour-blindness to read the history of modern Europe and America as a progress from religion to philosophy. In the morphology of Calvinism, for instance, the sequence Calvin—Hume—Carlyle in Scotland or Calvin—Jonathan Edwards—Emerson in New England is at least as much a continuous process of philosophic degeneration as a struggle between dogma and free thought.

I dare not venture further into a history of philosophy. I must leave the bare mention of this sequence as my slender bridge across three centuries. But on the hither side of that bridge we come to a movement of thought of which we are the direct heirs and which we may, therefore, be able to judge with greater certainty. And in that movement we can perhaps discern the reason for those repeated failures of human thought which puzzle and disappoint us as we study the remoter past.

The nineteenth century was the age of scientific, as the sixteenth had been the age of geographical, discovery. As in the sixteenth century, discovery was accompanied by a revival of philosophy and was followed by a revival of religious faith. But the curious and significant fact is this: that discovery, while it gave philosophy its new impulse, did not give it its new material. The material on which the new schools of philosophy mainly worked was, not the scientific, but the social. True, this material was partly the indirect product of discovery—the changed economy resulting from the technologist's application of the scientist's new knowledge. But much of it was simply the old material of human relationships newly envisaged. It was no change in human relationships that stimulated, for instance, the philosophy of legal reform from Beccaria and Bentham onwards. And even in rationalizing social change the philosopher neither asked nor received much help from the scientist. The new humanitarian philosophy called on men to re-examine themselves as individuals and as members of society, rather than to reconsider their position in any cosmic scheme. It held out the prospect that such self-examination might be made as rigorously and objectively scientific as any analysis of inanimate matter. In that hope it sought to create a new category of social sciences, and to make that category almost independent of the physical sciences. The Utilitarians may not unfairly be said to have found a use for everything except the new facts of physical science.

The religious revival for the most part followed the same model,

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from Lacordaire and the Christian Socialists to the social reform movements of our own day. Even the dogmatic and authoritarian revival in the Roman Catholic Church was intimately associated with the new humanitarianism; even revived mysticism focused itself at Lourdes in a faith directly related to the alleviation of human suffering.

Moreover, as science became self-conscious, the scientists themselves united in warning off the philosopher. Huxley's agnosticism was more hostile to philosophy than to faith. It could dismiss the mystic with Hobbes's smiling retort: If any man pretended to a private revelation, no other man could contradict him. But the rationalist must be positively and authoritatively assured that scientific knowledge was not far enough advanced to justify any sort of philosophic synthesis. This agnosticism perhaps reached its culmination in men like Ray Lankester, who anticipated by some years Mr. Henry Ford's discovery that history itself is "bunk." More recently there has, indeed, been a reaction among scientists against the agnostic attitude, but the reaction has taken a form hardly more helpful to philosophy. We are now assured that the universal flux into which the physicist is resolving the universe may be fitted into almost any scale of spiritual values; but a free pass to journey on every conceivable road is not much help to the traveller who is looking for a signpost.

Philosophy, thus driven back upon the study of society, could not, of course, remain untouched by science, but it has drawn from science analogies rather than material. And these drafts have been dangerous. In adopting analogies, the philosopher has tended to forget that he is using a different time-scale. No one seriously believes, for instance, that the theory of biological evolution, with a time-scale reckoned in tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of years, has any direct relevance to the history of organized human society during the last sixty centuries or so. Yet what began as nothing more than a suggestive analogy has tended to become a fundamental assumption. Biological evolution has been transmuted on the shorter time-scale into "social progress"—a process tacitly regarded as equally continuous and inevitable. On this foundation has been built up a sort of introspective, a sort of self-contemplative, social philosophy. Science has been assumed to have cut the connection between progressive humanity and the supernatural; and it has confessed itself unable to trace any alternative connection between humanity and the natural universe. Meanwhile the scientist has at least demonstrated that the universe contains many forces capable of being harnessed by man for his material enrichment. Let man, therefore, contemplate himself as the independent master of the universe. Let him observe that his mastery has been attained,

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and can only be developed, by co-operative effort on a scale undreamed of at any earlier stage of human history. From this observation let him draw a new sense of social responsibility and evolve a new form of democratic society. Humanity, engaged on a pioneering adventure, is cut off from any outside influence or guidance; let it find in that thought a new self-reliance and a new comradeship.

Only the crassest prejudice could be blind to the nobility of this ideology, but it has an obvious danger—precisely the same danger as we know threatens the individual who indulges in excessive introspection. So long as such introspection takes the form of self-confidence confirmed by a career of constant success, the individual may be both happy and useful, however exasperating he may be as a companion. But, his course of success once interrupted, his superiority complex may turn rapidly into an inferiority one. Then his personality disintegrates; he becomes a nuisance to himself and to the world. Is not this what is happening to all civilized societies to-day? As a new science of psychology, on the border-line between the social and the physical sciences, has been intensifying the drive towards an introspective social philosophy, men have been rapidly losing faith in the prospect which had been the sole foundation of that social philosophy—the prospect of progress through the conquest of nature. The scientist's accumulating knowledge of the universe has not only remained indigestible by the philosopher; it has become unmanageable by society. War and economic chaos have made the conception of progress look like a bad joke. In the twilight of the inferiority complex thus created all the elements in our fashionable social philosophy, old and new, have faded into a discredited jumble; the ancient idea of freedom has joined more sophisticated ideas, such as "progress" and "social democracy," in a limbo of mere culture. And so revolt: the falsehoods of an iron regimentation are better than vague contentment with a traditional culture.

We seem, in short, to have reached that point in the cycle of thought when men are likely to turn from philosophy to a new religious faith. And when I say "new" I mean something more than a "revival," in the sense in which that word is often used. I mean something revolutionary, a profound change of mind. There are signs enough in the world to-day of such a change. Behind all the violence to which we are becoming accustomed in Europe lies an aspiration which may be defined, with equal accuracy, in language borrowed either from political philosophy or from theology. In the one language it is a desire for *status*; in the other, for *justification*. It is, in fact, a demand for some intelligible interpretation of man's position in the scheme of things. And since no contemporary system

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of philosophic rationalism has been able to meet that demand, men are turning to those who at least profess to be able to meet it, to propagandists who hold out the prospect of justification by some kind of faith.

I suppose that none who have listened to me thus far will have failed to detect my own bias. My belief is that philosophy without faith is dead. You might suppose therefore that I should welcome this approaching revolution. But that is not my feeling. I have no doubt that the demand for faith will create its own supply; but I have equally no doubt that the resulting faith may be false in a sense to which we of the Western world have long been unaccustomed. It may be not merely superstitious or liable to the exaggerations of fanaticism; it may be inherently and positively evil. The Kakodaemon is a perfectly tenable philosophical hypothesis; devil-worship is a perfectly genuine religion; there is a worship of humanity which seems to awaken the primitive beast in man. If we have not learnt these facts from history, we have only to look round the Europe of to-day.

In face of this rising passion, born of intellectual and moral disappointment, my chief anxiety is that all those who have any responsibility for guiding human thought should remember and reassert the double foundation, intellectual and moral, on which all faith and all philosophy must rest. No system of thought can be true that does not build a bridge, both between every man and the physical universe, and between every man and all other men. Its intellectual synthesis must embrace all human knowledge, not merely the immediate environment which obviously determines the individual's life and livelihood; its moral synthesis must embrace all mankind, transcending the limits of race, geography, political allegiance or culture. And we shall not, I suggest, be able to reassert these truths, to convince men of their intellectual and moral responsibility, unless we realize the causes of our own failure in the past. It seems to me to be the supreme paradox of rationalism that it has never, in any age, been unsuccessful in moral synthesis, but has always, in every age, failed in intellectual synthesis. From that paradox proceeds another: that revivals of faith have usually resulted from a craving for intellectual integrity rather than for moral reform. That paradox has always puzzled the scholar; as embodied in Luther it drove Erasmus to despair. It is not without significance that so many cultured people to-day should feel drawn to Erasmus as one of the most sympathetic figures of history. He is that; his memory has all the lonely nobility that belongs to men who have failed to understand the times in which they lived; but we to-day have a sterner task before us than to win a like renown at the cost of a like failure.

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Our task is to reassert the power of human reason—its power not only to know but to understand. Man is not committed to the closed cycle of faith and philosophy, cult and culture, round which he has so long revolved. His thought can strike out into a straight road which does not end in a blind alley. To assert this is, indeed, itself an act of faith, but it is an act that has been made, consciously or unconsciously, by every human being who has ever set out seriously to use his reason. Especially has that act been the starting-point of all thought in the last two thousand years, since Christianity, transferring man's golden age from the past to the future, created the conception of "hope." Few of us perhaps realize how that conception has saturated our mind. Only in a mind so saturated could the idea of "progress" have been born; only in a mind unconscious of its own postulates could that idea have ended in the blind alley of political or economic programmes.

My own belief is that reason, having once made this act of faith, can be satisfied only when it has made another; that any fearless use of reason must lead to the conclusion voiced by a recent French writer: "*Il faut faire renaître l'idée de Dieu.*" If man by searching cannot find out God, his search must at least lead to the conviction that only by finding God can he reach "the place of understanding." But, even if this be true, those who believe it must be on their guard against a religious self-satisfaction quite as deadly to a serious use of reason as any agnostic indifference. Even the finding of God can only be the beginning of wisdom; there can be no end to the effort to understand. If the modern world is revolting against both cult and culture, it is chiefly because Christians have forgotten that the God revealed in Christ is not only a God whose will must be obeyed, but a God whose purpose must be understood. The choice which is being presented to men to-day is perhaps the final choice which will determine the continuance or the downfall of our civilization; and it is presented alike to all who are at ease in Zion, whether they take their ease in the reading-rooms of culture, or in the lecture halls of philosophy or in the household of faith. It is the iron choice between reason and passion. On the one hand lies the endless adventure of universal understanding, which is also the adventure of love; on the other the trench warfare of tribal affections and doctrinaire prejudice. There is no middle road; scholarly indifference will find itself sooner or later dragged in one direction or the other. It is surely time that those whose choice is reason should realize the full meaning and the full responsibility of the choice that they have made.

THE STORY OF AMERICAN REALISM

PROFESSOR WM. PEPPERELL MONTAGUE

I. THE PRE-REALISTIC BACKGROUND

IN American philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century there was small interest in Empiricism and almost no interest in Realism.

The great Thomistic realism of the Catholics was unfortunately regarded by the non-Catholics as too closely bound up with theological dogmas to be of any significance for secular thought. The realistic doctrines of the Scottish school, at one time rather widely current in the country and expressed with vigour by McCosh at Princeton, had passed away. The agnostic realism of Spencer and Hamilton had not affected to any extent the teaching in the universities. The traces of realism, both Platonic and particularistic, in the philosophy of C. S. Peirce had not attracted attention, and the same may be said of the kind of realism which Hyslop, a reader of the valuable but little-known work of Thomas Case, combined with his spiritistic beliefs. Paul Carus, whose blend of Buddhism and psycho-physical monism contained realistic elements, exerted little influence on academic philosophy, and he himself never received from the universities the recognition which his valuable services to philosophic journalism should have elicited.

In contrast to these fragmentary realistic tendencies, Idealism, both epistemological and ontological, was everywhere rampant. Even before the Transcendentalism of Emerson and Alcott had quite died away in New England, Dr. W. T. Harris, the much respected United States Commissioner of Education, had organized a group in St. Louis for the study of Hegelianism and had founded the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. The Idealism thus started in the Middle West was further continued by Wenley at Michigan and by many others. G. H. Howison at the University of California had developed a very original though not thoroughly worked out system of pluralistic idealism in which the monadism of Leibniz and the subjectivism of Fichte were combined in a new synthesis. And by the force of his personality and the ardour of his convictions he created on the Pacific coast an enthusiasm for philosophy that still endures. So much for the West. In the East, Thomas Davidson at his "Bread-Winners' College" in New York was preaching a form of pluralistic idealism similar to that of Howison but more voluntaristic, and strongly colored by the thought of Rosmini. At the universities, there were Creighton at Cornell, Ormond at Princeton, Fullerton at

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Pennsylvania, Miss Calkins at Wellesley, Butler at Columbia, Ladd and Duncan at Yale (more Lotzian than Hegelian), and Borden P. Bowne at Boston University whose "Personalism" is being vigorously continued to-day by Brightman and Flewelling. Finally at Harvard, there were Everett, Palmer, Muensterberg, and Royce. (I have listed merely the names that come to mind, and many others should doubtless be added.)

Most of these idealists were "Right Wing" rather than "Left." From the Orthodox Christian Theism of Bowne to the Personalistic Absolutism of Royce there was little of the Spinozistic or pantheistic tendency of Bradleyan idealism. Howison, Fullerton, and Davidson were, however, in successively increasing degree aloof from the position of traditional religion; and Muensterberg with considerable originality used Fichtean transcendentalism as a façade for the thoroughgoing mechanistic naturalism which he applied to the existential world of phenomena.

II. THE REVOLT OF THE PRAGMATISTS

The first decade of the present century was a time of change and insurgency in American philosophy. The pragmatism of William James foreshadowed in his great *Psychology* and explicitly proclaimed in his California address in 1898 was systematically expounded in the books entitled *Pragmatism* and *The Meaning of Truth*. During these same years John Dewey, first at Chicago and later at Columbia, had developed independently of James but in close sympathy with him, the form of pragmatic philosophy known as Instrumentalism. Though the pragmatism of James and the instrumentalism of Dewey were alike in opposing the monism and intellectualism of the dominant forms of idealism, it is my impression that it was the metaphysical and psychological faults of those doctrines that aroused James to revolt, while for Dewey it was rather the sociological and methodological weaknesses of idealism that merited attack. As a result of this difference in emphasis, the philosophy of James developed into a metaphysical pluralism stressing the free will and independence of the individual as opposed to the idea of what he termed the "block universe" of the absolutists. This personalistic pluralism was later extended to the even more complete pluralism of *Radical Empiricism*. On the other hand, Dewey's instrumentalism, true to its name, developed from its first theoretical expression in his *Essays on Experimental Logic* into increasingly practicalistic treatises on education and social questions, in which the problems of traditional metaphysics were less and less stressed and finally abandoned as outmoded and artificial. In short, the instrumentalism of Dewey, both in its practicalistic motivation and in its anti-meta-

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physical outcome, has proved itself to be for better or for worse more purely pragmatic than pragmatism itself.

III. THE NEW REALISTS AND THEIR PROGRAMME

It was, I think, in the spring of 1910 that six teachers of philosophy formed a group for the purpose of expounding and defending a new kind of realistic philosophy. The group consisted of Perry and Holt from Harvard, Marvin and Spaulding from Princeton, Pitkin and myself from Columbia. After a few meetings we published in *The Journal of Philosophy* "A Program and First Platform of Six Realists." This co-operative article was followed in a year and a half by a co-operative book entitled *The New Realism*.

Although the impressions of American realism that are to be sketched in this paper are almost exclusively concerned with the organized groups calling themselves "New Realists" and "Critical Realists," it is appropriate to mention at least the names of six American philosophers who, though they were not officially members of either group, have during the past thirty years in various ways and in varying degree expounded a realistic philosophy. These "unofficial" realists are: first and most important of the series, Woodbridge of Columbia (who was invited but refused to join the New Realists), McGilvary of Wisconsin, Boodin (now) of the University of California at Los Angeles, Cohen of the College of the City of New York, Loewenberg of the University of California, and Macintosh of Yale.

We had all been realists prior to our forming the group, and each of us had written papers in which realism was implicitly or explicitly defended. I think that Perry and I wrote the first two of the explicitly realistic articles, and these were each inspired by the bitter attack on the realistic standpoint contained in the first volume of his Gifford Lectures by our teacher, Professor Royce. My article in *The Philosophical Review* for March 1901 was entitled "Professor Royce's Refutation of Realism"; and Perry's article entitled "Professor Royce's Refutation of Realism and Pluralism" was printed in *The Monist* for October of the same year. Though the members of our new group differed widely in their metaphysical views, there were certain methodological and epistemological postulates which we shared in common. I may summarize them as follows:

1. Philosophers should follow the example of scientists and co-operate rather than work alone. The co-operation which we were to practise consisted in each man showing his essay to the others, taking account of their suggestions and securing not unanimous agreement with every proposition, but general assent to the essay as a whole.

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I am not sure that this precept was put into practice to any very significant extent. We read one another's papers and listened conscientiously to one another's criticisms, and we did for the most part make the revisions or at least the omissions that were requested, but I am afraid that especially on matters about which we felt strongly there tended to develop among us a tacit and I hope an unconscious understanding which if made explicit could have been expressed as "I'll pass your stuff if you'll pass mine."

2. Philosophers should follow the example of scientists in isolating their problems and tackling them one by one. We were to follow this precept by isolating the epistemological problem and studying the cognitive relation obtaining between any knower or apprehender and any object that he knows or apprehends without prejudging or even raising the question as to the ultimate nature of the apprehending subjects or of the apprehended objects.

I think that we stuck to this precept fairly consistently. If a certain amount of ontology and cosmology was included in each of the essays in our book it was by way of supplementation and clarification of the central issue which was the question of whether the cognitive relation was or was not a necessary condition for the reality of the objects cognized. The point was of especial importance to me because I had a metaphysics less naturalistic and more dualistic than that of the others—with the possible exception of Pitkin—and I wanted to be quite sure that our agreement on the realistic theory that *knowledge as such makes no difference to the objects known* was not going to commit us to any theory as to the nature of those objects or of man's place among them.

3. Some at least of the *particulars* of which we are conscious exist when we are not conscious of them.

This was the ordinary particularistic or *existential* realism of common sense.

4. Some at least of the *essences or universals* of which we are conscious subsist when we are not conscious of them.

This was Platonic or *subsistential* realism.

5. Some at least of the particulars as well as the universals that are real are apprehended directly rather than indirectly through copies or mental images.

This was the *presentative* realism of Reid as contrasted with the representative realism or epistemological dualism of Descartes and Locke.

It will be seen from the last three of our five postulates that we planned to revive and defend ordinary realism by adding to it Platonism and by subtracting from it the dualistic or copy theory of knowledge.

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IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR EXISTENTIAL REALISM.

The general argument for our new realism as applied to particular things in space and time was itself not new but old. It consisted in the attempt to show by empirical examination and inference that the things that are believed to be real do not seem to depend on the fact that they can figure as objects of perceptual and conceptual experience. To prove this independence directly by Mill's Method of Difference is of course impossible; and to demand it of the realist is both unfair and absurd. We can bring a dog into the presence of a cat and observe that he growls, then take him away and note that the growling ceases and thereupon infer with high probability that the dog's growling depended upon his being in the presence of the cat. Or, substituting a chair and a book for the cat, we can introduce a dog to their presence and by the same Method of Difference infer that his behaviour is not affected by and hence not dependent upon his being in the presence of those objects. But we cannot look at a thing before we see it or after we have seen it and note whether our seeing it has changed its appearance. Yet, as Perry so conclusively showed in his classic paper on *The Egocentric Predicament*, it does not follow because an object's independence of our experiencing it cannot be proved by the Method of Difference that therefore it cannot be proved by some other method. Still less does it follow that the idealist's hypothesis of the dependence of objects upon consciousness is implied by the fact that when objects are observed, consciousness is always present.

The presence of consciousness together with the objects of which we are conscious is merely a tautology which leaves the dependence or independence of the objects an open question to be decided by inference from their behaviour *while under observation*.

The situation is analogous to the one in which we find the stars always present together with human affairs. If we wish to refute the astrologer's claim that human affairs depend upon the presence of the stars, we cannot do it by removing the stars and taking note of what then happens. So far as the Method of Difference is concerned we are to be sure in a "predicament." But despite our predicament we seek confidently to show that there are no constant or causally significant correlations between the behaviour (conjunctions) of the heavenly bodies and the episodes of men's lives. In the same way and with at least as much success, we as realists can seek to show that the behaviour of objects when co-present with consciousness reveals no constant or causally significant correlations with that consciousness. Even the astrologer, whatever his other fallacies, does not rest his case merely upon the irremediable co-presence of the course of the stars and the course of human affairs. But the

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idealist, whatever his other virtues, does incline to rest *his* case on the mere co-presence of the two terms in the situation whose dependence or independence is at issue. *He entrenches himself behind a tautology in the belief that it is an axiom.* And as Dr. G. E. Moore has remarked, if only the idealist can once be made to entertain even as a bare possibility the hypothesis that the objects of which we are aware may nevertheless be independent of that awareness, half the battle for realism is won. For whether we consider the objects of ordinary perception or the more recondite objects of science, it is somewhat pathetically obvious that in neither case does their behaviour show any signs of being affected by their presence in consciousness. They come and go as they list, and while our experience and its changes depend largely upon them and upon their changes, the converse is not true. Of all the invariant relations or "laws" of physical nature, I know of no single one that depends for its reality upon the mere fact that it is or can be experienced.

V. THE ARGUMENT FOR SUBSISTENTIAL REALISM

The method of proving the independent reality of the universals or essences that *subsist* is the same as the method of proving the independent reality of the particular things or events that *exist*. That $7+5=12$ is entirely explained by the natures of seven, of five, and of twelve, and not in the least by the nature of consciousness. The "egocentric predicament" applies as much and means as little for our knowledge of forms as for our knowledge of particular facts. Whether the forms are numbers or non-quantitative qualities like blue and yellow, their relations and configurations exhibit a complete indifference to the fact that we are conscious of them. It is of course true that *which* of the forms or *which* of the events a man will experience at any moment will be determined by the condition of his organism and even by his memories and interests at that moment. But the function of these subjective factors is *selective* rather than *constitutive*, and the objects themselves are to be explained in terms of their relations to one another and not in terms of their relations to the process of selecting them.

VI. THE ARGUMENT FOR A PRESENTATIVE RATHER THAN A REPRESENTATIVE OR COPY-THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

For an object to be perceived it is necessary either that it should stimulate the percipient organism as with waves of light or sound, or else that an effect similar to that of a stimulus should in some other way be produced in the organism. Thus we shall normally perceive a sphere in front of us if there actually is such a sphere and

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if it sends to our eyes light waves and by that means ultimately produces a certain specific effect in our brain. But if that same specific effect is produced by two flat disks acting through the mechanism of a stereoscope, we shall perceive a sphere as clearly as in the other case. Everybody admits such facts as these; and there are many who have argued that because an effect in the organism must precede the perception of an object it must follow that the perceived object is itself identical with the effect produced in the organism. The truth of such a conclusion would mean that the whole perceptual world is inside the percipient and that it is at best no more than a copy of the external world of physical entities.

Now we New Realists believed that this epistemological dualism was not implied by the premises invoked in its support. We argued that Descartes, Locke, and their followers were guilty of a sheer *non sequitur* in concluding that the object perceived must be identical with the intra-organic means by which it was perceived, and that as the latter was internal the former would have to be equally internal.

The arguments for our position in this matter were not, I think, as clear and consistent as they should have been. We were perhaps all in agreement that the fact that perceived objects at least *appear* to be external created a presumption that they were really external and that the burden of proof rested upon those who would deny that presumption. I think we were also agreed that the space and time of perceptual experience, despite specific aberrations that might call for correction, took up so to speak "all the room there was," and that consequently there was no room left for a conceptual or inferred space and time that were to be real beyond and behind the realm of perceived and perceivable objects. These seemed to be as external as possible; and if *they* were not really outside us there was nothing else that could be.

To the extent that we attempted to supplement these rather vague feelings by explicit arguments, we fell into disagreement and of those disagreements I shall speak later.

VII. NEW REALISM IN RELATION TO IDEALISM

The fallacies of idealism as they appeared to us can be briefly stated and such a statement may help to clarify our own position.

The first and cardinal fallacy of idealists was their ascription of self-evidence to the proposition that the relation of the knower to the object known is an "internal relation," that is, a relation such that the terms related are dependent upon the existence of the relation.

This first dogma, asserting the axiomaticity of idealism, has been

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held by idealists from Berkeley to Bradley. The realist of course denies that the relation of the knower to the object known is self-evidently revealed as "internal." He makes no counter claim for the self-evidence of the "externality" of the cognitive relation, but he does hold that the latter can be proved inductively.

Now when the idealist has once committed himself to the postulate that no object can exist apart from consciousness or experience, he finds himself in a predicament. The universe is obviously too large and long enduring for him to regard it as dependent upon the finite experience of himself and his neighbours, hence there must be postulated an infinite and absolute experience in which it is contained and on which it does depend. The second postulate of Absolutism is thus made necessary to repair the havoc wrought by the first postulate of Subjectivism. If, however, we refuse as realists to take the first step, we are under no compulsion to take the second. If events can exist in their own right without the need of depending on consciousness, the hypothesis of an absolute consciousness is no longer demanded by the situation. The Absolute may of course be inferrible on other grounds, but not on the grounds of epistemology.

VIII. NEW REALISM IN RELATION TO PRAGMATISM

From the standpoint of most realistic observers, the essential doctrine of pragmatism consists of two postulates which we may term respectively the Methodological postulate of *Practicalism* (which states a theory as to the *criterion* of truth), and the Epistemological postulate of *Relativism* (which states a theory as to the *meaning* of truth). The methodological postulate is very ambiguous and appears to be variously interpreted even by the pragmatists themselves. When one says that a proposition can be believed to be true if it works well in practice or if it leads to successful consequences, one may mean either (1) that accepting the proposition brings happiness or (2) that it brings a sensory experience of which the proposition in question was an anticipation. A religious creed, for example, may be held to be true on the ground that it enables its adherents to function efficiently and to meet the crises of life with serenity and courage. In this sense it works well and leads to successful results in practice. But I think that most realists would regard the correlation between the truth of a proposition and its "working well" in this sense as very imperfect and unreliable. There are many false beliefs that have worked well over long periods of time for many people, and again there are many true propositions that can bring despair and even paralysis of action to some of the persons who believe them. If on the other hand we take "working well" or "successful consequence in practice" to mean *sensory fulfilment of anticipation*, then indeed

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we have a reliable criterion of truth—which is, however, nothing but old-fashioned empiricism under a new name.

But it was not the methodological postulate of pragmatism (even when interpreted “humanistically” rather than empirically) to which realists as such were mainly opposed, but rather the epistemological postulate which grew out of it. To regard the successful experiences that ensue from a belief as a criterion of its truth is one thing—and a thing that is sometimes bad and sometimes good—but to assume that *truth itself consists in the process by which it is verified* is a different thing and always bad. It makes truth a psychological affair, and as such an affair of individual experience and relative to each individual who has the experience. I may experience successful consequences from believing that the proposition “A is B” is true; you may experience consequences that are equally successful and successful in the same sense from believing that it is false. Shall we then say that the same proposition is at once both true and false? True for me and false for you? This relativistic epistemology of the pragmatists was rejected by the realists. The truth (or falsity) of a proposition *antedates* the process by which it is verified (or refuted). The proposition “Mars is inhabited by intelligent beings” is either true or false; but it may be a long time before we discover which. When and if we do discover whether the proposition is true it will occur to nobody except a philosophic pragmatist in the privacy of his study to imagine that the proposition waited until that moment to *become* true or to *become* false. The facts about Mars, like other facts in the world, will be regarded as having been what they were prior to the events of their discovery or verification.

To this realistic attitude the pragmatists replied by saying that we were making a fetish of “Truth in the abstract” or “Truth with a capital T” which could never be experienced and which consequently had no use or meaning. And they would add the comment that while it was all very well for us to say that truth was the relation of “agreement between judgments and realities,” we ought at the same time to admit that such agreement could only be found in individual experiences to which therefore it was relative and on which it was dependent.

It seems to me that we have here a recurrence of the “*egocentric predicament*,” but in an interestingly altered form. In the original form of the “predicament” we were challenged by the *idealists* to point to a case of *reality* apart from experience. In the new form of the “predicament” we are challenged by the *pragmatists* to point to a case of *truth* (i.e. the agreement relation of judgments with reality), apart from experience. We answered the idealist by pointing out that though quite obviously facts could never be observed in the absence of experiencing them, yet when they were observed in the

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presence of experience they gave every sign of being independent of that experience with which they were co-present. And as it was with *facts* so also is it with *truth*, which is the special relation of agreement or correspondence obtaining between facts and the judgments about them. The agreements can never be discovered when absent from the experience that verifies them, but when discovered in that experience they give every sign of not depending upon it. When Columbus verifies his hypothesis that there is land to the westward of Europe; when Newton verifies his gravitational hypothesis; when Pythagoras verifies his geometrical hypothesis—in each and every case the truth that is verified reveals a structure that could not have depended upon or have had to “wait for” the verifying experience in order to be what it is. The whole nature and behaviour of things testifies to the realists’ conclusion that the function of experience in general and of verification in particular is not to create in themselves the things and the agreements that are experienced and verified but rather to reveal or discover them to us. It is we the perceiving subjects and not they the perceived objects that profit and are changed by that strangest of all relations between an individual and his environment, the relation which we variously denominate “awareness of,” “consciousness of,” or “experiencing.”

There was a final charge that was sometimes brought by the pragmatists which made us peculiarly and justifiably indignant. This was the charge that, because we held that facts and truths do not depend upon being experienced, we should also hold that experience is *otiose* and makes no difference to the world in which it occurs. In rejecting this imputation of epiphenomenalism (at least as a necessary consequence of his epistemological theory), the realist may point out that consciousness, though not affecting objects in the act of revealing them, can and does change them through the actions of the being to whom they are revealed. Seeing an object enables the seer to adapt himself to it and to its laws, or even to adapt it to himself and to his needs. The light of a lantern does not directly affect the obstacles in the path of the traveller, but it does affect them indirectly by enabling the traveller to remove them. Thus and thus only are objects affected by our experience of them.

From this Section (and the one preceding) it will be seen that the epistemological controversy was triangular: Idealism, Pragmatism, Realism—each one against the other two. From our realistic viewpoint the idealists were right in holding to the ordinary conception of truth as something absolute and not relative to finite minds, but wrong in their insistence that facts exist ultimately only as items of a single all-embracing experience; while on the other hand the pragmatists were right in holding to a pluralistic world of facts,

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but wrong in supposing that truth about those facts was relative to and dependent upon the changing and conflicting experiences of verification. In matters of ethics, however, the pragmatists were usually on the side of the angels. And as we were all utilitarians we approved of their making *value* relative to the needs and satisfactions of individuals while regretting that they should fail to see the contrast in this respect between value and truth. When the same proposition seems true to one man and false to another, *one* of the men must be *wrong*; but when one and the same thing is felt as a good to one man and as an evil to another, *both* of the men can be *right*. One man's meat can be another man's poison.

IX. DISAGREEMENTS OF THE NEW REALISTS

The six members of the organized group of New Realists had come to the movement for differing reasons and with differing interests. And our views on metaphysics and even on some aspects of epistemology were by no means always in agreement. Which of these differences were the most important and how they should be formulated would themselves, I am afraid, be questions about which we should differ. As I am the one who is at present telling the story I must of necessity formulate the points at issue between us in my own way and select as the most important those that seem most important to me. If in this matter or elsewhere in the article I inadvertently misrepresent the position of friends (or opponents), I here and now apologize.

From my standpoint the differences that were most important both in themselves and in their influence on the later development of the neo-realistic movement centred first on the question as to the "*Behaviouristic*" nature of consciousness and second on the question as to the "*relativistic*" but existential status of the objects of illusion and error. On these two questions Perry and Holt held views which I believed to be false. As to the positions of Pitkin, Marvin, and Spaulding on these points I was never quite clear.

X. THE FALLACIES OF NEO-REALISM: BEHAVIOURISM

As to the nature of consciousness: Perry and Holt believed that an individual's awareness of an object consisted in a "specific response" of that individual's organism to the object. Now an organism's response ("specific" or otherwise) to an object must be a *motion* simple or complex of some or all of the material particles composing the organism. Any motion must be up or down, east or west, north or south, or in some intermediate spatial direction. How can such a motion constitute what we experience as the "consciousness of"

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an object? (1) It does not resemble it in any way, unless in the small proportion of cases in which the object is itself a motion of material particles. (2) It cannot be directed toward it except in those cases in which the object of our consciousness is a spatial event contemporary with the organism's motion. (3) It affords no clue to our ability to apprehend secondary qualities, abstract ideas, other minds, or events of the past and the future. (4) Worst of all, the organism's specific response or directed motion fails to provide for the *duration* or "specious present" that characterizes every experience and significantly differentiates it from all other events and relations. Each phase or momentary cross-section of a *motion* must be over and gone before a later one can come. But with *consciousness* it is just the reverse. Each phase or momentary cross-section is not over and gone when the successor appears but endures along with it.

These objections which applied with sufficient strength to the older forms of materialism are even stronger against this new materialism or Behaviourism which would identify the awareness of an object outside the body with a "specific response," i.e. a hypothetical motion of the body or its parts towards that object. The peculiar self-transcending thing called *awareness* puts an individual in relation to objects that are either in other places and times or not in space and time at all. If it is to be identified with something in the organism, that something should be anything rather than motion.

XI. THE FALLACIES OF NEO-REALISM: OBJECTIVE RELATIVISM

The second of my differences with my colleagues concerned the existential status of the objects of perceptual illusions and of other erroneous experiences. Unless I have grossly misunderstood them in this matter, they held the theory of "Relativistic Objectivism," or (as re-christened by Lovejoy) "Objective Relativism." This is the view that every object that *appears* to be in space *is* in space, and because different and mutually incompatible objects appear (though not to the same observer at the same time) to occupy the same space, it must follow that an object at each instant has no single position and shape by its own right, but many positions and shapes each one of which is relative to some observer.

To illustrate: The rails over which your train has travelled, when seen from the rear platform appear convergent, and when seen from directly above appear parallel. The convergent rails are apparently just as objectively existent in space as the rails that are parallel. But in each case the objective existence is not absolute but relative to an observer. Or again, that which normally appears as two flat disks will, when viewed through a stereopticon, appear as a single solid sphere; and the latter is to the objective relativist as truly

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an occupant of space as is the former. Or finally, what to a healthy man appears as a bed-post may to a man suffering from delirium appear as a serpent. Each of these objects will (it is claimed) exist objectively in space—the bed-post relative to the healthy brain, the serpent relative to the fevered brain. In short, the things that exist objectively in space are to include along with the things ordinarily supposed to exist there the totality of actual and possible objects of perspective aberration and illusion and even of dreams and hallucinations.

The objective relativist is of course careful to point out that for an objective existent to be relative to and in that sense dependent upon an actual (or possible) observer or organism does not at all mean a relativity to or a dependence upon *consciousness*. And my neo-realist colleagues would feel outraged if they were accused of having surrendered in their theory of error to that very subjectivism against which we were all pledged to revolt. And yet despite the insistence that whatever appears can be relative to an observational context without thereby forfeiting its ontological status as a "physical" existent, it still seems to me that these relativistic objects do bear a suspicious resemblance to the sense-impressions of Hume, Mill, and Avenarius; and that the New Realism in adopting them has evolved (or degenerated) into the old phenomenalism.

There are three objections to this theory of illusory perception which I feel justified in stating as a part of my story of American realism, not only because I think that they constitute a decisive refutation of objective relativism itself, but because the failure of New Realism to meet them was the cause and the justification for the coming of Critical Realism.

The first difficulty with objective relativism is its neglect of the profound *asymmetry* of the relation between the veridical and the illusory objects of perception. The asymmetry referred to consists in the fact that *the illusory perceptions can be explained by the veridical, whereas the veridical cannot be explained by the illusory*. The rails over which my train has travelled appear convergent from some viewpoints and parallel from others. If we assume that the rails *are* parallel we can easily explain why and how and when an *appearance* of their being convergent will arise. But if we reverse this procedure and assume that they are in fact convergent we cannot explain why the appearance of their parallelism should occur under the circumstances in which it does occur. Or again, if the two flat disks in front of the stereoscope are in reality what they appear to be in what would usually be called veridical perception, we can then explain in terms of physical and physiological optics why these two disks when viewed stereoscopically should cause the appearance of a single sphere. But if we reverse the business and posit the solid sphere to be the

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physical fact, we cannot explain why or how it should ever give rise to the appearance of two flat disks.

Between the hallucinations of dreams and the experiences of waking life the same asymmetry is found. Dream worlds can be explained in terms of the waking world but not the reverse. The dream hallucinations, like the perceptual illusions, can be as vivid and internally consistent as their veridical counterparts. Taken in themselves and by themselves one appearance is as good as another. But when we inter-relate them by that type of procedure which we call "explanation" their fatal differences in ontological status are easily discerned.

The second of the difficulties in the theory of objective relativism is a sort of generalization of the first. Real objects have two ways of producing effects, unreal or illusory objects have but one. An existent thing, be it material or mental, produces (1) direct effects, i.e. effects in its own right, upon all other things; and it produces (2) indirect effects through the agency of whoever believes or even apprehends it. The thing produces this second group of effects not *by right* as existing but *by grace* as being an object of some experience. Now while veridical or existent things produce both classes of effects, illusory or non-existent objects produce only those indirect effects that come through the agency of the minds whose objects they are. Consider flounders and mermaids. Flounders affect the hooks that catch them and the stomachs that digest them, and in addition as objects of contemplation they inspire fishermen and perhaps poets to do things that they would not do unless they figured in the experience of those agents. On the other hand, the mermaids, while they too as objects of contemplation have inspired poets and perhaps fishermen to undertake various actions, they have never in their own right affected a hook or a stomach or anything else. Or again, compare and contrast the real God that you believe in with the unreal god believed in by your theological opponents. You of course know that, while the effects of the latter are restricted to the fancies and resultant actions of the unfortunates who are deluded, the effects of your God are produced not only through the minds of His followers but upon the world as a whole.

This difference holds all along the line. Unreal objects, whether they be objects of hallucination and sensory illusion, such as stereoscopic spheres and converging railway tracks, or whether they be objects of intellectual delusion and mistaken belief, such as mermaids and false gods, are characterized by their utter inability to produce any effects except on and through the victimized minds in whose experience they appear.

It is because of his failure to realize this obvious but important truth that the objective relativist is guilty of a preposterously impudent *understatement* when he says that the objects of so-called

veridical perceptions are more "convenient" than the objects of so-called illusory perception. The former do not just happen to be more convenient. There is a reason; and the reason is that the veridical objects form a select aristocracy of appearances which owe their rank (1) to their ability to explain all the rest and (2) to their ability to constitute a self-consistent and self-contained system of causally related elements. This is just another way of saying that real objects are such objects and only such objects as can produce effects directly upon one another as well as indirectly by grace of the minds that perceive them.

The last of the three weaknesses in the theory of objective relativism is based upon its unmanageable complexity. It may be possible to find room in a single spatial system for the totality of such perspective aberrations as railway tracks of various degrees of convergence and of pennies of various degrees of ellipticity; but if we add to these comparatively simple erroneous perceptions not only the stereoscopic spheres but the objects of every dream and every delirium, then not even the genius of a Russell or a Whitehead could devise a space or a space-time that would be adequate to serve as a bed, no matter how procrustean, in which such so-called and mis-called "physical existents" could all be placed and duly ordered. Yet each and all of these objects would be *physical* if by "physical" one is to mean whatever appears as spatial. Indeed, "Pan-physicalism" should be the awkward but accurately descriptive term to designate this phase of objective relativism in which the phobia against a "bifurcation" or division of spatial phenomena into subjective and objective has been indulged to such an extent as to confer the same ontological status upon everything that appears to have shape, size, and position. But if, in order at any price to avoid "bifurcation," we must practice this metaphysical egalitarianism, I for one would prefer the idealistic form of it. It is less difficult, even if not less gratuitous, to think of the totality of actual and possible appearances as being somehow synthesized and harmonized in one absolute consciousness than in any milieu of a spatial or physical kind.

Of course the objective relativism which I have been attacking was not the only way out. Without lapsing into either dualism or idealism it would have been quite possible for the New Realists to have dealt with the problem of error by the simple expedient of *denying any locus of any kind to the non-existent things that figure in all erroneous experience*, as objects either of perceptual illusion or of conceptual delusion. For a thing not to exist is for it to exist nowhere. Any possible or subsistent object *can* appear in consciousness and a few of them *do* appear there; but only a minority of such objects enjoy membership in the great society of interacting existents

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as well as in the little societies of objects for conscious minds. Just as one and the same point can be a member of two or more intersecting curves, so, as William James pointed out (for the first time I believe in a college class which I attended in 1898), can one and the same object be a member of the independent order of existence and at the same time and with no disruption of identity be also an object of experience. By accepting such a view of the matter, coupled with a refusal to accord any physical locus to the unreal objects of illusion and delusion, we can escape bifurcation or epistemological dualism without falling into either idealism or pan-physicalism.

I wish I could think of the theory just stated which was my own solution of the epistemological problem as the "Right Wing of New Realism"; but, alas, it takes more than one feather to make a wing, and as I was quite unable to stem the drift to the Left—i.e. to Behaviourism and Objective Relativism—I fear it is historically correct to regard those movements as constituting the essence of American New Realism, at least in its later stage of development.

XII. CRITICAL REALISM

In or about the year 1920 a second group of American philosophers decided to write a co-operative book in the interest of a realistic epistemology. The group was composed of George Santayana, formerly at Harvard, C. A. Strong, formerly at Columbia, A. K. Rogers, formerly at Yale, A. O. Lovejoy at Johns Hopkins, R. W. Sellars at Michigan, J. B. Pratt at Williams, and Durant Drake at Vassar. They called themselves Critical Realists and entitled their book *Essays in Critical Realism*. They regarded our New Realism with its attempt to interpret existent objects as directly presented to the mind (rather than as indirectly represented through images or copies), as a form of Naïve Realism—(which indeed it was) and they chose the word "Critical" as suitably antithetic to the "Naïveness" of which we their predecessors had been guilty.

As in the earlier group of six, so also in this later group of seven the members combined agreement in epistemology with disagreement in metaphysics. Rogers was a sceptic though with naturalistic tendencies. He had, however, been trained in idealism, and his realism was mellowed by a rich historical scholarship and an unusual tolerance of mind. Strong, Drake, and Sellars were all definitely naturalistic, though Strong supplemented his naturalism with a kind of pan-psychism in which Drake followed him, while Sellars supplemented his with an enthusiasm for Emergent Evolution. Lovejoy and Pratt were dualists in psycho-physics as well as in epistemology and constituted the Right Wing of the movement. Lovejoy put especial emphasis on the significance of *time* as affecting all aspects

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of nature and mind, and christened his philosophy Temporalism. His pet aversions were Behaviourism and Objective Relativism, and against them he waged unremitting dialectical war, always urbane but devastatingly effective. Even further to the Right than Lovejoy and nearer than any of the others to a metaphysical spiritualism was Pratt, who combined a first-hand knowledge of the mystical idealisms of India with a strong sympathy for Christian theism. As for Santayana, his rich and many-sided philosophy is known to everybody. At least as naturalistic as Sellars, Strong, and Drake, he combined with his naturalism and materialistic epiphenomenalism a Platonic realism more completely and consistently worked out than in any previous philosophy. This blend of a materialistic conception of the realm of *existence* with a Platonic conception of the realm of *essence* from which all things derive their meanings and their values, but not their destiny, has always seemed to me (second only to Bergson's) the most challenging and instructive of modern visions. Even to one who, like the writer, is unable to share Santayana's pessimistic belief in the *causal impotence* of Platonic forms it is a great thing to have that vast encompassing realm of essence or subsistence depicted in its purity and completeness and freed from irrelevant entanglements with the subjectivistic theories of knowledge and the teleological theories of nature which have traditionally obscured both its meaning and its beauty.

When one turns from the original and richly varying metaphysical affiliations of the Critical Realists to the bare nucleus of epistemological doctrine on which they were all agreed and which constitutes the definition of Critical Realism itself, I am myself unable to see anything that is either rich or original. The theory may be true but it certainly is not new. It is indeed nothing but a restatement of the Epistemological Dualism which is explicit in Locke and Descartes and implicit in Hobbes, Spinoza, and the other modern philosophers prior to Berkeley.

This dualistic epistemology is very simple and clear. Its tenets are the following:

1. The world is composed of at least two sets of entities. (a) material things; and (b) mental states or ideas.

2. The ideas alone are given or presented as objects in consciousness and in that sense are *immediately* known, while the material things are only *mediately* known, being inferred as the direct or indirect causes of the ideas.

3. The inferred material objects are always numerically or existentially non-identical with the immediately presented objects or ideas from which they are inferred; and they are furthermore at least partially different in kind or nature from the latter.

From this point on, epistemological dualists differ from one

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another. Some of them, for example Descartes and Locke, hold that the ideas inhere in a mental substance or spirit; others, for example, Hobbes and Spinoza, hold that the ideas do not inhere in a non-material substance, but that they are phantasms or inner aspects of the body or of the substance of which the body is the outer aspect. But it is important to realize that the question of whether the mind is numerically identical or numerically non-identical with the brain is a psycho-physical or metaphysical question that has no direct bearing upon the epistemological question of the relation of ideas to the material objects that are inferred as their causes. In other words, the alleged epistemological duality of internal ideas and external objects is not aggravated by supplementing it with the psycho-physical dualism of Descartes, nor is it mitigated by supplementing it with the psycho-physical monism of Hobbes or of Spinoza.

On the epistemological dualism which has just been summarily expounded, there are two preliminary comments which can be made without prejudgment of the question of its ultimate validity or invalidity. First, the theory seems to account simply and clearly for the illusions and aberrations of sensory experience and for what is generally assumed as to the physical and physiological processes that condition our awareness of events distant from us in space and time. Second, the theory seems to be as weak in accounting for truth as it is strong in accounting for error. If our experience affords direct access only to the internal realm of one's own mental states, by what magic can we jump out of our skins and infer or construct that external realm of material objects in which we undoubtedly do believe? If we emphasize the inaccessibility of an external world, we are led to scepticism. for we must doubt the extent to which that world which we can never experience can be proved to resemble the world that we can experience. In fact we must be doubtful not only as to the nature of the external world but even as to whether it can be shown to exist at all. On the other hand, if instead of concentrating on the numerical otherness of the external world, the epistemological dualist attends to the assumed qualitative likeness of that world to the world of his experience, then he is led not to scepticism but to idealism; for the world that he believes in and that he has alleged to be external now turns out to be an extension and elaboration of his world of ideas.

These two comments that I have just made briefly have been made at length and in detail by the whole history of philosophy subsequent to Locke.

Now what, if anything, have the Critical Realists done to mitigate the two sad dialectical sequels to epistemological dualism with which our philosophic tradition has made us familiar?

So far as I can see, their contributions to epistemology are mainly

confined to a refutation of the *monistic objectivism* of the New Realists and to a restatement in slightly different form of the dualistic or representative theory of perception. In the matter of refutation the most effective work, in my opinion, was done (1) by Drake in his arguments against any form of simple or absolute objectivism; and (2) by Lovejoy in his careful and extensive analysis of the fallacies of the relativistic objectivism of Whitehead, Russell, and the "Logical Positivists."

In the matter of restating the theory of dualistic realism, Santayana is the only member of the group whose thought makes any claim to an advance beyond the position of Locke and Descartes. Yet even in the case of Santayana, whose work in metaphysics is of such enduring value, I can find nothing of real novelty for the epistemological problem. To say that the object of awareness is always an "essence," and that one and the same essence can be exemplified both in subjective experience and in objective nature, does at first sight appear to bridge the traditional gulf between the internal realm of mental states and the external realm of material things. But this appearance of novelty in thought is, I fear, due entirely to a novelty in language—the language of Platonism being employed to describe a situation that is ordinarily described in the language of Nominalism.

To illustrate the way in which the two languages can be used with equal propriety to describe one and the same situation, let us take the classic example of Tweedledum and Tweedledee. Here are two numerically or existentially separate individuals who are, however, in quality, kind, or essence, exactly the same. If we are in a nominalistic mood and desire to emphasize their existential duality rather than their qualitative sameness, we shall characterize them as "two different individuals, Dum and Dec, who happen to be perfectly similar in respect to their *Tweedleness*." If, on the other hand, we are in a Platonic mood and desire to emphasize their qualitative sameness at the expense of their existential duality, we can characterize them as "a case in which one identical essence of *Tweedleness* happens to be exemplified or actualized twice, once in *Dum* and once in *Dec*." But it is easy to see that the two characterizations are merely different verbal formulae equally applicable to one and the same situation. For suppose that only one of the twins were given in experience; then the other could not be inferred with any more validity by calling him "a second exemplification of the very essence that is experienced" than by calling him "a second individual exactly similar to the one that is experienced." Now if for Tweedledum and Tweedledee we substitute respectively *ideas that are internal and given as mental states* and *physical objects that are external and inferred as being similar to the ideas in all or some of their properties*, we don't bridge

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the gap between the given and the inferred by replacing the Lockian "*similarity of mental and physical things*" with the Santayanan "*mental and physical exemplifications of the same essence.*"

I should regard the analysis just given as too obvious to call for statement were it not for the fact that I believe that the Critical Realists labour under the delusion that quite apart from Santayana's Platonic *ontology* the description of the exclusively internal objects of consciousness as "essences" works in a mysterious way to bridge the epistemological gap between mental states and the material things inferred from them, and thus constitutes a real advance beyond the traditional dualistic epistemology of Locke and Descartes. That such is not the case is (ironically enough) nowhere more clearly brought out than by Santayana himself, who quite frankly deduces a conclusion of pure scepticism from his own epistemology. For he tells us that the hypothesis that external things as the causes and correspondents of our ideas do exist cannot at all be proved even with probability. We *believe* that they exist on the basis of "animal faith" which is the completely non-rational but biologically necessary instinct to regard our private mental states as symbolic of a public material nature. No actual sceptic, so far as I know, has claimed to disbelieve in an objective world. Scepticism is not a denial of belief, but rather a denial of rational grounds for belief. Santayana's picturesque name of "animal faith" does not in any way differentiate his position from that of Hume or other sceptics who have bowed to the inevitable fact that our basic practical attitudes toward the world are psychologically founded upon instinct rather than logically grounded on reason.

XIII. THE INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN REALISM ON AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

My story of Realism in America, sketchy and inadequate though it be, is already far too long. I shall conclude it with two comments of a nature and temper more cheerful than my mainly destructive analyses of the arguments of both the New and the Critical Realists might seem to warrant.

First, then, for our comfort let us remember that *unproven is not disproven*. Grant that I have been right in arguing that New Realism in its eagerness to *bridge the gap* between the mind and its physical world has by its theory of Objective Relativism degraded the pure members of that world to an unseemly parity with the objects of error and fantasy, while at the same time, by its theory of Behaviourism, it has degraded the mind itself to a mass of "specific responses." Grant also that I have been right in arguing that Critical Realism has revived an old puzzle rather than contributed a new solution of

it and that in its eagerness to *preserve the gap* between the undisciplined hordes of mutually incompatible ideas and the single self-consistent system of univalent material entities it has made that gap as hopelessly unbridgeable as it was in the earlier dualistic realisms of Locke and Descartes. Grant me both of these negative appraisals of the two schools of American Realism and I can still say that the object of their joint devotion: viz. a physical world existing independently of the minds that inhabit it and use it, remains inviolate at least as an object of faith if not as an object of proof. And that "faith," which as Santayana has said is necessary to the life of animals, may be also necessary to the growth and health of philosophy.

Certain it is that both of the recent movements of realism, whatever the validity of their arguments, have brought a new and more invigorating atmosphere to American philosophy,—and this is the second and last of my concluding comments.

Prior to the advent of the New Realism, academic philosophy was curiously out of touch with common sense, with science and even with religion. The usual tenor of a course in "Introduction to Philosophy" was to convince the students in the first place that Berkeley's conception of the physical world was essential to philosophic truth, and in the second place that it was a kind of truth which, when accepted, made no essential difference to any particular belief. The net result of such teaching was the impression that philosophy was a combination of the paradoxical and the unimportant. As for science, its working categories and great discoveries were all too often belittled as "vicious abstractions from the organic unity of experience." Philosophers as such (with the notable exception of Josiah Royce) regarded themselves as under no obligation to acquaint themselves with what experts in various departments were finding out about the universe. Finally as to religion, the attitude of the professors alternated between a condescending neglect of it as a crude embryonic form of real philosophy and an idealistic defence of it that gave an all too easy assurance of God, Freedom, and Immortality based not on a study of the universe and its history but on a dialectical analysis of the problem of epistemology.

Thanks to Realism and also to Pragmatism, these thin manners of philosophy in the colleges have changed to something thicker and better. The teaching of metaphysics and ethics to-day is much more relevantly related to the natural and social sciences. And finally, the basic beliefs of religion are analysed more often in terms of their connection with what is known about physical nature and human history than in terms of idealistic platitudes, with the result that on the one hand the values and the dangers of the church as a social

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institution are better understood, and on the other hand Theism itself is seen as an exciting and momentous hypothesis rather than as either a dialectical truism or a mere dogma of faith.

In short, to some extent at least there has come into our speculative thinking a revival of the ancient Ionian attitudes of curiosity as to the specific features of the universe and wonder as to its central mystery. And for this restoration of health to American philosophy the two movements of New and Critical Realism have, I believe, been largely responsible.

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PROFESSOR JOHN LAIRD

ANYONE who thinks, for example, of "realism," "sur-realism," and the like in matters of art, or of the vulgar and journalistic vagueness in the use of the adjective "realistic," may be prepared for the discovery that in philosophy also the term "realist" is either uncomfortably fluid or else acquires technical senses that are rather easily blurred. Our lexicographers tell us that, in its most general sense, "realism" indicates fidelity to what is real, particularly in the representation of (usually sordid) matters of fact, and that in philosophy it is an antithetic term, asserting the contrary either of "nominalism" or of "idealism." In the main, we might probably say that "realism" in twentieth-century British philosophy is employed in the second of these philosophical senses, the mediaeval controversy regarding the status of universals (although perennial) being no part of its special business. But we should have to be wary in saying so.

Indeed, there would be nothing improper or archaic even to-day in Campbell Fraser's statement (say) that Berkeley was a "spiritual realist," and if it were true in fact that all contemporary British realists agreed in repudiating idealism, it may be doubted whether such a statement would help us very much. For "idealism" in philosophy is a very ambiguous term, and "its" opponents may well be opposing quite different things. Again, even if "idealism" were less ambiguous than in fact it is, there need not be much common ground among its opponents. One could hardly define blue as anti-buff; why then expect to define "realism" as anti-idealism? And what of the distinctions between philosophical realists? Some of them are "critical realists," not, indeed, of the American variety but as Mr. Dawes Hicks is; some, like the late Mr. Lloyd Morgan, are impenitent "natural" or "representative" realists; some come as near to being "naïve" or perhaps "direct" realists as they dare; and most of the members of the league of realists are prepared to castigate their dubious allies for being uncritical, unnatural, sophisticated, or oblique realists.

These observations are more than a piece of preliminary sparring, intended to stimulate the writer's circulation and possibly to catch the attention of an idle reader. As logic often is, they are devastatingly matter-of-fact. Thus a recent writer (Mr. S. Z. Hasan, in his *Realism*, 1928) gives a fairly full discussion of the views of Cook

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Wilson, Prichard and Joseph, yet makes Moore the central figure in British philosophical realism. "There is hardly any position of fundamental importance which cannot be traced to him" (p. 229). But what in Cook Wilson could be traced to Moore? and how could it be maintained that Moore was greatly influenced by the "natural realism" that persisted in British philosophy from the time of Reid onwards, that did influence such writers as Pringle-Pattison and S. S. Laurie, and is not wholly extinct in these islands to-day? Again, how could anyone seriously maintain that all recent British anti-idealisms are pro-realistic? Is it not clear that most British pragmatists are anti-absolutists, but *not* realists? And did they not obtain the support of certain "personal idealists" some of whom, like Stout, might count themselves realists in a half-Reidian way, although with a host of qualifications, amendments, amplifications, and divagations?

Let us, then, begin all over again. All philosophical realists, we may allow, are opponents of some sort of idealism, but must be presumed to agree in a positive direction, even if they do not, strictly, occupy a common platform.

In attempting to give an account of this common tendency, I propose to take a course that may be unfair to several British philosophers now living. It is not true, I think, that all the contemporary British philosophies that might legitimately be called realism in terms of some quite intelligible definition or definitions of that word, owed much to Dr. Moore; but it is true, I submit, that what was commonly called "realism" in pre-War Britain during the present century was roused in the main by Moore's *Refutation of Idealism* and fostered by the immense activity of those who agreed very largely with him. Moreover, the War did not end this central fact. Consequently I propose to typify British realism in the present century by this sort of debate. We may not hear much about it now, but its influence lingers, just as the influence of realism in any of its senses lingers to-day, although we do not usually hear much about "realism" as such.

(I should warn my readers, however, that neither Moore nor Russell (who at one time followed him) called themselves realists. The name was thrust upon them. It will also appear that these writers, as well as many others, developed their philosophies in ways they did not originally contemplate, so that no one would call them "realists" now, although many would have called them so in Edwardian times.)

Why, then, did these authors, and others like them, attack "idealism," and what in the first fine *careful* rapture of their attack committed them to some form of "realism"?

As has been said, "idealism" has many varieties. It may not, for example, be much more than the doctrine that somehow the

nature of things satisfies as well as begets men's highest aspirations. Substantially, however, we may say that it has two major forms which, despite many individual differences, may be called respectively epistemological and ontological idealism.

By epistemological idealism I mean the view that knowing, perceiving, opining, believing, and all such processes (for short all cognitions) are such that anything cognized is by that mere circumstance mentalized in some way, so that the non-mental is incognoscible. Such cognition, so far as the argument goes, might be animal, human, superhuman, super-personal, or divine, but human cognitions and what they mentalize would, on any showing, play a prominent part in any such philosophy.

By ontological idealism I mean simply the view that the universe is either a spirit or a collection of spirits, so that nothing exists save spirit and its states. That is a view about the constitution of being, and it might be held quite independently of any epistemological premiss. For an idealist of the second type might hold that while there was no contradiction in the idea of non-mental things existing and being known, there were positive ontological grounds for denying that such things existed in fact. The alleged "things" might, for example (like the traditional devil), be too poor or too weak to exist; or they might be impossible participants in a universe as unified and as orderly as we know the actual universe to be. On the other hand, epistemological idealism would support ontological idealism if it could prove that the inevitable mentalization of any entity we can so much as conceive implied that that entity was either spirit or a "state" of spirit. In terms of this major division within idealism, British realism before the War was principally concerned with the denial of epistemological idealism, and presented an epistemological counter-analysis (or counter-analyses) realistic in some positive ways. This had an ontological bearing; but it was initially epistemological.

In his *Refutation of Idealism* (*Mind*, 1903) Mr. Moore argued that all idealisms required the premiss that *esse* necessarily implied *percipi* (assuming that *percipi* included thought as well as sensation), that this premiss was either an airy conceit or a confusion between "what is experienced" and "the experience of it," that in fact all cognitive events included a common part viz. "consciousness" or "awareness" together with a varying part, viz. the different "objects" cognized; that these parts were distinct and might exist separately; that consciousness, although "as it were diaphanous" was visible to introspection; that among other confusions the idealists treated the objects of mind as "contents" of mind (although they were "contents" of the object if they were "contents" in any intelligible sense at all) and that he personally

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was "as directly aware of the existence of material things in space as of his own sensations."

This way of putting the case, despite its vigour and genuine acumen, may not seem to be wholly convincing. Thus it is true of any object experienced that it is experienced for a finite time; and it is also true that all experiencing lasts for a finite time. It could hardly be inferred, however, that pure diaphanous time, being common to both, may exist separately. On the other hand, the positive claim that we can see, by careful inspection, that acts of awareness are always existences distinct from the objects we are aware of, and that these objects could exist without being experienced is, in the slang phrase, something to bite upon. It is also "realistic" in a very obvious sense, for it asserts that there is no reason to doubt that the human mind can apprehend both itself and objects other than itself (including non-mental objects) as they are in themselves, thus denying epistemological relativism and agnosticism as well as idealism.

Accordingly there was much discussion of the grounds and tenability of this analysis, or of other analyses that were, broadly speaking, similar. Some of the critics, as Mr. Dawes Hicks, professed themselves to be realists (for it does not follow that epistemological realism stands or falls with the letter of Moore's *Refutation*); others were anti-realists; others did not care whether they were realists or not. The point is that the dominant idealism in Britain at the time had been badly shaken, and that much close if furious thinking ensued.

Let us select certain points for a brief consideration. (1) Do acts of pure awareness exist in the sense alleged? (2) Is it legitimate to treat the act-object analysis as an absolute prius in all epistemology? (3) Are all the "objects" of such "acts" existentially distinct from the acts, or some only, or none?

(1) In his later arguments Moore held that the nature of cognitive acts was "extraordinarily difficult" to be clear about although the characteristic of appearing must certainly be distinguished from and additional to the constitutive characteristics of any object.¹ In the *Refutation*, however, he held that "the awareness of blue" was existentially distinct from "blue" and itself directly introspectible. We could inspect the awareness, with some difficulty, and were not simply left with the puzzle that something must be blue, although a blue awareness was nonsense. Indeed, although this analysis of sensation might be incapable of being made more general (since we might not be able, e.g., to introspect an act of remembering, distinct from the remembered, although we could introspect an act of sensing distinct from the sensed), Moore in the *Refutation* took the analysis to extend to all cognition.

¹ See *Aristotelian Society Proceedings* (= *A.P.*), April 1921, pp. 134 sqq.

In this he had comparatively few followers. According to Russell (arguing against Meinong rather than against Moore), "empirically I cannot discover anything corresponding to the supposed act" (*The Analysis of Mind*, p. 17 sq.). According to Alexander, the distinction between experiencing and the experienced is absolutely fundamental, and the *ings* are introspectible; but it is not true that introspection "contemplates" or could conceivably contemplate mental acts. It can only "enjoy" them (*Space, Time, and Deity*,¹ I, p. 12 sq.). According to Dawes Hicks "awareness" in Moore's proffered analysis was a mere universal, not an empirical fact. Hicks therefore maintained that Moore was asking quite wrong-headed questions about it (*A.P.*, 1916-17, p. 353).

(2) Hicks (among others) held that we should be "critical" realists, that is to say, realists who had learned a great deal from Kant, but had also unlearned some of him. Objectivity should be regarded as a gradual discriminative achievement, not something that could ever be visible to simple inspection. And subjectivity was a still more difficult achievement. Coleridge's growl about "ommjec" and "summjec" had a lesson for all this light-hearted, confident chatter about *-ings* and *-eds* (Applause from Scotland, and subdued applause from Oxford).

Again, if, as Russell later held, mind and physical nature (with certain reservations regarding passion and images) were to be regarded primarily as different series of sensory phenomena¹ stuff, and *not* as distinct existences, it is clear that Moore's analysis was roundly disputed, although it would be a question of definition whether "realism," in all its important epistemological senses, was also disputed. It is also clear that there might be considerable resemblance between Kantians and rabid anti-Kantians in this matter.

(3) Superficially, at least, the third problem is even more complicated than the others. I shall try, however, to give an account (brief and necessarily sketchy) of some of the more important points that were debated in this country.

(a) Even if it be assumed that there are definite acts of awareness occupying an assignable time in someone's life history, it cannot be inferred from this mere circumstance that (to retain a convenient piece of jargon) the *-eds* could exist apart from the *-ings*. Many, for example, would hold that there could not be an unexperienced pain, although, verbally at least, it is possible to distinguish between experiencing a sharp pain and the sharp pain experienced, and although it is easy to distinguish an aching tooth from an aching toe, although an "aching feeling" may be said to be common to both.

Accordingly, if we attempted to analyse all cognition into cog-

¹ Cited hereafter as *S.T.D.*

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nizing and cognized, holding that sensing and sensum, memory and the remembered, imagining and the imagined (and so forth) are, in each case, two distinct entities, we might find ourselves rather unhappy. The general position set forth in Moore's *Refutation* would need to be supported by particular arguments of detail if it were maintained that we do in fact sense colours (and the like) as they exist apart from sensing, that we remember past events as they were when not remembered, that we imagine imaginary objects as they would be unimagined, etc.

In lieu of debating such points in detail, I shall only remark that few professing realists would go so far as to defend such a thesis in full (at any rate without important reservations), although I personally think that anyone who persistently took such a view would have a much better case than is currently supposed.

(b) Awareness is always awareness of something. Therefore if, in the analysis of cognition, nothing is included except, on the one hand, awareness and on the other hand its "object," it may fairly be asked, "Where, then, is there room for error?" For, in error we do seem to be aware, in some sense, of "objects" that "really" are *not* objects, or, alternatively, of an "object" that is not what we are aware of it as being.

Something, no doubt, may be done in the way of classifying the causes and the types of possible error, and so of restricting the zone of hostilities. Certain persons, for example (not all of them realists), hold that there can be no mis-sensing (since sensation is below truth and error), no mis-imagining (since imagination cannot be false), no mis-knowing (since it would be self-contradictory to *know* what was false). But it would be impossible to deny that mis-judging, mis-conceiving and mis-remembering occur quite frequently.

Consequently, the objection was frequently raised that realists could not find a home for error, or that, if they did find a home for it, they were logically constrained to abandon their realistic domicile regarding truth. This realists deny; and Mr. Alexander, in particular, grappled with the problem very pertinaciously on realistic lines (*S.T.D.*, III, vii and viii). It seems fair to remark that a realist who is error-conscious is apt to be a chastened rather than a truculently "naïve" realist. He can scarcely maintain that error is the correct awareness of "false objects"¹; for even if there were such objects, the correct awareness of them would not be erroneous. On the other hand, it seems pessimistic to conclude that nothing is apprehended as it is because some things are apprehended as they are not, or that any non-realistic theory of error is better able to deal with this problem, at the critical point, than a

¹ Or "objectives" in Meinong's terminology.

realistic theory. (Some such theories can push the problem a stage further back; but that is not a solution.)

(c) It is also pretty clear that not all "objects" of an "act" of cognition have the same status *vis-à-vis* the mind that a yellow patch (say) may plausibly be held to have *vis-à-vis* the sensing of it. A yellow patch (we may plausibly, if rashly, say) is "there" to be seen. But consider such apprehensions as "It will probably rain to-morrow," "Jones will either sink his putt or lose the match." Rain may be "there," but not "probable rain," and "reality" cannot be "either-or." In short, propositions are cognized and may in some sense be non-mental; but many or all of them seem to "express" or "correspond to" reality rather than to *be* it. Hence it is not surprising that most of those who busy themselves with symbols and "objectives" rather than with "objects" commonly suppose that they have thereby emancipated themselves from the sort of problem that appealed to the more enthusiastic British realists in the early years of the present century.

(d) Nevertheless, the problem of the status of physical objects remains; and the popular view, at least among semi-philosophical people, is that a realist in philosophy is a stout fellow who insists that there is a physical world which has existed, and probably will exist, independently of the observations of a human or, indeed, of any mind; and that human beings can apprehend portions or phases of this physical world as it would be if they were nowhere near it.

In this general sense there might be many divergent types of realism. Thus it might be held that our senses represented such a world correctly (a form of "natural" realism), that thought but not sense might grasp the real nature of physical things (noëtic realism), that we might be able to divine the essence of physical nature in some romantic or mystical sur-realistic way. For the most part, however, what the plain man understands by "realism" is the doctrine that if he opens his eyes or his ears he will (usually if not infallibly) become acquainted with physical nature as it truly is. If he sees white paper, and is not dreaming or drugged, then there is paper in his neighbourhood, and that paper is white. He believes that "realism" is a sophisticated philosophical defence of this naïve attitude. It is a *sensory* realism that interests him, and he is not inclined to brief a philosophical barrister who takes too many liberties with that fundamental position.

The philosophical problems concerning sense-perception have been exceptionally prominent in British philosophy for at least two centuries, but few would deny that Moore, Nunn, Russell, Stout, Alexande., Broad, and Price (to mention no others) have greatly increased our knowledge of the subtlety of these problems and of

the need for being circumspective in our inferences regarding this topic. And all these writers were either realists or considerably influenced by realistic views. They roused many philosophers from what had tended to be something very like an idealistic slumber, and made even an idealistic nap rather difficult, especially for the young. Moore may not have been justified in believing that he was "as directly aware of the existence of physical things in space as of his own sensations"; but it was much to have shown that the question "If not, why not?" had to be taken very seriously indeed.

In ordinary speech (and keeping to a stock example) we say that a penny is brown and round, and that our evidence for this belief is that we see the penny to be so. Yet we also say that "it" looks elliptical when viewed sideways, and black, not brown, in the dusk. Here again the evidence is that we see these shapes and hues.

"Its" colour, therefore, would seem to require a concealed premiss concerning the illumination, and (because of possible colour-blindness, etc.) a concealed premiss regarding psycho-physics. "Its" shape might also seem to involve a concealed premiss regarding the position from which the penny was seen.

Let it be granted that at any open-eyed moment we do see something, and that we should not confuse between glimpsing and glimpsed. Can it then be held that we really see "glimpseds" (or visual sensa) and that these are identical with some portion or phase of the physical penny?

The plain man talks about a penny that has only one shape, and, I suppose, only one colour; but there are many "glimpseds" that he would deny to be identical with this single shape or single colour (for example, all the oblique or crepuscular "glimpseds" of normal people, and all the "glimpseds" of persons drugged, or drunk, or standing on their heads).

Keeping to shape, we might argue (α) that *the* penny, visually considered, is a name for a set of shapes tending towards roundness, as a sort of paradigm, and defined by this tendency. It has not really *one* shape, except in a "Pickwickian" sense; but it is convenient to talk of *one* shape in order to designate a certain assemblage of shapes readily distinguishable from any other assemblage. And all the shapes might be non-mental and belong to the physical world.

We might also argue (β) that the penny has only one permanent shape, but that the elliptical glimpsed-shapes *are* its surface with certain omissions, while the omissions (if any) in its round glimpsed-shape do not affect the visible circularity of that in the surface which is *not* omitted. (The main difficulty in this line of argument would be that if a normal man presses his eye-ball, he perceives two glimpsed-pennies without actually creating a second penny.)

Or we might say (γ) that the physical penny (which is always round) should be distinguished from the glimpsed-shapes (which need not be round). If so, theories (α) and (β) would be very un-plausible, since they imply, without adequate cause, that certain glimpsed-shapes are privileged. The plausible conclusion would be that the physical penny is not sensed at all, but it might be maintained, nevertheless, that the glimpsed-shapes justified the belief in the existence of a (round?) physical penny either by being the basis of an inference, or in some way even more fundamental than inference.

All these suggestions are, in various ways, realistic; and they illustrate, without exhausting, the realistic possibilities. None of them would quite satisfy the plain man; but I am afraid the plain man must for ever remain unsatisfied. He is Pickwickianized and de-Pickwickianized, and re-Pickwickianized by the most friendly philosophers.

Another possible view for realists would be that there are, properly speaking, *no* *sensa*. It cannot be inferred from "I see X" (such reasoners would say) that there is any entity a "seen-X" regarding which one can legitimately use the same sort of language as regarding X. Sensing, in short, is a "way" of apprehending X, and it is a matter for detailed argument whether X has sense qualities at all, or certain sense qualities (but not others), and generally what is meant by being sense-qualified. Yet the need for such investigation should not pre-judge the question whether X *was* sense-qualified.

Here I must abandon this type of question and pass to others. I have tried to indicate, in a rough way, the variety and also the realistic trend of much British discussion of these questions.

While it seems to me to be correct to say that Moore's *Refutation* originated the greater and more characteristic part of what is commonly understood by twentieth-century British (epistemological) realism, it would be absurd to suggest that the *Refutation* exhausted his views, or exhausted those that had a direct bearing upon "realism." Indeed, Russell mentioned rather different matters when at an early stage in his career he avowed his allegiance to Moore. "On fundamental questions of philosophy," Russell said (*The Principles of Mathematics*, 1903, p. viii): "My position, in all its chief features, is derived from Mr. G. E. Moore. I have accepted from him the non-existential nature of propositions (except such as happen to assert existence) and their independence of any knowing mind; also the pluralism which regards the world, both that of existents and that of entities, as composed of an infinite number of mutually independent entities, with relations that are ultimate, and not reducible to adjectives of their terms, or of the whole which these compose. . . . The doctrines just mentioned are, in my opinion,

quite indispensable to any even tolerably satisfactory philosophy of mathematics."

Russell's work on logistics and on mathematics was a truly great philosophical achievement, bringing him (and this country) international and lasting renown. This was admitted by his British opponents. As the greatest of them said (F. H. Bradley in *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 309): "There is no living writer, with whom I am acquainted, whose work in philosophy seems to me more original and valuable." Again, the belief that philosophy could renew its ancient alliance with science, and even take the lead in the bolder sort of scientific explanation, seemed to give a solidity and importance to the whole enterprise that the rather condescending views of the absolutists regarding science had expressly abandoned. To-day we think of Russell, Alexander, and Whitehead as the pioneers and executants of a philosophico-scientific movement of great importance, and may not be disposed to inquire too nicely into the question whether they are "realists," and, if so, what kind of realists.

Nevertheless, Russell was a realist, without calling himself so, when he wrote *The Principles of Mathematics* and the "fundamental questions" (concerning which I have quoted his opinions at that time) were intimately connected with the argument of the *Refutation*. This is particularly obvious with respect to the philosophy of relations. To speak popularly, if, in being aware of X, I am aware of X as it is in itself, and as it would be if I were not aware of it, there must be an important sense in which certain relations (e.g. the relations involved in cognition) "make no difference" to some of the terms related. In short, certain relations, if not all, must be "external," yet true and quite fundamental. In certain presidential addresses to the Aristotelian Society, and at other times during a prolonged period, Russell reiterated this theme; and there is still room and need for discussing it.

In the main, however, Russell and a great many others argued such points with reference to analysis rather than to realism, and were not greatly interested in the question whether their analysis implied realism or didn't. Indeed, in 1914, Russell, in publishing his *Our Knowledge of the External World*, added the sub-title "As a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy." The "logical-analytic method" was now the idol, and was to be followed wherever it led—to philosophical solipsism, perhaps, or to phenomenism, or to nine and ninety other -isms.

Moore's philosophy headed in a similar direction. He also became the champion of analysis (although he may never have become a super-analyst like Wittgenstein and the logical positivists). In general, and speaking roughly, his position turned out to be that

we know with certainty "in the familiar sense" that there are pens, and hands, and pens in the hands, but that the correct analysis of such knowledge is of a higher order that can neither support nor refute common sense (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series). Since "realism" is frequently supposed to be a vindication of the common-sense order of statement, it is plain that philosophical analysts, in the exercise of their profession, are above all realisms.

Writers like Broad or Whitehead would not (I think) commit themselves to Moore's later views, but they sit loose to realism as currently understood, and I do not think that a nice discussion of the extent to which they are "realists" would serve any useful purpose. Even Mr. Alexander, who is still in earnest with his realism (see *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, p. 10), preferred to take wider ground. "As to the terms idealism and realism," he said (*S.T.D.*, I, 7 sq.), "I should be heartily glad if we might get rid of them altogether; they have such shifting senses, and carry with them so much prejudice."

Indeed, in allowing myself to speak of affinities between realism and common sense (as I have occasionally done) I have myself come dangerously near to shifting the senses of the term "realism." Up to the present I have tried, pretty resolutely, to deal with "realism" as an epistemological doctrine; and "common sense," although it may heartily dislike certain epistemological conclusions, does not have much epistemology in its composition. In short, epistemological realism (to which department I should willingly confine all philosophical realism) is a *philosophical* theory.

It is clear, however, that many people, when they speak of "realism," think of it primarily as an ontological doctrine, which may be strenuously philosophical, but also has marked affinities with a non-philosophical commonsensical view of the world. This point of view has certainly not been absent from British philosophy in the present century, and Mr. Alexander, I think, was a "realist" principally because he wanted to offer, at a high philosophical level, a defence of ontological realism. "The temper of realism," he said in a famous preliminary sketch of his beliefs (*British Academy Proceedings*, 1914) "is to de-anthropomorphize; to order man and mind to their proper place among the world of finite things; on the one hand to divest physical things of the colouring which they have received from the vanity or arrogance of mind; and on the other hand to assign them, along with minds, their due measure of self-existence." And in his latest book (*Beauty and other Forms of Value*, p. 9) while "deliberately abstaining from metaphysics," he says (*ibid.*) "In every case the external object physically excites a physical response, but in creatures with minds the response is of such a character that at once the creature is aware, and the thing which

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before was merely a physical object is revealed in its appropriate characters; as blue or green, or hard or soft, or sweet, or fragrant."

I shall, therefore, conclude this article (1) by saying a little more about the relation between epistemological and ontological realism (with special regard to this country and to the present century), and (2) by attempting to indicate the sort of theory that might be considered realistic, ontological, British, and relatively new-fangled.

(1) Even the negative proposition that there is no good reason for denying the existence of non-experiences opens up an important ontological vista; and if realism were the doctrine that we are acquainted with non-experiences, that would be an ontological doctrine. Suppose that, in Mr. Alexander's language, cognition, except, perhaps, in sheer error (if there is such a thing) always *reveals* something. If so (admitting epistemological realism), there is no objection to accepting such revelations as they come. If an object shows itself to be non-mental it is non-mental. If it shows itself to be mental it is mental. And so forth. There is no general presumption that things must be *very* different from what they seem to be; and if they are very different the proof would be one of "revealed" reasons and would not be a governing epistemological ordinance.

Nevertheless, the objects would have to declare their own "realism." According to the epistemological theory (and speaking metaphorically), they proclaim themselves such and such; but from the epistemological premiss that we should accept their declarations, we obviously cannot infer what these declarations are.

(2) What "declarations," then, should be called realistic in an ontological sense?

I do not see how this question could be answered to anyone's legitimate satisfaction. If "reality" reveals itself as it is, realism must accrue—and does so tautologically. If "reality" showed itself to be spiritual, coherent, a seamless garment, an irreducible plurality, a chaos, a plenum, a cycle, or a babble of change—any such revelation, being *ex hypothesi* authentic, would be a "realism." Ontological realism, therefore, if it is to have a special and distinctive meaning, must express the view that objects declare themselves to have a certain quite special type of constitution.

What this special constitution is I do not pretend to know, but I can make a guess at what most people would understand by it. They would hold in substance that a realistic theory of the universe is one in which spatio-temporal existence is the matrix, that everything in the universe, including mind itself, is consubstantial with its matrix. Such realism is itself a species of "naturalism," and "naturalism" is a vague and (I dare say) a pagan term; but doctrines

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belonging to a type that might be vague, need not be vague themselves.

Suppose a philosophy claimed to be based upon physical matter-of-fact. Suppose it further maintained that the mind itself was physical matter-of-fact, and that mind, with all its genuine excellences and exalted functions was a natural growth, carrying to high perfection one of the potencies of physical matter-of-fact, and developing what sub-mentally is a pervasive property of all that there is. Suppose that a philosophy conceived in this spirit vindicated itself more successfully than any other—regard being had, in particular, to the modish panorama of the universe that the newer sciences have suggested or actually unfolded. In that case you would have a philosophy of a realistic temper. You would also have sympathy and much general agreement with Alexander and, I dare say, with Whitehead. But you might very well prefer to banish the term “realism” altogether.

HUME'S DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION

B. M. LAING, M.A., D.LITT.

PROFESSOR Kemp Smith in providing a new edition of Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, embodying all the author's additions and corrections, has given expression to the perennial interest and fascination which this work has possessed for many minds during the odd one hundred and fifty years since it was first published by Hume's nephew. The editor himself has performed a great service by contributing an Introduction and a clear and concise summary of the *Dialogues*, in both of which he expounds his own view as to how Hume's discussion is to be interpreted. Hume employs three characters—Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes; and the discussion is ostensibly reported by a youth Pamphilus, who claims to have been an onlooker at the time and who at the end sums up his impression to the following effect: "Upon a serious review of the whole, I cannot but think, that Philo's principles are more probable than Demea's; but that those of Cleanthes approach still nearer the truth." As Philo plays the rôle of the sceptical critic and Cleanthes that of defender of the teleological argument, the conclusion of the *Dialogues* suggests that Hume's sympathies are with Cleanthes, that he is to be identified with the latter, and that he thus is to be regarded as accepting the teleological view with its theistic implications. What has rendered it difficult for many students of Hume to accept this reading of the *Dialogues* is their apparently mainly negative character combined with the apparently sceptical nature of Hume's general philosophy. Professor Kemp Smith is one of those students and in his Introduction to, and in his summary of the argument in, the present edition he seeks to defend the interpretation that Hume and Philo are to be identified.

According to his presentation of the argument the *Dialogues* constitute a somewhat disjointed and even curiously inconsistent piece of work, infected by a supposedly mischievous humour on the part of Hume, even, it is to be suspected, by a certain degree of insincerity. Arguments of an important character are left unanswered by Cleanthes because he seems unable to deal with them. Philo is really made to have the best of the discussion: he dominates the argument and forces Cleanthes into positions which the latter cannot defend, being reduced to simple re-assertions of his view. He is able to state even Cleanthes' views more clearly and more

effectively than Cleanthes himself. Some of the arguments put into the mouth of Cleanthes, as in his reply to Demea in Part IX, "sound very strangely"; and in Part X "he is made to voice against Demea those very objections which Philo has been urging against his own modes of formulating the argument from design, and the cogency of which he refuses to recognize when they are again urged against him by Philo." On the other hand, Philo at times behaves with "mischievous intent." Hume's "usual procedure" is to have as much as possible of Philo's case expounded by one of the other protagonists. The close of the discussion contains merely "the conventionally prescribed avowal" about the disabilities of reason and the need of revelation. The latter part of the *Dialogues* takes "a very strange and indeed bewildering turn," for Philo comes forward as the champion of the case for design and claims to believe in final causes. And Philo, it has to be remembered, is to be identified with Hume. But the obvious absurdity of the sceptic, after an admitted victorious argument, confessing to a belief in what he had been opposing requires some explanation; and either it points to a playful insincerity in Philo and a mere debating success over Cleanthes, or else it requires resort to the "artfulness" and "mischievous intent" of Hume (that is, Philo) whose object is to whittle away any important theistic significance which Philo's confession may seem to have. It is the second alternative which Professor Kemp Smith emphasizes. Consequently in his opinion the outcome of the *Dialogues* is, firstly, more sheerly negative than is usually supposed, and, secondly, the conviction that Hume consciously and deliberately set out to undermine the religious hypothesis.

The resort to Hume's "artfulness" admittedly has support in a statement made by himself in a letter to Adam Smith (August 15, 1776) where he says that "nothing can be more artfully written." In what sense Hume's use of the word "artful" is to be understood is a debatable point. The context points to the effect which the fears and hesitations affecting his friends had upon him. Hume recognizes, as clearly appears from a letter to Strahan (June 8, 1776), that the topics advanced by Philo in the course of the argument are "out of the Common Road" and will give umbrage; and there too he definitely states that "he introduces a Sceptic, who is indeed refuted, and at last gives up the Argument, nay confesses that he was only amusing himself by all his Cavils." Either this statement must be regarded as another bit of egregious "artfulness," with the consequence that the *Dialogues* as well as Hume's other philosophical writings have to be considered as all a playful jest, or else it must be taken in all seriousness as expressing what Hume believed the *Dialogues* to be, with the consequence that he quite clearly identifies

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himself with Cleanthes. That the statement of the case for scepticism, which is upheld by Philo, required careful handling in the super-charged religious atmosphere of the eighteenth century must be acknowledged. It was only too easy to formulate the sceptical position in an arrogant and offensive form. Hume's caution and "artfulness," if the latter is to be given a meaning other than skill shown in literary presentation and in developing the opposing views, requires no other interpretation than this—that he recognized, aided no doubt by the observed reactions of his friends, that he was treating a subject apt to provoke strong feeling and that it was incumbent upon him to write within the canons of good taste.

Somehow a sort of tradition, much like that about Voltaire, has arisen that Hume wrote with his tongue in his cheek and that any avowal of religious faith is but a cloak which merely serves his purpose of delivering surreptitious but deadly blows at religion. Professor Kemp Smith, for instance, considers that in the *Dialogues* Hume is deliberately and consciously undermining the religious hypothesis. Two points must be mentioned in reply to this contention. In the first place, the *Dialogues* are concerned purely with Natural Religion, and even for a very large section of orthodox divines in the eighteenth century the arguments of Natural Religion were a sort of heretical argument; and the deliberate exposure of their weakness, an exposure even ending in scepticism so far as that line of reasoning was concerned, would have caused no dismay, in fact would have met with approval, for it would have left their own position untouched, if not strengthened. In the second place, Professor Kemp Smith's assertion is made in face of Hume's express declaration in a letter to Sir Gilbert Elliot that "any Propensity you imagine I have to the other side (that is, in favour of the sceptical views of Philo) crept in upon me against my will," and in face of a definite request for assistance in strengthening the case of Cleanthes who, he says, is made the hero of the *Dialogues*. Unless this letter is to be regarded as another piece of artfulness, it is impossible to admit Professor Kemp Smith's assertion.

Those who take the view that the *Dialogues*, not merely in tendency but in intention, are sceptical lay stress upon at least two points. In the first place, one of the strongest supports in favour of such an interpretation is that Hume's general philosophy necessitates it. That philosophy is held to be essentially sceptical. Yet Hume himself in a footnote to Section XIV of Part III of the *Treatise*, where he is discussing the idea of necessary connection, writes: "The same imperfection attends our ideas of the Deity; but this can have no effect either on religion or morals. The order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind; that is, a mind whose will is *constantly attended* with the obedience of every creature and being. Nothing

more is requisite to give a foundation to all the articles of religion." This passage is clear evidence that Hume, whatever interpretation the philosophical public may put and may have put upon his theory, did not consider that that theory was inconsistent with an acceptance of the teleological argument; and it requires convincing evidence that he at any later time came to reject it. It rules out once more the suggestion that Hume was in temperament and in intention a sceptic. What alone could be legitimately maintained—what is quite a different thing—is that, whatever Hume himself may have thought, his views, including the discussion in the *Dialogues*, lead, when carefully examined, to sceptical results. In the second place, stress may be laid, as by Professor Kemp Smith, upon the weakness of Cleanthes' defence—a weakness which stands out prominently in spite of Hume's efforts to cover it up. This weakness must here be taken to be a matter of logically defective argument and not merely one of artful touches for or against Cleanthes, since Philo too is represented as being once at a loss in face of Cleanthes' argument and is also made to confess how great an effort was required of him to meet his opponent's view. Cleanthes, it is pointed out, seems, apart from the statement of his thesis, to be singularly lacking in argument and in ability to refute his opponent, he simply repeats his doctrine and is reduced in the end practically to silence. On the other hand, it is fair to point out that he is represented as treating Philo's objections as arbitrary and frivolous, in fact as simply irrelevant, as refusing to admit the conclusions which Philo puts forward as drawn from his hypothesis, as declaring that he sees in general the fallacy and error of Philo's arguments, although he does not state these fallacies and errors, as finding that the vulgar theology with its injudicious reasoning has given Philo too just a handle for his attitude of ridicule. Are all these features so much artfulness on the part of Hume and really designed to insinuate in the mind of the reader a belief in the weakness and untenability of the teleological argument?

Is the argument, then, of Cleanthes as weak as Professor Kemp Smith suggests and has Philo the best of it? Or is there some foundation for Cleanthes' contention that Philo's arguments are arbitrary and irrelevant and directed too much upon the "injudicious reasoning" of the ordinary theologians? The views expounded by Philo are stated in terms which are rejected by Hume in his general philosophy. They assume a clear and precise distinction between mind and matter which Hume's philosophy denies. Philo uses the notion of "actuating force" several times; he speaks in terms of productive power or energy which Hume has elsewhere ruled out—expressly in the footnote in Part III of the *Treatise* to which reference has already been made. The arguments at these points is non-

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Humean because pre-Humean. It is true that Cleanthes in replying to Demea in Part IX seems to use an argument which involves a distinction between mind and matter. This is one of the arguments which Professor Kemp Smith thinks "sounds very strangely in the mouth of Cleanthes." But Cleanthes is here not maintaining any positive doctrine involving and requiring any such distinction; he is concerned purely with the refutation of Demea's theory, and, within the limits of that "pretended explication of necessity" asserted by Demea, he seeks to show that Demea has not proved that the "necessary existent" is the Deity, since matter may equally well be that necessary existent. But Cleanthes goes on in the same passage to point out that the same argument used to rule out matter as the necessary existent can be with equal justification used against the conclusion that the Deity is that existent; and his contention rests upon the inability of the human mind to make any clear distinction between mind and matter. The rejection of the term "necessary existence" by Cleanthes because it has no meaning is thoroughly Humean, the word "necessary" (if we may assume an interpretation of Hume's general philosophy here) having only an epistemological, not an ontological, significance. The views which Philo puts forward can have justification only on one ground, namely that they are serious alternatives to the thesis put forward by Cleanthes; and to be serious alternatives they must have a certain degree of intelligibility and of probability in themselves. To ensure the rejection of the teleological argument they must have a probability greater than that of the former. This must be the case with *each* alternative theory. Cleanthes protests against Philo's faculty of invention and declares its futility; in this he is justified, for Philo by piling up one possibility on top of another is relying for the refutation of Cleanthes upon the total effect of these various possibilities, when, as a matter of fact, each doctrine must be considered by itself and when the total effect is no greater than that of the one possessed of the greatest probability. The issue of the *Dialogues* is essentially reducible to the question whether the teleological argument is inherently intelligible and probable, and whether any other alternative with equal intelligibility and with equal or more probability can be formulated. The three characters in the *Dialogues* stand for three different, though at points over-lapping, standpoints. Demea represents the view that there is a Divine Being who is Creator of the universe but who is so far different from human nature and from anything in human experience that his nature is mysterious and incomprehensible; it is the view of those orthodox believers who stand by a supernatural revelation, and for whom a philosophical discussion about the Divine nature is absurd, indeed blasphemous. Philo's attitude is somewhat complex;

he cannot as a sceptic assert that there is no Divine Being; yet at times he argues that there is evidence in support of such a view; at times he agrees with Demea that the Divine nature is not knowable because of its incomprehensibility; at other times he argues that we cannot be certain whether there is or is not a Divine Being. Cleanthes holds that the Divine nature is to some extent knowable and knowable to an extent that is really requisite for human purposes; and, while Philo makes no attempt to assess the probabilities of the various ideas he puts forward and to consider whether there is a decisive probability in favour of one against his opponent's position, being content to insist upon the conflict of evidence and the need of suspense of judgment, Cleanthes contends that, according to the ordinary rules of evidence accepted even by the sceptic in other matters, the balance turns in his favour.

These considerations suggest that not only is it not beyond question that Philo has the best of the argument but also that the *Dialogues* can in a very fundamental way be regarded not as an expression of a personal attitude on the part of Hume, in which case his relation to Calvinism and to religion becomes a somewhat irrelevant matter, but as a discussion on *evidence*, just as the *Essay on Miracles* is essentially a discussion on evidence, religious issues being employed as a medium for a detached examination of logical issues. It is clear from Hume's correspondence relative to the *Dialogues* that he felt the weight of the evidence to be such as to create difficulties for the traditional religious views; and there arises an important question regarding the significance of the scepticism maintained by Philo and the teleological position maintained by Cleanthes. Hume in his correspondence is seen to be struggling honestly and seriously with a religious problem, which there is reason to believe arose for him through acquaintance with critical theories affecting religious beliefs. It is an analogous problem with which he deals in his general philosophy. What requires to be emphasized in regard to the *Dialogues* is that many, if not all, of the views put into the mouth of Philo are not original but borrowed. Professor Kemp Smith recognizes that one large portion is borrowed from Bayle on Strato's atheism. The presence of evil in the world, which is the subject of discussion in the latter part of the *Dialogues*, was a matter that received attention from many writers before and at the time of Hume, and the substance of that latter part is to be found in some of Voltaire's writings¹ published long before the *Dialogues* and while Hume, according to Professor Kemp Smith's

¹ The reference is to the *Éléments de la Philosophie de Newton* (1738), *Traité de Métaphysique* (1734), *Le Désastre de Lisbonne* (1756). There are many similarities of phrasing in the two writers, e.g. light is anatomized, (which I have been unable to trace in Newton).

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view of the chronology of that work, was probably writing it. Voltaire even formulated the arguments for and against the teleological theory. The relevance of this fact is that, if Hume is to be identified with Philo, he and his *Dialogues* cease to have any importance as an original contribution to the problem of Natural Religion. All that he has done is to expound scepticism in the literary form of dialogue and thereby to give the discussion a certain dramatic interest. But otherwise he has simply collected and repeated arguments which had been often stated previously. If the *Dialogues* are to be or deserve to be rescued from this insignificance, it is necessary to look to the position maintained by Cleanthes, however imperfectly developed that position may be.

The discussion on evidence is concerned with the validity and value of the teleological argument based on analogy. Two main difficulties are brought forward: first, one connected with the use of the causal principle; second, one connected with the terms of the analogy, whether a machine of human contrivance is the most suitable term or one that need be used and whether *mind* is the only possible cause. Philo is made the spokesman of these objections. Causal inference rests upon a *species* of effect which in experience we have found to proceed from that *species* of cause. In order that a causal inference may be possible the universe must come under a *species* of effect which has always been found to proceed from a *species* of cause. But the universe is, or at any rate may be, so far as the evidence goes, something unique, and hence the requisite basis for an inference as to its cause is lacking. Because of this, room is left open for the admission of other possible causes and other possible effects to which the world may be compared. The world need not be compared to a work of art; it may with just as much justification be considered to be similar to an animal or a vegetable. Mind is not the only possible cause of order; matter itself may contain an internal principle of order; the cause may be rather of the nature of generation or organization than of the nature of mind.

The objection based on the nature of causal inference is discussed elsewhere in Hume's writings.¹ In Section IX of the *Enquiry* Hume lays down the principle that "all our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of Analogy," and he draws attention to the part played by *sameness* and *similarity* of causes and effects. In Section XI he recognizes the importance of a *species* of cause and a *species* of effect, for if something were claimed to be an effect and were entirely singular, any inference as to its cause would be impossible—a view which is relevant, of course, to the question of miracles, for miracles are often singular or unique events. But

¹ *Enquiry*, Sect. xi.

at the end of this section Hume's words can be read to the effect that a denial of any other possibility is not intended but that some other avenue may be still open. Hume leaves it to the Epicurean "to pursue the consequences" of the principle enunciated, and observes that, since the opponents of Epicurus always assume the universe to be unique in its kind and the Deity, its cause, also to be unique, the Epicurean's reasonings upon that supposition "seem at least, to merit our attention." Cleanthes in the *Dialogues* rejects the view that the existence of any Being—for that is a matter of fact—can be *proved* and explicitly takes his stand upon the argument from analogy with the success or failure of which religion itself stands or falls. It might be noted that this issue has a topical interest in view of the contention of Logical Positivists that propositions about God have no meaning because they are not verifiable. How does Cleanthes fare under Philo's criticisms?

Emphasis is put upon the uniqueness of the universe and upon the consequent possibility of other causes than mind. Objection is taken not merely to the adequacy of a comparison of the universe to a human work of art but to the *need* of such a comparison. There are possible analogies, such as an animal or vegetable, besides a machine. Professor Kemp Smith, on the basis of a fundamental distinction between artificial products and organisms, argues in a long comment that the distinction invalidates Cleanthes' attempt to illustrate their self-evident similarity. Philo's criticism assumes this supposed contrast between a machine and an organism, and he is represented as making the utmost use of the idea of an organism to overthrow Cleanthes' position. Though it is he who elaborates the comparison of the universe to an animal and Cleanthes is represented as not having thought of this form of analogy, admitted to be a "pretty natural one," yet it is Cleanthes who first makes reference in Part III to animals, but in a respect different from Philo; and the difference serves to bring out an important feature of Cleanthes' theory. It is a feature that is inherent in Hume's general philosophy, the nature of which has been too much obscured by a preoccupation with the doctrine of causation as invariable sequence conjoined with custom, generating expectation and for the elucidation of which the *Dialogues* make an essential contribution.

Philo in his discussion of the analogy of an organism lays stress upon organization in the sense of activity, energy, power, as the source of order; and Professor Kemp Smith, in his use of such terms as "self-organizing," "self-maintaining," "self-regulating," and so on, seems to accept a similar view. Such terms are ruled out by Hume's general philosophy from any intelligible account of phenomena; and they are not used nor accepted by Cleanthes in the *Dialogues*. He is insisting upon the fact of order itself; organ-

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ization is for him order. In the sense of power or activity it is simply an unknown α or occult quality, incapable of providing any basis for analogy. *Prima facie*, machines, animals, vegetables, are very different from each other, and are also very different from minds. Hence there are dissimilitudes which constitute a grave difficulty. But there is one feature in which all agree, namely order. When Cleanthes in stating his argument makes use of the term "machine," it is order of which he is thinking; when he refers to an animal, it is the "anatomy" that he mentions; when he speaks of light, it is the word "anatomy" that he uses, and in using it he intends to emphasize structure and order. The illustrations employed by Cleanthes in Part III and considered by Professor Kemp Smith to be bewildering, irrelevant, and misleading are a failure only if stress is laid upon the idea of propagation or upon the instances only as facts, but are significant when it is kept in mind that Cleanthes wishes to draw attention to order—exemplified in his special illustration by wisdom and coherence. Everywhere order is being discovered; the more science advances, the more does it come upon order. Philo argues in terms of causes of order or of organization, for instance in animals, and suggests that the cause may not and need not be mind. This form of argument is from Hume's point of view a traditional one because it employs traditional terms and concepts. It leads Philo to argue that a tree is the cause of a tree or an animal is the cause of an animal; and it leads him also to press Cleanthes as to the cause of mind and hence of the Divine Mind—a procedure against which the latter protests and which, it is pointed out, always presupposes order and does not explain it. On this interpretation of Cleanthes' argument the difficulty based on the requirement that causal inference rests upon a *species* of cause and a *species* of effect is removed, for Cleanthes accepts too the Humean doctrine that mind is to be understood and is *known* only as an order or system.

One important and significant feature of Hume's philosophy, often overlooked, is that it annuls so far as scientific investigation and knowledge are concerned the hard and fast distinction between machines and organisms and between mechanism and teleology, and forestalls the later controversy of mechanism versus vitalism or teleology by seeking a common and universal notion in that of order, system, or organization. When Hume himself spoke of the mind as a mechanism he did not consider it necessary to compare it to or to regard it as an engine or a pump. He was among the first, if not the first, of modern philosophers to draw attention to *relations* and to the problem of knowledge as a problem of relations. Whenever the human mind investigates nature, it always comes upon relations or upon structure.

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"Light is in reality anatomized," says Cleanthes in the *Dialogues*. "Would not a man be ridiculous who pretended to reject Newton's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of the rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays of light." In the *Treatise* where he deals with the question of personal identity he discusses this issue in a way which annuls any fundamental distinction between the productions of nature and the works of art as well as between these and minds. When a machine is investigated what are discovered are relations between the parts—"a reference of the parts to each other, and a combination to some common end or purpose." In the case of animals and vegetables the parts bear to each other reciprocal relations of cause and effect; they have a mutual dependence on, and a connection with each other, as well as having a reference to some general purpose. The intellect explains or understands a machine, just as it does an animal or vegetable, when it discovers its structure or system of relations. This applies equally to minds; the intellect never discovers a *self*—that is, a simple, unchanging entity or substance; it comes upon only a system of "perceptions," a system which Hume, in order to elucidate his view, compares to a republic. To try to get behind structure, system, or order, as Philo suggests in his argument is on such a Humean doctrine absurd; and Cleanthes in the *Dialogues* voices this absurdity when he is asked to account for the cause of the Whole itself. "Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts." It leads him also to point out that Philo's argument presupposes order or system and is not accounting for it; for though, as Philo maintains, there is a sense in which a tree is the cause of a tree and an animal the cause of an animal, this does not affect Cleanthes' contention since, in terms of Hume's philosophy, a tree or an animal is to be understood as an order or system, and this order is being all the time assumed.

The conclusion, therefore, to be drawn from a more detailed examination of the discussion is that there is no need to admit that Philo has the better of the argument, since on this interpretation of Hume and Cleanthes, his contentions are mainly irrelevant and have importance only when the whole matter is treated on traditional, that is non-Humean, lines. It is known from Hume's correspondence that he was aware of a difficulty due to the "dissimilitudes" or dissimilarities—a difficulty which Cleanthes recognizes; but he does not allow this to be a decisive factor in the argument. The various systems, including mind, have a fundamental *similarity*. How then on this basis does the principle of analogy apply?

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A consideration of this question necessitates a reference to the nature of analogy as Hume understood it. In the *Treatise*¹ he gives a narrower interpretation of analogy which is a form of reasoning based upon a specific degree of resemblance between cases. In the *Enquiry*² he gives a wider meaning to it, for it is now regarded as equivalent to inductive inference or as covering the whole field of probability instead of being "one species of probability"; and in this respect he is in alignment with certain continental writers of the eighteenth century.³ The difference between the two interpretations of analogy is that in the former case the inference is to a specific cause or effect and in the latter case to a general proposition or to a wider uniformity. There is no clear and fundamental distinction between the two, for by the analogical procedure in the narrower sense the known uniformity is having its range widened and the way is being opened for a more extensive generalization. On Hume's principles there is no guarantee that any such generalization will necessarily be true. Any generalization is experimental. The difference between scientific generalization and the generalizations⁴ made by plain people in ordinary life lies in the fact that the scientist working under the guidance of rules elaborated in accordance with experience gained in the experimental investigation of nature exercises precautions and gauges the degree of probability according to the observed evidence and the character of the properties in respect of which bodies are similar. In this, too, Hume is in line with continental writers who otherwise differ regarding the foundations of their theory; but both agree in declaring that insight into nature, though not obtained by way of demonstration as exemplified in geometry, has none the less a kind of certainty of its own.

One objection urged by Philo against the argument by analogy is expressed in the question whether, supposing order to be admitted throughout the universe, such order is evidence of mind as the cause. Philo wants to argue back to a *cause* of order, and in doing so is thinking conformably to the traditional view and to Hume's more limited meaning of the nature of analogy. The characteristic order of a machine is due to mind; hence the order of the universe, which is similar to that of a machine, is due to mind. The existence and nature of a Divine Mind are thus *inferred from* similarity of effects and causes. It is *inferred from* the order observed in nature.

¹ Part III, Sect. xii (at end).

² Sect. ix.

³ e.g. S'Gravesande in his essay *Sur l'évidence*.

⁴ Cleanthes in the *Dialogues* (I'art I) says: In vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common life, or between one science and another. The arguments employed in all, if just, are of a similar nature, and contain the same force and evidence.

The tendency of this view is to regard the Divine Mind as something remote from the human mind; it is the attitude favoured by Deism and makes the Deity "an abstract, invisible object" as Hume elsewhere says. Cleanthes, however, in the *Dialogues* proceeds to maintain another position,¹ which Professor Kemp Smith holds to be inconsistent with the preceding argument which put emphasis on *inference*. It has to be admitted that there seems an inconsistency. This other position is that the belief in a Divine Mind immediately flows in upon one with a force like that of sensation; that is, the Divine Mind is not *inferred from* but is *immediately apprehended in* the order of nature. The view implies that the human mind is in direct contact with the Divine Nature, and it is the view accepted later even by Philo.

It is this second view which agrees most closely with Hume's other theories, especially his theory of mind as a system. The transition in the *Dialogues* is accompanied by a change in the way of looking at the various instances of order in the universe, for they are spoken of no longer as merely effects of mind but as "the image of mind reflected on us from innumerable objects." These are the words of Cleanthes. The first form of the argument involves a distinction between mind and order which is not consistent with Hume's point of view. For him, as for Cleanthes, mind is order of a certain kind, so far as mind is known at all, and that is the only way in which we can intelligently, and are entitled to, speak of mind. When emphasis is once put upon this idea, and a mind and a machine, as well as organisms, are considered as structures or systems, a machine is not merely an effect but is an effect that has a similarity to its cause. That such similarity exists between causes and effects is implied even on the ordinary view that trees are the causes of trees or animals of animals. Consequently, machines may be said to have a mental character, even that they have a mind—no doubt of a simple and rudimentary nature but none the less a mind—provided that Hume's theory of mind is remembered. For the purposes of the teleological argument, which is essentially an affair of reasoning, the relation of machines to mind has to be considered in order to justify the use of the word mind in respect of the type of order in question.² This makes the argument one by

¹ This form of the argument has a likeness to Voltaire's statement of the teleological view. The arrangements in nature "font une demonstration qui, à force d'être sensible, en est presque méprisée par quelques philosophes" (*Éléments de la Philosophie de Newton*, I, Ch. i). Cf. other passages, "Je ne sais . . . si jamais il y a eu un plus bel argument que cet verset: *Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei*."

² In the eighteenth century it is probable that order and design were not two distinct ideas. In a footnote to *Le Désastre de Lisbonne* (vers. 75) Voltaire expresses a view concerning the order of the universe, which, according to

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analogy in the narrower sense; and the argument is easily transformed into analogy in the wider sense in the form of a generalization expressing a world-wide uniformity. But any argument of this kind is only an attempt to elucidate and justify by means of reason what is a prior experience of a direct kind with an all-pervasive order of the nature of mind.

Philo admits later that, in dealing with Cleanthes' theory, he has needed all his metaphysical and sceptical subtlety to elude his grasp, but he adopts a triumphant note when he comes to discuss how the teleological view, based on experience and observation, can establish the moral attributes of the Divine Being. This issue, introduced by Demea, is recognized by Cleanthes as a crucial one, for the answer will determine whether there is to be "an end at once of all religion," and that answer is made to turn again upon whether mankind can be proved unhappy or corrupted. The issue is not discussed really very fully. It is one, however, which confronts not merely teleologists but all religious views; it troubled philosophers and theologians in the eighteenth century particularly because the difficulties seemed so favourable to scepticism. Cleanthes is giving expression to this fact in admitting that Philo has now fallen upon a subject worthy of his "noble spirit of opposition and controversy." He openly admits that the only way in which the moral attributes of the Deity—and he is prepared to adopt this way—can be defended is "to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of man"; but even discounting much of the exaggerated account of Philo regarding human suffering he is still constrained to recognize that there is evil. In face of this fact the view which he ventures to suggest—a new theory he calls it—is that of a "finitely perfect Deity," "benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity." The conclusion which Philo on the other hand would draw is that the ultimate principle of the universe is morally neutral or indifferent.

The theory of a finite Deity is in accordance with the whole of Cleanthes' preceding argument; and the rejection of the idea of infinity is in line with Hume's general philosophical principles. That danger lies in the obscurity and the vagueness of the terminology used in reference to the Deity is suggested at more than one point of the *Dialogues*, and Cleanthes prefaces his theory of a finite Deity with remarks to this effect. The difficulty, however, confronting the teleological view in respect of the moral issue is a serious one, and there is evidence in Hume's correspondence with Hutcheson

the *Avertissement*, was interpreted to signify that "this word order applied to nature is void of sense, unless it signifies an arrangement of which we apprehend the regularity and design." Cf. Cleanthes' declaration concerning what is to be taken as a *whole*.

that he was fully aware of it at an early stage. The difficulty, which is noted also by Voltaire, is one concerning the ontological status of moral principles. If the latter are interpreted, as Hume interpreted them, in such a way as to make them relative to human nature or needs and subject to the varying circumstances in which human life has to be organized; if, for instance, *justice* is to be considered mainly in reference to the human institution of *property* and moral qualities generally in terms of *utility*, then there is no evidence that moral designations are applicable to the Deity or to any beings superior to, or even other than, man. Consequently, the basis of any analogical argument is lacking. Nevertheless it is possible to find in the idea of utility a means of transition from human life to the universe and a means of giving significance to Cleanthes' theory of a finitely perfect Deity. The question at issue at this stage is not that of the existence of a Divine Mind but of his moral nature. The theory of a finitely perfect Deity only requires that the Divine Being tend on the whole to promote the happiness of mankind. This does not rule out suffering, but it does assume a particular meaning of morality and goodness and it does require the admission, made by Cleanthes, that happiness predominates over the misery of mankind. The assumption may be wrong and Cleanthes' admission may be unverifiable; but within these limits the foundations for analogy exist.

The conclusion is obviously not, so far as words at least are concerned, what orthodoxy requires. But no claim can be made that Cleanthes is arguing on behalf of orthodoxy, the representative of which, if any one is, is Demea. The whole issue is one regarding the extent to which reason, dealing with the evidence obtainable by means of experience and observation, will give support to the beliefs characteristic of the religious attitude; and of course the meaning to be given to the terms of such beliefs must be fixed also in accordance with that evidence. Apart, however, from this question about the lack of clearness and precision in the terms occurring in religious discussion, it is obvious that Cleanthes is far from orthodox and has given a new turn to the teleological theory. He is well aware of this; his concluding doctrine about a finitely perfect Deity is put forward with the statement that "if it deserve our attention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it into form." The final estimate of the *Dialogues* must of course depend in part on the interpretation of Hume's attitude to scepticism, in favour of which, according to Professor Kemp Smith, he deliber-

* Cleanthes' anthropomorphism can hardly be objectionable to an orthodoxy which holds that God created man in His own image, for, if so, man has a likeness to the Divine Nature. His theory is labelled *experimental theism* (Part V) and contrasted with the true system of theism.

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ately and often with concealed and malicious intent argues. In order that such an interpretation in respect of the *Dialogues* may be successfully maintained, the representation of Philo the sceptic expressing his belief in the value of the teleological argument at the end of the discussion has to be understood as a subtle or "artful" manner of depriving the view of any serious significance. But the change-over on the part of Philo is not merely peculiar; it is a very inartistic device on the part of Hume, too glaring in its inconsistency to be considered even subtle or artful; and although Philo's attitude becomes nominally that of Cleanthes, there remain considerable differences between them regarding such matters as the foundation of religion, the part played by religion in life, and the relation between religion as a practical attitude in life and the intellectual interpretation of this attitude. The references to light and its anatomization suggest the view that, just as the scientist may analyse the seeing eye and light into structures and does not thereby annul the fact that the eye sees white light, which is an experience connected with a synthetic power characteristic of the eye, so analysis does not destroy the fact that human nature may be so constituted as to be religious or to view the world in a religious way. Herein there may be found an overlooked significance of Hume's *Natural History of Religion* which seeks to show that the religious attitude is universal, and herein too is found a reason for Cleanthes' insistence upon the universal influence of religion. Hume's references to religion elsewhere in his writings give no hint of any rejection of religion, though he gives many hints about his questioning theories of religion. The final representation of Philo is quite consistent with much that Hume says concerning the inability of the sceptic to adhere *à l'outrance* to his own doctrine, and it can be regarded as an artistic portrayal of such an attitude on Hume's part towards scepticism.

The critical and destructive side of Hume has been so much emphasized historically that the constructive pioneer, possibly because the construction is not of great magnitude, has been ignored. In the *Dialogues* the arguments of Philo are somewhat stale and hackneyed so far as the eighteenth century is concerned. It is the views put forward by Cleanthes, no doubt in very undeveloped form, that are of real interest and of philosophical value, however dangerous and heretical they may be from the point of view of the orthodox. Cleanthes' denial of the simplicity of the Divine Being, his acceptance of that mind as a system, in the sense in which Hume considers the human mind to be a system, his assertion of the finitude of the Deity carry with them the temporalizing of the Deity. These are the consequences of the application of Hume's philosophical ideas to religion. The precise historical significance of this re-inter-

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pretation of teleology, as distinct from the philosophical validity of such a re-interpretation, would require an acquaintance with, and an examination of, the conflict of certain ideas in the eighteenth century. For the present it must suffice to mention a recent work by Professor A. O. Lovejoy on *The Great Chain of Being*, in which he points out, though Hume is not mentioned at all, that such ideas as have just been stated in connection with Cleanthes came to be put forward in the eighteenth century.

NATURE, EDUCATION AND FREEDOM ACCORDING TO JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU

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Do the most celebrated works of Rousseau—more particularly his *Discourse on Inequality*, *Émile*, and *Contrat Social*—present on the whole a coherent answer to the problems of Education and Society? My impression is that Rousseau has here been very much calumniated, owing to the incredible haste and superficiality with which his writings have generally been studied. Even sympathetic inquirers, like M. Schinz in his thorough and attractive work *La Pensée de J.-J. Rousseau*, seem to be too easily discouraged in the quest for unity.

My thesis, which will be further summarized at the end of the essay, is that, allowing for that movement and variety which are the signs of life, we must include Rousseau on the strength of the writings named, among the great *constructive* thinkers. For example, he speaks of Nature, not in an indefinite number of ways, but always in one of two very precise senses which can be recognized by the context in which the word is used. Primitive society is natural in the one sense, *Émile's* education in the other. Again, Rousseau may be confused in answering the question whether "civil religion" and "natural religion" are the same, or are diametrically opposed; he may, it is true, stress the Spartan ideal of Society more in the *Contrat Social* than elsewhere; but his main intentions are clear and their development logical.

Above all, he makes visible a close parallel between the evolution of the State and the growth of the child. This is, I hold, the key to the unity of Rousseau's system, as well as the origin of its difficulties. Rousseau, as we know, interested himself from the first both in education and in the organization of society, and published his chief works, in each case the result of long research, in the same year; so that politics and education play a similar part in his mental history. But he also finds many analogies between the two spheres; it was no accident that he returned so often to this parallel.

In the *Discourse on Inequality* he distinguishes a "childhood," and a "youth" of the human race, following one another in succession, and bringing men, as yet under the guidance of sentiment, to the threshold of Law. The *Contrat Social* extends this quasi-historical account, offering a comparison of the age of self-government to that of manhood. The legislator and the tutor alike are represented

as allowing the *form* of self-government to their charges at a time when they are able to withhold the substance of it. Premature self-government is compared by Rousseau to precocious education. He sees the parallel from the reverse side in *Émile*, Book II, where the child is compared to a man in the state of nature, and allowed a freedom of a comparable kind and degree; all this in spite of the fact that . . . Rousseau's pupil is intended . . . to remain all his life a *man of nature* as opposed to a citizen.

His reason for this parallel? The State is an individual, though moral and collective, body, with Sovereignty for its heart and Government for its brain; which must decline by an inevitable natural law to old age and death.

I wish to begin with a rapid review, which will raise few points of controversy, of all that Rousseau regards as *natural*.

(1) EDUCATION

We see from the first book of the *Émile* that in all education there is an element which belongs exclusively to nature. "Our education comes partly from nature, partly from men, and partly from things. The inner development of our faculties and organs is the education of nature; the use which we are taught to make of this development is the education of men; and anything that we acquire by our own experience of the objects which affect us is the education of things." We are educated by three sorts of masters, and we are well educated if their lessons are in harmony.

However, when Rousseau describes the ideal to which his book is devoted as a "natural education"; when he speaks of *Émile* as a man or child of nature, in contrast to *l'homme de l'homme* or *l'homme civil*; he of course does not mean to debar him from education by things or by men, as he would do if nature were still used in the same narrow sense. The ideal is not one of *laissez-faire*; though, in the earliest stages, where education "should be purely negative," it may almost seem to be so. We should be able to infer this from the fact that *Émile* is kept constantly dependent on things and on the guidance of his master; moreover, we have a clear statement on "natural education" from Rousseau himself a little later in Book I.

He opposes it there to the *civil* education, treating the alternatives as quite exclusive. "Forced to combat Nature or social institutions, we must decide whether to educate a man or a citizen; no one can be both at once." In order to inspire loyalty, the civil education must destroy the natural emotion of universal sympathy; in order to secure unity, it must suppress private emotions and judgments. Thus "*les bonnes institutions sociales sont celles qui savent le mieux dénaturer l'homme.*" "He who would preserve in the civil order the

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primacy of the sentiments of nature does not know what he asks." Moreover, civil education is associated in Rousseau's mind with education in colleges or any other form of education *en masse* (it is obvious that this is a mere mistake, since experience shows that such education may prevail in individualistic societies); he therefore jumps to the conclusion that natural education means *domestic* or *family* education. Its purpose cannot, indeed, be to train a man to live entirely by himself; "if (he says) we could combine with it the advantages of civil education, then by removing the contradictions of man we should remove a great obstacle to his happiness." He hopes to pave the way for this union. Man, he says in Book IV, is *sociable* by nature, or at least designed to become so; our man of nature is not a savage, only fit to retire to the depths of the forest; but in society he will not be the slave of fashion, as other men are. It will be remembered that Rousseau's pupil does indeed receive this mixed education; his training is international, but it is not anti-social. On growing up he is introduced to the world, is married, and, having chosen a community, subjects himself to its laws.

At this point Rousseau coolly ignores the dilemma which had been stated with such force in Book I. He has dwelt so long on Émile's originality and independence that we find ourselves wondering what form of State will commend itself to him; and it is not enlightening to be given a mere extract from the *Contrat Social*. On the one hand it is scarcely credible that Émile will prefer a totalitarian State (it is difficult to imagine him as even a moderate patriot); on the other hand, if he is an untamable individualist, the dilemma of Book I is retained, but it is not answered; and the view that freedom and morality are only possible to the citizen, vital as it is to the *Contrat Social*, seems to have vanished into thin air.

Suppose the child of nature to be unlucky in his search for a hospitable republic, in which to earn his living as a carpenter and peacefully follow the natural religion; Rousseau assumes that he might then retire into seclusion without grave loss of happiness, as Plato's philosopher shelters under a wall. But if full freedom must come from the State, this assumption is impossible and optimistic. Indeed, if we are to put faith in *Contrat Social*, I. 8, no one but a citizen can begin to make a deliberate choice. But it is always assumed that Émile possesses responsibility, and that, citizen or no citizen, he enters upon a life of self-discipline when he has grown up into a man. At this moment he passes beyond the guidance of mere sentiments, i.e. beyond what I believe M. Schinz would call a "romantic" happiness, into the rational or moral order. From this it is fair to infer that the *Émile* is at one with the *Contrat Social* in its definition of freedom, "l'impulsion du seul appétit est esclavage, et l'obéissance à la loi qu'on s'est prescrite est liberté." But the

question whether the State is the *sine qua non* of such freedom is no longer answered in the same spirit. (The obscurity of the view that "man is naturally good"—Rousseau's essential doctrine, by his own account—lies in this, that it *may* refer to the limited goodness of enlightened *sentiment*, or else to the crowning goodness of the rational morality for which we have the natural endowments.)

Since we have raised the question of happiness, and its possibility without the State, let us hear what is said of it in *Émile* (Book II). We do not know absolute happiness (or misery); we only know a relative freedom from evil. But we are affected by sentiments of pleasure and pain, and by a consequent desire to secure the one and be free of the other. Misery consists in a disproportion between our desires and our faculties, and "un être sensible dont les facultés égalaient les désirs serait un être *absolument heureux*." This being the ideal, attainable happiness is reached "by diminishing the excess of our desires over our faculties, and placing power and will in perfect equality." (It is the ratio that matters; thus neither an extension of our faculties nor a diminution of our desires alone can assure us of happiness.)

Rousseau might be expected to continue that the desirable ratio can be established by self-discipline, in or out of society; but instead, he refers us to Nature. "It is only *in the primitive state* that the equilibrium of power and desire is found, and that man is not unhappy." In civilized man the imagination disturbs that equilibrium by exciting in advance desires which can never be satisfied. "Au contraire, plus l'homme est resté près de sa condition naturelle, plus la différence de ses facultés à ses désirs est petite; et moins par conséquent il est éloigné d'être heureux. Il n'est jamais moins misérable que quand il paraît dépourvu de tout; car la misère ne consiste pas dans la privation des choses, mais dans le besoin qui s'en fait sentir." Hence we must curb imagination, and resolve to pursue reality. But the real goods are health, strength, and self-respect; the real evils, bodily pain and the remorse of conscience. Physical evils "destroy themselves or destroy us." The wise man will remain in the place assigned to him by nature, not revolt against physical necessity, and never enlarge his unhappiness by imagination.

The inclusion of morality and immorality among the real goods and evils shows that Rousseau is not here giving directions for primitive or savage men, or exhorting us to imitate them. (A later passage, in Book III, says: "Le bonheur de l'homme naturel est aussi simple que sa vie; il consiste à ne pas souffrir: la santé, la liberté, le nécessaire, le constituant: Le bonheur de l'homme moral est autre chose.") Neither are his directions applicable to the civil man. They apply therefore (like the rest of *Émile*) to a man, who is conceived for present purposes to have reached morality and freedom

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apart from society. Rousseau does not emphasize that self-restraint is necessary to the happiness he depicts; but how else are his directions to be obeyed? It is notable that nothing could be further from "Romanticism" than the command to curb the imagination; perhaps still more notable that no sermon was ever less taken to heart by its author.

(2) STAGES OF GROWTH, RACIAL AND INDIVIDUAL

To return now to the enumeration of things ordained by nature: there are, Rousseau informs us, four stages in human growth. First, infancy in the literal sense of speechlessness, when the child is completely helpless, and the only educator is the mother or nurse. Secondly, childhood, in which the young are unable to generalize, being guided entirely by their particular impulses or sense-impressions. Rousseau argues that they cannot profit by reading or any of the usual forms of instruction; nor, in what concerns conduct, can they listen to reason or obey moral motives. Positive instruction should be avoided; we should attempt to lose time rather than to gain it. If lessons in behaviour become necessary, we should make use of the child's fondness for imitation, inducing him to ape the virtues which he will one day understand; no attempt at explanation is advisable. In conduct children should not be allowed to have their own way, but the restraint used should be a restraint of things; for as yet they live only in the physical world. Thirdly, there is a short stage between the first dawning of reason at the age of 12 or 13, and adolescence. It is the subject of Book III of *Émile*, and is summarily described as "l'âge paisible d'intelligence." Reading and other education of the mind can be begun. On the practical side, the child's impulses are no longer casual; he can advance to the notion of *utility*, and must now always be permitted to ask "A quoi cela est-il bon?" This advance is not a mark of dawning *conscience*, but is due to the beneficial working of the natural urge to self-preservation, in alliance with sympathy or pity. Fourthly, there is the period of adolescence. Rousseau conceives intellectual training as coming practically to a standstill. History, however, serves to impart some acquaintance with human nature from a safe distance. Physical exercise is intensified to counteract the violent onset of emotion; apart from this, the "natural education" consists of a training, in the proper emotional setting, in "natural religion," and in the introduction of *Émile* to the world of men. Any *philosophical* reasonings about conduct Rousseau rightly postpones to a still later stage; the moral law, like the political (*Contrat Social*, II, 7), is at first grounded in Religion.

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A careful reading of the *Discourse on Inequality* shows, I think, that Rousseau's account of the growth of the human race depends largely, and perhaps entirely, on his view of childhood. In the child we can observe the natural man, far better than in the pages of travellers and historians. The first part of the *Discourse* is accordingly devoted to an attempt to reconstruct the *childlike*¹ man (there is, of course, no parallel to literal infancy). In the latter part men are supposed to have settled down in families, and to have reached, merely by natural sentiment, their first ideas of promises and alliances; at the same time, the pursuit of utility has led them to discover agriculture and a few industries. A just mean between "l'indolence de l'état primitif" and "la pétulante activité de notre amour-propre," this age must have been the happiest and most lasting; men can only have left it by some disastrous chance. "The example of savages, who have nearly all been discovered at this point, seems to assure us that the human race was designed to remain in it for ever, that this state is the veritable youth of the world, and that all further advances, in appearance so many steps towards the perfection of the individual, have really led to the decrepitude of the race." The "disastrous chance" is less fortuitous than Rousseau here admits; for the social life is bound to engender rivalry and self-consciousness, and with these the tyranny of wealth and class is at hand.

(Both in its virtues and in its dangers if uncontrolled, this age is an exact counterpart to the "age paisible d'intelligence" in individual growth.)

Henceforth if men allow their affairs to drift, or if usurpation forestalls the social contract, they are carried down the path to inequality and injustice, which now descends steeply; and miseries more intolerable than those of the state of nature await them. From the gulf in which they are lost there can be no return to "primitive innocence," and no easy or immediate change to the freedom of citizenship. But if by chance a legislator appeared in time, he would control the adolescent people by the voice of Religion, until with the progress of generations they arrived at intelligence and freedom. Rousseau thinks that the few free peoples of history have always, by the grace of God, found a legislator before it was too late. In their case the Contract which was designed only as a defence against wrong, soon turns to an instrument of positive good.

(The *practical effect* of this is too complex to be mentioned here. It must be remembered that Rousseau in any case regards many inhabitants of the globe as for ever debarred from self-government, owing to climate or heredity.)

¹ "La race étoit déjà vieille; et l'homme restoit toujours enfant."

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(3) EMOTIONS AND SENTIMENTS

There are in human nature "deux principes, dont l'un nous intéresse ardemment à notre bien-être et à la conservation de nous-mêmes; et l'autre nous inspire une répugnance naturelle à voir périr ou souffrir tout être sensible, et principalement nos semblables" (*Discourse on Inequality*). Concerning self-love, Rousseau makes three important points: first, that it is the basis and origin of all other passions: secondly, that it is different from *amour-propre* ("self-esteem"), an artificial and relative sentiment, born in society, which inspires rivalry among men, and may thus be the source either of honour or of cruelty: thirdly, that self-love and pity together give rise to "natural right." By this Rousseau means that they can produce an imitation of morality and justice.

(i) That self-love is the original passion is stated in *Émile*, Book IV. "La source de nos passions, . . . la seule qui naît avec l'homme et ne le quitte jamais tant qu'il vit, est l'amour de soi: passion primitive, innée, antérieure à toute autre, et dont les autres ne sont, en un sens, que des modifications. En ce sens toutes, si l'on veut, sont naturelles. . . . L'amour de soi est toujours bon, et toujours conforme à l'ordre."

When self-love finds itself assisted or hindered by another *will*, it turns into love or hatred. Towards *insensible* things, however much they assist or hinder us, we are not moved in the same way. "Ce qui nous sert, on le cherche; mais ce qui nous veut servir, on l'aime. Ce qui nous nuit, on le fuit; mais ce qui nous veut nuire, on le hait." In the *Émile*, from which the quotation comes, Rousseau passes over the emotion of pity, which, according to the *Discourse*, was a second basic emotion "whose function is to moderate in each individual the activity of self-love, and conduce to the mutual preservation of the species."

(ii) The contrast between self-love and self-esteem occurs both in the *Discourse* (especially Note 2) and the *Émile*. Self-esteem is later, both logically and in fact, than self-love; it does not appear until social intercourse has made men self-conscious and reputation has become a valuable asset. Thus in the history of the race it is the origin of social (as distinct from physical) inequality; and it causes "une multitude de mauvaises choses sur un petit nombre de bonnes."

In individual history, self-esteem is associated by Rousseau with the awakening of sexual feelings, which, according to him, first make us self-conscious and provoke jealous comparison with others. He seems now to allow it no good effects at all (cf. "voilà comment les passions douces et affectueuses naissent de l'amour de soi, et comment les passions haineuses et irascibles naissent de l'amour-propre"). He sternly rejects competition as an instrument of education; it

is better that a child should never learn, than that he should learn through vanity and jealousy. (What Rousseau says here may not be acceptable, but he is making a valid criticism of earlier views of the state of nature, which, from the truism that men are naturally self-seeking, infer that they are naturally enemies.)

(iii) In the Preface to the *Discourse on Inequality* we read that the two natural emotions in proper alliance can produce results as beneficial, though not as lasting and secure, as those of conscience. "It is from the agreement and combination which the understanding is in a position to establish between these two principles, without its being necessary to introduce that of sociability, that all the rules of natural right appear to me to be derived—rules which reason is afterwards obliged to reaffirm on other foundations, when by its successive developments it has completely stifled nature." Later in the *Discourse* he returns to this idea and sings the praises of "natural sympathy." It fills, in the natural state, the place of law and morality, with the advantage that none are tempted to disobey its gentle voice; it cannot, indeed, inspire "the sublime maxim of rational justice: Do to others as you would have them do to you;" but it can inspire "that other maxim of natural goodness, much less perfect indeed, but perhaps more useful: Do good to yourself with as little evil as possible to others." If virtue could only be acquired by reason, he adds, the human race would long have ceased to exist.

There is an important observation to make here. Just as Rousseau always treats earlier forms of Society as more natural than the State founded on contract, and just as he treats sensation as more natural than intellect; so he treats the life governed by passions, however "sublime" and "gentle" these are, as more natural than the life governed by conscience. And although he refers to conscience as a "sentiment," he certainly does not regard it as merely an intensified degree of the natural sentiments he has discovered; but as something fresh and unique, which really stands in contrast to all "sentiment." But is it equally opposed to "Nature"? The example of Émile, who is the natural man, shows that it is not.

We have already seen that "nature," in the narrowest sense, contributes only a small part of the "natural education." We can now add to this a new point: That when the State and the conscience are sharply opposed to *nature* and the *natural*, nature is again confined to the narrower of its two senses. It must also be true that a life without discipline is *unnatural*. And to prove this we have only to look at Rousseau's picture of a "natural education."

He deceives himself to some extent here, arguing that reason and society are only "natural" to men *as at present constituted*—as though they might have remained, but for some unfortunate

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accident, in the golden age where everything is ruled by sentiment. That is to say that sentiment is more "original" than reason, not only in a logical sense, but in an actual sense as well. Rousseau does not see that this assertion is unfounded; and that, in order to give it foundation, he must undertake that inquiry into the evidence of *facts* which he has rejected at the opening of the *Discourse*.

(4) RELIGION

The "natural man" of the *Discourse on Inequality* is without religion: when he begins to have a religion, it is crude and polytheistic. But in another sense there is a natural religion, and one of its few dogmas is the existence of a single supreme Deity. We have already learnt that the recipient of a natural education cannot be intended to live in the state of nature, and I think we can once more see through an apparent ambiguity to the truth which Rousseau wants to express.

"Natural religion," on the whole, means for Rousseau the tenets of Gospel Christianity; not upheld on the strength of literary tradition, or of a revelation communicated to a few gifted individuals, but regarded as obvious by the light of nature to every sincere man. Just as he has argued that "natural education" unfits a man to live under laws which call upon him to sacrifice his individuality, so he argues that the good Christian is a bad citizen, and the worse the nearer he is to the "natural" Christianity of the Gospels. He is unable to tell us how we are to patch up our divided loyalties, which he attributes to ineradicable contradictions in human nature.¹

I must pass lightly here over the textual evidence for these conclusions, as the skein is more than usually difficult to unravel. The chapter entitled "Civil Religion" (C.S., IV, 8), was evidently written by Rousseau in much the same mood as the contrast between the man and the citizen in Book I of *Émile*, with which it should be compared. He seems to delight in excavating as deep a cleft as possible between natural happiness and life in society. The religion of *man*, he states, requires no temples or altars; it is "un culte purement intérieur du dieu suprême . . . la pure et simple religion de l'Évangile." From it follows *le droit divin naturel*. On the other hand, the religion of the *citizen* is of a narrowly patriotic kind. It extends no rights to the citizens of other communities; it marks itself off from them by outward formalities and local rites. It leads to *le droit divin civil ou positif*. A third and more bizarre kind of

¹ However, the "civil religion" which he outlines in contrast to Christianity (C.S., IV., 8), has, to judge from his dogmas, more resemblances to it (i.e. ideal Christianity), than one would expect. Rousseau seems simply to forget the point he is urging, viz. that some of the old polytheisms are much stronger *civil* religions than Christianity is.

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religion has arisen, an attempted combination of both, which gives a man two rival masters, the Church and the State, with the result that its adherents fail both in piety and in patriotism. He names as examples the religion of the Llamas, the Japanese religion, and Roman Catholicism.

He now argues that, though a society of Christians under "le droit divin naturel" is in some respects the most perfect imaginable, the very idea of it conflicts with the limited State. Christianity inspires us with indifference to the present life, urges submission, and teaches that men of all nations are brothers in a society which is not even dissolved at death. Now it is in the interest of the Sovereign that every citizen should have a religion which makes him loyal. It is also in the *power* of the Sovereign to fix certain articles of belief, and to punish the citizen if he will not subscribe to them and behave as if they were true. There should be a few such dogmas of civil religion, and they should be announced in simple, precise terms without commentary: the existence of a Deity, powerful, wise, and good; the future life, the happiness of the just; the sacred character of the social contract.¹ Whether this ideal civil religion requires priests and ceremonies, Rousseau does not seem to say.

In his *Profession de Foi* he shows us what would be the philosophical commentary, which has been neglected for civil purposes. It now appears, not only that the doctrines which the State needs to enforce are few and simple, but also that human nature is essentially incapable of grasping any but these few and simple truths. And Rousseau's attitude to established religions is therefore more searching and critical in the *Contrat Social* than it had been in the *Profession de Foi*; from the civil point of view, the various creeds with their ceremonies and superstitions had at least been tolerated as long as they were compatible with the few doctrines of State religion; but now Rousseau argues, with intent to destroy, against miracles, the literal truth of the Bible, the necessity of faith to salvation, and other articles of Christian belief. In this attack both Catholicism and Protestantism seem to suffer; for Rousseau is no less hostile to the idea that every man is a competent judge of the Bible, a book written long ago in a foreign tongue, than he is to the spiritual authority of the priest. As records of historical fact, the Gospels require trained criticism, though the truth of their morality is obvious to everybody. (Rousseau's defence in the *Lettres de la Montagne* shows that he is above all anxious to appear a true Protestant; for he argues that he, and not the Council of Geneva, stands in the true line of descent from the Reformers.)

The "natural religion," then, consists of the morality and theology

¹ I must repeat that I am compelled to leave aside the question why these are, after all, so similar to the dogmas of natural religion.

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of the Gospels, from which the support of miracle and revelation has been withdrawn, and a philosophical foundation, borrowed from Plato and Samuel Clarke, substituted in their place. This religion would not seem (*pace* M. Masson) necessarily to vilify the lower elements of human nature in a spirit contradictory to that of the remainder of *Émile*; but it would seem, from the more emphatic of Rousseau's statements, to conflict with the ideal of a good citizen. Even on this point some doubt must remain, since at the very moment of making it Rousseau draws up the creed of civil religion, and gives as its dogmas the existence of a mighty, intelligent, provident, beneficent Deity; *the future life*; the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of the social contract and the laws; and these seem after all to be identical with the dogmas of natural religion, with (a) the addition of an article about the Contract; (b) the omission of arguments for free will and for a unitary self, and of the rest of the metaphysical foundation.

Thus Rousseau intends to convey by the terms "natural education" and "natural religion," the education and the religion which man, as at present constituted, ought to adopt. These terms have no allusion to the hypothetical "state of nature"; but Rousseau does so far misrepresent his own true purpose as to suggest that only some fall or decline on the part of man, some change in his "original" nature, have made them possible. Nor does the term natural imply that men will turn spontaneously to this education and religion, for Rousseau explicitly distinguishes a part within the whole "natural education" which is to be left to the unaided forces of nature.

With the term "natural" as applied to society, the case is otherwise. Rousseau is bound to follow the lead of his predecessors in identifying natural with primitive society. The corollary to this is that civilized society is artificial, and Rousseau accepts this gladly, arguing against Locke, Diderot, and others that only if the State is deliberately constructed can we hope to reconcile Law and Freedom. As before, he is untrue to his real purpose when he depicts this construction of the State as an unfortunate necessity, by which men stave off greater evils. In spirit he seems quite positive that the State, too, is "natural" in the Aristotelian sense, being a proper outcome of human endeavour and a condition of the good life. In what sense the return to nature is a part of Rousseau's teaching will perhaps be obvious from this summary. It is also sometimes disputed whether he taught the natural goodness or the natural depravity of human nature, or neither; but into this question we cannot enter.

LAW AND FREEDOM

After the survey of "Nature," we have to consider Rousseau's treatment of freedom. How do men become and remain politically

free? As is known, his answers are (i) that they superimpose on the natural order a new order, imitated from that of nature and yet superseding it; (ii) that every individual must share in the construction of this order, since he has also to share in its maintenance. But these answers only receive their full significance when illustrated by what Rousseau says of the liberty of children, as compared with that of men.

On becoming a citizen, each man forsakes natural liberty, i.e. an unlimited right to everything he succeeds in obtaining—a right bounded only by his strength—and he receives in exchange a civil liberty limited by the general will, by which his possessions become property. Now the purpose of this change is not to spurn the natural order in favour of something different, but rather to flatter it by imitation. This is made most evident in the second book of *Émile*. The child, says Rousseau, enjoys a liberty similar to that of man under the reign of Nature; but children are feeble, their needs far surpass their strength, whereas men in the natural state are robust and self-sufficient; and so the man is happy, the child is not. "Les enfants ne jouissent, même dans l'état de Nature, que d'une liberté imparfaite, semblable à celle dont jouissent les hommes dans l'état civil (*the degenerate society, we must assume*); . . . nous étions faits pour être hommes; les lois et la société nous ont replongé dans l'enfance." But the faults of society can be remedied. There are two sorts of dependence—dependence on *things*, the effect of nature, and dependence on *men*, the effect of society. The former, having no moral significance, does no injury to liberty, and engenders no vices; the latter, because it is incalculable, engenders every vice. "If there is a means of remedying this evil in society, it is by substituting Law for a man, and arming general wills with a real force superior to the action of any particular will. *If the laws of nations could be given the inflexibility of natural laws, so that no human force on earth could prevail over them, dependence on men would return once more to a dependence on things*—the Republic would combine the benefits of the reign of nature with those of society; to the liberty which keeps men free from vice, we should join the morality which elevates them to virtue."

How is this to be achieved? At no point is it more vital to remember that Rousseau's purpose is to discover true principles of general application, and not to enter into practical details and difficulties, as a reformer must do. However, the problem of "substituting Law for a man" is faced in the *Contrat Social*, and its solution shown to be conditional on gradual enlightenment under the guidance of a legislator. At present, in Book II of the *Émile*, we return to individual education, and learn how the child of nature is fitted for moral freedom by his tutor. What is never solved is the problem

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of uniting these achievements, and adapting the man of nature to citizenship; and until this is done, the careful parallel between the race and the man is wasted. *One* of the desiderata expressed in the last quotation may be taken to be answered by the doctrine of the general will; dependence on men is made inflexible; but there is no union of the blessings of nature with those of citizenship, and it seems to remain true that "les bonnes institutions sociales sont celles qui savent le mieux dénaturer l'homme."

If children are kept exclusively dependent on *things*, says Rousseau, then firstly they receive the kind of freedom to which, as creatures of nature, they are entitled; and secondly they are prepared—negatively, no doubt, but effectively—for the life of reason and virtue. "Maintenez l'enfant dans la seule dépendance des choses, vous aurez suivi l'ordre de la nature dans le progrès de son éducation." This means, in practice, a middle course between indulgence and severity. The spoilt child is artificially and unnaturally shielded by his parents from the world of things ("if you are too careful to spare them every variety of discomfort, you withdraw them from their position as human beings, to which they will, nevertheless, be one day forced to return"); on the other hand, the repressed child is deprived of happiness now, and can only be timid and sensitive afterwards. Further, the dependence on things carries with it the consequence that we should never appeal to reason, or to anything save force and sensible example. It is not only useless, in restraining children, to harp on authority, obedience, or other moral and religious notions; it is also extremely dangerous, since that which should be welcomed as a privilege will have established itself prematurely in their minds in a fantastic guise. Rousseau foresees the objection that even young children will meet such notions accidentally, and so we shall be forced either to satisfy their curiosity, or to run the risks of reticence. He replies that positive teaching, where necessary, can be conveyed by force of example, children being natural imitators; supporting this in the manner of Aristotle, with the point that their behaviour will not be moral, "but at an age when the heart has as yet no feeling, we must cause children to imitate the actions in which they are to be habituated, in order that they may some day do them from discernment and love of the good" (*Émile*, Book II).

When childhood passes into the age of awakening intellect, and this into adolescence, these directions are no longer applicable. Enough has been said, and enough is generally known of Rousseau's educational methods, to allow me to be brief here. The notions of utility and happiness suggest themselves to children in the age of first intelligence, and provide a plank on which to cross over to those of duty and morality. Therefore at this age there is still no reason for

discipline by command. Adolescence, which follows, is the beginning of self-government, if the preceding rules have been observed. "Moi, comparant mon élève aux vôtres, je trouve à peine ce qu'ils peuvent avoir de commun. . . . Comme il a passé son enfance dans toute la liberté qu'ils prennent dans leur jeunesse ("which they assume in their early manhood"), il commence à prendre dans sa jeunesse la règle à laquelle on les a soumis enfants: cette règle devient leur fléau . . . ils se dédominent alors de la longue contrainte où on les a tenus; . . . Émile, au contraire, s'honore de se faire homme, et de s'assujettir au joug de la raison naissante." He is no longer the pupil, he is now the friend of his master. "Quand, par les signes dont j'ai parlé, vous pressentirez le moment critique, à l'instant quittez avec lui pour jamais votre ancien ton." The master does not, by this step, abandon his *authority*; on the contrary, he now comes to secure it for the first time, having never yet obtained anything from his pupil except by force or ruse.

We see, then, that growth is divided into three periods, and that the child of nature is always free; in the first he possesses the liberty of the physical realm, to which he entirely belongs; in the second his life is a free pursuit of utility, which is the highest end he then recognizes; in the third, he "is proud to become a man, and to subject himself to the yoke of nascent reason." He has never had to listen to a command.

Rousseau in his *Discourse* had given a history of the human race in the two earlier periods, and had also drawn the darker side of the third; his theme was the eclipse of natural freedom. But in the *Contrat Social* he tells how a nation can be guided through adolescence into maturity, and "remain as free as before." "Par le pacte social, nous avons donné l'existence et la vie au corps politique; il s'agit maintenant de lui donner le mouvement et la volonté par la législation." This later contract, unlike the first, is to be regarded as historical; but in its perfect form it requires a legislator whose unselfishness and wisdom transcend anything that we can imagine to be possible. He must also, by a miraculous chance, appear at the right moment. "Most nations, like most men, are teachable only in youth. Once customs are established and prejudices have taken root, it is a vain and dangerous enterprise to try to correct them. . . . There is for nations, as for men, a period of youth, or, shall we say, maturity, before which they should not be made subject to laws." The legislator must further be able to impose his will only by persuasion and an appeal to the fear of God, for he possesses no authority or magistracy, and even at this early time the people are to fasten the yoke on their own necks. In this consists the almost insuperable difficulty. For a young people to be able to discern sound principles, the effect would have to

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become the cause; the spirit which is to be created by law would have to preside over the institution of law itself.

The crisis, which we are supposed to be watching, corresponds to adolescence in the individual. Rousseau asks us to assume that, as the end of all education is fitness for freedom in the sense of self-control, so the end of all legislation is fitness for self-government. In self-control Reason harnesses the force drawn from the whole body. In self-government, judgment and selection belong to a few, but all share in willing the Law. There is, indeed, one serious flaw in comparison; for whereas the tutor has been at hand throughout the earlier stages, constantly intervening "by force or dupery," the legislator does not appear on the scene any sooner than he is needed, and may delay till irreparable mistakes have already marred the young nation for self-government; unless we can rescue consistency by a belief in watchful Providence. But Rousseau, by his hypothesis of a legislator, has in any case withdrawn from real life; and he is now entitled to conclude that, if fortune is moderately, or perhaps rather unusually, kind, there is no reason why either a nation or an individual should at any period (whether before or after the age of intelligence), have to listen to an arbitrary command.

Thus the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people under ideal circumstances is an absolutely rigid deduction from Rousseau's premisses; he is, I think, compelled to propose an assembly as the mouthpiece of the General Will. But among these premisses must be counted the doubtful analogy between a nation and an individual man.

Under real circumstances, Rousseau must clearly withdraw the hypotheses he assumed—especially the existence of the legislator and tutor—and attempt to salvage what he can. He generally declines this, as belonging to the province of practice; the analogy of education helps us to this extent, that we can compare the task of a statesman in modern Europe to that of the tutor of a backward boy. Modern peoples are like children who have in some cases been made timid by tyrannical parents, in others spoilt by excessive indulgence, whilst their positive education has been neglected. It is clear (i) that the ideal could, in these conditions, never be attained, (ii) that instant emancipation would be disastrous, (iii) that the child's mental growth, however distorted, will prevent some of the methods which prove so salutary under ideal circumstances, e.g. the dupery. The cause of this is that the time is hopelessly out of joint: mental quickness and maturity have become joined to an infancy of the character.

Remembering this, we need not despair of bringing even the despised *Discourse on the Sciences and Arts* within the framework of Rousseau's system; for it is there that he gives his version of European history. It goes deeper than an impassioned exhortation

to set fire to our libraries and academies; Rousseau, as Professor Cassirer has explained, does not grudge men intellectual and artistic culture as such, but argues vehemently that they are luxuries to be provided only when justice and equality have been found. And is not this, too, a cardinal point in the *Émile*? Mental education is ruthlessly subordinated by Rousseau to education of character, in accordance with what he believes to be the destiny of man and the natural order of his growth. (His psychology, however, seems to be unusually wide of the mark here. It is preposterous to suppose that children *cannot* learn languages and the sciences, or take pleasure in reading.) It is sometimes said that in discussing religious truth, Rousseau shows himself a pragmatist. That is not the case, unless Kant also is one; his principle is not "that which works, or proves its utility, is true"; but that the competence of our reason is limited to those subjects which concern our welfare, and secondly that within this sphere, that which works morally, and is immediately obvious to the heart, is true. Rousseau's principle is the subordination of theoretical to practical reason, not the subordination of indifferent truths to important ones.

CONCLUSION

"In this," it may be said, "have you not elucidated Rousseau to his own discredit? does not this merely show his view of sovereignty to be untenable, because bound up more closely than had been thought with dubious analogies and fairy-tales?" To discuss the objection here would take me on to an entirely different plane. I prefer therefore to reserve it for a future discussion, which will, I believe, involve a fuller account of Rousseau's religious views and of other questions which have been skirted by this essay. Meanwhile, I am convinced that it is quite unprofitable to expound, and hypocritical to hold, the doctrine of the General Will without the background which I have tried to depict.

These are the conclusions which I hope I may not unfairly claim to have established:

(1) The use of the word Nature in Rousseau is twofold. It may be applied to all that is not human, including those features of human conduct which are shared with animals and inert bodies, i.e. instincts and impulses. But the natural education and religion are natural precisely because they *include* what is distinctively human. Rousseau preaches a return to nature, *first*, because he would have us embrace the natural education and religion, and *secondly*, because civilized society, though artificial, is according to him an imitation of nature. It models itself on the inflexibility of natural law. The "natural" education is neither (a) an education among natural

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objects, though this may be one of its requirements, nor (b) an education in which nature alone works.

(2) Between the *Émile* and *Contrat Social* there is much unresolved contradiction. Both agree that discipline is essential to freedom, but the political work diverges in maintaining that only the State can impart such discipline; whereas the *Émile*, and Rousseau's writings as a whole, maintain that the State is a harsh instrument of uniformity, and that the independent natural man could, and would, reach self-discipline without it.

(3) Rousseau's view of freedom is entirely dependent on his view of the growth of society, and this in turn on the analogy ever present to his eyes, between individual and racial development. What this analogy gives him is a sharp contrast between physical and moral freedom (to one or other of which men and nations have an inalienable right); a view that sentiment and utility provide a bridge between the natural and the moral; and a conviction that the claim to justice and happiness is more vital to human nature than the claim to truth.

We might, in extension of this, show that the significance of Rousseau as a precursor of Kant is possibly far greater than anyone except Kant himself has realized.

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CANON OLIVER QUICK

THE relation of knowledge to action and of theory to practice constitutes one of the most vital problems for human thought to-day. The classical philosophy, which the Catholic Church has inherited from the master-minds of ancient Greece, tends on the whole to rank theory above practice, and to maintain that ultimately we act for the sake of knowing. Characteristically modern thought, on the other hand, in most of its multifarious forms, inverts this order of precedence. We are commonly taught to-day that knowledge exists for the sake of action, and that theories are to be judged true or false according to their tendency to promote or hinder those severely practical aims, the attainment of which must constitute the main business of living. It is with the causes of this change of mind, and the judgment which we ought to pass upon its general value, that I propose to deal in this article.

I will begin with a dogmatic assertion, which I hope subsequently to elucidate. There are two relations which fundamentally determine the whole structure of human experience and of reality as it appears therein; these two are causal efficacy and significance.

Causal efficacy is that by which one event produces or brings to pass another. Everything that happens is produced or brought to pass by something else. But the succession of events manifests a certain order and repetition of sequence. Hence the laws of causal efficacy state the uniformities according to which events necessarily follow upon one another in occurrence. In this aspect reality is apprehended as changing and being changed in temporal process. And it is our acquaintance with causal laws which enables us to act within the process so as to modify and control what happens.

Significance is that by which events are presented to the mind together and associated in the mind with one another. By significance events are held together so as to become in the mind symbols which indicate or express the things which are signified objects of thought. The laws of significance are the uniformities according to which one meaning (i.e. thing signified) necessarily implies another rationally and in logic. In this aspect reality is apprehended as, at least relatively, static and enduring, and as having an order which transcends the temporal process and change of happening events. It is through significance that we know things as they are.

Consider first how intimately these two relations are connected,

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and yet how obstinately they remain distinct, even in the most rudimentary elements of our experience. What is involved in the simple fact that I see a tree? When we think of the matter in terms of causation, my seeing of the tree is an event which comes at the end of a series of other events which cause it. It is produced by the action of light vibrating through some atmospheric medium, both upon the object and upon the retina and optic nerve in my body. Vibrations travel from the object to the retina and along the optic nerve into my brain, and then I see the tree. But the series of events takes time to happen. Accordingly, I seem obliged to say, not that I can see the tree as it is at the moment when the causal process is completed, but that then I have a visual image of the tree possibly as it was when the process began, the visual image being the effect in my mind of a physical process of causation which terminates in the brain. What, therefore, I directly "sense" is the mental image. But then, what can I mean by asserting that it is an image *of the tree*? Clearly I cannot mean either that it is an image *like the tree*, or that it is an image *caused by the tree*. For "an image like the tree" need not necessarily be an image *of* the tree at all.¹ and "an image caused by the tree" might be something altogether different.

This difficulty, of course, is a very old story in the theory of sense-perception. Mere common sense may wish to cut the knot by saying that I see the tree as it appears, and not its visual image at all. But common sense is refuted by scientific examination, which is verified by the indisputable fact that we sometimes see trees which are not there. There is only one way out of the impasse; and that is to suppose that when I have the experience which I call "seeing the tree," my mind entertains, indeed, a visual image caused by the tree, but treats it, not merely as caused by the tree, but as *signifying* its existence there and now. In other words, the moment the visual image comes into my mind, I perform an act of interpretation (not infallible) which ages of practice have rendered unconscious. Thus it takes both causal efficacy and significance, in their union and in their distinctness, to enable me to see anything at all.

It is in their connection with *time* that the difference between causal efficacy and significance is most plainly revealed. There is causal efficacy just as soon and just as long as events depend on one another in temporal succession. But it is the essential function of significance to transcend the causal and temporal order of events; and it does so in a double manner:

¹ Doubtless it is a more important consideration that I can never compare the image with the tree itself, but only with other images or sense-impressions. All "sense-data" are originally apprehended as significant of something; and it is their essential significance which escapes us when we try to analyse or classify them in terms of causation.

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(1) A sign itself (at least so far as it consists in anything seen, heard, or felt through the bodily mechanism) is brought into being by an analysable series of physical events which, entering the mind, are held together by it in a single and simultaneous whole. A temporal series of physical stimuli goes to make up the visual image of a tree, which, as an image in the mind, is complete at a single instant. But the same truth is more clearly perceived, when we consider the case of a verbal sentence. The words as understood have a fixed order of before and after, and, if I am hearing or reading the sentence, they are even apprehended as coming successively into the mind. Nevertheless, the sentence constitutes a single and simultaneous sign. The meaning is carried by the sentence as a whole, and not by the succession of its parts; and, if there be any causal relation between the parts, it is irrelevant to the meaning.

(2) Again, since anything signified comes into the mind together with its sign, it must be possible for any past or future thing, which can be signified, to be made really *present* to the mind. Past events, of course, cannot be made now to *happen* in my mind. For happening, which embodies causal efficacy, is altogether fixed in time. A past event can only be properly signified as having happened, not as happening—for otherwise it would cease to be past.¹ And yet, if a past event can be really presented to my mind at all, it must be so because all events have in reality an aspect other than their actual happening which passes, viz. their capacity for being signified, which endures. Because they happened, they are “dated” by their happening; and therefore they can be *thought* of at any time in their abiding character as past. All temporal connections presented through significance fall within a whole which is before the mind at the time of its thinking. The temporal connections as signified still constitute a certain order in events; but this order has ceased to be temporal, i.e. successive, since, far from preventing, it actually enables events which occurred *at different times* to be thought of *simultaneously*. Events thought of as temporal cease to be merely temporal just in so far as they are thought of. It is on this fundamental paradox that the possibility of true history depends.

All knowledge of objects is mediated by significance. Yet there is an element in our knowledge which is not so mediated, namely, the mind’s awareness of the life of its own organism in interaction

¹ If a past event were really presented as actually happening, the event would be repeated now. In the dramatic representation of a historical event there is some show of repeating it; but it is only a show, precisely because, however vivid the representation, the original causes and effects of the event are absent. In so far as any representation of a historical event gives me a true idea of the event itself, the representation is precisely not a *repetition* of the original (still less, as Macmurray suggests in *Interpreting the Universe*, a substitute for it), but an image significant of it.

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with what is beyond it. It is in this awareness, unmediated by signs, that we have direct experience of causal efficacy. We have it, when we are aware that something in us moves our limbs, and that the movement of the limb follows upon the decision of the mind to move it. But our immediate awareness is not simply of our own action upon an environment, but also of its action upon us. The use of the very word action seems to imply the presence in the environment of a causality similar to that which we experience in ourselves. And primitive man, no doubt, tends to attribute all the movements of nature to the direct action of some will, because he is aware that it is by a will that his own body is moved. This animistic tendency is soon corrected by the increasing knowledge of his environment which man acquires through the interpretation of the signs which enter his mind in sense-impressions. This interpretation we commonly call "observation of fact." Now causal efficacy itself can never be observed; for it belongs entirely to that actual momentary happening which can only be *felt* and never *perceived*.¹ Nevertheless, systematic observation does establish the recurrence of fixed sequences and uniformities in events, according to which certain consequents follow upon certain antecedents. And we call these uniformities, as they are expressed in our knowledge, "laws of causal efficacy," because they are the forms under which the interpreting mind represents to itself that order of interaction and production of change which is one aspect of reality.

But this knowledge of fixed order and invariability in the sequence of events has a further connection with causal efficacy. It is the invariability of certain sequences which enables man to extend control over his environment by his own causal and efficacious action. It is because the continued friction of two bits of wood invariably produces sparks that he finds himself able to command fire at will. And with every fresh discovery of a further uniformity of this kind man's potential control over nature is increased. Even if the events exemplifying the uniformity are such that he cannot produce or prevent their occurrence, at least he is enabled to direct his action in the light of new knowledge of what will occur.

The more we reflect upon the matter, the more surely I think we shall conclude that the pragmatists are right in maintaining that all this study of events as they succeed and pass into one another in the constant flux of occurrence, issues from and has its end in the practical interests of mankind. It gives us one whole branch of human knowledge, that, namely, by which we adapt means to ends and attain our purposes in practice. And yet there is one kind of knowledge it can never give, the knowledge of rational understand-

¹ We never literally "see a thing happen." What we *see* is the change in phenomena (perceived objects) which the happening produces.

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ing. For that is a knowledge of things as they are in their abiding nature as signified and signifying. And it is impossible that the mere study of things as they change and produce changes (that is, as instruments or organs of *action*) should ever give us the knowledge of things as they are enduringly, that is, as objects of thought or intuition united by their mutual implication of one another in significance. This is the proper knowledge of *truth*.

Thus, there is a dual character in the reality with which we live and think. On the one hand, reality *happens* in a constant flux and succession of temporal events, which in all their changes observe certain uniformities of sequence. By an ever-extending acquaintance with these uniformities man both predicts what will happen, and, through the appropriate interposition of his own causal action, makes what happens serve his will. On the other hand, reality is presented to the mind through signs which indicate or express abiding entities beyond themselves. And by reflecting on this significance of things the mind aspires to know reality, not as a passing series which is to be modified by action, but as an ordered whole which can be understood.

The dual character of reality generates two kinds of knowledge, or ways of knowing. There is the knowledge which seeks to acquaint itself with the causal order and uniformities in the flux of happening events, so that human action may be more efficacious as a cause; and there is the knowledge which seeks to understand the abiding truth of things, which is signified, not by the momentary happening of events, but by the relatively static appearances of things in the mind. We may, if we will, call the former knowledge practical, and the latter theoretic. But we must beware of supposing that distinction implies complete separability. On the one hand, the very facts of causal change and interaction are known, at least in part, through appearances which also signify the abiding nature of the truth. On the other hand, the most theoretic quest of the truth through the study of significance is itself an action which constitutes an efficacious cause in the flux of events. And yet one question remains, of fundamental importance both for theory and practice. What is our ultimate aim both in acting and knowing? Does the understanding of permanent truth, gained through the study of the significance of appearances, ultimately subserve the action which directs change and controls events? Or does the experimental acquaintance with events, which enables us to control them, subserve the knowledge which understands and contemplates what is?

There is no doubt what answer the modern world would give to this question. Marx's great saying, that the business of our philosophy is not to understand the world but to change it, might well stand as the motto of what is most characteristic in the intellectual life of

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our time. Modern thought subordinates knowledge to action. What are the historical causes for its judgment? There are two:

(1) The first is the dominion which experimental science has established over the modern mind. Experimental science views the world as a causal process. As experimental science, it does not trouble itself about the theoretical meaning or intelligibility of anything, either of causation or even of its own theories. Such matters it leaves, sometimes half contemptuously, to the metaphysicians. Its business is to apply its theories, to test them experimentally, and to show that they work. A scientific theory works, when it enables us to predict, and therefore to control, results. And in many branches of science it has seemed that theories, even in proportion as they have been found to work more perfectly and with more startling effects in human life, have been more and more deprived of any definite or intelligible meaning which even their own exponents can understand.

This result has certainly been paradoxical to the men of science themselves. The founders of modern science took over from the scholastic philosophy the notion of a causal order immanent in all things. Their method was different from that of the philosophers, in that they were interested in observation and experiment upon facts, rather than in the logic of ideas. But their dominant aim was *discovery*, the searching out of the realities behind phenomena. The *invention* of mechanical appliances was only a by-product of their main work. They sought to understand nature rather than to control her. And yet it is beginning to look as though increased control, rather than increased understanding, were the main fruit which we are to reap from the long labour of scientific investigation. This is especially the case in physics. In the Newtonian physics terms such as space, time, matter, mass, velocity, gravitation, and the like, still seemed to have a meaning intelligible to the ordinary man who understood the use of language; since he could refer these terms to objects of his own perception. But now that Einstein has supplanted Newton, the case is very different. The further analysis of causal process has immeasurably enlarged the gulf between everything that human senses can directly perceive, and the entities which the expert uncertainly supposes to exist as the causal ground of effects which are registered by instruments of precision. The Newtonian terms have become just popular and misleading words, for what can be accurately represented only by mathematical symbols. And it belongs to the essential function of such symbols, that they mean nothing in particular, but stand only for certain general relations which must hold between any entities fulfilling certain postulated conditions. Hence some modern physicists suggest that we can know no more of the material world outside

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us than a deaf man might learn of music from a diligent study of musical literature and notation. Others maintain that if we would really know the nature of anything we must use other faculties and other methods than those which physical science calls into play. Others again are inclined to blame the structure of language for the mental darkness into which the study of physical light has plunged our thought. We must begin with the help of mathematics to build up a quite new philosophy which dispenses with the use of language altogether.

At first sight this is a somewhat tragic issue of the inquiries which were begun with such high hope in the seventeenth century. Yet what has so far been said represents, after all, only one side of the picture. Our attention is called to the other, every time we listen to the wireless or travel by aeroplane, or read of the minute accuracy which astronomical predictions have displayed under the test of observation. The real marvel and mystery of modern physical science becomes apparent when we contrast the astonishing exactness of its observations and predictions and the extent of the new powers which it has bestowed upon mankind, with the hardly less surprising absence of any certain or agreed information as to the real constitution of the physical universe.

No doubt in the biological sciences the contrast is less glaring. Yet even here there is a marked discrepancy between the biologist's success in analysing and manipulating the processes of vital and organic activity, and his failure to furnish us with any clear notion of what life is. Distinguished experts look forward to a time when the physical and mental characteristics of our offspring will be artificially controlled in a way altogether shocking to old-fashioned believers either in nature or in God. But as to any fresh understanding of life itself as an abiding reality signified and significant, they tell us nothing. And we may add that the case is hardly different with the psychologists, who help us so wonderfully to control the mind.

Small wonder, then, if most men are impressed with the changes which science has brought and will bring, rather than with the obscure and uncertain explanations which scientific experts may suggest as to the nature of things as they really are.

(2) Another potent influence tending in the same direction is the social unrest which science itself has done much to produce. Perhaps the most profound difference between the character of civilized man as it is to-day and as it was in the ancient and mediaeval worlds, concerns the emotional attitude towards the future. In the Hellenic philosophy time was usually conceived of as an endless series of recurring cycles, and the Jewish-Christian eschatology, which modified the pagan doctrine, certainly did not encourage belief in any general progress or evolution towards the good. Conse-

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quently, if a man found the present course of events utterly unsatisfying to his reason and conscience, he naturally sought for some ground of hope, not in the future of this world, but in another world to which his soul might attain after bodily death, or, even before death, in spiritual knowledge or mystical experience. Apart from such hope, he had no resource but the cultivation of a stoical apathy. This whole outlook tended to encourage a doctrine of salvation through knowledge of eternal realities dimly discerned beyond the flux of time. Nowadays, men's thoughts have a very different bent. They may find the actual and present conditions of life no less unsatisfactory than did their forefathers; but they believe implicitly that there are forces at work in natural and human evolution which tend towards the realization of better things in the future. They cry out for the changes which man himself can and might and surely will produce in this spatio-temporal world. Salvation for them is by scientifically directed action. Our reformers and revolutionaries feel that they have the powers of the natural universe on their side; and time to them is the bringer of all good things, even though its slow steps have occasionally to be hastened by the judicious application of a little dynamite. The ancient notion of time summed up in the lines of Sophocles:

*ἀπανθ' ὁ μακρὸς κἀνηριθμητὸς χρόνος
φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται*

is quite foreign to their minds. In vain Spengler harks back to older methods of reading history. He has hardly more audience than the scholastic logicians. Thus it is that the whole attempt to pursue knowledge for its own sake, or to put forward the contemplation of things in their ultimate significance as an end for the mental activity of man, is regarded by Marxists as simply the by-product of a bourgeois society where thinkers theorize at leisure, because they live on wealth filched from the working man. The life of reason is at once accounted for and invalidated by being attributed to an economic *cause*.

No doubt it is the Marxist who pushes this type of pragmatism to extremes. But the general principle of subordinating reasons to causes is characteristic of the age. It is the intellectual root both of the relativism of the tolerant agnostic, who supposes that all theories of the truth are just the product of particular conditions, and of the zeal of the fanatic, who seeks to make his own doctrines prevail by the efficacy with which opposition to them is suppressed. Thus the infinitely various opinions of the modern world seem on the whole to be converging towards this amount of consensus, that the business of thought is not so much to understand the world as to change it, that knowledge exists for the sake of action, that causes

are more important than reasons, and efficacy than significance, and that time, in which things happen and are successively produced, is more real than the fancied eternity in which they may be contemplated and understood together in the order of their rational coherence.

But, after all, modern thought can hardly be allowed to be judge in its own case. It may be condemned by the thought of to-morrow. And even if it is not, it is by no means self-evident that the thought of to-morrow must be truer than the thought of yesterday, unless we assume, to start with, the truth of a particular philosophy of evolution, which itself is on trial in the dispute. Speaking generally, if it be legitimate at all to acknowledge a supreme end for human life, there seems to be no more intrinsic absurdity in making the goal the understanding of things in their ultimate significance, than in making it the continuance of action accompanied by a greater range of satisfaction than we now enjoy. If it be urged that knowledge arises out of action, that is no reason why it should end in it. And if it be urged that knowledge in fact furthers action, it may be replied that the converse is also true.

Our answer to the ultimate question will, in fact, depend largely on the importance which we attach to our ideals. Ideals of beauty, truth, and goodness are evidently derived, in some sense, from our experience of the actual world; and, equally evidently, they move us to condemn it. Is their function then solely to stimulate us to improve it by action? So pragmatism maintains. But it is evident that the word improvement has no meaning, unless it implies some movement in a fixed direction determined by the abiding nature of the ideal. If ideals themselves change utterly with the passing generations, what is improvement to one generation may be deterioration to another, and any doctrine of general or universal progress becomes nonsense. If, on the other hand, there is any genuinely abiding and absolute character in the ideal, it is hard to resist the conclusion that we have in it some hint of a genuinely eternal being which is the source and goal of temporal change, and with which human spirits have some degree of community, just because they are able to survey and contemplate and judge, and are not tied to mere interaction with environment like the creatures of time. And in that case the goal of right action, which produces change, must in some sense be the contemplation and enjoyment of an unchanging truth and good.

We can now see more clearly why it is that the typically modern point of view, which is dominated by experimental science, is peculiarly inimical both to metaphysics and to religion. We have seen reason for thinking that the function of experimental science is to give us that kind of acquaintance with the causal sequences

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of events which enables us to predict what will happen, and also by our own causative action to control it. Such study moves in the realm of efficient causes, and metaphysical speculation is outside its range. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is essentially the attempt to discover something which lies beyond, and is signified by, the seemingly unending sequences of causation. It tries not to change, but to understand the world, and to understand it as a whole. If phenomena are really meaningless except in relation to human action, if the very notion of the universe as a whole is just a human fancy, then metaphysics is simply a mistake. Neither pragmatism nor dialectical materialism, nor any doctrine which simply subordinates knowledge to action can be a metaphysic—except in so far as it is a metaphysical judgment to deny the value of metaphysics.

The ground of the opposition of modern thought to *religion* is more difficult to state, because the specific aim of religion is less easy to define than that of metaphysics. Schleiermacher, though of late he has fallen into disfavour among theologians, was surely on the right track when he emphasized the feeling of dependence as belonging to the essence of religion. Yet clearly the aim of religion is precisely not to leave men dependent upon the sequences of natural events, but to free them from such bondage by making them dependent upon a less changeful order of reality. Like metaphysics, therefore, religion seeks communion with an enduring reality beyond and behind the change and chance of temporal events. But its search has a different purpose. It would make us realize our vital and personal dependence upon the higher reality, while metaphysics would present it only as a principle of order to illuminate our understanding. And thus the function of religion is seen to be in direct contrast with that of experimental science. Science acquaints us with the causation of events in such a way that we may learn to control them. Religion teaches us the significance of events so that we may learn to be controlled by the reality which is beyond and above them.

It is true that religion, like science, has sometimes been a revolutionary force in human affairs, and, much more often than science, a cause of violence. Nevertheless, when the religious man girds on his armour and goes "to the help of the Lord against the mighty," he does so, in so far as he is genuinely religious, not because he thinks the Lord cannot overcome the mighty without him, but rather because it is the Lord's will to use him for that end, and his own very life depends upon the divine control. In the highest religion the ultimate end is conceived as *worship*. And worship differs both from the practical activity, which is the fruit of experimental science, and from the theoretical cognition, which is the aim of metaphysics, precisely in its fusion of the element of knowledge

with the feeling of service and self-abasement. In proportion as either the metaphysician or the man of science feels himself utterly abased before that which the world reveals to him, he is already a religious man, or at least he is experiencing a specifically religious emotion.

Our present attempt to grasp or define the problems set by the dual character of reality as given in experience will best be concluded by some further illustration of the essential contrast between experimental science and religion as ways of knowledge—the one the most modern, the other the most ancient, which the human mind has followed.

Religion in its beginnings is often difficult to distinguish from magic. In order to gain success in war, agriculture, or hunting, the savage may either pray and sacrifice to his god, or else he may perform spells and incantations over weapons or fields, or seek to charm the game into his power. The one method is religious, and the other magical; but often they merge into one another. The difference, which gradually becomes defined, lies essentially in the element of interpretation and rational explanation which religion requires and magic does not. Religion seeks to win the favour of a deity who will then help his worshippers to gain their ends. It gives some more or less intelligible explanation why the deity is pleased by the sacrifice, and why success follows. Magical ceremonies, on the other hand, appear to be incomprehensibly effective; and this is hardly less the case if they are supposed to bind or compel mysterious forces to produce the desired result. If the effect is thought to depend on the will of a god, we are dealing with religion. The essential character of magical proceedings is—and their mysterious efficacy is partly derived from the fact—that they appear to be almost wholly meaningless.

Experimental science gives success by a different method. It discards both magical mystery and religious explanation. But it has an explanatory principle of its own rooted in a law of causation, the precise meaning of which it can never successfully explain. By applying it with the help of minute observation and experiment it discerns ever more accurately the uniform sequences in which events actually happen. The characteristic of the scientific method is analysis. *Divide et impera* is its motto. First, each particular science, for convenience of handling, separates off its own subject-matter from that of others. Then, every obstacle presented is met by further analysis, so that when no uniformity of sequence can be found to hold in the relations of larger or more complex entities, uniformities may still be established in the relations of their smaller or simpler components. Some sciences now deal with entities so minute that they are not perceptible at all, and are only inferred from the changes which they cause in observable phenomena. Modern

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physicists apparently regard even electrons as altogether too gross and palpable to be the primary elements of matter. Biology makes much of genes, and psychologists divide and subdivide the human mind. And yet it is not unfair to say that the greatest experts are becoming more and more aware that science is somehow missing the main significance of things, in spite of all the information which it acquires and the new power which it bestows. For science by its analysis necessarily breaks up the wholeness of the sign which means, and of the reality which is meant, in order to reduce all things to a causal succession of events.

Meanwhile, religion also still pursues its own characteristic and opposite method. Like science, it often finds the facts recalcitrant. They do not fit the explanations which it offers, or fulfil the expectations which it evokes. They seem to mean something different from the doctrine which it has hitherto maintained. Religion no more abandons its belief in God than science abandons its belief in causal law. But, instead of analysing the difficult facts further, religion seeks rather to synthesize them with others, to put them in a wider context, so that the Godward-pointing significance which seems after all to be excluded from the narrower sphere, may nevertheless be made manifest in the larger. The general answer of religious faith to doubts and difficulties is that, if we could but see all, if we could only enlarge the range of our experience, or attain some Pisgah-height from which we could view the whole country, then somehow we should find God's ways to man justified after all, in spite of present appearances. It is the limitation of our minds and our experience which prevents us from seeing how all things really point to the infinite goodness and wisdom of God. We are not "straitened in" Him, but in our own thoughts and affections.

The words of an ancient and of a modern poet may serve to illustrate how constantly religious faith seeks to reduce the ugliness or chaos of the present by viewing it together with a remembered past or a hoped-for future, so as to see the whole significance of things in the wider range:

Hath God forgotten to be gracious? And will He shut up His loving-kindness in displeasure? And I said, It is mine own infirmity: but I will remember the years of the right hand of the Most Highest. I will remember the works of the Lord, and call to mind Thy wonders of old time."¹

And again:

Grow old along with me!
The best is yet to be,
The last of life, for which the first was made:
Our times are in His hand
Who saith: "A whole I planned;
Youth shows but half: trust God: see all, nor be afraid."²

¹ Psalm lxxvii, verses 7-11.

² Browning: *Rabbi ben Ezra*.

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Or let us go back once more to the mystery of sense-perception from which our discussion started. A man sees a flower. Physics gets to work on the fact, and forthwith both flower and light are dissolved into complex systems of "waves" which ultimately cause an image in what we call the mind. Physiology and psychology take up the tale and give their account of causal happenings within the organism of the seer. From these sciences, when their studies are perfected, I may learn everything about perception, except one thing, viz. the reason, nature, and meaning of its truth. But then listen to the religious poets dealing with the same simple fact:

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but *if* I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.¹

And again:

A primrose by a river's brim
A yellow primrose was to him,
And it was nothing more.²

It is the failure to see the universal significance of the particular which is the mark of spiritual blindness.

So religion, as it develops, constantly strives to discern God's presence and operation, no longer just in this or that series of events, but rather in the whole or in all, so that through final knowledge worship may be complete. And yet the continuing process of temporal change and causation for ever defeats its effort. The whole is never presented. What shall be does not yet appear; and what has been recedes into the darkness of the irrecoverable past. The religious soul is left to guess by faith at the vision which it seeks through the signs afforded by the fragments of its experience. Yet it remains sure—to the naturalistic mind absurdly sure—that there must be a "world" or plane of experience in which even the temporal process of continually changing events can be seen as itself significant, because in the whole and in the end it works out a pattern, which to the eternal mind is good. Others may suggest that religion should confine itself to propagating ideas which are serviceable for action within the environment of temporal events. But the religious man will obstinately reply that he cannot consider temporal events apart from the unchanging reality which they signify as the source and goal of their process and the ground of their coherence. In face of all doubts and difficulties his characteristic prayer will be that the power of his faith may be increased, so that "holding fast the word of God

¹ Tennyson: *Flower in the Crannied Wall*.

² Wordsworth: *Peter Bell*.

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he may come to the sight of what he now believes." He may agree that in this world knowledge ought on the whole to be subordinated to action. For, as Newman said, "here below to live is to change," and, no doubt, to live well is to make changes for the better. But "in a higher world it is otherwise." And it is the reality of the higher world, discerned through signs, which alone gives purpose and meaning to that causal process of change which is our present life.

DISCUSSION

BOTH GOD AND MAN—A Reply

THE ARCHBISHOP OF YORK

An adequate reply to Mr. Graham's article would take more time than I can at present give, and more space than could (probably) be allowed. But I ask leave to make a few comments. Mr. Graham opens with a quotation from Whitehead: "All verbal forms of statement that have been long before the world disclose ambiguities, and sometimes the ambiguities strike at the very heart of the meaning." The two crucial statements on which Mr. Graham's argument appears to hang—whether or not they have in this form been long before the world—disclose ambiguities which strike at the very heart of his meaning.

1. He states the Principles of Identity and Contradiction ambiguously and adopts an interpretation which is a *Petitio Principii*.

"Everything is what it is and not some other thing." This is true only if "other" means "incompatible." The old form is preferable: "A is A and not not-A."

"A thing cannot be both what it is and something else." Again, this is true only if "else" means "incompatible." It is true that a horse cannot be both a horse and an apple; but that is because "horse" and "apple" are terms representing incompatible modes of being. Again the old form is preferable: A cannot be B and not-B at the same time and in the same relation. A father cannot also be a mother; but it is quite possible to be both a father and a violinist. There is no necessary connection between "father" and "violinist," but also there is no incompatibility.

The question whether "God" and "Man" are terms representing compatible or incompatible modes of being is the first question raised by the Christian dogma of the Incarnation. If they are certainly incompatible, the dogma is untrue; if the dogma is true, it involves conceptions of God and of Man such as are not incompatible. This is part of what is meant by the familiar saying that the doctrine of the Incarnation is primarily a doctrine about God. If God once lived a human life (to put it crudely) then God must be such that it is possible that He should live a human life.

2. Having, by the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*, persuaded himself that the doctrine of the Incarnation is self-contradictory, Mr. Graham offers what he supposes to be the defence of Christians who have been driven to accept this result; and he apparently attributes this line of defence to myself. He imagines the Christian to maintain "the credibility of the unintelligible." (Does he remember the climax of Kant's argument about the moral law as a law of freedom?—"Thus, while we do not comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet comprehend its incomprehensibility"—i.e. we see why our power to comprehend stops short.) But Mr. Graham does not define his terms.

"Can we believe what we do not understand?" Here again is the fatal ambiguity. Of course we cannot believe that to which we attach no meaning—such as the "sibling of rollochites" put forward by Mr. Graham as an illustration of "what we do not understand." But we all believe much which

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we understand in very small measure, and know that we understand in very small measure. There are modes of human experience which are utterly beyond my reach. I have no notion what it would feel like to be mentally pregnant with *King Lear* or the *Ninth Symphony*. But I can attach meanings to propositions concerning Shakespeare and Beethoven in their throes of composition, and can believe these, while knowing that the reality exceeds my grasp, and that what remains unknown might (if I could come to know it) profoundly modify the apprehension I have reached; in such a case, however, I should still believe that this partial apprehension must be included in the fuller grasp. Still more must I recognize that I cannot, being man only, reach any full comprehension of what it would be to be both God and Man; I cannot, in the usual sense of the word, "understand" such an experience. But if, having "beheld his glory," I confess belief in Jesus Christ as the Word made flesh, I attach a real meaning to that expression, and may try to understand it more and more adequately, while yet knowing that the reality so far exceeds my grasp as to make my best endeavours so inadequate as to be almost futile. Yet I shall still believe that a full understanding, if it could be reached, or as it exists in the divine mind, contains and does justice to the reality grasped in the initial confession.

3. It is, no doubt, true that my own reference to this topic in *Nature, Man and God* is a *petitio* if that description may be applied to what is mentioned without argument. The argument I should develop on that theme could not be brought within the scope of the Gifford Trust, and the paragraph to which Mr. Graham refers is not an exposition of Christian doctrine but an outline of the way in which I should set out to defend that doctrine against the particular attack upon it contained in the last Gifford Lectures of Professor Pringle Pattison. So far as I have attempted a reasoned exposition of the doctrine of the Incarnation, it is not in *Nature, Man and God*, but in *Christus Veritas*.

4. There seems to be no room for doubt that the spiritual form of religious faith springs from that in it which is intellectually least easy to assimilate. I do not believe that a "vision of God as the personification of goodness" or any "ideal of love and selfless service" has much power to re-shape the human heart or the world of men. The power of Christianity, whenever it exhibits power, comes from the conviction—not that we ought to act in some way, nor even that God is such and such, but that God has acted—that He "hath visited and redeemed His people."

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PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

(STUDIES IN LEIBNIZ)

Of recent years there has been seen in Italy a revival of the study of Leibniz, such as had already taken place elsewhere. At the beginning of the century the work of Russell, Couturat, and Cassirer shed fresh light, though with differing perspectives, on the problems of Leibniz's logic and metaphysics; since then the conviction has been gradually forming among students that the classical expositions of the system, such as those of Fischer and Boutroux, have had their day, and that new approaches needed to be made. Even without accepting Couturat's radical thesis, which tended to reduce the complexity of Leibniz's thought to the logical schemes of the propositions of predication, it has yet been generally apprehended that this thesis was of great importance for the understanding of some more formalistic aspects of monadology that stultify and devitalize the dynamism of the new conceptions of force, activity, and development. Thus the old "harmonistic" view of Leibniz's thought has been replaced by an "antinomistic" view, which represents the philosopher as tormented by an inner discord between a static logic and a dynamic metaphysics. On the other hand, the emphasis laid on the logical "point of view" or "perspective" in the historical reconstruction of the system has given rise to a countervailing stressing of other perspectives centred on some salient aspect of Leibniz's mentality. Such a view was suggested about ten years ago by Carlotti¹ in a book in which, following Baruzi, he considered interest in religion to be the point from which the whole system was orientated. The thesis was weak in itself because too generic—to particularize, it would be found that, not religion as such, but the philosophy of religion or philosophy pure and simple, is what lies closest to Leibniz's heart—and Carlotti conducted his argument in a particularly unfortunate manner, or rather he superimposed it like a hood on a treatment that took no account of it. Carlotti showed ignorance of the fact that much work had already been done in this field in Germany, where Schmalenbach and Heimsoeth, while exaggerating, the one the protestantism of Leibniz, and the other his "mysticism," had yet succeeded in laying bare some important religious aspects in the genesis of monadology: for example, the sense of impenetrability of the individual conscience, the feeling of solitude that each soul experiences in face of God, etc. When Carlotti, after an interval of many years, took up his argument once more in order to write the article on Leibniz for the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, he dropped the hood but did not in any wise improve his exposition, which is flat and colourless because it does not reveal the least sense of the problems of Leibnizian hermeneutics.

To Carlotti's "religious" Leibniz, Olgiati² has opposed a Leibniz who "on the religious side is superficial," "who had an intensely active external life, but knew nothing whatever of the interior life." This antithesis smacks of paradox: the philosopher who strove all his life to reduce the external

¹ G. CARLOTTI: *Il sistema di Leibniz*, Messina, 1923.

² G. OLGIATI: *Il significato storico di Leibniz*, Milano, 1929.

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to the internal to be devoid of all inner life! But Olgiati, at bottom, only meant to say that Leibniz is not a mystic, and he mistook for religious superficiality what was instead a scrutiny of religion from a different point of view—speculative, not practical or sentimental. On the other hand, for Olgiati the true Leibniz is the founder or precursor of the modern science of history. After this affirmation one might legitimately expect an investigation of Leibniz's historiography, similar to that of Dalvillé. Instead Olgiati altogether omits any such inquiry, and goes on to find Leibniz's historical theory in the conception of the monad as the principle of activity and of development, without even asking himself whether that conception (the monad being without windows on the world) is compatible with such a function. Certainly it may be averred that the conception of the monad foreshadows that of spirit, as the latter foreshadows the conception of historicity, but there is a long road in between, and to try to shorten the distances is to risk taking pre-established harmony as the fount of historicity!

The three essays of Bariè, Colorni, and Del Boca on Leibniz follow his thought more closely, and are consequently more useful to the student. The first¹ considers Leibniz as the founder of modern spiritualism, and points out the road by which this spiritualism, freeing itself from ontological residues, has gone on increasing in strength and evolving. Bariè's book is of imposing mass, and makes difficult reading through the continual clashing between the author's strictly historical and doctrinal interests. But the section dedicated to the historical reconstruction of Leibniz's thought contains important material for evaluation that ought not to be neglected if his thought is to be understood in its complexity. While Bariè insists on the conception of the spirituality of being in Leibniz, he would be far from subscribing to Carloti's statement that the German philosopher has reduced everything to *res cogitantes*. He demonstrates rather that there is a primary ontological-realistic phase of Leibniz's metaphysics, on which a second, gnoseological-spiritualistic, phase has been superimposed. Leibniz endeavoured to reabsorb all the realism of the first phase into the spiritualism of the second, and succeeded in making considerable progress along this road, but there remains a residue that has not and cannot be assimilated of the old realism whose presence gives rise to a discord in the thought of Leibniz that has never been harmonized. One of the most vexed points of the doctrine (but not the only one) in which this disharmony is revealed is in the conception of the material world, in which phenomenalism and realism collide with one another, and if the former is more in evidence (for which reason it seems to the majority of historians to dominate the field), the latter moves in the background, never completely subdued.

Colorni's² little volume is an exposition of Leibniz's philosophy in the form of an anthology. Hence the author's thought can be better deduced indirectly by means of the criterion of selection and the connection of the excerpts than through direct statement. Colorni adheres to the idea of logical-formal genesis of the conception of substance, which has left marked traces in the *Discours de Metaphysique* and in the correspondence with Arnault. He admits, however, other concurrent mental interests (physical, psychological, metaphysical), which have assisted to determine that substance as the monad. He therefore tends to harmonize too easily the diverse sources of Leibniz's inspiration, and to conceal their contrasts. In only one point, but that a fundamental one, does he reveal a perception of a grave

¹ G. E. BARIÈ: *La spiritualità dell'essere e Leibniz*, Padova, 1933.

² E. COLORNI: *La monadologia, preceduta da una esposizione antologica del sistema leibniziano*, Firenze, 1934.

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discordance, and that is where he states that "the monad is immaterial yet it retains a material aspect; thus it is not soul without body. Having made this statement, Leibniz goes on as if forgetting his premises which make matter out to be only some function of the soul, and he seeks for autonomous laws of the material world, distinct from those of the spiritual world. He returns to the Cartesian conception that he had always combated, that soul and body are two separate substances" (p. 116). For the rest, an exposition of Leibniz that saddles itself with the task of accounting for the knotty points of the system is an extremely difficult undertaking, and Colorni's, in spite of its omissions, is the best that has been attempted up till now. The most serious hiatus is that which concerns the concept of pre-established harmony, which, to quote Colorni, "does not add much that is essential to the doctrine of the monad" (p. 124). On this point he is completely astray; pre-established harmony is the very soul of the system. He has allowed himself to be misled by some esoteric appearances of the doctrine—the comparison of the clocks, Foucher's objections, etc. But, as there are two phases in the formulation of the terms of the relation (soul and body in a primary time; general communication of substances in a secondary time), so there are two conceptions and functions of pre-established harmony; and the second is the deepening, not the mere extension, of the first.

Susanna del Boca's work¹ was suggested by a page in Piat's *Leibniz*, where it is shown that Leibniz, in spite of all his efforts, ends by falling into Spinozism, and some of Leibniz's conclusions are summarily listed in confirmation of this lapse. But this only remains a suggestion because, while Piat is satisfied with a fleeting verification and huddles it among other disconnected items in his inchoate volume, del Boca has submitted those problems to a minute and closely reasoned examination. Revealing the other aspect of Leibniz's thought—that which is opposed to Spinoza—she has specified a series of antinomies which throw a vivid light on the whole system. For reasons of space we shall confine ourselves to the consideration of the first only of these, which concerns the principle of sufficient reason. "On the one hand, religious and moral exigencies incline Leibniz to a metaphysics of contingency, which should place the sufficient reason of the fact beyond the fact, in a being which is at the same time cause and end of that reality which is its creature. On the other hand, his dream of logical arrangement draws him inevitably in the direction of a metaphysics of necessity, synthesized in the principle of identity. Whatever efforts he may make, he never succeeds in extricating himself from these straits" (p. 36). However, in opposition to the thesis of Couturat who reduces the principle of reason *sic et simpliciter* to that of identity, del Boca justly maintains that "Leibniz thought out the principle of sufficient reason from the earliest period of his speculation free from any logical preconception in order to resolve a problem of purely metaphysical character. He thought it out in opposition to the principle of identity, which can be applied in its strict form only to the relations of geometric necessity, and made it the basis of a metaphysics of liberty and contingency." But she adds "when the logical scheme which was to provide him with the framework for the completion of the *scientia generalis* and the *characteristica* of which he dreamed appeared to him synthesized in the formula *praedicatum inest subjecto*, he tried, naturally, to include in it also the principle of sufficient reason, but without ever losing sight of the fact that this principle had been affirmed in order to justify a reality which was and had to remain contingent, not to be confounded with truths of mathematical order. Thereupon he

¹ S. DEL BOCA: *Finalismo e necessità in Leibniz*, Firenze, 1936.

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began a series of tentatives which had inevitably to be expressed in ambiguous and contradictory assertions."

Del Boca observes the same contrast in the problem of creation, where the affirmation that the world originated through free, intelligent, divine choice is in danger of being cancelled out in the *mechanismus metaphysicus* of the struggle of possibles for existence. Similarly, after an acute and brilliant confutation of the Spinozan thesis that the real is that which is, and there is no other term of comparison beyond it, the principle of perfection which Leibniz affirms to be the directing criterion in the choice of the real finally changes its own nature to such an extent as to acquire the Spinozan significance which it was intended to controvert. Through the examination of this and other problems, del Boca arrives at the conclusion that "those principles which, by a powerful effort of thought, Leibniz formulated and opposed to Spinozism, little by little are defaced by his attempt to frame them in a logic which was not their own. While they were thought out as a decisive and radical confutation of Spinozism, these principles are altered to the point where they end by serving the cause which Leibniz had combated with energy and sincerity, not because Leibniz set out from a position analogous to Spinoza's, but because he was impelled in the direction of Spinoza by his own attempt at logical systematization, a logic objectively understood, of which the fragments of the *Characteristica* remain as the most infelicitous and evident witness" (p. 221). It is a just conclusion, which the authoress reaches by means of a painstaking and acute analysis.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by Constance M. Allen.)

NEW BOOKS

An Examination of Logical Positivism. By JULIUS RUDOLPH WEINBERG, Ph.D., Cornell University. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd. 1936. Pp. vii + 311. Price 12s. 6d.)

The main doctrines of Logical Positivism (Logistical Positivism would be a better name) are already familiar, at least in outline, to students of Philosophy in this country. We all realize now—some of us with pain, some with relief—that a new brand of Empiricism has arisen, a brand far more formidable than its predecessors, because it has absorbed the super-subtle technique of modern symbolic Logic. By comparison with it, the old Empiricism of Mill looks amateurish, and even Hume himself is seen to have some residues of Dogmatism in him. This new Empiricism has two main aims, a negative aim and a positive one. The negative aim is the elimination of all metaphysical doctrines, which it asserts to be not false, as some of its predecessors said, nor indemonstrable, as others of them said, but meaningless—and so not even false. Hence the answer to any metaphysical questions is simply that there is no such question. Its positive aim is to exhibit as clearly as possible the structure of the Natural Sciences, for in these alone (it holds) the answers to all questions can be found. Pure Mathematics and Pure Logic, consisting as they do of nothing but analytic propositions (as both Hume and Leibniz held), tell us nothing one way or the other about the world; their function, roughly speaking, is to provide a mechanism for transforming one empirical, i.e. question-answering, proposition into another. That indeed is why they are valid, as Leibniz said, for all possible worlds. Such is the startling programme of Logical Positivism; but in the working out of it perplexing problems have been encountered, splits have developed between Right Wing and Left Wing, and a number of alternative theories, as queer as they are ingenious, have been put forward. Logical Positivism is a movement, not a set of dogmas. It has been developed by continuous discussion, much of it conducted in the pages of the periodical *Erkenntnis*, and it is still being developed. For some time past we have been badly in need of a guide to its main currents and cross-currents. This is what Dr. Weinberg has now provided. It was a difficult task, and on the whole he has performed it admirably. He has the necessary logical and mathematical equipment, and he is in sympathy with the main aims of the School without being an adherent of any one party within it, though perhaps he inclines slightly to the Right Wing (led by the late Professor Moritz Schlick).

The book begins with a good historical introduction, where it is shown how the movement arose through a fusion of traditional Empiricism, culminating in the work of Ernst Mach, and Mathematical Logic culminating in the *Principia Mathematica* of Russell and Whitehead. The rest of the book is divided into five parts. Part I, "Logical Foundations," is chiefly devoted to an exposition of Dr. Wittgenstein's Logic, the basic doctrine of which is that all synthetic propositions are "truth-functions" of elementary propositions, which in turn either accord or discord with the atomic facts of which the world consists. Part II, "Theory of Scientific Method," expounds the Logical Positivist theories of Probability, Induction, and Natural Law.

Here the most characteristic Positivist doctrine (known to English readers from Mr. F. P. Ramsey's essay on "General Propositions and Causality" in his posthumous book *The Foundations of Mathematics*) is that the laws of Nature are not propositions but prescriptions. They are not themselves true or false, but are recipes or rules for constructing singular propositions—especially predictions—which *are* true or false. If the laws are not themselves propositions, the classical problem of Induction—viz. how laws are to be made probable by the examination of a limited number of instances—of course no longer arises.

Here Dr. Weinberg has several objections to make. I will mention three of them. First, he complains that on such a view the sentences which formulate laws of Nature are *meaningless*, since they do not state anything which is either true or false. This objection does not seem to be very serious, and could be met by a change of terminology. Surely there is a good sense of the word "meaning" in which prescriptions or commands can be said to have meaning, and in which moreover those commands which have meaning can be distinguished from others which have not. Thus "Shut the door" has meaning, while "shut the square on the hypotenuse" has none. The second criticism is that some laws are *deducible from* other laws, which seems to show that they are propositions after all. This could perhaps be met by the consideration that laws, even though not themselves propositions, would have to include propositional functions, such as " x is heated" or " x expands" (where x is a variable). Thirdly, Dr. Weinberg objects that it is not explained why a law which has led to many true predictions is trusted—and reasonably trusted—more than a law which has led to few. This seems the most serious objection, and Dr. Weinberg plausibly contends that the Problem of Induction, which was alleged to have been got rid of, here returns upon us in another form.

In Part III, "The Elimination of Metaphysics," the most interesting topic is the so-called Solipsism which seems to be the necessary consequence of Dr. Wittgenstein's Verification Principle: since on the face of it there is no conceivable way in which I could verify the sentences which purport to describe the experiences of other people. It appears to follow that either these sentences are meaningless, or if they do mean something they must be descriptions of processes in other human *bodies* (which I *could* conceivably verify). This extremely paradoxical consequence has vexed the School a good deal, and no wonder. Various more or less heroic remedies have been suggested, notably the somewhat homoeopathic one called "Physicalism," developed by Prof. Rudolf Carnap, one of the leaders of the School. To this Dr. Weinberg turns in the next part.

Part IV, "Radical Physicalism," is accordingly devoted chiefly to Prof. Carnap's theory. The main aim of the Physicalist is to show by a detailed examination of the structure of language that all statements whatever—including those purporting to describe the experiences of other people—can theoretically be translated into the "inter-subjective" language of Physics.

In order to do this, Prof. Carnap has to give up, or at least greatly modify the old Verification Principle, which said that sentences were to be verified or falsified by direct reference to the empirical data of sensation or introspection. He seems to hold that sentences can only be verified by reference to other sentences, and even then never conclusively. For the other sentences in turn will need verification too. Thus we seem to have a closed world of sentences, much like the closed world of "judgments" in the Coherence Theory of Truth, and the indispensable empirical element which distinguishes Science from mere games like chess is in danger of being thrown out altogether. (It is

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noteworthy that another Physicalist, Prof. Otto Neurath, explicitly defends an extreme form of the Coherence Theory of Truth.)

I am not sure that Dr. Weinberg really succeeds in making clear the complicated details of Prof. Carnap's theory of language, which involves a good deal of difficult and (to one reader at least) unfamiliar symbolism. But I think he is right in saying that the proposed remedy is worse than the disease, and moreover in contending that it isn't really a remedy at all. For there still remains an irreducible difference between my statements and other people's: e.g. between "I am tired" and "Smith says, 'I feel tired.'"

Part V, "Conclusion," consists of two chapters. The first, "An estimate of the Viennese Circle," is in effect a summary of the preceding parts of the book. The other, "The Possibility of an Alternative Theory of Language," is only a brief sketch, and I am not sure that I fully understand it. Dr. Weinberg seems to hold (1) that the doctrine that general propositions are *finite* conjunctions must be abandoned; (2) that, *pace* Prof. Carnap and others, there are ostensive propositions which refer directly to empirical data; (3) that Solipsism can be avoided if refutability (as opposed to verifiability) be taken as the criterion of the meaningfulness of sentences. It seems desirable that these suggestions should be more fully developed. On the face of it, the relations between (2) and (3) seem likely to cause trouble.

I will conclude with a few criticisms.

1. It must be admitted that some parts of the book are very difficult. Dr. Weinberg, like other experts, sometimes assumes that his readers are as completely at home in the handling of the Russell-Whitehead-Shaefter symbolism as he is himself. And I doubt whether his exposition of Wittgenstein and Carnap could be followed by anyone who was entirely unfamiliar with the doctrines of those writers; though a reader who (like many of us) has a half-familiarity with them will certainly learn a good deal.

2. The book contains a number of typographical singularities. Some are outright misprints: e.g. "it is clear that $\sim(\exists x) \sim \phi x$ and $\sim(\exists x) \sim \phi x$ can both be true on this theory" (p. 131.) Some are unfortunate conventions. Thus not- p is frequently written not- P , where the unguarded reader might suppose that the long dash was a technical symbol, and might be tempted to read "not not p ." (This is all the more likely to happen where the "not" occurs at the end of one line and the long dash at the beginning of the next.) And what are we to say of the statement that " P implies $\Phi = df P|1|\Phi$ " (p. 180)? (I suppose we should substitute $\overline{P}|\Phi|\Phi$.)

3. Dr. Weinberg's English is sometimes difficult. The German abbreviation "resp." (respektive) occurs more than once; e.g. "objective (resp. intersubjective)" (p. 278), and one is occasionally puzzled by curious turns of expression, e.g. "if Wittgenstein's theory of number is contrasted with Russell's in order to see significance" (p. 96).

H. H. PRICE.

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Edited by CHARLES HARTSHORNE and PAUL WEISS. Volume VI, *Scientific Metaphysics*. (U.S.A. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. x + 462. Price 5 dollars; 21s.)

With the publication of this volume the presentation of Peirce's views on metaphysics is completed. Some metaphysical papers were included in Volume I, whilst Volume V (*Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*¹) contains what is virtually Peirce's prolegomena to metaphysics. It must be admitted that

¹ This was reviewed in the *Journal* for January 1936.

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the present volume is, for the most part, dull, not to say, boring. It may well be the case that only the conscientious reviewer will attempt to read the whole of it, or to look up the constant references to the preceding volumes. There can be no doubt that Peirce held the view that methodology must terminate in metaphysics. His Pragmaticism is a propaedeutic to a curious form of objective idealism. Readers of the earlier volumes will not expect to find any fully developed metaphysical theory. Peirce was extraordinarily scrappy, not only in his mode of writing but also in his mode of thinking. The papers in this volume present the usual curious mixture of vague, obscure, grandiose speculation and penetrating analyses of various special topics.

The title of "Scientific Metaphysics"—chosen for this volume by the editors—must not be taken to suggest any fundamental agreement with what it is now fashionable to call "scientific philosophy." Kant, Hegel, and Schelling are Peirce's masters, but there is more of Hegel in him than of Kant, and of Schelling than of either of the others. But Peirce's metaphysical theory is also peculiarly his own; it is, on the whole, a surprising theory for so great a symbolic logician to have held. Peirce took very seriously the traditional inquiries into ontology and cosmology. Metaphysics, in his opinion, "has to account for the whole universe of being. It has, therefore, to do something like supposing a state of things in which that universe did not exist, and consider how it could have arisen" (vi, 214¹). He hastens to add that "when we speak of the universe as 'arising' we do not mean that literally," since "time itself is a part of that universe whose origin is to be considered." All that "arising" can be taken to indicate is an objective logical sequence. Unfortunately Peirce's discussion of this distinction is too scrappy to be at all enlightening.

He begins (or, rather, this volume begins) by sketching an extremely comprehensive programme for the metaphysician. His business is "to study the most general features of reality and real objects." Among the questions that Peirce regards as falling within the scope of metaphysics are the following: "Whether or no there be any real indefiniteness, or real possibility and impossibility?" "Whether or not there is any definite indeterminacy?" "What general explanation or account can be given of the different qualities of feeling and their apparent connection with determinations of mass, space, and time?" "Is Time a real thing, and if not, what is the nature of the reality that it represents?" "What is consciousness or mind like; meaning, is it a single continuum like Time and Space, which is for different purposes variously broken up by that which it contains; or is it composed of solid atoms, or is it more like a fluid?" Such questions as these have been commonly considered by metaphysicians. It is not surprising to find that Peirce gave much thought to them. But it is surprising to find that he regarded metaphysics, thus understood, as "an observational science." He insists that "the data of metaphysics are not less open to observation, but immeasurably more so, than the data, say, of the very highly developed science of astronomy, to make any important addition to whose observations requires an expenditure of tens of thousands of dollars" (6, 3). It is difficult to see how an observational science, using "the universal methods of such science," should be able to deal with questions such as those enumerated above. Yet Peirce believed that the backwardness of metaphysics was due to the fact that it had been left "to the caste of theologians." The editors of the present volume seem to suppose that Peirce's animus against theologians and his assertion that metaphysics is an "observational science" suffice to yield a "scientific metaphysic."

¹ References are throughout to the numbered paragraphs; the number of the volume is prefixed.

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What this metaphysic amounts to is already fairly well known. The main points of his doctrine are contained in the papers published in the *Monist* at the beginning of this century, some of which appeared in the volume edited by Professor Morris Cohen under the title, *Chance, Love, and Logic*. The curious juxtaposition of these three words in the title indicate the extremely original theory of the universe to which Peirce gave the name "tychistic-agapastic-synecchism." He believed that it is regularity that requires explanation, and contended that the universe originated in chance, whereas love is the generating power of systems. Regularity is to be explained as being the product of evolution from the chance elements in the universe. By "chance" Peirce seems to mean "general indetermination." From chance as a matrix regularity is born. From his many disconnected statements on this topic it is difficult to derive any clear, still less consistent, view. But there can be no doubt that the assertion of absolute chance is essential to his metaphysics. His discussion of Necessitarianism throws light upon this point. "Necessitarianism," he urges, "cannot logically stop short of making the whole action of the mind a part of the physical universe. . . . On the other hand, by supposing the rigid exactitude of causation to yield, I care not how little—be it but by a strictly infinitesimal amount—we gain room to insert mind into our scheme, and to put it into the place where it is needed, into the position which, as the sole self-intelligible thing, it is entitled to occupy, that of the fountain of existence" (6, 61). In this way he is led, by devious reasonings, to the conclusion that a form of objective idealism provides the only satisfactory, because the only intelligible, theory of nature. Matter is effete mind; physical laws are the habits of this effete mind. The creative force in the universe is Love.

Peirce's exposition of this doctrine is, for the most part, extremely obscure. It is encumbered by his passion for Triads, by his elaboration of a decidedly unenlightening architectonic, and by his unfortunate love of coining an unnecessary terminology. So far as I have been able to understand what he says about Time and Space, his views seem to me to be unduly simple-minded. There are, scattered about the volume, many illuminating *chiter dicta*, and some suggestive views are indicated, but far too briefly to be of much service. In my opinion this is the least interesting of the six volumes of Peirce's *Collected Works*. It is to be hoped that when his able and indefatigable editors have finished their laborious task, they will give us their estimate of Peirce's significance for philosophy. It is well known that he had a considerable influence upon William James and Royce; this volume suggests that there are interesting affinities between Peirce and Santayana. That this should be so is some evidence of the many-sidedness of Peirce's interest and of his importance in the development of philosophical thought in the United States.

L. SUSAN STEBBING.

The World's Unborn Soul. An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford by SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN, Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics. (London: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 31. Price 2s. net.)

Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was elected last summer as the first occupant of the new chair of Eastern Religions and Ethics founded in Oxford by Mr. and Mrs. Spalding. His appointment comes at an interesting moment of Indian history, when people in this country are interested as never before

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in the ideas on the fundamental questions of religion and ethics that have moulded the life of the East in the past, and under the new constitution will have freer scope to direct its destinies in the future. His inaugural lecture is a notable utterance upon the wider influence which these ideas may have as a contribution to what he conceives of as the world's greatest problem at the present moment: the salvation of its soul. It falls into two parts. The first is a masterly sketch of the influences which have moulded modern civilization up to the present; the second an eloquent statement, coming as it were from the heart of Eastern religion and philosophy, of the message the writer thinks it has for the West in its present crisis. The main influences which he submits to analysis are those (1) of Greek Rationalism which laid the foundations of Science, secular Humanism, and the doctrine of the Sovereign State; (2) of Hebrew and Christian Religion centring in the idea of the revealed will of God, and permeating the West with a new ethical passion and a cultural unity which should replace the military unity of the Roman Empire; and (3) of the Renaissance issuing in the simultaneous growth of political freedom, economic prosperity, intellectual advance and social reform, but at the expense of the disintegration of the old faith in God as an overruling Will. "Humanism," we are told, "is the religion of the intellectuals to-day." "We know the shapes of thought, but do not have the substance of conviction." In such an atmosphere it is little wonder that men rally to the State and the Nation, "as savages to fetishes," or that the old divisions between Greek and Barbarian, Jew and Gentile, Damnation and Grace are revived in a new form, and menace the hard-won steps towards the unity of mankind.

But perhaps, it is suggested, this profound *malaise* is only a form of growing pains. Great periods of human history have before now been the result of the quickening influence of foreign cultures. It is such a quickening that Professor Radhakrishnan hopes may yet come from the Eastern conception of religion, as "a transforming experience" rather than as "a notion of God," and as subordinating "belief and conduct, rites and ceremonies, authorities and dogma" to "the art of conscious self-discovery and contact with the Divine."

To attempt to condense the fine interpretation of what the author wishes us to understand by this "transforming experience" in its twofold aspect as a *negative* movement away from the *moha* or delusion of worldly values of the merely animal or the barbaric life, and a *positive* towards *vidya* or true self-knowledge would only spoil it. I prefer to use the few more lines allowed me to express gratitude to our first Indian Professor for the telling picture he has drawn of ourselves in the West, as others see us, and for the equally telling direction to the way of salvation, as we have it, whispered indeed by our own greatest philosophers from the time of Pythagoras and Plato, but proclaimed upon the housetops in the Upanisads of India; and to wish him every success in his work in Oxford and beyond it, of which he has here given us the key-note.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

Human Nature and Human History. By R. G. COLLINGWOOD, Fellow of the Academy. From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXII. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1936. Pp. 33. Price 2s. net.)

"The really new element in the thought of to-day as compared with that of three centuries ago is the rise of history" (7). When will our English

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philosophers realize this truth and its immense significance for philosophy? When will they emancipate themselves from the *cadres* of scientific thinking, as formulated by Descartes and his successors, and recognize that, side by side with the knowledge of universal connexions, is the knowledge of individuals in their individuality, with at least as full a title as the former to a place within the synthesis of metaphysics? The *Geisteswissenschaften*, which in the last half-century have aroused so much attention from Continental thinkers, have been handled in this country in stepmotherly fashion, if they have not been passed by wholly without notice. Professor Whitehead, it is true, has set his sails to voyage on the uncharted sea, but English thinkers, though they study his books with admiration, are reluctant to follow him on his adventure. The psychologists still dream, as did Locke and Hume, of a 'science' of the human mind, analogous in method and purpose to the sciences of nature, and, when confronted by failure, "excuse themselves by saying that psychology is still in its infancy" (6). Sociology is a hybrid, history masquerading in the garb of science; while political science, in Maitland's words, "is either history or humbug." What is called for, in these latter days, is a thinker who will broaden the traditional outlook of metaphysics by an examination, independent of the tradition of scientific method, of the claim of history to truth. Professor Collingwood, who, like Croce, is at once a philosopher and a historian, is surely the man to satisfy the need.

The difference between history and the sciences of nature is twofold. In the first place the sciences aim at generalization, history at the discovery of unique and unrepeatable patterns of human actions. The historian is not concerned with prediction of future events on the basis of timeless formulae of conjunction of characters—"he has no gift of prophecy, and knows it" (21). He uses, indeed, the concept of causality, but very differently from the scientist. "When a scientist asks, 'Why did that piece of litmus paper turn pink?' he means, 'On what kinds of occasions do pieces of litmus paper turn pink?' When a historian asks, 'Why did Brutus stab Caesar?' he means, 'What did Brutus think, which made him decide to stab Caesar?'" (14). His task is not, like that of the scientist, "to discover an event by sense-perception and then explain its occurrence by assigning it to its class and determining the relation between that class and others," but to understand the event by discovering the thought expressed in it. "To discover that thought is already to understand it. After the historian has ascertained the facts, there is no further process of inquiring into their causes. When he knows what happened, he already knows why it happened" (*ib.*). Here we see the second distinction between history and science. Science deals with events from the outside, "as a spectacle presented to his intelligent observation," capable of description "in terms of bodies and their movements"; history deals with their "insides," with what "can only be described in terms of thought," i.e. with actions embodying the thoughts of human agents. The business of the historian is to discern this thought by thinking himself into the action (13). Hence it is an error to hold that the recognition of physical processes as subject to time and change implies that "the entire world of nature" can be swept "into the historian's net." Professor Collingwood, while acknowledging his debt to Professor Alexander, declines to follow him to this conclusion. "There is only one hypothesis," he says (17), "on which natural processes could be regarded as ultimately historical in character, namely, that these processes are in reality processes of action determined by a thought which is their own inner side." He goes on, to our mind somewhat cavalierly, to dismiss this alternative on the ground that "such a hypothesis could claim our serious attention only if it led to a better

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understanding of the natural world." Is not this just what Professor Whitehead argues in *Process and Reality* that it does lead to, provided always that we substitute for the word "thought," with its implication of conscious mind, the wider term "subjective form"? Every "occasion," according to Professor Whitehead, has "its own inner side." When Professor Collingwood adds that the scientist has no need of any such hypothesis, he seems to fall into an ambiguity. Certainly such a cosmology as Professor Whitehead's is unnecessary for departmental researches; but the question remains for the philosopher. As soon as we look beyond the sciences, the rejected hypothesis can surely claim to demand "serious attention" as offering "a better understanding of the natural world." Nor does its acceptance in any way preclude the drawing of a relative distinction between the history of human actions, expressive of conscious purposes, and the wider history that is co-extensive with the whole process of the universe. But the processes of events and those of thought could no longer be regarded, as Professor Collingwood regards them, as constituting "altogether different" worlds.

History, then, is the true, and the only true, knowledge of mind. For "the only way in which I can know my own mind is by performing some mental act or other and then considering what the act is that I have performed" (19). And, as we have seen, where mind is not active there can be no history: "So far as a man's conduct is determined by what may be called his animal nature, his impulses, and appetites, it is non-historical; the process of those activities is a natural process. Thus, the historian is not interested in the fact that men eat and sleep and make love and thus satisfy their natural appetites; but he is interested in the social customs which they create by their thought as a framework within which these appetites find satisfaction in ways sanctioned by convention and morality" (16). We shall return to this point presently; for the moment, our concern is with Professor Collingwood's interpretation of the theme, "History as the knowledge of mind," in the third section of his essay. For it is clear that behind the doctrines here advocated lies a metaphysic, which raises problems that carry the reader far beyond the scope of the immediate discussion. That the historian must "rethink for himself" all the thoughts that constitute his knowledge (18) will be readily granted; as also that the object of his study is "mind as acting in certain determinate ways in certain determinate situations" (21). But is this equivalent to his "rethinking *the same thought* which created the situation" under investigation? (18). The "eternal object" (e.g. the Roman constitution (18)) is the same, but does not the difference of the "occasion" in which it is "ingredient" (to use Professor Whitehead's terminology) involve a historical difference between the thought that is studied and the thought that studies it? To take Professor Collingwood's illustration (18), we can indeed think to-day the identical theorem that was thought by Pythagoras some 2,500 years ago; but in so far as we do so we are thinking as geometers, not as historians. As historians, what we think of is "Pythagoras thinking the theorem," a particular act of mind which in its uniqueness is other, and not the same, as the act of historical thinking that recalls it. Here is where Professor Collingwood's metaphysical presuppositions come into play. So long as they are not made explicit, the reader is left sorely in doubt as to his meaning. We are told (15) that "the historian not only re-enacts past thought, he re-enacts it in the context for his own knowledge, and therefore, in re-enacting it, criticizes it, forms his own judgment of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern in it." Are, then, *res gestae* and *historia rerum gestarum* one and the same? "History is nothing but the re-enactment of past thought in the historian's mind" (30). "The historical process is a process

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in which man creates for himself this or that kind of human nature by re-creating in his own thought the past to which he is heir" (28). "Re-enact," "creates," "re-creates"—these are the question-raising phrases, that lead us to wonder whether after all, and in what sense, there is a past inherited by the historian, or whether the past exists only as a moment in the dialectic of the historian's present act of self-consciousness, as a *ὁρόθεσις* of his departmental inquiry, to be *aufgehoben* when he rises from history to philosophy. Will Professor Collingwood go all the way with the Italian idealists, and identify philosophy and history in the eternal present of the self-conscious synthesis? And if so, what becomes of the historian's empirical individuality or of the empirical object-matter, the inherited past? What survives is the present, the whole present, and nothing but the present. "Since the historical present includes in itself its own past, the real ground on which the whole rests, namely, the past out of which it has grown, is not outside but is included within it" (31-32). "Certain historians . . . find in certain periods nothing intelligible, and call them Dark Ages; but such phrases tell us nothing about those ages themselves, though they tell us a great deal about the persons who use them, namely, that they are unable to rethink the thoughts that were fundamental to their life" (19). This is true, no doubt, of certain historians who are ill qualified for their occupation; but has Professor Collingwood any criterion for discriminating between those who are qualified and those who are not? Does not his doctrine lead to the conclusion that the darkness of the so-called Dark Ages is merely the darkness that clouds the mind of the modern historian who so calls them?

Professor Collingwood is, of course, prepared with an answer to these objections on lines, probably, analogous to those followed by Gentile in his *Teoria dello Spirito*. Obviously we cannot embark in this brief review on any discussion of first principles, especially when the author has refrained from any clear expression of the metaphysical ground work of his essay. If we quarrel with the ground he has chosen for the engagement, he is at least fighting for a good cause. If we seek to know the truth about the human mind, it is to history, and not to psychology, that we must turn. Is there, then, no scope for Psychology as an autonomous inquiry? We saw that the "animal processes" in human life were natural processes, and therefore presumably matter for the natural sciences. At the close of this essay, Professor Collingwood offers an alternative suggestion. These animal processes, we are now told, hold an intermediate place between that in mind which is the object of history and non-historical nature. On the one hand they are not rational; on the other, they fall within mind, not within body. "To use an old distinction, they are psyche or soul as distinct from spirit. These irrational elements are the subject-matter of psychology. They are the blind forces and activities in us which are part of human life as it consciously experiences itself, but are not parts of the historical process. . . . Their importance to us consists in the fact that they form the proximate environment in which our reason lives. . . . They are the basis of our rational life, though no part of it" (33). This suggestion is most interesting and calls for fuller development. If accepted, it would entail some modification of Professor Collingwood's earlier statements that the only way of knowing mind is that of history, and that the historian alone is concerned with events from the inside. For the irrational processes in question which should be the object of the psychologist's study, fall within mind and constitute the inner activity of the occasions and events informed by them.

W. G. DE BURGH.

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A Study in Plato. By W. F. R. HARDIE. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xiii + 172. Price 8s. 6d.)

I hope that this very interesting book will be widely read by all students of Plato. For it approaches the consideration of his philosophy from a point of view which, if not absolutely new, has been far too much neglected. This point of view is expressed by Mr. Hardie in the words: "The object of Platonic study must surely be not merely to discover what Plato meant to say, but to discover just how much of what he meant to say is true or at least plausible." And from this angle he examines most of the main problems of the Platonic philosophy, the Theory of Forms, the relations of sensation, opinion, and knowledge, the interpretation of the Divided Line, the meaning of the *Parmenides*, and the theory of God and the soul.

With this general line of approach I am in the fullest sympathy. But I should like to modify Mr. Hardie's formulation of it in two directions. On the one hand, I would suggest that understanding what a philosopher means is not a process which can be kept sharply distinct from estimating the value of his contribution to thought. For we cannot understand what he means at all by just inspecting the propositions in which his final conclusions are set out. We have to see how he came to believe that, and in trying to do this we have eventually to come back to the real facts of human experience from which his problems arose. On the other hand, when we have done this we shall, I think, rarely feel inclined to summarize his results for ourselves in a series of propositions, each of which can be judged as simply true or simply false. At any rate, if we do it will only be at the end of a strenuous and prolonged effort to put ourselves in a position where we can see clearly how he came to believe what he did.

I must confess that, in spite of many admirable philosophical qualities, Mr. Hardie seems to me to fail in this respect. He is a conscientious but unsympathetic critic, and, while there is always something in his criticisms, there nearly always seems to me a good deal more to say in support of Plato than he recognizes. Thus he dismisses summarily the idea that to be fully real a thing must be permanent and unchanging. Yet there must obviously be something more in the idea than he allows. It reappears so constantly in the history of thought, not only as a metaphysical doctrine but as a guiding principle of scientific thought with its various theories of conservation, which a modern scientist has described as "the test of objective existence." Again, the criticisms of the tripartite division of the soul, especially the place assigned to "spirit," seem to me somewhat unimaginative and external. I should be prepared to argue that, if we examine our own experience, we can find within it real distinctions that correspond almost exactly to what Plato has to say about the "parts" of the soul, though we should express it in different terms.

Mr. Hardie would, perhaps, say that in that case Plato was to be blamed for not expressing himself in better terms. And it is no doubt a healthy tendency to be critical of ambiguous or obscure language. Yet it would be obviously unfair to blame Plato for not expressing himself in the precise terminology that we have evolved at the present day after centuries of discussion. Mr. Hardie seems to me at times to come near to doing this. At any rate, he is far from doing justice to the difficulties that would have faced anyone in finding appropriate language for what were really novel ideas. At times, also, he seems almost inclined to blame Plato for not having anticipated all the possible alternative views to his own which have been developed subsequently. Thus he makes it a ground for criticism of the Theory of Forms that Plato has not disposed of the possibility of a conceptualist theory of

universals. Yet how could he have done so when no systematic conceptualist theory had yet been developed? Personally, I am inclined to hold that no coherent conceptualist theory is possible, and that it was an advantage to Plato's thought that it was not distracted by the necessity of chasing this particular will-o'-the-wisp. The rudimentary suggestion of the theory that we find in the *Parmenides* seems to be sufficiently disposed of by the obvious objection that is put to it. And one can hardly blame Plato for not seeing all the possibilities of all the theories that occurred to any of his contemporaries.

There are many other questions both of criticism and interpretation on which I should be inclined to join issue with Mr. Hardie. I cannot, for instance, find his objections to the Burnet-Taylor view of the *Parmenides* at all convincing. And his own interpretation of the second part of that dialogue seems to me to be so speculative and to involve reading so much more into the evidence than is actually there that, even if it admits of no answer, it certainly carries no conviction.

I have probably made it sufficiently clear that on debatable questions I rarely find myself in agreement with Mr. Hardie. But that does not, to my mind, detract from the value of the book. Mr. Hardie's arguments always have to be taken seriously. And those who differ from him will find in him a stimulus and a challenge to reconsider and restate their own point of view, for which they ought to be quite as grateful as if he had succeeded in converting them.

G. C. FIELD.

An Essay on Economy and Value. By ALEC L. MACFIE. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1936. Pp. xi + 152. Price 7s. 6d.)

Mr. Macfie performs a considerable service in this endeavour to clear the meaning of two obscure terms and set them in intelligible relations. He begins by accepting the definition given to "economics" by Professor Robbins: "Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses." Though this is commonly confined to the case of marketable goods, it evidently has a wider application, as, for instance, to the uses of leisure or companionship, and other aspects of behaviour. In the course of his essay Mr. Macfie places economy in its right relation to various types of useful and valuable activities. Fastening first upon the condition of "scarcity" and using the economic laws of diminishing and marginal utility, he shows how they operate in all sorts of organic conduct, whether individual or social. In modern economic science dealing with the satisfaction of desires, it is evident that separate utility cannot be ascribed to each desire. Though Mr. Macfie does not bring out this fallacious separation in considering the concrete productivity of economic processes, it is equally applicable there. The meaning of marginal costs and utilities is applicable both on the supply and the demand side in a continuous process of production and consumption. For the make-up of a factory as a complex whole determines just how many units of each sort of capital and labour shall be employed: the marginal unit is a composite thing. So on the demand side the organic character of a standard of living determines how much shall be spent on this and that article. Marginal equivalence is a result of the right application of such economic calculation. To assign to margins any directly causative or determinative influence is an error which some economists commit because they seek to ensure modes of exact quantitative measurement which are inapplicable to any human problem. In order to make of economics an exact science, you must dehumanize it.

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Mr. Macfie relates economy to value in two ways. Taking value to signify experiences that satisfy impulses or desires that are common to humanity "founded in the actual essence of human nature" (p. 36), he finds two distinguishable, though related, values in "economy," one the separate positive feeling of satisfaction from the performance of any action with a minimum of cost or waste, the other the contribution which "economy" makes towards the higher values of life. Exceedingly interesting passages examine the place of "economy" in the fine arts and in literature.

Positive economics, in the Robbins sense, is entitled to disregard the part which economy plays in a progressive society, for positive economics has no law of progress. But normative economics, which alone can contribute to the art of social economic progress, employs economy in an evolutionary sense, making it dependent on and contributory to some purposive end. Mr. Macfie makes a powerful case for the admission of economy into the company of the "oughts" which constitute the highest values. But he cannot, of course, validate by reasoning the detachment of any of these values from the material aspect of the human organism which enters into every sort of satisfaction. The organic structure of the ear and eye are determinant factors in music and painting as sources or containers of value. Mr. Macfie sometimes assumes, but cannot prove, the detachment of the higher values from the make-up of the human organism. This can only be done by taking the idealist position that all experience is purely psychical. Unless that position is taken, some interaction must always be assumed between body and spirit in every experience, however valuable.

I throw out one final doubt. Is "scarcity" essential to "economy"? During a depression the arrangement of such production as takes place may be subject to no scarcity either of plant, materials, or labour. Such "scarcity" as exists is on the consumption or demand side. Or, taking a homely instance, the amount of water I mix with my whisky is not determined by any scarcity. It is determined by my personal sense of proportion. Would it not then be better to define economy as "a right proportion," i.e. a proportion most satisfactory for "organic" needs, material and spiritual, individual and social?

J. A. HOBSON.

The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis. By LEO STRAUSS.

Translated from the German manuscript by E. M. SINCLAIR. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xviii + 172. Price 10s.)

This is, in many ways, a remarkable book, and deserves the attention of anyone interested in the history of political philosophy. It comes at a time when what is particularly needed in the study of Hobbes is fresh insight rather than new knowledge, and whatever else it fails to give, it certainly provides 'new light' on the philosophy of Hobbes. Further, it is the work of a scholar who has reconsidered the relevant writings of Hobbes with great thoroughness and intelligence. And again, it is remarkable for the subtlety of its interpretation, and (in spite of the fact that it must be considered a difficult book to read) for the lucidity of its exposition. It contains, perhaps, more repetition than it ought; but it has the great merit of not wasting time by going over all the old ground.

The most important theses defended by Mr. Strauss are, (i) that Hobbes's political philosophy is a revolt from the natural law theory of society, and that Hobbes wrote more truly than he knew when he claimed that "civil

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philosophy is no older than my own book, *De Cive*"; (ii) that the distinctive innovation of Hobbes is the replacement of *law* by *right* or *claim* as the principle from which the State is to be deduced; (iii) that Hobbes's political philosophy is founded upon neither the moral principles of natural law, nor (like Spinoza's) upon purely naturalistic principles, but, coming at the "fertile moment when the classical and theological tradition was already shaken, and a tradition of modern science not yet formed and established," it stands midway between them; (iv) that three main periods may be distinguished in Hobbes's writings, (a) a first philosophical period, under the influence of the traditional natural law theory, (b) a 'humanistic' period, during which he turned his attention to history because the traditional theory seemed to have no way of putting its norms into practice, and (c) the period in which he works out his own political philosophy, based upon a new set of norms, a new morality, and influenced by the new 'Euclidian' method; (v) that the real basis of Hobbes's political philosophy is not (as has been supposed) natural science, is not the traditional moral theory, but a new moral theory, derived from Hobbes's observation of human behaviour, in which fear of violent death is the chief virtue and pride or vanity the chief vice. Besides these theses, all of which except perhaps the first two are by way of being novel and original views in the interpretation of Hobbes, Mr. Strauss has an interesting chapter called 'Aristotelianism' in which he establishes Hobbes's great debt to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, especially in regard to the analysis of the passions, and another (to me rather obscure) chapter called 'The State and Religion,' in which he discusses a rather miscellaneous set of subjects and which I find somewhat inadequate an account of a failure to go deeply enough into Hobbes's theory (if it can be called that) of religious belief.

Now, it must be said at once that Mr. Strauss produces many and powerful arguments in defence of his main theses. Very rarely is he guilty of exaggeration or an attempt to make his evidence prove more than he does; and his whole argument is both ingenious and, in the main, convincing. Perhaps he is sometimes rather over-impressed by some of his new discoveries; but, as a whole, he retains an excellent sense of proportion. There are, however, one or two important points which I think admit of criticism. First, with regard to Hobbes's "deviation from tradition," which is insisted upon in many passages in this book. I think it is exaggerated. It is true that, before he had finished, Hobbes had deviated radically from the natural law tradition; although, for example, his selection of pride or vanity as the primary vice of human nature which makes civil government necessary is thoroughly in keeping with this tradition; and his whole method of argument belongs to the scholastic tradition rather than to any other. But, because he does not belong to the natural law tradition, it does not follow that he belongs to none. He belonged in fact to a tradition which had enjoyed a period of great vitality and was coming into its own again at the end of the sixteenth century—what may be called the Epicurean tradition. And it is surprising to find in this book so little recognition that, for example, this selection of will instead of law as the principle from which the State is deduced, belongs even in Hobbes's time to an already established tradition. It is true that this view has Hobbes as its first thorough expositor, but in principle it by no means begins with Hobbes and belongs to the sixteenth-century revival of Epicureanism. Hobbes did not desert one tradition merely to create an entirely new one. Then again, Mr. Strauss's attempt to establish the independence of Hobbes's theory of nature from his theory of the State is often well conceived—as, for example, when he argues that "the consistent naturalism which

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Hobbes displays in his scientific writings cannot be the foundation of his political philosophy" because that philosophy requires and assumes a different conception of nature—but sometimes there seems to be a confusion between questions of genesis and questions of basis; a biographical argument directed to show that the main lines of the politics were laid down before the theory of the natural world was considered in detail, cannot itself prove that the one is in fact independent of the other. And certainly, in the *Leviathan*, the two are made to hang together essentially. Indeed, I am not certain that I understand what Mr. Strauss means by Hobbes's "scientific writings"; Hobbes's theory of the natural world is conceived always as a theory of knowledge, and is always determined by his fundamental concepts of the nature of reason and the character of philosophical explanation.

Perhaps the most original parts of the book are (i) the exposition of the 'periods' of Hobbes's life and work, which is excellently done, being both ingenious and convincing; and (ii) the account of the change which took place in Hobbes's moral ideas, a change which Mr. Strauss suggests led him from a belief in the aristocratic virtue of valour to the bourgeois virtue of prudence, for the principle of honour to the principle of fear of violent death, and which produced Hobbes's political philosophy as we have it.

There are suggestions in this volume that it may be followed by a second which will contain a full exposition of Hobbes's political philosophy itself, and if this is so, the readers of this book will look forward eagerly to the appearance of the other.

MICHAEL OAKESHOTT.

The Philosophy of Physics. By MAX PLANCK. Translated by W. H. Johnston (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 118. Price 4s. 6d. net.)

This little book consists of a translation of four essays published originally in Germany. In the first essay Planck is concerned with the principles underlying scientific progress and points out their general ethical value. The principle that there must be no inherent contradiction may, he maintains, when translated into the ethical equivalents of honesty and truthfulness, be ranked as the first and most important of virtues. The laws of nature are unchangeable and the same for all men and all nations, and this should apply to the laws of justice also. He concludes by emphasizing the ethical value of continued forward striving towards perfection, but in the Third Reich he dare not add that this requires freedom.

The second essay on "Causality in Nature" is the most interesting of the four. Planck starts with "the simple and general proposition that an event is causally conditioned if it can be foretold with certainty." He then points out that it is never possible to predict a physical event with complete accuracy. However, rather than deny causality as the Indeterminists do, Planck redefines the word 'event' ("By an event, physics means a certain merely intellectual process") so that it occurs in an intellectual construct called the "physical world image." In this world image strict causality can be maintained, and the only change necessary to pass from classical to modern physics is to substitute in the image mass-waves for the mass-point. "The uncertainty in forecasting events in the world of the senses disappears and in its place we have an uncertainty with regard to the connection between the world image and the world of the senses. In other words, we have the inaccuracy arising from a transfer of the symbols of the world image to the sense world, and vice versa. The fact that physicists have been willing to put up with this double inaccuracy is an impressive demonstration of the importance of

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maintaining the rule of determinism within the world image" (p. 61). He then goes on to suggest that causality could be given a more important rôle than that of holding together an image, by modifying the *subject* of the prediction and not the object (i.e. event). In this way Planck arrives at the notion of a supreme intellect resembling Laplace's, who, knowing everything, can predict with complete accuracy, and this satisfies his own criterion for causality. He concludes the essay by once again demolishing the illusion of human free will.

Two short essays on "Scientific Ideas" and "Science and Faith" complete this interesting and stimulating little book.

G. BURNISTON BROWN.

Aesthetic Analysis. By D. W. PRALL. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1936. Pp. 211. Price 2 dollars.)

The best part of Dr. Prall's book is his analysis of those elementary forms whose combinations and permutations produce the complex formal structure of the arts. His first four chapters are an elucidation of the simple mathematical relations contained in rhythm, proportion, symmetry, etc. He shows how the orders within which these relations prevail are either qualitative—the pitch or intensity of sound, the brightness or shade of colour—spatial—simple shapes borrowed from geometry or nature—or temporal—rhythm and metre in verse, rhythm and tempo in music. The last two chapters deal with the function of art and the nature of critical standards. We at once find ourselves among the worst Crocean aberrations. "The purpose of the so-called fine arts," we read on page 142, "is expression." But "expression" of what? "Feeling or emotion presented as the qualitative character of imaginal content"—at any rate in the case of poetry. Now "feeling" in Dr. Prall's sense is simply the impact of the external world on our organs of sense. "Feeling simply is concrete direct experience." This is a bad relapse into the Crocean confusion between aesthetic experience and ordinary perception; the two things cannot possibly be identified. This view harmonizes, however, with the author's conception of aesthetics as "the science of the immediate." Why is it that of all the contemporary European writers on aesthetics only Croce seems to have crossed the Atlantic? One would have thought that the library of such a seat of learning as Harvard might have found a place on its shelves for the works of Volkelt, Dessoir, and Laurila.

LISTOWEL.

Ästhetische Streitfragen. By K. S. LAURILA. (Helsingfors: Akademische Buchhandlung. 1934. Pp. 424.)

The mantle of Y. Hirn has clearly fallen upon his fellow-countryman K. S. Laurila, a Finnish writer whose publications—the above collection of essays, first fruits of his philosophical labours during the last twenty-five years, and three brilliant articles on aesthetics in the Scandinavian countries contributed to Dessoir's *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* for 1936—have entitled to a place in the front rank of contemporary aestheticians. The student will find no better introduction than this book to the fundamental problems of aesthetics, which are formulated with admirable clarity by a mind saturated in the main tradition of aesthetical speculation; and the critical observations that accompany this exposition often shed a new light on first principles.

The first essay is a penetrating psychological study of the feelings—"Gefühle"—experienced in the spectator's reaction to art or nature. He finds

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it impossible to distinguish them, either in quality, duration, or intensity, or by their mental antecedents, from all the real emotions and ideal sentiments—religious, ethical, logical, social—seated in the mind. He therefore concludes that it is the entire aesthetic frame of mind as a disinterested and emotional contemplation of things that distinguishes it from the attitude of the practical man, the moralist, and the scientist. But the most valuable contribution is a successful, commonsensical attack upon the accepted dogma of pleasure or enjoyment as the unfailing accompaniment of an aesthetic reaction. Experience shows that our feelings in face of the comic, the characteristic, the pathetic, are generally a "mixture" of pain and pleasure, while high tragedy buries a molehill of joy under a mountain of sorrow. Brushing aside those who would confine aesthetics to the study of beauty, or of works of art, he declares that its proper object is the whole aesthetic sphere of life, "die Erklärung des ganzen ästhetischen Lebensgebietes."

In a chapter on the associative process he excludes every kind of "association" as irrelevant to the aesthetic reaction, and only allows "fused" meanings and feelings to figure in aesthetic appreciation. His solution of the old quarrel between the formalists and the adherents of content is that form and content are inseparable, the one corresponding to the direct factor, the other to the indirect factor—using Fechnerian terminology—in aesthetic apperception.

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Polarity: A German Catholic's Interpretation of Religion. By P. ERICH PRZYWARA, S.J. Translated by A. C. BOUQUET, D.D. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1935. Pp. xii + 150. Price 8s. 6d.)

The translator rather vaguely refers to the original of this work as "a contribution to the great *Handbook on Philosophy*." Since the title given to the translation is admittedly "not of the author's choosing," it seems well to note that the original appears as "Religionsphilosophie Katholischer Theologie," the fifth essay of the second volume ("Natur, Geist, Gott") of the *Handbuch der Philosophie*, edited by A. Baeumler and A. Schroeter, in four volumes, published at Munich, 1927-30.

The translation is deliberately close rather than free, but it would have been almost impossible to reproduce the exact thought enclosed in the author's extremely difficult German without carrying over into English some traces of his unusual use of words and somewhat involved style. The compendious nature of the essay calls for expansion and commentary rather than for synoptic review; here we can do no more than to indicate Fr. Przywara's main point and the lines along which he develops it.

The book is divided into three sections: first, a statement of the problem concerning the relation between man and God; second, the solution of this problem by means of the principle of "the analogy of being"; third, an historical summary of the workings of this principle in the various systems of Catholic philosophy.

The problem is a twofold one: (1) the "essence of religion": what is the relationship between God and man, as set forth in various philosophies of religion? (2) the "existence of religion": how is this relationship accomplished; as a relationship which is from God toward man, or one from man toward God?

Like all philosophic problems, this problem occurs within consciousness; hence its solution is worked out along lines proceeding from an analysis of consciousness. In our most fundamental act of awareness, we are conscious of an inward "ego-concept," and of the correlation between this concept and

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the "id" of an (ideal or real) object which is independent of the ego-concept itself. Hence arises a basic activity of tension between subject and object, which expresses itself along three main lines: (1) experience of the ego as that which unites into a complete and final unity all the events of awareness; (2) experience of the ego as related to an external unity which it apprehends; (3) experience of the ego as striving towards a unity which it never fully attains, either within itself or outside of itself. These activities together make up the complex basic experience of consciousness. By itself, each is an abstraction; yet emphasis on any one will give rise to a definite philosophy and a definite type of religious activity: (1) immanence, (2) transcendence, (3) transcendentality. (The interaction of these activities results in each of them being more or less combined with the other two. Hence beside the three "pure" types, there are distinguishable six other "hybrid" types which are a combination of the pure type with each of the other two types in turn. Since the "hybrids" are ultimately cases of oscillation between the pure types—mere stages in the history of the interplay of the latter—they are of less importance for the problem, and are not further discussed in detail.)

Each of these types of philosophy take a different view of the relationship between God and creation. The "immanence" type sees God as the "Immanent Unity" within creation, the unifying factor of the opposing elements which fluctuate in the external and internal world of consciousness. The "transcendence" type sees God as the "Infinite Reality" completely separated from and beyond creation, the once-for-all Architect of creation, which now remains shut up in its own unity of tension. The "transcendentality" type sees God as the Ideal toward which creation ever strives upward.

In each case a definite religious attitude results: a definite relation of the soul towards God. For "immanence" the soul sees itself in a relation of intimate union with God. For "transcendence," the soul's attitude is that of the complete "aloofness of reverence." For "transcendentality" it is a combination of absolute unity and complete aloofness.

This purely abstract view of God and of man's relation to Him becomes concrete when it is noted that in the concrete human individual we find another basic tension besides the "subject-object" tension discussed thus far. For the concrete human ego experiences itself not simply as an ego in general, but as (a) a mind which is also a body, and (b) an individual who is also a member of a community. Each element in the two parts of this double tension, if emphasized in relation to the other elements, will give rise to the following four ways in which the ego may experience itself: (1) "Body-community"—as a ripple on the stream of the cosmic totality of Nature. (2) "Spirit-community"—as the breath of the objective spirit of humanity. (3) "Individual-spirit unity"—experiencing the whole as united in itself in the unity of its innermost spiritual ego. (4) "Individual-body unity"—experiencing the whole as united in itself in the unity of its perfect body.

The book is a constructive work of great merit, but it does not make easy reading.

L. J. WALKER.

Consciousness in Neo-Realism. By BINAYENDRANATH RAY, M.A., Ph.D. (Dacca). (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. 1'p. xv + 153. Price 9s.)

"Much thought and labour have . . . been bestowed upon the consideration of other aspects of neo-realism, such as the problems of sense-data, truth and error, values, etc., but the problem of consciousness has not, so far, received any exhaustive treatment" (p. xiv). Hence Dr. Ray's thesis, which canvasses

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its chosen field with commendable clarity and thoroughness. The author wisely limits himself to the more prominent Anglo-American developments of realism, and even so finds a variety of doctrine wide enough to render difficult the task of unified treatment. Yet this limitation, inevitable as it is, does involve a difficulty to which I shall refer below.

The author is of the opinion that "the views of English realists as compared with those of their confrères on the other side of the Atlantic are more reasonable and balanced and represent with greater fidelity the observed facts of experience" (p. 96). Nevertheless, these too fail to present an acceptable view of consciousness. As fairly abstracted by Dr. Ray, few will maintain that the "cross-sectionist" doctrine of Holt and Russell can be taken seriously. That of Holt seems to come to little more than fantastic, but dogmatic, asseveration: while Russell's variation, theoretically neat as it is, calls for amputation so severe as to present, in the end, a palp bly (and partially) reassembled corpse in place of a conscious subject. The author finds Alexander more plausible and more solid. But he cannot accept his two conceptions, compresence and selection, as fully characterizing consciousness. "Compresence as a universal relation holds," he observes, "between any two empirical finites." Alexander's motive in interpreting consciousness in this fashion is his desire "to link up the various empirical finites in an unbroken chain of continuity and to exhibit them as marked by a complete absence of any gap or hiatus. This is demanded by his Space-Time hypothesis . . ." (pp. 103-4). Nor, Dr. Ray argues, can consciousness be merely selective. It appears also "in the new rôle of creator."

The author's principal conclusion is that the positive contribution of neo-realism to a doctrine of consciousness is slight where it is not mistaken; while its negative value, as a criticism of dualism and substantialism, is considerable. It is, of course, plain that men such as Holt cannot be looked to for any light on the problem of consciousness, since, in renouncing (with anathemas) introspection and the subjective, they deny *ab initio* that there is a problem to be solved. As to Alexander, however, is it not his private and peculiar ontology, certainly no less than his realistic epistemology, which determines his attitude to consciousness? One is driven to ask the question whether or not it is an accident that these realists turn out (as Dr. Ray analyses them) to be in essence naturalists (or—what comes to much the same thing, neutralists). I should say that it is an accident simply, and that there is no essential connection between realism in epistemology and either neutralism or naturalism, plain or "emergent." If, for instance, Dr. Ray had considered in his book the views of Professor Laird, would he not have disclosed a very different conjunction of doctrines on knowledge and the soul or mind? I take it, indeed, to be a part of Dr. Ray's conclusion, that while realistic epistemology demands the recognition of passivity, or selectivity, as features of consciousness, this does not rule out the reality of other features, namely, of the activity, or the creativity, of the mind. While arguing, however, for these latter features the author does not attempt the more difficult task of specifying the scope and limits of the mind's activity. This is, of course, a very large question, not lightly to be embarked upon.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

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St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century. By ANTON CHARLES PEGIS, Ph.D. (Toronto: St. Michael's College. 1934. Pp. 213. Price \$2.50.)

The rapid diffusion of the study of Aristotle's works in the thirteenth century gave rise to many problems, of which not the least important and interesting concerned the nature of the human soul and the source and scope of human knowledge. Aristotle's *ψυχή* (soul) was but the organizing principle of the living human body, and perished with it: his intelligence (*νοῦς*), on the other hand, was immortal, but existed 'apart,' and the ambiguity of this latter phrase had given rise to many and diverse interpretations. All human knowledge, moreover, in his theory is derived from sense-perception. If Aristotelianism was to be adopted, it must be reinterpreted in accordance with Christian beliefs and its relation to the older and prevailing philosophy of Plato and Augustine must be discussed.

In a well-documented work in which the footnotes occupy almost as much space as the text, Dr. Pegis of Marquette University deals with the controversies which thus arose between the older Augustinian school, of which Bonaventure is the outstanding exponent, and the newer Aristotelian school, in which the outstanding names were those of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. The author displays an extensive knowledge and a shrewd appreciation both of medieval documents and of the very considerable literature which of recent years has grown up around them. His work contains an able summary of the main issues at stake and should prove of great value to the student of philosophical thought during this period. It contains a short bibliography and an index to proper names, but no subject index—an omission that one hopes a second edition may remedy.

L. J. WALKER.

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- V. FERM. *First Adventures in Philosophy.* New York: C. Scribner's Sons. 1936. Pp. xi + 548. 2 dollars.
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- C. L. NORDON. *International Relations and The Elimination of War.* London: Caledonian Press Ltd. 1937. Pp. 23. 6d.
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- A. P. USHENKO. *The Philosophy of Relativity.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 208. 8s. 6d.
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- P. T. RAJU. *Thought and Reality. Hegelianism and Advaita.* (Foreword by J. H. Muirhead.) London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 285. 10s. 6d.
- F. LEANDER. *Humanism and Naturalism. A Comparative Study of Ernest Scillaire, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More.* Göteborg: Wettergren & Kerbers Förlag. 1937. Pp. vii + 227. Kr. 8.
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- M. BLONDEL. *L'Action. I. Le problème des causes secondes et le pur agir* Paris: F. Alcan. 1937. Pp. 492. 50 fr.
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- Histoire de la pensée scientifique:—
- F. ENRIQUES et G. DE SANTILLANA. I. *Les Ioniens et la nature des choses*. Pp. 76. 12 fr. II. *Le Problème de la matière. Pythagoriciens et Eléates*. Pp. 62. 10 fr. III. *Les Derniers 'Physiologues' de la Grèce*. Pp. 45. 8 fr. Paris: Hermann & Cie. 1936.
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THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY (Congrès Descartes)

Organized by the Société Française de Philosophie under the presidency of
Monsieur Henri Bergson

Will be held in Paris, August 1st-6th, 1937.

THE Congress will commemorate the third centenary of the publication of Descartes's *Discours de la Méthode*. Communications have been promised from 280 contributors, among whom are philosophers representative of every European country. The work of the Congress, which will consist mainly in the discussion of these papers, is to be divided into five sections, as follows:

1. *The Present Position of Cartesian Studies.*
2. *The Unity of Science.*
 - (a) *Methodology and the methods of the special sciences.*
 - (b) *The History of the Problem in Antiquity, in the Middle Ages and in Modern Times.*
3. *Logic and Mathematics: Logic, Logistic and the Philosophy of Mathematics.*
4. *Causality and Determinism in Physics and Biology; Probability and Statistics.*
5. *Reflective Analysis and Transcendence: Mind and Body.*
6. *Value and Reality: Ethical, Social and Aesthetical Norms.*

Of the communications promised, 210 treat of problems falling under Sections 2-6, from the standpoint of their present position and interest, the 70 belonging to Section 1 are alone concerned with Cartesianism, its history, influence, the interpretation and relations of its doctrine.

Invitations are extended to readers of *Philosophy* to participate as either "active members" or "associate members" (fee payable respectively, 80 francs or 40 francs). The former alone take active part in the work of the Congress and receive a copy of its *Actes*.

Applications for either membership or inquiries concerning the privileges accorded—(reduced train fares, admission to the *Exposition Internationale*, etc.)—should be addressed to Monsieur R. Bayer, 26, avenue Théophile-Gautier, Paris, XVI.

The Director of Studies of the British Institute of Philosophy (14, Gordon Square, London, W.C.1) would be obliged if members of the Institute intending to be present at the Congress would inform him, in addition to sending their applications to Monsieur R. Bayer.

S. V. K.

Deuxième circulaire.

**DEUXIÈME CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL
D'ESTHÉTIQUE
ET DE SCIENCE DE L'ART
PARIS, 1937**

MONSIEUR,

L'Association pour l'Étude des Arts et les Recherches relatives à la Science de l'Art a l'honneur de vous rappeler qu'en Juin 1936 elle vous a adressé une circulaire vous faisant connaître qu'elle organise, à l'occasion de l'Exposition Universelle de 1937 à Paris, du Dimanche 8 au Mercredi 11 Août inclus, un Congrès International d'Esthétique et de Science de l'Art auquel elle serait heureuse que vous puissiez participer.

L'Association vous avisait qu'elle avait nommé un Comité d'organisation dont le Bureau est composé comme suit:

Présidents d'Honneur:

M. Henri BERGSON, de l'Académie Française.
M. Paul VALÉRY, de l'Académie Française.
M. Paul CLAUDEL, Ambassadeur de France.

Président:

M. Victor BASCH, Professeur honoraire d'esthétique à la Sorbonne,
8, rue Huysmans, Paris-VI^e.

Vice-Président Trésorier:

M. Charles LALO, Chargé du Cours d'esthétique à la Sorbonne, 7,
rue Mirabeau, Paris-XVI^e.

Secrétaire Général:

M. Raymond BAYER, Docteur ès-lettres, Agrégé de Philosophie,
26, avenue Théophile-Gautier, Paris-XVI^e.

Elle vous faisait savoir que le Congrès serait divisé en trois sections:

- I. *Esthétique générale et Histoire de l'Esthétique.*
- II. *Histoire et Critique de l'Art.*
- III. *Science et Technique des Arts.*

Nous sommes en mesure d'ajouter aujourd'hui que la section de *Psychologie Esthétique*, prévue au Congrès de Psychologie de Madrid, a été transférée à notre congrès, d'accord avec le Comité du Congrès International de Psychologie. Nous avons donc organisé une quatrième section:

IV. *Psychologie esthétique*

et nous prions instamment les psychologues qui désirent y faire une communication de se faire inscrire dès maintenant.

Les quatre grands thèmes, sur lesquels portera la discussion des séances

SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF AESTHETICS

plénières, toute liberté de choix étant laissée pour les questions traitées dans les séances de travail, sont:

- 1°) Esthétique et Science de l'Art.
- 2°) Quelques méthodes récentes de l'esthétique (méthodes phénoménologique et psychanalytique).
- 3°) Esthétique, sociologie et culture.
- 4°) Les grands courants artistiques dans l'Europe du XX^e siècle.

DISPOSITIONS PRATIQUES

Plus de 120 communications, émanant de savants réputés de tous les pays, ont déjà été annoncées au Comité. Nous prions vivement ceux d'entre les esthéticiens qui n'ont pas encore rempli cette formalité de faire parvenir, *au plus tôt*, le titre choisi par eux à l'adresse suivante: M. Raymond BAYER, Secrétaire du Comité, 26, avenue Théophile-Gautier, Paris-xv^e (Tél. Aut. 06-28). Un résumé *dactylographié* de 1.000 mots maximum pour chaque communication (environ 3 pages de dactylographie courante) devra être envoyé au Secrétariat au 1^{er} Mars 1937 dernier délai. Ce résumé seul sera imprimé et figurera dans le volume des Actes du Congrès. La durée des communications en séance est fixée à 1/4 d'heure. Chaque intervention sur les communications présentées pourra durer au maximum 5 minutes. Les langues admises sont, suivant l'usage des congrès scientifiques, l'allemand, l'anglais, l'espagnol, le français et l'italien.

ORGANISATION MATÉRIELLE

Le Congrès qui aura lieu à Paris, du 8 au 11 Août 1937, suivra immédiatement le Congrès International de Philosophie qui doit se réunir à Paris à cette époque, et bénéficiera, comme lui, des avantages réservés aux Congrès agréés par le Commissariat Général de l'Exposition Internationale de Paris. C'est ainsi que l'entrée gratuite à l'Exposition est accordée à tous les Congressistes pendant toute la durée du Congrès. Le Comité s'occupe activement de l'organisation de réceptions spéciales, soirées de gala, excursions, visites d'ateliers, manifestations d'art. Des réductions importantes sur tous les réseaux français pour le voyage d'aller et le voyage de retour, ainsi que pour tout voyage effectué sur le territoire français par les congressistes pendant leur séjour en France, des réductions variables mais analogues sur les réseaux ferroviaires étrangers: tels sont les avantages d'ores et déjà prévus. Une carte de légitimation dispensera du visa les ressortissants des pays pour lesquels le visa des passeports est nécessaire. Le logement des étrangers, étant particulièrement délicat aux dates choisies pour le Congrès, sera l'objet des soins du Comité: une liste par catégories des principaux hôtels, avec les prix moyens, va être établie incessamment par l'Agence de voyage dont le Comité d'organisation s'est réservé le concours.

Dès maintenant, en effet, le service d'information touristique est assuré par l'*Office des Congrès*, aux Voyages DUCHEMIN-EXPRINTER, 26, avenue de l'Opéra, Paris (1^{er}). Tél. Opéra 56-41, qui est chargé de répondre à toute demande d'ordre matériel.

Nous signalons également que la *Cité Universitaire* mettra volontiers, dans la mesure de ses disponibilités et à des prix modiques, quelques chambres à la disposition d'étudiants ou de professeurs célibataires inscrits au Congrès. Il appartiendrait aux congressistes intéressés par l'offre qui nous est faite, de se mettre au plus tôt et *directement* en rapport avec leur fondation nationale à la Cité Universitaire, 19, boulevard Jourdan, Paris-14^e, pour retenir leur logement aux dates du Congrès.

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Un comité d'accueil, enfin, se proposera plus spécialement de rendre agréable aux familles de nos hôtes leur séjour dans la capitale.

Le droit d'inscription est fixé pour les membres actifs à soixante francs français; à quarante francs pour les membres associés. Les membres associés bénéficieront de tous les avantages du Congrès, et auront la faculté d'assister à ses séances, mais ils ne pourront prendre une part active à ses travaux et n'en recevront pas les actes en volume. Pour les congressistes qui participent également au Congrès International de Philosophie, la cotisation de membre actif sera ramenée à cinquante francs.

On adressera les versements *au plus tard le 30 Juin 1937*:

1°) Soit directement au *Trésorier* (M. Charles LALO, 7, rue Mirabeau, Paris-xvi^e. — Compte Chèque Postal: Paris 272-71).

2°) Soit par chèque à la *Société Générale*, Agence G, 27, boulevard Saint-Michel, Paris-v^e (Compte 23.826, Comité du Congrès d'esthétique).

Pour le Comité d'Organisation:
VICTOR BASCH

Président du Comité
Professeur Honoraire à la Sorbonne
8, rue Huysmans, PARIS-vi^e.

Paris, 10 Janvier 1937.

THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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INSTITUTE NOTES

DURING the past term Professor W. G. de Burgh has delivered an interesting course of lectures on "Reason and Unreason in the Modern World."

The addresses at the Evening Meetings have been as follows: "Progress and Spiritual Values," by Professor Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan; "The Modern Gospel of Unreason," by Professor W. G. de Burgh; "Should our Rulers be Biologists?" by N. J. T. Needham, Ph.D., Sc.D.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE.

The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

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- (1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented—Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.

These lectures are free to members.

- (2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).
- (3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.

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- (4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.
- (5) Encourages research in Philosophy.
- (6) There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle and Durham, and Sheffield.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies, at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C. 1.

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FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute shall be sufficient discharge for the same.

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PROGRESS AND SPIRITUAL VALUES¹

PROFESSOR SIR SARVEPALI RADHAKRISHNAN

I

THE catchwords of our age, evolution and progress, sound very attractive so long as we do not pause to inquire into their significance. They are the delight of the sophist and the despair of the thinker. When we speak of progress we have in mind the human species. It is not easy to define what exactly the goal of human progress is. Even the leaders of the federation of progressive societies will find it difficult to give an adequate answer to the question of the end towards which we are actually progressing. They will find it more difficult to frame an ideal of human evolution which will be equally acceptable to, say, the monks of Mount Athos, Christian socialists, philosophical anarchists, secular humanists, Fascist nationalists, and classless Communists. Human nature is so widely differentiated in mind and outlook that there is not any single comprehensive purpose which will give direction to the partial and conflicting tendencies. Absence of any creative gradation of purposes has turned human society into a confused battlefield of groups holding passionate convictions that are irreconcilably opposed to one another. These groups, self-centred and exclusive, with clashing standards of value and diverse goals of action, are attempting to subdue and exploit the whole human commonwealth for the sake of their tribal aims. While modern science and the extraordinary progress of communications have made the world into a closely knit whole, and produced a unity in external and superficial things,

¹ Lecture delivered at the Evening Meeting of the Institute on January 19, 1937.

the mental, moral, and emotional hostilities are effectively preventing the development of a world consciousness and community. Human beings seem to belong to many different mental species. We have to-day a world of increasing material contact and spiritual disunion.

These post-war developments have rudely shaken men's faith in the idea of progress. From the theory of the human perfectibility inherited from the eighteenth century, from the Hegelian interpretation of history as the progressive manifestation of absolute spirit, from the more recent doctrine of evolution, above all from the immense scientific and technological progress, we were led to believe in a constant, continuous, and almost automatic progress. Man's future is an endless road in which we are ahead of some and behind others. There is one god and progress is his prophet. The view that each decade is a gain over the previous, that each century is an improvement on its predecessor, does not inspire much confidence to-day, thanks to the war and its aftermath. No shock, no horror, no unprovoked aggression, no hideous assassination surprises us to-day. The world has grown incredibly harder and more brutal since 1914.

In his elaborate treatise on *The Decline of the West*, Spengler offers historical evidence for his thesis that cultures live through a period of development, flourishing, and decay. The culture of Babylon was so perfect and yet it vanished. Ancient Greece did great things in science and philosophy, in art and literature, but came to an abrupt end. Though one may not agree with Spengler's view, it helped to upset men's unreasoning faith in the providential nature of progress. There are some who believe that man and his world had been created perfect and all that had happened since was a steady falling away. Others argue that man and his manners have come out of savagery and he is steadily moving towards the golden age which lies not behind but in front of him. The idea of inevitability, whether of progress or of decline, of a dialectical movement in historical sequence, is an illusion. Human history is not subject to natural laws.

The human element with its free initiative and adventure makes it difficult to accept the view that history is the fulfilment of a plan or a purpose. Turgot looked upon history as a pathless jungle and laid it down as a general historical principle that there were no historical principles. Professor H. A. L. Fisher endorses this view in the Preface to his recent *A History of Europe*. He writes: "One intellectual excitement has however been denied me. Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me . . . (there is) only one safe rule for the historian;

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that he should recognize in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen." This very capriciousness of history is the sign of the power of the human mind to produce good or evil. Men are autonomous beings and not automata. If the human individual were not to some extent a free cause independent of divine control and natural necessity there would be no history. If the divine were all, we should have the Kingdom of God on earth; if natural necessity were all, history would become a meaningless, mechanical routine. It is human freedom that gives meaning to history, which makes it irregular and inconsistent as well as attractive and interesting. Materialist views of history attempt to account for human progress by outward circumstances, by climatic changes, or social inventions. External conditions, however, are only the material. They provoke the reaction but do not produce it. The driving power of all change is the mind of man, his intelligent purposive striving to adapt himself more adequately to the changing world. Man is not a soulless item in a natural process borne on the tide of events of which he is the slave, willing or unwilling. He is the originator of the incalculable. If progress is not linear or uninterrupted, it is because we use our freedom in the wrong way. On account of our blindness and stupidity we fail to respond to opportunity and thus delay the triumph of ideals. History is more than a mere external phenomenon. It deals with events that take place on the plane of mind. Its reality implies the dynamism of man. There is no fatality of history, no obstacle which man cannot break down, no inescapable historic law.

Though there is no automatism in history, its course is not a matter of mere accident or chance. It may not disclose a plot or a rhythm; it yet has a reason and a sense. It is not a mere chaos. The ebb and flow in the waves of humanity, the great periods of enlightenment as well as the dark ages can be understood by a study of the underlying spirit of man. Unfortunately we know more about the affairs of kings and the intrigues of statesmen, about the collisions and upheavals which the world has endured on account of the unhappy egoism of powerful people, and less about the changes which have occurred in the thoughts and feelings of men. The way in which men ceased to care about the gladiatorial contests, how they came to feel after countless centuries that slavery was abominable, how to-day refined natures are revolting against wars and massacres is more revealing than dynastic feuds and quarrels.

Civilization does not proceed in a straight line upward or downward, but rather in a series of reaches. It follows an undulatory course. The great cultures of the past attained a pitch of perfection in many respects superior to anything of which we are capable. Due to the inertia and ill-will of man, dark ages occur off and on.

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Progress is not inevitable. It requires to be achieved by man who grows by aspiration and effort. Ideas rule the world. Man must have a clear consciousness of the goal he is aiming at. He can advance to his goal by knowledge and achievement. He must adopt a world view which will bring him under the control of the great ideals of spirit. Human society is yet in its infancy with vast spaces of time to fulfil the destiny that awaits it.

II

(1) But what is the good of human effort and striving if in the end nothing really matters, if it is true that the ultimate extinction of life on earth is absolutely certain? On earth, there is no joy which is not tainted with sorrow. There is not one who is happy among mortals. Of all the fruits of our labour and toil, there is nothing which shall endure, nothing that shall abide and pass not away. All things are but ashes and smoke. Man is defenceless against death. The despondent author of the Book of Ecclesiastes says: "Because to every purpose there is time and judgment, therefore, the misery of man is great upon him. For he knoweth not that which shall be: for who can tell him when it shall be?"¹ That life is brief, that there is much in it of which we can have no sure knowledge, that there is no reason to suppose that in the end anything really matters ("Vanity of vanities, all is vanity"), are views which were dismissed as sentimental tosh so long as its spokesman was only the preacher. But now scientists are supporting the preacher's version of life and tell us of dissolving systems leading to universal extinction. The second law of thermodynamics or the law of entropy suggests the conclusion that the world had a beginning in time and is running down to a state of equal distribution of energy.² The world cannot escape the doom of all things mortal. It is folly to imagine that the human species will inhabit the world for ever. It will perish without leaving a trace behind. Just as we have individual death, we will have cosmic death. If the world is growing old and advancing towards its death, this aging of the world cannot be equated with progress. Dean Inge

¹ viii. 6-7. There is a passage in the Burial Service of the Church of England which reads thus: "Man that is born of a woman hath but a short time to live, and is full of misery. He cometh up and is cut down, like a flower; he fleeth as it were a shadow, and never continueth in one stay."

² Sir James Jeans writes: "The general principle known as the second law of thermodynamics predicts that there can be but one end to the universe—a 'heat death' in which the total energy of the universe is uniformly distributed and all the substance of the universe is at the same temperature. This temperature will be so low as to make life impossible. The end of the journey cannot be other than universal death."—*The Mysterious Universe*, p. 13.

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writes: "An irreversible process towards higher value on the one side, and an irreversible process towards final extinction on the other, can hardly be manifestations of the same law."¹ Unamuno, the Spanish thinker who died recently, was haunted by the question: "What is the use of truth if a man dies?" The fortunes of the human race, so far as science can tell us, are too local, transitory, and unimportant an accident in the general scheme of things to satisfy human aspirations.

(2) It is true that science does not take the ultimate dissolution of the universe as quite settled. It is suggested that the process of dissolution is being balanced by recreation, and so the physical universe will go on endlessly. Space-time is essentially incomplete, not merely at this stage, but at all stages. A genuine duration must always be passing and can never be complete. In principle it is incapable of being completed. There can never come a time when the cosmic process will attain perfection. It can approximate to it perhaps but can never reach it. Man's historical experience cannot be anything else than one of steady failure. This failure is inseparable from material relations. Nothing perfect can be realized in time. The end of man consists in an uninterrupted striving after an impossible ideal. His aspirations can never be satisfied though it is necessary for him to cherish them since they animate his other activities and desires which are capable of fulfilment. There is no heaven other than the joy of ascent. Even this consolation is denied to us on a stricter interpretation. The Greeks, for example, regarded the process as a cyclic motion. Their gods were remote from the temporal process of history. The Greeks had no conception of a historical process which carries the universe to a "far off divine event." Aristotle tells us that human affairs are like the sea, which on its surface is distributed into a thousand motions, while at bottom it is comparatively changeless and still. The Florentine confirms this view when he paints the wheel of fortune on which a static mankind for ever revolves with the same sum total of virtue though differently distributed. Some of our progressives affirm that no age is or can be perfect, that goodness would not be goodness if there were no evil and that one age is not better or worse than another, but is only different. There is no hope of progress on this view. Even on the hypothesis of an endless process man is condemned to the fate of Tantalus. To strive after the unattainable, to waste the best of one's energy in the pursuit of a faith beyond the strength of man, cannot be the meaning of life.

(3) The Persians and the Jews were aware of history and historical destiny. For them history has a point of departure, a goal, a centre, and a purpose. For the Persians the conflict between

¹ *The New Twilight of the Gods* (1932), p. 16.

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Ormuz and Ahriman is resolved by a catastrophic end of history which begins something else. The Jews believed in a final solution of history. The advent of the Messiah would solve the earthly destiny of Israel. The idea of the Kingdom of God was the centre of Jesus's teaching. As a child of his age, he was dominated by the contemporary expectation of a Messiah who would miraculously inaugurate a golden age. Though the Jews and the Christians valued the time process because it led up to a perfected state of the divine community, it is difficult to be definite about its nature and conditions. Some forms of Jewish and Christian eschatology declare the reign of Messiah on earth to be of very limited duration. Others do not believe in a steady progress but argue that things on earth would grow worse and worse until God intervenes catastrophically to inaugurate a reign of justice and happiness. In recent times, however, the idea that history leads by a gradual progressive development to a satisfying state on earth has become more prominent. This view raises two difficulties: (i) If the last generation is meant for perfection, what happens to the earlier generations? Are the individuals belonging to earlier epochs devoid of intrinsic value and significance? Are they mere means and instruments to the ultimate goal? How can future perfection expiate the sufferings of past generations? If this view were correct, then it is not a god of love that dwells at the heart of creation, but a "vampire pitiless and unjust" to the great bulk of mankind. In this difficulty, the religious expectation of the resurrection of all mankind is suggested, though this is a desperate remedy for a desperate situation. (ii) Perfection as a historical event is not a satisfactory goal. It is a psychological law that every sensation is blunted by being prolonged. If an agreeable stimulus lasts for long, it turns out painful. Weariness is the quality of all that lasts.

III

The difficulties mentioned in the previous section are due to a confusion between progress and perfection which belong to two different planes. Progress refers to a future world-aeon and perfection to the ultimate depths of one's being. Progress deals with a solution in the stream of time at some undated moment in the future history of mankind. It thinks of an ultimate perfection within the time order, within the limits of the historical process. Perfection is a victory over time, a triumphant passage from the historical to the superhistorical. Death is the symbol of time and resurrection is the symbol of the consciousness which has triumphed over death. We break up time into past, present, and future and argue that the future or the past has greater reality than the present. Eternity

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suffers no such division. It is a quality, not a career, a possession not a pursuit. It is not a yonder state or a future consummation, but one here and now, a state we realize when we turn away from unreality and darkness to true light and life. The destiny of man is a realization higher than any that can be achieved in his purely historical experience. Man's inner division is reintegrated only in a higher and absolute reality. Perfection is not a goal at which the soul of man arrives, not a finality beyond himself. Release in this life (*jīvanmukti*) of the Hindu, perfection here and now of the Buddhist (*samditthakam nibbānam*) is the apprehension of reality which is not to be confused with the historical succession which is only the actual. "By reality and perfection," says Spinoza, "I mean the same thing." What causes the mind of man to entertain the idea of the eternal is the presence of the eternal in him. It is this that makes man put forth his effort to be purer and nobler than he is. When he rises to the higher life and apprehends the real, he transcends the pleasures and delights of life as well as its suffering and sorrows.

The intention of the Christian revelation is to endow history with this super-historical goal. At the moment of the revelation the bond of time is broken and the super-historical consummation realized. The closed circle of history is invaded by the energies of a higher plane, and this transformation is the climax and meaning of the history of our world in time. Christian theology, however, believes that the revelation of God in history is a non-recurring, indivisible, incomparable, and unique event. Hindu and Buddhist thought does not look upon it as exceptional. The experience is sufficiently frequent to be called normal. The unique event is an illustration of a recurring fact, of the fundamental truth that the eternal and the temporal coexist in reciprocal participation. Each individual contains the potentialities of spirit in him and can embody the divine Logos within himself. Eternal life is the birth-right of every individual. As Śāṃkara, the great Hindu thinker, says,¹ everyone, by the very fact of his humanity, is capable of attaining the highest perfection. The call to perfection is addressed to each one of us: "Be ye perfect even as your father in heaven is perfect." If in the consciousness of Jesus man and God have found each other, each one of us can grow into this consciousness: "Have this mind in you which was also in Christ Jesus."² The Johannine letter describes the goal of Christian progress when it says that "we shall be like him."³ Men of spiritual realization become "like" unto God according to the *Bhagavadgītā*.⁴

¹ Purusamāstrasamlandhibhih.

³ 1 John iii. 2.

² Philipians ii. 5.

⁴ Mamasādharmyamāgatāh, xiv. 2.

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All systems of modern thought agree in regarding the world not as an unchanging succession of the same phenomena but as an evolutionary ascent, a progressive development from matter to man. The fundamental principle of this undoubted fact which has given us successively matter, plants, animals, and men is that this ascent cannot be interrupted at the stage of the imperfect being called man. The logical issue of this progression is that we should have further heights of consciousness and power which are not yet within our reach. There is a more developed consciousness possible, where we are able to release the imprisoned spirit by breaking down the obstacles which our body and life present. In other words, man can become the superman when his whole nature is organized and controlled by spirit. The spiritual heroes give us a measure of the stature of fullness or perfected individuality that is intended for us. To a world given over to succession they declare the magnetism of the unchanging, the call and cost of spiritual life. Look at Spinoza's noble words: "Love for the eternal and infinite feeds the mind with pure delight and is wholly free from every taint of sorrow; herein must lie the supreme goal of our desire, to be sought with all our strength."

The purpose of the universe, the ground of creation, so far as we can understand it is the attainment of perfection. Every aspect, every level, every individual contains within it a tendency to its perfection. Though it may not actually be achieved, its achievement would constitute its perfection. So far as the world is concerned, its justification would be the attainment of perfection at which it now darkly hints. When the human individuals freely respond to the call of spirit, when its rule prevails in the minds and hearts and wills of all men, when the spiritual perfection which we see realized in a few individuals is consummated in universal humanity, the Kingdom is established. It is the beginning and end of creation, its first cause and final goal.

Speaking in terms of time which is all that is open to us, we can say that such a complete manifestation of eternal values on the plane of history can only be, if at all, in the last moment of concrete time which contains all the others in the sense that it completes, synthesizes, and explains them. This completion of the universe is realized at the end when the process as such has ceased to exist. What was a naked possibility at the beginning becomes an accomplished fact in the end. The possibility which is the operative ideal and the driving power of the universe is the heavenly plan and the terrestrial destiny of mankind. The historical has its reflection in the eternal. It has an absolute significance as it is based on ultimate reality. When we say that the historical has its beginning and its fulfilment in the inmost depths of experience, we admit that it has

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its origin in reality with which our spiritual life at its deepest comes into communion. The historical does not, however, exhaust the absolute. It translates into the plane of space-time one of the infinite possibilities in the absolute.

(1) So far as the end of the world is concerned, we need not be so dogmatic as to assert that it is either irrational or intolerable. Hindu and Buddhist religions accept the impermanence of things. The Hebrew poet who wrote "In the beginning," Plato who dramatized the world as having a beginning, a middle, and an end, and the early Christian writer who spoke of a time when "the heavens shall pass away with a great noise and the elements shall be dissolved into a fervent heat" conceived the world to be a finite entity. Time has meaning in relation to a process or purpose which is fulfilled or frustrated. When the universe becomes a bearer of values, it may well have its terminus. When the purpose of the cosmic process is achieved it only remains for it to be wound up, as mere continuance in time will not make values more valuable. Value is independent of time. When Blake tells us that we can hold infinity in the palm of the hand and eternity in an hour, he is pointing to the distinction between time and eternity. Time passes and along with it all things that belong to it. In the midst of things that are passing, there are a few that do not pass, which are exempt from death. These values abide while things only endure. The law of degradation makes no difference to the spirit which is the home of timeless values. Time is real only as the vehicle of values. Ultimate reality is distinct from a completed series of events and is of a higher character. When the Indian sage remarks that, when, his capital city is ablaze, nothing that is really his is lost,¹ he is affirming the reality of absolute values which remain unaffected by the chances and changes of the world.

(2) Eternal life is different from everlasting life. It is not an infinitely extended persistence through time. What is insoluble within the historical framework may be solved without it. History must be rescued from the externality of time, from its exile on the surface of that spirit to whose depths it belongs and restored to the perspective of the eternal.

(3) There is no such thing in history as progress from good to better and best on a single plane of development in virtue of which some future generation may perfect itself at the expense of those that have gone before. The absoluteness of spiritual life makes it possible for every generation to be in contact with it. It is erroneous to assume that only the last products of history are admitted to perfection. Every generation has its goal and justification, and every individual his meaning and value. No one is merely the

¹ Mithilāyām pradīptāyām na me dahyati kiñcana.—*Bhāgavata*, xii, 176, 56.

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instrument of another. Through his spiritual impulses, every one approximates to the divine life.

IV

The significance of history is to be judged by its relation to absolute values, to the purpose which is independent of the historical process. Since the purpose is detached from time, is not situated within history, is not connected with any period of past, present, or future, it is well calculated to elucidate the historical process. It is not for us to say what exactly the end of the universe is. Its full comprehension is beyond human grasp. Though the details may be dark to us, we may say with confidence that the goal includes the development of free spiritual personalities with a universal outlook. This world is the sphere where the kingdom of spirit must begin and increase. It is realized by the spiritual redemption of the human race. It is not the same as the production of the greatest possible amount of pleasurable feeling or the creation of an earthly Utopia to be brought about by the co-operation of men of good will. Progress is not to be measured by the spread of an urban mechanical civilization whose evils are lessened by humanitarian movements. If humanity does not set before itself a transcendent aim, it will relapse into some barren rehearsal of the past or wallow in pleasure. A civilization requires to be judged by its capacity to increase the spiritual resources of humanity. We must ask whether it contributes to freedom, humility, and gentleness of soul or not, whether it recognizes the unique, imperishable value of the individual, and strives to maintain the sanctity of life at all hazards or not, whether it bases the social order on fineness of feeling or force. That there is *on the whole* progress is an assumption which must ultimately rest for its justification on the evidence of the facts themselves.

Freedom is the essential condition of man's higher life, intellectual and artistic, ethical and spiritual. Whether men make history or history makes men is an old controversy.¹ If we take away one man's vision, one man's heroic creation, one man's hold on the mind of his contemporaries, to that extent we will alter the course of history. The free individuals are the shapers of society. Every stage of our progress from the primeval slime began as a revolutionary thought in the mind of a single person, who was persecuted, if not stoned and killed for his audacity in daring to think differently. The great scientific inventions, artistic creations, philosophical discoveries, and religious insights are the work of exceptional individuals. A handful of free individuals guided the Christianiza-

¹ Cf Kālo vā kāranam rājño rājā vā kālakāranam, iti te samśayo mābhūd rājā kālasya kāranam.

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tion of Europe. Another handful to-day are staging a relapse into barbarism and disgracing the age in which we live.

From inward conflicts and outward chaos, from the instability of human nature and the bewilderment of the human soul it is clear that we have lost our hold on freedom. The fire of spiritual ideals is burning low. There is little zeal available for what is right and just, little indignation against the spread of inhuman ideals. Individual freedom is sacrificed in the name of mass movements. Mind, soul, conscience are absorbed into mass mind, mass soul, and mass conscience. We think with the crowd, feel with it, and act with it to the point of killing and getting killed. Society has become a machine and man a cog in it with no rights and claims to personal dignity. Nationalism is acting far more effectively as the opium of the people than religion. The regimentation of the mind, the annihilation of the individual spirit, the crushing of the soul is inimical to spiritual life. The process of history shows us many departures from the path of freedom to that of compulsion. The Grand Inquisitor wished to relieve men of the burden of freedom. Freedom is difficult and tragic. It is heroic responsibility and martyrdom. Automatism is easy, less heroic, less tragic. But there is no drama without personal freedom. When man sells his birthright for comfort and security, he is spiritually flagging, and growing insensitive to his high destiny.

The two chief characteristics of our age which are hostile to the life of spirit are economic materialism and romantic sentimentalism.

(1) Science has put us under an incalculable debt in its own domain. It has changed the face of the world. It has liberated man from drudgery and many occupations dangerous to human life and health have been abolished. If it has produced an industrial society and increased our dependence on machines, it is not in itself an evil. From that dim and distant date when a human creature struck out the first flint instrument, through all the ages until now, when man belts the globe with the radio and plans to annihilate whole cities with gas-bombs from the sky, the course of human life has been a career of material conquest and mechanical achievement. The pen, the brush, the spade, the lever, the pulley, the locomotive, and the internal-combustion engine form a continuous ascent. The machine is an expression of the victory of mind over matter. The machine is not an end in itself. It is a tool devised by man to give practical effect to his ideals. If our ideals are wrong, the fault is in ourselves, not in the machines. If our ideals are right, machines could be used to remove injustice, improve the lot of mankind, and help the spirit to grow into maturity. Those who declare that the danger of our situation is the excess of mechanism, the mechanizing of mind and the increase of machines in the outer world point to the excessive *tempo* of modern civilization, the anxiety connected

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with the competition of living, the precariousness of life, the drabness and monotony of the lives of many workers who are required to repeat the same movement hour after hour mechanically, the exciting nature of our amusements and love for blinding speed and deafening noise. All these effects have little to do with machines as such. There is nothing in a motor car which requires us to drive it so fast as to kill innocent pedestrians. There is nothing in an aeroplane which compels us to drop bombs on fellow-men. If the modern tyrannies use the resources of modern science for making their despotisms more searching and ferocious than any autocracies of the past and succeed in turning out men as standardized units in the mass like the products of factories, it is because we are not keen about freedom. We do not seem to realize that it is not progress to try to shape ourselves in the image of ants and behave like worms. The technique of modern science and machinery could be used for the welfare of mankind as a whole, for giving them opportunities of spiritual development which were till now the privilege of a select few.

Unfortunately a false ideal of progress developed along with large-scale production. The machines produced in large quantities, and so more consumers had to be persuaded to buy the goods. Prosperity was said to depend on raising the standard of life which meant making two desires grow where only one grew before. While systems of religion and ethics plead for control of desires, the gospel of economic materialism demands increase of desires. To stimulate consumption, we must provoke longings and provide people with reasons for buying goods produced by machines. As a consequence, the only art which has advanced in recent times is the art of advertisement. Millions are wasting their whole labour in producing things that nobody ought to want, like stimulants and narcotics. The psychological equivalents which they help to assuage are depression and violence, exhaustion and excitement. The ambition of nations is to turn out goods cheaper and quicker than others and provide themselves with markets and colonies. By an inexorable logic, the quest for economic salvation and the idolatrous worship of the State lead to international anarchy and chaos. The world has become a madhouse of greed and conflicting interests.

We have long been familiar with calculating machines, and it will be more interesting if we get thinking machines. It will then be possible for us to know what the machines think of us, which will be more accurate than what we think of ourselves. Man's difference from the machine lies also in the power he has to conceive himself as other than he is. The thinking machines will show up our crudity of mind and insignificance. They will point out that prosperity and power, comfort and security are our ideals which tend to divide

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and not unite mankind. They will laugh at our anxiety to get rich quick, at our readiness to succumb to schemes of sudden wealth, at the popularity of races and speculation, and at the ease with which material comfort has come to be a substitute for spiritual life.¹ Even our advanced thinkers set forth scientific Utopias which will result in turning the world into a well-run hotel or café. It is not realized sufficiently that outer organization is different from inner values. Outward success may coexist with inward failure, in individuals as well as in groups. A man may prosper in his business and reach a high position in his career and yet fail to overcome defects of character and attain serenity of mind. Another may fail outwardly and succeed inwardly. His success in his inward career may possibly be due to his outward failure. Success and prosperity may easily create a temper of mind in which the claims of spirit are forgotten. We are familiar with the parable of the Rich Fool, who, because his granaries were overflowing, chose to give himself over to the pursuit of pleasure. Science and its inventions are concerned with the outer organization, not the inward living. They can remove the hindrances to the good life but cannot create it. They can diminish illness but cannot tell a man what he shall do with his health. They can remove poverty and cure unemployment, but cannot tell a man what he shall do with his wealth and leisure. Oscar Wilde has a great short story, "Christ came from a white plain to a purple city and as he passed through the first street, he heard voices overhead, and saw a young man lying drunk on a window-sill, 'Why do you waste your soul in drunkenness?' He said: 'Lord, I was a leper and you healed me, what else can I do?' A little further through the town he saw a young man following a harlot, and said: 'Why do you dissolve your soul in debauchery?' and the young man answered: 'Lord, I was blind and you healed me, what else can I do?' At last in the middle of the city he saw an old man crouching weeping upon the ground, and when he asked why he wept, the old man answered: 'Lord, I was dead, and you raised me unto life, what else can I do but weep?' " Oscar Wilde is here pointing to the distinction between life and the appurtenances of life, between the means of living and the ends of life. Health, wealth, leisure, and life itself, which science can further, are the opportunities for higher life. Spengler draws a distinction between culture which is of the spirit and civilization which is of the flesh. Though

¹ An American Life Insurance Company recently advertised as follows: "Buddha, who was a born prince, gave up his name, succession, and heritage to attain security. But . . . we do not have to give up the world; we have only to see a life insurance agent who can sell us security for the future, the most direct step to serenity of mind," quoted in Babbitt: *The Dhammapada* (1936), pp. 114-15.

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the two are not separable, a highly developed culture may subsist with a primitive civilization, as in ancient Greece, India, and China, and a highly developed civilization may subsist with a primitive culture as in the Roman Empire. While science gives us the capacity to control the conditions of life, it does not help us to use these conditions for fine living. We have to go beyond science to get the ideal values. If natural science is set higher than spiritual wisdom, if machines are allowed to make tools of men, the resulting state of the world can be best imagined by reflecting on Zola's hideous picture in his novel *La Débâcle*, of an express train roaring through the night with its crowds of passengers while the driver has fallen dead in the engine.

(2) Those who feel that it is difficult to organize life on the basis of science and utilitarian morality turn to the dark gods of instinct and feeling. Reality is for them not above but below the human and the rational level. "The man who thinks is a depraved animal," says Rousseau. "My great religion," said D. H. Lawrence, "is a belief in the blood, the flesh as being wiser than the intellect. We can go wrong in our minds. But what the blood feels, and believes, and says, is always true." Only the other day Goering said, "Intellectual activity has been the curse of our people." We are asked to substitute impulse, life force, blood, nature, for the ideals of reason and spirit. When we think with the blood puerilism, superstition, violence, idolatry and the open worship of the noble pagan and the predatory barbarian are the results. The romantic revivals which despise the critical principle and surrender to their own kind of unreason naturally come into conflict. Each one's allegiance depends on one's temperament. One man's goal is another's mirage. Between these private dream worlds, even communication becomes impossible. Cults of unintelligibility and codes of self-expression grow profusely. Romanticism is an evasion, a reaction.

Freedom is here confused with the absence of limitations, with the removal of the chains, with the throwing off of controls. Carlyle calls this kind of liberty the unstrapping of the devil. He represents the crowd as shouting at each successive liberation from control, "Glory, glory, another strap is gone." This kind of liberty cannot give us peace of mind or unity of life. Rousseau remarked that "his heart and head did not seem to belong to the same individual." We are not free simply because we happen to be born; we achieve freedom by effort and struggle. Freedom is attained only through the imposition of forms on the raw material of life. It is the spirit that shapes the given elements of our nature to a pattern and makes life fruitful.

A few words may be said about the expression of these conflicting tendencies in literature and morals, in philosophy and religion. "It

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is as much a trade to make a book, as it is to make a clock," says La Bruyère. It is a matter of rules and technique. Delicacy, distinction, elevation of soul are not thought of. The great is reduced to the commonplace. On the other hand, we have the tendency to confound the real with the welter of the actual. Instead of eliciting the deeper meaning of facts, we are keen to show their lack of meaning. We are content with a jazzy impressionism, with crude accounts of the rawness of life. "Poetry," Diderot observes, "calls for something enormous, barbaric, and savage." Literature becomes the indulgence of idiosyncrasies. What is eccentric or unusual is said to convey the glamour of the spiritual. Robert Wolsley wrote as long ago as 1685, "Every ass that's romantic believes he's inspired." When Longinus tells us that great literature is the echo of a great soul, he makes out that it is inseparable from good living. Good living is neither temperamental overflow nor mechanical routine. Men's minds are shaped to-day not by the ancient classics, but by the works of Marx and Lenin and Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. In morals we have the Philistine and the Bohemian. The former lives outwardly, mouths the current prejudices, is impervious to ideals, and innocent of beauty. He exercises no free intelligence and vulgarizes everything he touches. He often speaks of morals and is perturbed about forms of conduct, but his moral being is as crude and undeveloped as the rest of his nature. He is an untrained, pushful, spiritually uprooted orphan, cocksure in his manner though not in his morals. There is not much meaning left in a morality that is always turning over text-books and quoting laws. The Bohemian, who is at the opposite pole, speaks of him as having the morals of a publican and the manners of a Pharisee and himself pleads for a relaxation of all forms of self-control. The evils of our age are due, according to the Philistines, to the unrestraint and temperamental liberty which are so fashionable and, according to the Bohemians, to the tyranny of taboos and traditional inhibitions. The Philistine and the Bohemian are not the only alternatives. There is the man of spirit who has faith in the transcendent and in the light of it achieves the delicate adjustment between the craving for freedom and the need of control. Everything, says Goethe, that liberates the spirit without a corresponding growth in self-mastery is pernicious. Long patient effort has ever been a part of the price to be paid for spiritual insight.

The rationalists reduce the divine reality to a pure transparency and are most at ease in moving within the circle of divine essence into which they seem to claim absolute insight. They emphasize right beliefs in God as essential to salvation. The romanticists advocate ecstatic worship and proclaim painless plans for getting into "tune with the infinite." Insistence on the art of meditation

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implies the admission of the inadequacy of mere beliefs. Meditation is different from intellectual conceit and imaginative reverie. It is the strenuous effort of man's whole nature. Reverie is a dissipation of attention, a mere relaxation of one's grip on the world of spirit. Cultivation is the opposite of crudeness. It is personal exertion. Meditation is a strenuous effort of will assisted by keen intellectual discrimination.

Philosophy has lost its power because the over-intellectuals have reduced it to linguistic analysis and logical disputation. Protests against hard and crude rationalisms are uttered by romanticists who require us to become vital and dynamic. There is a tendency to confuse instinctive life with the spiritual. When we pass from outer to inner life, we enter the region of imponderables, that both eludes rules and scientific measurement, a region that is summed up in the word "soul." In the life of instinct and that of spirit, we have spontaneity and immediacy. In the former they are the result of absence of checks; in the latter of self-control. Spiritual life is not something into which we slip passively but is the result of the activity of man's whole nature. It is the task of philosophy to declare to us the truths of spirit, the eternal values which are above the stream of change.

V

If we scan the history of mankind over the centuries we see that with frequent failures, set-backs, and discouragements, it has advanced remarkably. There has been a steady growth in the accumulated knowledge and experience, the use of tools, customs, and traditions which make decent life in society possible. The reign of law and pity for the less fortunate and the weak have assuredly and gradually strengthened. We have knowledge, we have good will, and yet we are not able to shape our lives and institutions in a way that would free the world from the fear of wars. Resources, material and mental, exist in abundance, but are either unused or used with deliberate waste and destructiveness. We know that unlimited armaments mean ultimately competition in armaments and a race towards war. Like a drunkard who cannot give up drink in spite of his best will, like an addict who wants to give up his drug but cannot, civilization seems unable to save itself. Thinking men have much fear for the future and the unthinking suffer from nerves. We are in urgent need of a remedy that will soothe our shattered nerves and unify our distracted lives. Spread of enlightenment and growth of pacifist sentiment are not enough. Our rationalist prophets define the problems, deliver the doctrine, and declare that if man would but start to think, he would proceed to his salvation.

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It is not quite so simple. These short cuts remind us of the dancing-master in Molière, who asserted that "all the mistakes of men, the fatal reverses that fill the world's annals, the shortcomings of statesmen, and the blunders of great captains arise from not knowing how to dance." Humanitarian sentiment is not effective enough to change men's minds. The question of peace or war is not simply a matter of political arrangement. Peace is a state of mind. So long as individuals are filled with restless desire and do not have peace in their hearts, it is madness to expect peace in the world. While resolved to renounce nothing, this generation wishes to enjoy the fruits of renunciation. A new simplicity, a new asceticism is what we need. If men conquer their own inordinate desires, this inner victory will show forth in their outer relations. In the third century B.C., Asoka succeeded to a realm more extensive than modern British India. He achieved in early life a reputation as a military hero. The spectacle of the misery caused by war filled him with remorse and he became a man of peace and an enthusiastic disciple of Buddha. The results of his conversion may be told in his own words as they appeared in the edicts which he caused to be carved on rocks and pillars throughout his vast empire. In one of them he tells us of his profound sorrow at the thousands who had been slain in his war on the Kalingas and at the misery inflicted on the non-combatants. "If a hundredth or a thousandth part of these were now to suffer the same fate, it would be matter of deep sorrow to his majesty. Though one should do him an injury, his majesty now holds that it must be patiently borne, so far as it can possibly be borne."¹ Here was a mighty emperor who not only repented of his lust for dominion but had his repentance cut in rocks for the instruction of future ages. If science and machinery get into other hands than those of warring Caesars and despotic Tamerlanes, if enough men and women arise in each community who are free from the fanaticisms of religion and of politics, who will oppose strenuously every kind of mental and moral tyranny, who will develop in place of an angular national spirit a rounded world view, who can tell what might not be done?

¹ Rock Edict XIII. See Vincent A. Smith: *The Edicts of Asoka* (1909), p. 19.

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PROFESSOR T. E. JESSOP

BERKELEY belonged to the days when it was possible to write philosophy without being learned, when it was sufficient to have fundamental convictions and to be able to write about them clearly. His contribution to the stock of philosophical possibilities was substantially complete when he was twenty-five, at which age no man can or should be learned. Not until he became a bishop did he pile up the burden of scholarship, and the work in which he expressed it, the *Siris*, has remained a stumbling-block to his expositors. In his day philosophy was not learning but culture and wisdom. He could only have contemplated with dismay the plight of philosophy in England in our own day—the confinement of it to the universities, the substitution of scholarship for conviction, and the consequential admission on the part of many of those who teach it of its insignificance for practice. For him philosophy was not an academic discipline but a phase of an integrated life, or at any rate a part of the effort towards integration. All knowing, he said repeatedly, is a practical affair. For saying this he has been called a pragmatist, whereas he was only pragmatic. And because knowing is practical, it is simple. For the same reason its most significant findings are largely coincident with the beliefs of the plain man about the obvious world of sense and its supernatural foundation. He regarded himself as the philosopher of common sense. Practicality, simplicity, and constancy and serenity of religious conviction are the three qualities of Berkeley's mind that moulded and informed his philosophy. He stepped into the philosophical arena because the mathematics and physics of his time were becoming what in his view all thinking becomes when it breaks loose from its practical moorings, namely, oversubtle; and because they and the philosophy of his time outraged both his common sense and his religious beliefs. His philosophy, he said in the *Alciphron* (III, 16), is "a medicine for the soul of man."

His philosophy does not stand or fall with his motives, but it cannot be fairly understood without reference to them. It is no service to him not to insist that he philosophized primarily as a clergyman intent on vindicating the creed of which he was not simply an official trustee but also an ardent and transparently

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sincere devotee. The ratification of belief, and of conduct through belief, was the dominating purpose of his writings. He went to philosophy as he went to America, to convert his fellows to what he regarded as the saving truths of religion. This religious purpose, besides its candid expression both at the climax and at many points on the way towards the climax of his several philosophical works, is emphatically advertised in his sub-titles and prefaces. It was not new truth but new proof of old truth that he set himself to discover. If, then, his conclusions were fixed beforehand, was he not rather a theologian than a philosopher? Since the objection would apply equally to St. Thomas, I see no force in it. The difference between the theologian and the religious-minded philosopher is not that the former has and the latter has not his main conclusions predetermined by an alleged revelation, but that the former treats whereas the latter does not treat this same revelation as evidence as well as source. By this test, Berkeley, equally with St. Thomas, is to be judged a philosopher. He integrates his foregone conclusions with empirical facts and rational principles and, at any rate in intention, with nothing else. To know that his conclusions were foregone is a valuable help to the proportioned understanding of his thought, but irrelevant to the question whether his thought, regarded not biographically but as an ordered body of propositions, is theology or philosophy. Besides, the main question about a man's thought is just whether it is true or not, and this can only be settled, not psychologically, but by considering the quality and extent of the evidence for it, its consistency, and the range of its explanatory power.

Berkeley, then, raised his religious apologetics to the rank of a philosophy. But this is not all. He could have done so very easily by refurbishing the Scholastic metaphysics that many of his contemporaries were content with, or by joining the recent but somewhat reactionary school of Platonizers. Instead, he took up the newest philosophy of his day and not only used its weapons but also endorsed much of its spirit. He was as rebellious as Locke and the Cartesians against the subtlety, pedantry, apriorism and authoritarianism of the Scholastic tradition. "I was distrustful at eight years old" (*Commonplace Book*, entry 275) is a confession which anyone who has tried to keep pace with his agile mind will not dream of questioning. In his verses on America he extolled the time

When men shall not impose for truth of sense
The pedantry of courts and schools.

The new "way of ideas" fascinated him. His respect for Locke stamps him as a child of the new age, of the eighteenth and not of the seventeenth century. This is evident also in his literary style.

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Not with affectation but with natural genius he adopted that simplicity and elegance of presentation which the new century into which his late 'teens ushered him demanded and achieved in every kind of writing. He was the first to show that even philosophy could be expressed in the new style at its best; and even in the brilliant company of Swift and Addison and Steele he stands distinguished on the strength of his writing alone. Had he but dwelt on the themes they dwelt on and written always for their public, his name, like theirs, would probably have been known to everybody. Gosse and Saintsbury all but give him the highest honours; Mr. Herbert Read also, who speaks of his style as "almost the purest and serenest in English literature." In our own annals no one has shown so great a triumph of style over subject-matter. The *Principles* is but slightly dulled by its treatise-form; the *Three Dialogues* start the comparison with Plato; and the *Alciphron*, with its living texture of posers, repartees, characterization, and satire, completes it. Only a great *writer* could make a book out of nothing but 595 questions and "get away" with it—his *Querist*, which ran through six editions in two years.

Berkeley began and continued to philosophize primarily to defend four fundamental religious convictions, namely, that a God certainly exists, that He is pure spirit, that He associates Himself providentially with mankind, and that the human soul is immortal. The provocation to defend them came from the Newtonian conception of matter, Locke's theory of material substance, and the distinction, of which Locke was not the author but the most recent patron, between primary and secondary qualities. The first two provoked him because he found that from them he could conclude to materialism and that others had in fact done so whole-heartedly, and the third because he divined in it a latent scepticism. That both Locke and Newton were devout was irrelevant. Berkeley was concerned not with their private beliefs but with what he thought to be the logical and practical consequences of their published doctrines, and he attacked these consequences because they were so dangerously congenial to the moral materialism of the time that he feared they would fall on it like sparks on tinder. He would deprive "free-thinking" of any philosophical excuse.

Instead of speaking of the Newtonian conception of matter we ought perhaps to speak of the Newtonian vindication of the conception of matter introduced by Galileo, but the abbreviation is convenient. The greatness of Galileo lies less in his being the champion of the Copernican astronomy than in his being the founder of physics, the first to overturn the ageworn Aristotelian dogma that a science of terrestrial matter is impossible. He denied the distinction between terrestrial and celestial stuff. He demonstrated experimentally and

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mathematically the identical regularities of both. After his work and Kepler's, Newton worked out his universal mechanics and fixed the conception of matter, so familiar to us but still fairly novel in Berkeley's day, as a homogeneous self-contained system operating in all its parts and elements in accordance with invariable laws which, when formulated, enable us to exhibit every physical happening as a necessitated one. This mechanistic scheme had been anticipated speculatively by Descartes and Hobbes. It thus came to Berkeley through both his scientific and his philosophical predecessors. What he saw in it was its most obvious religious bearing. Making of Nature a closed order, a blind machine operating entirely out of its own resources, it seemed to leave no place for God. It gave a warrant for atheism. Even a religious bias could carry it no further than deism, for it excluded not only the actuality but also the very possibility of that divine intervention in cosmic and terrestrial affairs which Christian theology maintained on the twofold ground that it is called for by man's needs and involved in God's essential sovereignty and benevolence.¹ Since both inferences, the atheistic and the deistic, had in fact been drawn and defended by a few known writers and a great many nameless talkers (when we write about "free-thinking" we tend to forget the coffee-houses), Berkeley recoiled from the grounds. His recoil generalized itself into a refusal to allow any view of matter that gave it an existence and potency independent of God. Positively and philosophically, he set himself the task of finding a theory of the corporeal world agreeable to the sovereignty and providence of God and at the same time compatible with the facts of perceptual experience; compatible also with man's responsible freedom and his immortality, which the new theory of matter was already being used to deny.

The peculiar turn given by Locke to the conception of matter was less overtly but just as dangerously susceptible of an anti-theistic interpretation. He analysed matter into qualities and substance. The former are aspects mirrored in such of our percepts as he considered to be veridical ("primary qualities"), the latter is an entity postulated as the support and possessor of the former, postulated under the demand of what we should now call the category of thinghood. But although both appear in knowledge with equal though unlike certainty—the one with the authority of perception, the other with the authority of reason—material qualities appear as

¹ Berkeley here had in mind providence rather than miracles. His avoidance of any stress on the evidential value of the latter is another sign of his modernity. One of the main aims of his thought was to preserve the vast regularities discovered by the new science. But by making them depend directly on the will and purpose of God and interpreting them exclusively as the condition of human living he preserved also his religious point.

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concrete content, whereas material substance stands only as a pure form, as simply that which it has been invented to be, namely, a something of which qualities are the qualities. For Locke, then, the very essence of matter, the producer of all perceptible phenomena and the bearer of such as are truly objective, is unknowable except as a rationally indispensable x . This agnostic conclusion alone was enough to antagonize Berkeley, who, until he settled down, for the first time in his life, at Cloyne, saw most things with the cognitive simplicity and confidence of youth. But when Locke went further, dividing spirit too into known qualities and unknowable substance, Berkeley revolted against the increasing nescience. And when Locke went still further, suggesting the theoretical possibility that material substance and spiritual substance are, for aught we know, the same—it is fatally easy to identify two x 's—Berkeley detected a grave danger to his own religious postulates. He saw that the suggested single indeterminate substance could be interpreted in two ways with equal legitimacy so far as Locke had gone, either with a spiritualist or with a materialist bias; and, knowing the temper of his day, he suspected that the latter was the more likely to be followed. He therefore undertook to disprove this alternative and establish the other. An unknowable entity, a postulated mystery, takes us away from the controls of responsible thinking: in so far as it is indeterminate it is incompatible with nothing, and in so far as it goes beyond the analogies of experience nothing can be either proved or disproved of it. Like the Unconscious of our psycho-analysts, it will accept almost anything we care to attribute to it.

The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is in Locke in one respect (against the Cartesians) a vindication of sense-perception, in another a condemnation of it. Berkeley fastened on the latter. Scepticism of sense was for him, I think, the worst scepticism of all, as being the least excusable. On the higher planes of thought there are obscure margins where the strangeness and inherent difficulty of the points at issue make uncertainty and controversy natural—no one was more aware of this than Berkeley—but at the lower level the certainty is so plain that we do and must live by it. Besides, quite independently of his motives, Berkeley found a Nature destitute of secondary qualities altogether incredible. He could not bring himself to believe that when he saw a colour he was really looking at a motion. What he felt, then, in the presence of Locke's criticism of sensory knowledge was that if we can get little or no certainty about the vulgar objects of sense there is little chance of our gaining certainty about such higher matters as the existence and nature of God and the freedom and immortality of the finite soul. True, Locke had urged, as Butler and Hume were

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to do shortly, that his conclusions proved only that our powers of knowing were given to us for practice, for which they are entirely adequate, not for speculation, for which they are inadequate, and that in consequence we are not logically entitled to deny the transcendent truths of religion. Berkeley's retort is one of his many paradoxes. The man who insisted that knowing is a practical function, who disliked finely spun concepts, who has been praised as a radical empiricist, stood for our title and ability to speculate. This, and not always because of his *esse-percipi* doctrine, is why he has warmed the heart of post-Kantian idealists. When we write our histories it is better to say, not that Locke posited empty substances, that Berkeley had the sense to get rid of some of them and Hume to get rid of them all, but that whereas Locke tried to cut down speculation to a minimum and Hume tried to destroy it altogether, Berkeley spoke out for it and gave it wings. He was one of the very few British ontologists of the eighteenth century, and the only one of any consequence. It was self-evident to him that the foundations of even practical belief and life are transcendental, to be received, therefore, either by faith or by speculative knowledge, or partly by one and partly by the other. He stood for the last of these three possibilities. From the beginning to the end of his career as a writer he shrank from the justification of religion and morals by the bankruptcy of either sense or reason. Even in the humble conclusion of the *Siris*, written in the chastened mood of age, he is still a gnostic, unable to take a single step towards Pascal; age finds knowledge harder, that is all. This gnosticism, of an entirely non-esoteric kind—to commend the ultimates, he said (*Alc.* VII, 15), it is not necessary to depart from the accepted rules of reasoning—is one of the marks that distinguish him from Malebranche, with whom his contemporaries confused him. Malebranche, after an arduously sustained philosophical effort, in the end fell back on a mystical intuition of God and a merely pious acceptance of a material world which he had shown to be theoretically dubitable and superfluous.

In these ways Berkeley's religious apologetic came to shape itself into strictly philosophical problems. The general problem was that of matter, which he analysed into the questions of the content, status and causation of the world of sense. His remaining problems arose out of the discussion of these. His general answer was that the senses reveal a real world, that they reveal it faithfully, and that this sensory world is spiritually created, spiritually maintained, and spiritually made known. Because one of its chief aims was to exclude matter, Berkeley called his doctrine immaterialism. "Immaterialistic theism" would describe both its negative and its positive aspects. Matter as an absolute existent or order and God are

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incompatible, for there cannot be two absolutes; and matter as an x is either sinister or simply silly.

Having given a name to his metaphysical position, how shall we characterize his epistemological position? There is a monstrous tradition that Berkeley was a sensationalist. I know only one text that can be quoted in support of it, but it is one of the entries in the *Commonplace Book* that he did not allow to pass into the works he published.¹ The tradition is monstrous because it makes his published works unintelligible and even foolish. Start by imposing this label and you can criticize his assumption of the causal principle as unwarranted, his introduction of "notions" as an inconsistent afterthought (although it is already in the *Commonplace Book*, cp. nos. 179, 527, 581, 724), and his affirmation of spiritual substance, whether divine or only human, as a scandalous lapse. You may even sink to the level of repeating the charge that the man who said "*esse is percipi*" left no place in existence for *percipere* and thereby made his position absurd. In print Berkeley never said that all knowledge comes from sense but only that without sense there would be nothing to start the thinking function into activity, the latter, once active, being another source. He never said that all our knowledge of even sensory objects is sensory—our knowledge of their causation is not—but only that the sensory evidence for these must be taken seriously if radical scepticism is to be avoided. And though he did say that *esse is percipi*, it was in a context in which he was considering only the existence of sensory objects, not existence in general or as such.² The apparently disproportionate space which he devoted to the problem of the world of perception is presumably responsible for the misunderstanding. But the misunderstanding is scarcely pardonable. The *Principles*, rightly taken as the most authoritative statement of his doctrine, was published as a fragment, as "Part I" (this is on the title-page), as that part in which the nature of only the perceptual world was to be the main subject; and his *Three Dialogues* appeared as a livelier re-writing of that one part. But even in that fragment he makes it abundantly clear—in the first edition and not only in the second³—that he accepts "reflection" as well as sensation as a way of getting

¹ No. 792 (Johnston) "I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen, 'Nil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.'"

² Berkeley is quite clear about the two senses of *esse*. See *Principles*, § 142, *ad init.*

³ Arguments about the changes in the second edition are unreliable in so far as they are based on Fraser's text, which, despite his claims, is at many points an amalgam of the two editions. For this reason I have prepared a new version of the *Principles*, giving in full the text of the first edition, and noting all deviations in the second. It is now in the press.

data, and reason as the faculty by which data have to be interpreted; and I do not know of any presuppositions or statements of his that make his acceptance of reflection and reason inconsistent with his acceptance of sensation. He was as little a sensationalist as Locke was, and as little an empiricist, if empiricism means the restriction of "experience" to "sense-experience" and the admission of reason as nothing more than the analysis and synthesis of sense in terms of sense alone. Like Locke, he just took the principles of reason for granted: there was no need to defend what had not then been impugned. He was, indeed, more rationalistic than Locke, in the sense that he had a bigger confidence in the power of reason to carry us beyond the limits of individual experience.

The line of argument by which Berkeley disposes of matter is subtle only because it is disconcertingly simple. He means by matter not only Locke's material substance and the quantitative body of the Newtonian physics, but also and always—for this is a more general concept including the others—any object of sense or analogue of an object of sense regarded as existing absolutely, that is, independently of mind. Any such conception, being grounded on sense, must be examined by examining the testimony of sense. He first cleared the way, in his *New Theory of Vision*, by showing that sensible objects are not given as external, not even in vision. Externality is only inferred. But his primary and persistent position was one which in his day needed no apology, for it was the primary and persistent position of the Cartesians and of Locke, namely, that the immediate objects of sense are ideas, that is, entities that cannot be regarded as floating about apart from a mind. Here he was no innovator. The philosophic issue of the day was the question what could be inferred from these sensible ideas, and the prevalent answer was that some of them mirror, and all of them are caused by, things that exist, possess their mirrored properties, and go their way, quite independently of any awareness by mind. It was this inference that Berkeley bent all his efforts to counter.

Firstly, he gave a shrewd refutation of the reason for distinguishing ideas into those that do (ideas of primary qualities) and those that do not (ideas of secondary qualities) copy things or properties existentially separate from them. That the former, unlike the latter, do not vary with the position and other conditions of the percipient is simply an error of fact. Moreover, it is utterly impossible to realize in consciousness any primary quality without a secondary one intimately suffusing it: extension, motion, rest, number, do in fact have and cannot be presented without a concrete filling. Wherever there is space, for example, there is colour, and conversely. They are correlatives, and correlatives cannot be separated in thought. Consequently—for Berkeley believed in the metaphysical

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truth of thought—they cannot be separated in reality. This is one of the bearings of his polemic against vicious abstraction.

Secondly, he laid the axe at the root, at the underlying supposition that an idea can represent, in the sense of copy, something that is not an idea or not potentially an idea. For since, on the one hand, *ex hypothesi* the mind cannot directly confront anything but ideas, it has no means of knowing whether these are or are not like anything beyond their own form of being, the condition of comparison (the direct presence of both) being absent; on the other hand, any such likeness is impossible, for how can an idea be like what is not an idea, the essentially perceptible like the essentially imperceptible? To say with Locke that the square I see is not the square that is really there but only a copy of it, though a faithful one, is to affirm what cannot be proved, and to imply what is incredible, namely, that there are shapes that *cannot* be perceived. Berkeley could no more believe this than he could believe that when we see a colour we are really seeing motions; and I imagine that in both these cases his incredulity was spontaneous, not derived from the metaphysical advantage he was to draw from it. The incredulity is so natural. He just failed to find a reason for taking properties that are immediately perceived and duplicating them in a supposititious realm inaccessible to perception; still less could he conceive why the gratuitous inaccessible duplicates should be called the real properties. He therefore flatly denied the twofold existence of sensory objects. And in so doing, he disposed not only of matter but also of scepticism regarding the worth of sense-knowledge, for an idea is only subject to doubt when it is supposed to stand for something else. What it *is* it itself reveals. What it represents is, however, nothing. Some ideas are not good copies and others bad ones, for none of them are copies at all. They are simply themselves. Therefore the very shape I see is the real shape; and the very colour I see, and the very sound I hear, and the very heat I feel, are real, not masks of invisible motions. The only escape from scepticism is insistence on the immediacy of perception.

An interesting feature of this hard-headed argument against representationism is that it can stand apart from the Cartesian presupposition, the "way of ideas," from which it started. It could be approved and repeated—indeed, it has been—by some of the extreme realists whom the twentieth century has brought forth. So far Berkeley was right in claiming that he had vindicated the naïve assessment of perceptual knowledge. The corporeal world is what I apprehend it to be when I use and trust my senses, and what I apprehend is the corporeal world itself, matter in the only meaningful sense of the word. But Berkeley assimilated all this to the presupposition that the directly apprehended world consists of

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ideas, of objects inseparable from awareness. As he himself put it, he sided with both the unreflective man and the philosopher, combining the insights of both—the horse-sense of the former that seeing is believing, that what I perceive is precisely what is there to be perceived, and the “discovery” of the latter that what I perceive is an idea. It is the union of the two that yields his famous formula *esse is percipi*. He urged that this formula was an eirenicon, a word of reconciliation between the man in the street and the philosopher. In his day, instead, the man in the street (for example, Dr. Johnson!) ridiculed its philosophic premiss, and the philosopher ridiculed its naïve premiss. This is ever the fate of the mediator. In our own day, the philosopher tends to accept the naïve premiss, while the plain man, sophisticated out of his plainness, just scratches his head. For Berkeley, however, the formula is axiomatic. That the existence of stones and trees consists in their being perceived is certainly not obvious. But if we reduce them to all that they exhibit themselves to be, to sensory qualities, the formula becomes “the *esse* of *perceptibilia* is their *percipi*,” which is less paradoxical. And if we then find ourselves quite unable to read any meaning whatever into the conception of a sensory quality such as shape that *cannot* be seen or touched (Locke’s “real” shape), we almost see the formula as Berkeley himself saw it.

So far matter has been disposed of as an unnecessary and unintelligible duplicate of the sensed world. It may still be affirmed as the substance of that world. Berkeley’s rejection of material substance is straightforward. The term “substance” must be understood either literally or metaphorically. Taken literally, it means something extended (“standing under”). Now if material substance is extended, it is perceptible. But it is by Locke defined as essentially imperceptible; and since he postulated it to provide something in which extension can inhere, it cannot itself be extended. In its literal sense, therefore, Locke’s material substance is self-contradictory. Is it, then, a metaphor? But “a metaphoris abstinendum philosopho” (*De Motu*, 3). The maxim is, of course, a sound one, but hard to follow, and Berkeley knew quite well that Locke introduced the postulate of material substance in order to provide a principle of attachment or unity for the fleeting objects of sense-perception. He agreed that such a principle is needed, that these objects do not wander about self-existently. But he could find no decently definable term, no tolerable concept, to express any attachment or unity on the side of the objects or beyond them, and therefore concluded that their only anchor and bond is their associated presentation to consciousness. This connection is factual; anything else is theory; the minimal requirement of theory is that it shall be intelligible; and Locke’s postulate is unintelligible. In

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the only sense that remains for the word "substance" in relation to the corporeal world, mind is the substance of sensory qualities. This is the first clear instance of the deliberate metamorphosis of substance into subject. Perceived qualities "inhere" in consciousness not by way of mode, not as qualifying it, but as objects over against it. They qualify nothing.

The last plea for matter is that even if we can give it no other content or function, we need it as the cause of sensory qualities. Berkeley agrees that these must have a cause, and that this cause is neither the qualities themselves nor the finite consciousness to which they happen to occur. They are not produced by one another because the testimony of consciousness gives no evidence whatever of it, and things whose whole nature is to be manifest cannot have occult powers. They are not produced by things like themselves but imperceptible because there are no such things. And they are not produced by us because they are the very qualities which the testimony of consciousness distinguishes as not produced by us. By the same testimony of consciousness, however, we do produce other ideas, and since, where reason gives of itself no guide, the analogies of experience are to be followed whenever there are any, we have to conclude that the ideas of sense are produced by a mental agency other than ours; by a single mind because they exhibit regularities in a single order of being, by a beneficent mind because their regularities are adapted to human needs, and by an infinite mind because nothing less accounts for their vastness. This is Berkeley's new proof of God, based on the doctrine of *esse is percipi*.

Here, in my belief, his interest in speculation, up to the time of his retirement to Cloyne, stopped. For himself and his readers, he held, such a conclusion required nothing more than the acceptance of its practical religious consequences. The internal development and extension of the theory he reserved for systematic works—Parts II and III of the *Principles*—which he never wrote, giving only glimpses in occasional writings such as the *De Motu* and the *Analyst*. His *Alciphron*, the product of the only real leisure he had in the twenty years between his first Dublin period and his going to Cloyne, is the nearest we get to a continuation, but it is richer in criticism than in construction. In the early period it was sufficient for him that he had sketched the main outlines of a philosophy, the *principles*, not the detailed organization, of human knowledge. And the principles he had so far formulated and defended arise only out of the problem of the status and origination of the order of objects given to us in sense. He has shown that even from this lowly level, and by a procedure consisting so largely of negations, of pruning by Ockham's razor, reasoning can raise us to a transcendent real, even to God. This is a *tour de force* without a parallel in the history

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of philosophy, the result of an original and inflexible simplicity of mind content to establish the minimal certainties of thought because they are the maximal certainties of life. Perhaps he simplified too much. If we attach any significance to the work begun by Kant and Hegel and to the achievements of nineteenth and twentieth-century science—for not forestalling these Berkeley can scarcely be blamed—we shall certainly find his system too attenuated. But simplicity is the ideal and criterion of science, and Berkeley's insistence on it in philosophy is a healthy admonition, and a welcome counterweight within idealism to the heavy involutions of the German tradition. A French writer has well said: "S'il est vrai que l'auteur des choses agisse toujours par les voies les plus simples, Berkeley doit être bien près d'avoir surpris le plan créateur."¹

Of his outline the above is itself a much abbreviated outline, omitting his criticism and restatement of the doctrine of abstraction, his theory of vision and visual language and of space, time, and number; omitting also any discussion of the questions whether he has logically avoided solipsism, whether his resort to (or concession of) archetypes is inconsistent with his denial of representationism, whether his account of thinghood is adequate, and other questions. Every statement of the outline bristles with challenges, which I have ignored for the sake of continuity of exposition. One paper cannot embrace all these. That they raise, indirectly when not directly, the basic problems of psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics is the chief reason why Berkeley is so often a text for philosophers and a text-book for their students. He suits the former because he leaves them room to use their wits in the eliciting and testing of special consequences; he is helpful to the latter because he keeps the big issues always to the fore.

Of his undeveloped doctrine of mind, to which the unwritten Part II of his *Principles* was to be devoted,² a word may be added with a view to removing a common misunderstanding. The implied criticism of Hume is often repeated that Berkeley, after rejecting the conception of material substance, had no right to retain the conception of spiritual substance. The criticism is confused. In the first place, Berkeley's arguments against the first do not apply at all obviously to the second. They turn on the incoherence of supposing anything "under" extension, on the impossibility of conceiving how the material could produce ideas, and on the superfluity of postulating a material principle of union among ideas. It was not because he could not find it given in sense-experience that he rejected it, but because he judged it to be meaningless and useless,

¹ G. Lyon, *L'idéalisme en Angleterre au 18 siècle* (1888), p. 337.

² See *Commonplace Book*, nos. 511 and 810, and *Principles*, § 144.

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creating problems and solving none, having "no foundation, either in sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority."¹ It is possible that he was wrong in this judgment, but he was not inconsistent; if he was wrong, the criticism that proves it is external, not immanent. In the second place, it is very doubtful whether the conception of spiritual substance he retained was analogous to the conception of material substance he rejected. His spiritual substance, it seems to me, was neither an α nor a postulate but a fact of experience; he meant by it the self-apprehending oneness of his own experiencing, the continuity of awareness that declares itself in remembering, and in following out a problem, and the power, introspectively evidenced, of producing new ideas. His taking the unity seriously, metaphysically, was a consequence of his belief in the veracity of consciousness; and the possibility that the unity is only derived or phenomenal, belonging wholly to the body, was not overlooked but logically excluded by his idealistic interpretation of the corporeal world. Hume is not Berkeley made consistent. The only material premiss they have in common is that the immediate objects of sense-perception are ideas, and Hume made these ideas the source and criterion of everything, whereas Berkeley made them the source and criterion of nothing but what alone they are relevant to, that is, knowledge of the corporeal world. From the outset, Berkeley recognized the peculiarities of mind or minding, again and again warning us not to construe it after the analogy of the corporeal, the sensory, the minded. It is the essentially active, ideas being the passive, and therefore even as object it is not an idea. This doctrine cannot be torn out of the *first* edition of the *Principles* without making nonsense of the whole book. What he added in the second edition was the name "notions" (which in the first edition had been used as a synonym for "ideas"), to fix for the terminologically minded a distinction which he had made clearly enough before. But few, I fear, will believe this as long as Fraser's imperfect collation of the two editions is the only text available.

To say anything about the *Siris* is to risk adding to the misunderstandings of that curious work. I certainly dare not claim that any thoroughly objective interpretation of it is possible. My own reading of it is heretical. I am not quite happy about the stock saying that it is the work of his old age. A philosopher of all men is scarcely old at fifty-nine. If the book is senile, its author's senility was premature. I doubt too whether the book, even when the tar-water is emptied out of it, is fairly treated when it is regarded as an essay in philosophy. Philosophy is at least argumentation, and of this there is scarcely anything in the *Siris*, which is much more a sequence than a consequence of affirmations and negations. When

¹ *Three Dialogues*, Fraser (1901), vol. i, p. 462.

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Whitehead¹ treated Berkeley in close connection with the Romantic Revival, he could have added by way of particular evidence that De Quincey and Blake and Coleridge were fond of Berkeley. But it was the Berkeley of this late book. After Berkeley's death, it seems, no one read the *Siris* except such romantic writers until it was resurrected—the first reprint since 1747—in Fraser's great edition of the *Works* (1871), since when it has been either praised as a deepening of his idealism or censured as a recantation of his early "sensationalism." The latter appears to me to be much further from the truth than the former. If there was indeed a *volle face*, it was not what it is usually represented to be. He still rejects abstract ideas in the only sense in which he ever rejected them (secs. 323, 335); there is still no absolute space or motion (270 f.); force is still only a mathematical hypothesis (234, 246, 250), and attraction still only a phenomenon and therefore not an explanatory factor but a fact to be explained (243, 245); natural phenomena are still simply what we perceive them to be (292); body is still inactive (248), physics dealing only with observed uniformities (250), corporeal "causes" being still entirely secondary, *συναίτιοι*, "necessary to assist, not the governor, but the governed" (160). And, of course, all bodies are still relative to mind (251). In all this Berkeley is but summarizing, in the aphorisms which the absence of argument makes possible and with the genius of perfect mastery of his thoughts, the main positions of his earlier works. Even the much-quoted saying, "Strictly the sense knows nothing" (253, cp. 304 f.), rings in its context with no unfamiliarity except one of emphasis. The only way to know a sensible object is to sense it, and it is still just what we sense it to be; but while all of us have senses, not all of us have (or at any rate use) understanding, which is requisite for the knowledge of their causes (cp. 264, 330): and Berkeley always held that *this* knowledge is an affair of reasoning. In the earlier days polemical exigencies moved him to defend sense; now other external provocations prompted him to exalt with an emphasis which his former problem did not demand the other factor in knowledge. The new emphasis does, however, betoken a deep change of attitude, the full explanation of which is an unsolved biographical problem, but only biographical, not philosophical. Accompanying it was an affection and respect, quite new in its extravagance, for the writings of the ancients. Through a farrago of quotations from and references to them he seeks to add authority to his own distinctive doctrines. Of this most uncharacteristic trait we fortunately have the hint of an explanation from Berkeley himself. The general temper of an age is influenced by the prevalent philosophy, his own age by the "corpuscularian and mechanical philosophy," which had given to

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 106.

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interests as well as to thinking a strongly materialistic bias; but "had the philosophy of Socrates and Pythagoras prevailed in this age . . . we should not have seen interest take so general and fast hold on the minds of men, nor public spirit reputed to be *γενναῖον εὐήθειαν*, a generous folly, among those who are reckoned to be the most knowing as well as the most getting part of mankind" (331). What led Berkeley from the moderns to the ancients was their stable sense of practical values. So that Berkeley's final lapse into scholarship was, after all, but a consequence of those practical prepossessions which had moved him to write the *Principles* and his other works, to sail to America, and to advertise to the world the virtues of tar-water.

OXFORD AND PHILOSOPHY

G. R. G. MURE, M.C., M.A.

I HAVE often wished that someone would write a History of Oxford Honour Schools. But I want that work written for reasons which the title does not immediately suggest.

To begin with, there is a certain attitude towards life associated with Oxford, of which we all recognize the outward forms. One of these is a sort of irony which, aggravated in the acuter cases by a slight drop of the larynx in speaking as in the voice-production of a bad contralto singer, used to be called the Oxford manner. But perhaps the Oxford manner died with the late Lord Curzon. Max Beerbohm showed a prettier side of the Oxford ethos when he said, "We are sent to a Public School to have the nonsense knocked out of us, and then we come up to Oxford to have it all gently put back again." It is maliciously illustrated in the story of the Oxford rowing man and the Cambridge rowing man, each of whom paid the other a visit in order to inspect the rival river. The Oxford man, having explained how much broader and livelier are the waters of the Isis than those of the Cam, led his friend into Christ Church Meadow through Rose Lane, and then turned left-handed, taking the longer route to the barges, in order to show him that Oxford had something comparable to the Backs as well as a better river to row on. "Oh!" said the Cambridge oarsman, when they reached the bank of the Cherwell, "it's not so very much broader!" Shortly afterwards the Oxford man returned the visit, and found himself with his friend on Clare Bridge. Leaning nonchalantly over the parapet, he remarked, "And is this the Tab?"

I will not try to describe this Oxford attitude more closely. Those who have it find the very attempt to define it a degree too ingenuous and unclever. That is characteristic of it. And yet in a hesitant age, which is beginning to feel for its roots in the past because it does not much like the look of its future, it might be good for Oxford too to take stock of itself; to examine historically the cast of mind which lies behind its outward manner and address; to ask what has produced this ethos, and what it has produced; even perhaps what is likely to become of it in the future.

That is one reason why I want a History of Oxford Honour Schools. Another is that though, when we are criticized, it may be dignified in us to refrain from active apology, yet I believe it is our business to help the world in general to a knowledge of what it is

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criticizing. I want not propaganda but impartial publicity; not self-advertisement but a frank effort to discover and give an account of the faith that is in us—or has at least been in us for the last few generations.

Those are two points which my historian will bear in mind.

Lord Curzon swallowed every academic honour. Max did not; he ploughed in Greats. So we might think that of "the sweet food of academic institution," as Lamb calls it, which nourished two such diverse talents, and which works a change even in the idlest passman, the actual curriculum is not the *pièce de résistance*. But I think we should be wrong. At any rate, my author will work on the hypothesis that Literae Humaniores have been the vital impulse—or, it may be, the lethal virus—which has permeated Oxford education as most of us habitually picture it to ourselves. Perhaps no one will be shocked by that. But—as the title of this article suggests—he will try to contend further that within Literae Humaniores philosophical studies have constituted a centre of influence which has radiated outwards through the teaching of the Classics to other humane subjects, and thence even to Pass Moderations and the non-scientific Groups; which has by leakage through channels official and unofficial even come to touch faintly the daily life of young men whose contact with the curriculum is superficial, and who would be astonished at the suggestion of any such sophistication.

That may seem less likely. It is of course true that this radiation diminishes constantly, fusing differently, as it lessens, with each fresh positive element which it meets, until at its circumference you can hardly recognize the blend. Modern Greats has altered in quality, but also strengthened, the philosophic efflux. Mathematics and natural science have naturally been little affected, and when my historian comes to deal with them, their probable future relations with philosophy in Oxford may fill one of his later chapters, but he will not much concern himself with their disconnection in the past. Yet I fancy that one can usually tell an Oxford scientist from one bred elsewhere.

A History of Oxford Honour Schools should, I suppose, open with a discussion, trivial and quadivial, of the medieval curriculum. But in the Middle Ages, and even in the eighteenth century, Oxford showed no very obvious germ of that distinctive character which it acquired in the nineteenth. Dr. Johnson's directly combative methods of conversation were not in the Oxford manner. It is with the year 1800 that the work itself will begin, and I will indicate a few of the facts which will constitute a part of its material.

In 1802 Oxford's first Honours Examination took place in accordance with the Examination Statute of 1800. The two candidates

who presented themselves were tested by the newly appointed Public Examiners in Divinity, Ethics, Rhetoric, Logic, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and the chief Latin and Greek classics. In 1807 a school of Mathematics and Physics separated off from *Literae Humaniores*, but proficiency in the Rudiments of Religion and in Lit. Hum. remained a necessary condition of the B.A. degree. Successful candidates were placed in three classes, and the further examination for the Master's degree was abolished. In 1825 the examiners were divided between the two schools on the ground that they were overworked and that it was becoming difficult to find men competent to examine both in Lit. Hum. and mathematics.

1830 is an important date. The statute of this year defines the scope of Lit. Hum. to include Greek and Latin Language and History, Rhetoric and Poetics, and the Moral and Political Sciences, "*quatenus a scriptoribus veteribus derivandae sint, quas tamen aliquando, prout expedire videbitur, ex neotericorum scriptis illustrari permittimus. Dialecticam (meaning, I suppose, Logic) . . . adnumeramus.*" Leave is given to the examiners to conduct their business either in Latin or English; to set the same question to several candidates in the written part of the examination; to read the papers "*etiam extra locum examinationis*"; to send candidates into another room to do their writing, and even to interrupt the *viva voce* proceedings in order to allow candidates to write.

One may infer that the written element in the examination was now greatly increased—there survives in Bodley a protest, circulated before the passing of the statute, against a proposed abolition of oral examination in mathematics—but one cannot conclude that writing was a complete innovation. 1831 is the date of the first printed examination paper in Bodley, and it may be that previously questions in MS. were handed to the candidates, a different one for each; not a very great burden in the early days when the examiners usually outnumbered their victims.

Thus in 1831 begins a more or less philosophical written examination, the detail of which can be traced in Bodley with fair continuity through the period during which Oxford acquired the peculiar but elusive ethos which I touched upon at the beginning of this article.

The 1831 Logic and Rhetoric paper contains twenty-three questions. It is not stated how many of these the candidate is expected to attempt, but I imagine he was intended to do most of them; for spaces are left on the question-paper itself for his replies. To us who know how hard a modern Honours candidate finds it to produce more than three decent answers in three hours, this will seem a trifle elementary, but there was probably still at that time opportunity for everyone to expatiate more largely in *viva*, and I have heard that there is still an American University which contends for

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the practice of setting one hundred questions to be answered by a plain yes or no. The character of the paper as a whole reveals—naturally—the current narrow and formal tradition of logic. Passages from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Cicero *De Officiis*, Horace *Epistles*, etc., are to be put into strict logical form, and so on. One question, however, rather mysteriously moots the supplementation of syllogism by “the higher logic.” I do not feel sure what is meant. Of three questions on language one shows some imagination: “Why is language figurative when poor—why when rich?” One could judge that with some knowledge of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, *Categories*, and *Prior*, but not *Posterior*, *Analytics*, and also, I suppose, of Aldrich’s Compendium, one might do pretty well. A smattering of the *Poetics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* would help. Also quite naturally, a background of good stiff, dogmatic, Protestant theology is evident. Question 6 is specially delightful: “The Romanists maintain the authority of the Church as paramount to that of the Scriptures. By what line of argument do they maintain this, and is it tenable?” Thus zealously do the examiners carry out the spirit of the statute, making doubly sure that the candidate, already examined in Divinity, shall not gain his degree unversed in the rudiments of religion. In a Pass paper of the same year candidates are bidden “Examine with respect to its logical nature as a definition the description of the Church in the Nineteenth Article,” and told to deduce a definition of “a neighbour” from the parable of the Good Samaritan.

The Moral Philosophy paper, on the other hand, is a single question for an essay. It is worth quoting as a fresh illustration of the dogmatic atmosphere spread by the religious beliefs of the time, and forced upon candidates in the Logic and Rhetoric paper by the exiguous space allotted for their answers. “The difference, and the only difference” between ‘acts of duty’ and ‘acts of prudence,’ says Paley, “is this, that in the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the other case we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come.” The examiners know better, but they are as cocksure as Paley in guiding the candidate. The question continues: “Examine the grounds and consequences of this principle, and show by a discussion of all the authorities with which you are acquainted, that the obligations of morality are perfect *in themselves*” (*Italics the examiners’*).

At this period the examination took place twice a year, and there still survives W. E. Gladstone’s answer to the Moral Philosophy question set in the Michaelmas term of 1831. Evidently the merciful rule that all the papers must be destroyed by the examiners as soon as their list is completed was not yet in force. I only know Gladstone’s effusion from an excerpt in Mallet’s *History of the*

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University of Oxford, Vol. III, p. 228. The question, which is not given, would appear to have been, in some shape or other, "Is conscience innate or factitious?" The Grand Young Man began: "It will be my endeavour, in the consideration of this question, to adhere as closely as possible, in point of division and arrangement, to the order suggested by the form in which it has been proposed. The principal heads may be thus briefly stated:

- I. To discuss

i. the absolute	}	compatibility of virtue and self-denial.
ii. the relative		
- II. To contrast the conclusion thus obtained with the Stoical doctrine of *ἀπάθεια*.
Also with a particular reference to Aristotle.
- III. By considering the nature and office of conscience, to inquire how far the question whether it is factitious or innate is affected by anything hitherto stated.

The topics embraced will be so numerous, that a brief and I fear often an abrupt notice must suffice for each."

According to Mallet, Gladstone then wrote fourteen long pages with references to Aristotle, Locke, and Butler, and finally decided that conscience is innate. He perorates with a noble apology: "I am aware that this paper must from its length, and from the time it occupies to get anything like an outline of the subject, have many marks of haste, and probably much of repetition and omission besides more serious errors—and in particular that the latter part is abrupt and slovenly—but as much has been done as time and hesitation would allow me. There is not even time to re-peruse." This is not quite the Oxford manner, but it was obviously Disraeli rather than Gladstone who ought to have been educated at Oxford. Gladstone, however, got his first. His diary throws further light on the examination. In contrast with the other papers, it seems that candidates were allowed as much space for their essay as they liked, and as much time as most of them could have wanted. "In morning," writes Gladstone, "getting up Roman History; but on going into the schools, found a moral essay on a very fine but very difficult subject. Wrote hard for five hours, but how effectively I have not the least conception."

In 1833 Logic has a paper to itself, and there is another question introducing good sound dogma by a side wind: "Why are the oracles of the Heathen, generally speaking, not to be considered as legitimate propositions?" It was five years now since John Newman had begun to preach at St. Mary's against the torpor of contemporary Anglicanism, the "cold, self-sufficient, self-wise tranquillity" of its Natural Theology. The Oxford Movement was already afoot—the

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first three *Tracts for the Times* were published in this year—but fortunately, though for the wrong reason, it is wholly ignored by the Public Examiners. Fortunately, because the Oxford Movement on its theoretical side was obscurantist and illiberal; genuinely free-thinking could not at that time be learnt at Oxford officially or unofficially, and Greats papers with a Tractarian bias could only have been a change for the worse. For the wrong reason, because the motive for exclusion can have been nothing but the hostility of the old dogmatism for the new.

Then I find a lamentable hiatus of thirteen years in the Bodleian records. This is the more unfortunate, since it covers the years in which Jowett and Matthew Arnold had to face the examiners. The 1846 Logic paper is definitely less formal and more speculative. Perhaps the ingenious Whateley had something to do with this.

On the other hand, though the number of questions is reduced to sixteen, the total area of virgin paper set before the examinee amounts roughly to three foolscap pages. In the Logic paper of the following year, 1847, he is requested to define and distinguish Desire, Will—Understanding, Reason—Appetite, Affection, Motive, in just about 15 square inches! There is in this paper a reference to the name of Aldrich, and the companion paper on Rhetoric and Ethics mentions Butler. These are the first extant instances—bar the quotation from Paley—in which the examiners openly avail themselves of the statutory permission to illustrate the classical basis of their syllabus from the writings of the moderns. There is a question on induction, but no explicit reference to J. S. Mill, whose *Logic* was published in 1843. But this lag in the admission of new authorities was perhaps not unwholesome. The urgent need was obviously to widen the classical basis of the examination, and there is a quotation from the *Posterior Analytics* and a question on Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence. There is also a demand in the Michaelmas Logic paper of the same year for the illustration of some thesis from the Platonic dialogues. Despite the terse textbook type of answer which the papers still obviously invite, the emergence of Plato and of the *Posterior Analytics* beside the more desiccated portions of Aristotle, and the absence of theological insinuation, do suggest a rather ampler air of speculative freedom. Greats is beginning to entail some sort of effort to think without dogmatic presuppositions.¹ Yet evidently the great men who were

¹ It might be thought that the free, dialectical, character of philosophical studies was likely to vanish with the substitution of written for oral examination, but all the evidence goes to show that oral discussion and examination had been a pretty cut-and-dried affair. Rather the paradox is that the introduction of Plato into the curriculum gave the spirit of freedom, whereas the old oral examination had preserved only the letter.

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young dons at the time, and were destined to refashion the mind of the University, broke away from academic tradition rather than built upon the foundations of their undergraduate studies. Jowett must have taken his schools about 1838, and his passion for Plato must have been as extra-curricular as Shelley's had been twenty years before. Nor can he have acquired his interest in Hegel from his tutors. Matthew Arnold's place is nearly central among the makers of that liberal, ironic, spirit of Oxford, which swings in self-expression from the silly-clever to the Olympian—an epithet early applied to Arnold by his contemporaries. But Arnold's mind was more literary and poetical than philosophic, and poetry is a freer growth, or at least more secret in its heredity, than the less purely imaginative human activities. Though they be close cousins, poetry is not born of philosophy as poets have sometimes—more often than philosophers—forgotten. Robert Bridges, like Matthew Arnold, took a second class in Greats. His *Testament of Beauty* designs to lift, or shift, speculation into poetry, but the thought is hackneyed, or it is, apart from flashes of felicitous phrasing, halting and confused: the pure poetry of its few descriptive passages comes always as a relief. Arnold was wiser in his choice of poetic themes.

After 1847 I find nothing until 1863. In this second unhappy gap falls the 1850 Commission, which, I suppose, really initiated modern Oxford. Separate schools of Natural Science, Law, and Modern History had already been inaugurated, and it soon became possible to combine any two Honour Schools for the purpose of obtaining a degree. So Lit. Hum. lost its monopoly, but, judging from the papers of 1863, the effect of this and other reforms in the University was to impart fresh life to philosophical teaching.

There now appear three separate papers on the *Republic* of Plato, the *Ethics*, and the *Politics*, of Aristotle, with "gobbets" for comment. There is a Political Philosophy paper and a Moral Philosophy paper, in each of which, however, eight out of the twelve questions set are definitely confined to Greek Philosophy. And once again the only modern authority named is Bishop Butler. The Logic paper begins with a question on the relations of Logic, Psychology, and Metaphysics, and invites criticism of the syllogism. It is far more general in scope than anything which precedes the sixteen-year interval. In a paper of five questions on the history of philosophy four are devoted to Greek philosophy, but the fifth contains a quotation from Kant. He had been dead for sixty years, but German philosophy did not spread very rapidly across the North Sea. All these papers show that the examinee of this time no longer wrote on the question-paper itself. One would like to know the precise date at which the old practice was abandoned: probably it was in the early 'fifties.

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The remarkable features of the 1863 examination strike me as being these. (1) The character of all the questions is undogmatic and genuinely speculative. Despite Pusey and the still unabolished Tests, philosophy is now being philosophically studied. (2) Greek philosophy is still of course enormously preponderant, but the questions on it now cover a really wide range. The appearance of a separate paper on Plato's *Republic* is particularly significant. Aristotle can be studied at the same time intensely and unintelligently. Plato at once excites all minds but the least speculative. With the institution of the *Republic* as a set book—perhaps due to Jowett in the 'fifties—begins, I fancy, the policy which has built up the best in humane education at Oxford, the policy of conserving tenaciously in the syllabus, without regard to the date of their composition, the greatest works of liberal-minded men. It is a philosophical policy.

During the next ten years the influence of J. S. Mill becomes obvious, and in 1865 there first appears the name of Bacon. Bacon had died nearly two and a half centuries before, but now that he had come into his own he was destined to survive in every Logic paper until the Great War. Butler preserves his popularity as a moral philosopher. A reference to analytic and synthetic judgments, an appeal for an explanation of the term "transcendental," and even in 1869 an actual quotation from Kant, herald the tardy arrival of German philosophy.

The period 1870-80 shows an immensely important expansion. The History of Philosophy paper becomes less purely classical. The 1871 paper mentions Descartes, Berkeley, Spinoza, and Kant. The Logic paper of the same year ventures to inquire into modality. In 1875—just fifteen years after the memorable meeting of the British Association at which Huxley told the Bishop of Oxford that he would rather be descended from an ape than from a divine who employed authority to stifle truth—biology is first noticed in a logic question as to the evidence for the hereditary transmission of mental qualities. There is also actually a special subject paper on the philosophy of Kant, due, I presume, to the efforts of Green and Caird. In 1876—only forty-six years after his death—Hegel first appears on the scene. The Logic paper has a question on the possibility of constructing an *a priori* system of logic, and invites comment on Hegel's identification of the real and the rational.

The next ten years suggest a steady progress of idealism. In 1882 there is a question on the hypothetical judgment, and in 1887 its possible identity with the categorical is canvassed. In 1891 occurs the first quite obvious reference to Bradley. Yet still in the Logic paper Aristotle, Bacon, and Mill form a nucleus which dwindles very slowly before the idealist war of attrition until we reach the

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period of the Great War. The "gobbet" questions on the *Posterior Analytics* and the *Novum Organum* do not vanish until 1906.

The period of twenty years from 1894 is chiefly remarkable for a great diversity of special subject papers. Besides Kant I find Psychology, William James's Psychology, Aristotle's metaphysical system with *Metaphysics* EZH, Descartes, and Spinoza, and also Political Economy.

Since the War special subjects have declined, and the Logic paper has been stretched to bursting point to include new philosophical theories. But at this critical juncture I should like to pause for a moment in order to instruct my potential historian. For I think he should select the end of the nineteenth century in order to make a very serious effort to grip the significance of Oxford in a wider world of ideas and actions. No doubt he will have done his best to ascertain from written records the effects during the first seventy-five years of the nineteenth century of an Oxford education conducted under the aegis of *Literae Humaniores*; but I fancy that what at any rate the more middle aged of us still think of as the Oxford ethos was largely built up during the last quarter of the century—so far as philosophy is concerned, by the English interpretation of a teutonic idealism, the roots of which go back as far as Socrates. He will not of course be tempted to minimize the Hellenic influence, in which the continuous study of Plato has been the most important factor. I am certain that without the Platonic Socrates there would have been no Oxford manner; though for the worst of it one need, I suppose, as little blame Socrates as one need hold Hegel responsible for the Great War, or the founder of Christianity for the Spanish Inquisition. But I am sure that without Socrates Oxford would never have seemed both a source of sophistication and critical irony and the home of lost causes. On the other hand, my historian will not forget the strongly British cast which for good or for evil was impressed, particularly by Bradley, upon the domesticated German philosophy. We have with the Greeks a common difference from the Germans in our liking of an amateurish pose.

Then I think it would be well to collect some evidence from tutors and examiners of that period as to the conduct and the efficacy of the examinational process itself. My historian will ask *inter alia* the general question how far the ability to carry in his mind over a period of more than two years a mass of material in various stages of undigestedness is a mark of the really able man. He will inquire of men of all nations who went out into the world after taking their degree in Greats during this twenty-five or thirty years, what went on in their minds while they were working for schools, and what has been the after-effect upon their general outlook. He will, of course, find himself at once amid a most befogging cloud of

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witness, and he will have, too, to compare the evidence of those who entrusted their minds to other Honour Schools. He will have to study the careers of great men in all walks of life. Everywhere he will find it hard to select without caprice. But I think he ought to try.

When he has completed this task, he will have, finally, to say something of the post-War period. I do not find it easy to help him here. It is now possible for two candidates to obtain first classes in Lit. Hum. having read no philosophy in common, although the alternatives to the *Republic* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* are rarely offered. In Modern Greats two candidates specializing in philosophy need not have opened one book in common save the more important works of Kant. Once the same men examined in Divinity, Classics, Philosophy, Mathematics, and Natural Science. Now philosophical examiners have often to rely largely on their colleagues' judgment on subjects in which they themselves have not specialized. Doubtless the same difficulty arises nowadays, through inevitable expansion, in all Honour Schools, but in philosophy the threatened break in continuity makes an especially acute problem. Faith in the old main stream of speculation, even as an examinational instrument, is growing weaker. Philosophy has, indeed, its healthy revolutions like all else that is alive, but until we discover the old in what is new, it is hard to see what is going to become of philosophy as an education for the ordinary more or less able student. It is often said that the purpose of reading philosophy is not to inform a man but to make him think, and it is added that an examiner can generally gauge a candidate's ability pretty accurately by his style and consistency, however unfamiliar the theory which he is expounding. There is much truth in both these contentions, but the lesson of thinking is very ill learnt without considerable study of what has been thought in the past, and thought through long periods of steady and consistent speculative striving by men whose greatness is as well established as any human reputation can be. The danger of criticism *in vacuo* was sufficiently familiar to Plato, and our study of nineteenth-century examination papers soon began to reveal a consistent effort to give youth something solid to try its teeth on, which should at the same time be not unstimulating to its palate.

Not many years ago all this would have sounded priggish and platitudinous; just the sort of thing which Oxford knew but did not talk about. Now I am less sure. One would like to know what print the most up-to-date philosophical tutor sets upon his pupils' minds. My experience as an examiner is not comforting in this respect. New countries are now often offered us as the promised land of philosophy, but I am far from sure that some of them have not

by some quite acute minds in the past been already prospected and found uncultivable. It may be that some fresh concentration of philosophic thought is soon to dawn, but at present it looks rather as if the only link between our philosophical examinations and those of the past will soon be the spirit of that injunction to examiners which occurs in the 1825 statute, and is perhaps even older: "*Lenitati ubique consultum volumus, modo ne ea sit, quae Juniorum socordiae patrocinari videatur.*" In short, "Be as kind as you can without letting through the really idle man."

Still, even that relic of the past would be something. I have no wish to dispirit my imaginary historian by excessive pessimism, and by the time he comes to write his final chapter he will have had every chance to sharpen his insight in dealing with the pre-War period. He will have had to decide whether there is more of Oxford in the irrepressible tartness and the stimulating agnosticism of Jowett, the prototype of all good Greats tutors; or in the strenuous, even saintly, liberalism of his gentler pupil, T. H. Green, who nevertheless voiced undergraduate opinion in favour of the biologists against the bishops at the meeting of the British Association in 1860. He will have had to set the smoothly rounded mentality of Bernard Bosanquet beside the sterner temper, logically just but humanly a trifle fierce, of F. H. Bradley, who called his dog "Pusey" in order that he might vent vicariously upon it his feelings towards that remarkable reactionary—an anecdote less sinister for the fact that Bradley adored dogs. He will have had to judge whether in Ruskin and in our Pre-Raphaelites—save perhaps William Morris—there was a certain absence of humour and self-criticism hardly assimilable, possibly even hostile, to essential Oxford. Blend the artistic and the academic, and too often you get the "arty." And what will he have seen in Oscar Wilde? A flash of Oxford's self, and a defect, too, of Oxford's native quality? Where will he have decided that A. E. Housman acquired his manner, poetic, critical and conversational? In Cambridge? No; rather, I think, in Oxford, where he ploughed in Greats, and wrote to the Chairman of Examiners asking from which class his name had been accidentally omitted. In considering the statesmen of this time, will he have found more characteristic of Oxford the crushing superiority of Lord Curzon or the robust insolence of the first Lord Birkenhead, loyallest of Oxford men?

Let my historian first answer these questions and the like. Then, if he has held a true course without shipwreck through the past, we can confidently leave him struggling to connect the 1936 Logic papers of Ancient and Modern Greats with our own uncertain tempered times.

THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN HUMAN CULTURE

PROFESSOR W. T. STACE

I THINK there is scarcely any academic subject regarding which there exists so much general misapprehension as philosophy. If I were to introduce myself to the readers of almost any newspaper as a professor of chemistry, or of classics, or of music, most of them would have a fairly good general idea of the nature of my subject. But if I were to introduce myself as a professor of philosophy, I suspect that many of them would vaguely associate my subject with theosophy, or palmistry, or occultism. Very few would have any notion of what philosophy really is. Even in a university, even among the learned themselves, it would be true to say, I think, that while the nature of such subjects as mathematics, classics, geology, is pretty well understood in a general way even by those who are not specialists in them, the nature of philosophy is not. If it is not by highly educated people mixed up with palmistry or occultism, it is at any rate apt to be regarded as hazy, high-flown talk, or as a kind of quibbling disputatiousness, or as the asking of vast, vague, and probably unanswerable questions about the universe.

So long as one does not trouble oneself about precisely accurate definitions, there is no great difficulty in describing, roughly at least, most other subjects; in saying at any rate what they are *about*. Biology is about living organisms. Astronomy is about the heavenly bodies. Physics is about light, heat, sound, and so on. The universe, man's total environment, has been cut up, more or less arbitrarily, into sections; and each science takes one section for its province. Botanists take the plants, zoologists the animals, astronomers the stars. Thus it comes about that, in spite of difficulties here and there about boundaries, these sciences are on the whole fairly easy to describe at least in a popular way.

But the difficulty in describing the nature of philosophy arises precisely from the fact that there is no one section of the universe which is more especially its province than any other. It does not, as most of the other sciences do, peg out a claim to some comparatively small area, and leave all the rest untouched. It is true, in a sense, that there is nothing anywhere in the universe with which philosophy is not concerned, and that the whole universe is its

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subject. And yet it has its own special content. And this is a kind of paradox. On the one hand, philosophy is clearly distinguished, by its own special content, from all other subjects. On the other hand, it overlaps them all. Clearly, then, philosophy is in some way peculiar as regards its relation to other branches of knowledge. What is this relation? What is the place of philosophy in the general scheme of human knowledge? I think it is obvious that this question will have to be answered before one can say what is the place of philosophy in education or in culture generally. And therefore I make no apology for beginning by considering the relation of philosophy to other branches of knowledge.

One theory on this subject is that the special function of philosophy is to co-ordinate the other branches of knowledge, to knit together the sciences into a single whole; to treat them in much the same way as a central government treats the several departments which come under it—except, of course, that philosophy has no special authority. This, I think, or something like it, was Herbert Spencer's conception of the business of philosophy.

I do not think this is at all a satisfactory view. It is out of date now, and no living philosopher would be likely to accept it. So I do not propose to discuss it at length. I will give only *one* reason for rejecting it—one among many which might be given—namely that it finds no place for many of the problems which have always been regarded as essentially philosophical. Take, for example, the problem whether the material world is in any way dependent for its existence upon mind. That it is so dependent has often been asserted in the past by idealistic philosophers, and is now again being asserted by some astronomers and scientists who are also amateur philosophers. This problem, which is certainly one of the most central and important of all philosophical problems, has no connection at all with the question how the sciences ought to be co-ordinated. It would therefore be excluded from philosophy by the suggested definition. And this definition, therefore, cannot be satisfactory.

Another idea, more common at the present day, is this. It is said that philosophy has for its subject-matter all those problems which have not *yet* been appropriated by any of the special sciences. Human knowledge is like a tree, with a trunk and many branches. The trunk, the parent stem, is, or was, philosophy. The branches are the special sciences. All knowledge was originally included in philosophy. But as knowledge has grown, it has differentiated itself. When the knowledge of any particular section of the universe became sufficiently advanced to stand alone, it separated itself off from the parent stem, and became a separate subject. There are still a certain number of subjects and problems regarding which our

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knowledge is so vague and rudimentary that they have not yet organized themselves into special sciences. This residue of problems not yet taken over by any science is what we call philosophy at the present day. I will call this view of the nature of philosophy the "trunk and branch view."

The evidence for this view is as follows. It is an historical fact that knowledge has grown much in the way described. Modern science has its roots historically in ancient Greece. The Greeks were the first people in the world to develop the scientific attitude. They were the first people to ask such questions as: What are the sun and the stars made of? What size are they? How far away are they from the earth? You may remember, as a picturesque piece of early astronomy, the assertion of Anaxagoras that the sun is a red-hot stone, larger than the Peloponnese—a statement which got Anaxagoras into serious trouble with the orthodox Greeks who regarded the sun as a god. The Greeks were also the first people who studied animals and plants in at all a scientific way. They were the first genuinely theoretical mathematicians. They were the first people to speculate as to whether the many different kinds of matter may not be ultimately reducible to a single kind of matter. They were the originators of the atomic theory, the theory that matter is ultimately composed of minute hard indivisible particles without colour, taste, or smell.

But the Greeks, or at any rate the early Greeks, did not distinguish between science and philosophy. The problems of the constitution of matter, the nature of the sun and stars, the properties of the triangle, were regarded by them as *philosophical* problems, and were not separated from such purely metaphysical problems as that concerning the nature of God. The scientist and the philosopher were in those days one and the same person. Aristotle, the philosopher, was the founder of the science of biology. Pure mathematics were mostly studied and advanced in the philosophical schools of such men as Pythagoras and Plato.

Thus philosophy in those days was practically synonymous with all human culture. Consequently, it was the parent stem out of which grew all branches of knowledge. It was only later, when the body of knowledge increased beyond the point at which one man could master it all, that specialization took place. The study of the stars broke off from the parent stem and became the special science of astronomy. And so with the other sciences.

It is commonly added that we can to some extent see the same sort of process going on even now. It is only in the last thirty or forty years that psychology has established itself as an independent science. It used, until then, to be included in philosophy. And following out this idea, I understand that Professor Alexander

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thinks there are signs that aesthetics is shortly about to separate itself from philosophy and become an independent science.

Now of course no one can dispute the historical facts just referred to. But for my part I do not think that this trunk and branch theory of the nature of philosophy and of its relation to other subjects is any more satisfactory than the view which we previously rejected. It implies that philosophy has no real content of its own. Philosophy is merely that which is one day going to be science, but which is not yet scientific enough. It is rudimentary science. And philosophy therefore has no real content distinct from what is, or ought to be, science. But in my view philosophy has a content of its own, quite distinct from anything that is, or ever could be, science.

I do not doubt that many problems, which were never properly speaking philosophical problems at all, have in the past been wrongly jumbled up with philosophy, and that these have gradually been sorted out and assigned to their proper spheres. That is all that the supposed historical evidence really proves. And no doubt psychology is a case in point. But I believe that there is a certain *core* of philosophical problems, which are in their nature philosophical, and *not* scientific, and which will therefore never be handed over to the special sciences, and will always remain what they are—philosophy proper.

As examples I would give all problems regarding the nature of what we call *values*—moral values, artistic values, and so on. I think that these can never, however far knowledge advances, become the subject-matter of science, or be dealt with by the methods which science adopts in other fields. I cannot here enter into a full justification of this statement, because it depends essentially upon the view one takes of the function of science and the nature of scientific method. But I will say that, as I see it, the sole business of science is to describe facts and events, to tell us what happens, what has happened, what will happen. I do not think it is at all the business of science to estimate the *value* of what happens, to say what *ought* to happen, or to say that one event is *better* than another. All such questions of value fall, in my opinion, within the sphere of philosophy.

The biologist, for example, tells us that organic species have evolved. Man is descended from ape-like ancestors, and originally from creatures which can scarcely be distinguished from little lumps of moving slime. That, you see, is an account of actual facts and events, of what has actually *happened* on the planet. It is the business of the evolutionary biologist to discover and piece together these facts and events, and to give, if possible, a complete description of them. And when he has done that, his task is finished.

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But now suppose I begin to ask, as regards evolution, such questions as the following: Is the change from protozoon to man a change for the *better*? Is it an *advance*? Is a man in any way a *higher* being than a protozoon, or a higher being than a dog? Or has the process of change, traced out by the biologist, been merely a process of change from one indifferent thing to another? Or—another possibility—is this whole conception of better and worse, of higher and lower, as applied to evolution, a misconception, an illusion? Are these merely *human* values, which have no application to affairs outside human society, no application at any rate to events on the cosmic scale? Is it altogether false, or meaningless, to apply conceptions of value to the non-human universe? Or what is the truth of this matter?

Such questions of value, I say, fall outside the sphere of biology. They belong to philosophy. And they will always belong to philosophy, and will never, at any time in the future, come to belong to biology, or to any other science, as the trunk and branch theory would have us believe. Or at least this must be so, if what I said just now about the nature and functions of science is true, namely that the sole function of science is to describe what *happens*, and that it is in no way concerned with the valuation of what happens.

Of course an individual biologist may very well have opinions on these questions. And his opinions may very well be interesting and important, although he will have, if his opinion is to be of any real value, to take into account many considerations besides his bare biological facts, considerations with which biology cannot supply him, but with which philosophy can. But however that may be, the important point is that, in having such opinions, he has really ceased to be a pure biologist, and has become a philosopher.

I have given the problem of values as an example of a problem which belongs, and must always belong, to philosophy, in order to show that the trunk and branch theory of philosophy, which implies that philosophy has no content of its own, cannot be true. But I do not mean to imply that the problem of values is the sole content of philosophy. I do not mean to say that the relation between philosophy and the sciences is that science deals with what happens, philosophy with the valuation of what happens. That would be far too simple a division of labour. And philosophy has many problems of its own, which are not scientific, and which yet are not in any sense problems of valuation. And I will try now to indicate what, in my opinion, the special nature of philosophy is, and what its relations to the sciences are.

The view which I advocate may best be described by saying that, in my opinion, philosophy is concerned with the search for *ultimate* principles, the attempt to push all knowledge back to its *ultimate*

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grounds, to answer *ultimate* questions; and that it is distinguished both from the sciences and from all other branches of knowledge by this fact. I would, in short, define philosophy as the knowledge of ultimate principles.

Of course you will say, and quite rightly, that this is a very vague definition. For what is the meaning of the word "ultimate" here? I certainly think it ought to be defined. And I think perhaps it could be defined by a process of careful logical analysis. But I think I can better convey to you something of what I mean when I speak of ultimate principles and questions if I give you a few examples than if I attempt the difficult logical feat of defining "ultimate."

You will find, if you take almost any subject of human discourse—whether it is a scientific subject or any other—that it leads *back*, upon reflection, to problems and questionings of a very fundamental character, problems and questionings which are not usually considered at all by those who specialize in that subject. These problems constitute, I should say, the special content of philosophy.

Suppose you take what are generally considered the first principles of any branch of knowledge. If you work *forwards* from those principles, taking them as ultimate, you will find yourself moving among the particular details of that branch of knowledge. For example, if you take the axioms of geometry (any geometry) as your first principles, and work forwards from them, you will find yourself among the detailed theorems of that geometry. But if you reflect upon these so-called first principles of any subject, you will generally find that they are not really ultimate at all, that it is possible to go *backwards* from them, instead of forwards, and to ask upon what more ultimate principles they themselves rest. You may, for example, ask yourself what is the basis of the axioms of geometry. Are they *a priori* laws of the human mind? Or are they laws gathered by observation from experience like most of the ordinary laws of nature? Or are they arbitrary assumptions based upon nothing but convenience? Or what are they, and on what depends their right to *be* the first principles of geometry? When you proceed backwards in that way from what you had hitherto considered to be first principles, and when you search for the more ultimate principles on which these depend, then you are in the realm of philosophy.

What I have just been saying is not only true of mathematics. I say that it is true of *any* branch of human knowledge. And I will take as further examples the specific spheres of morality, art, and science.

In the sphere of morality, we commonly say that some actions are right, others wrong. Most people take it for granted that there is *some* distinction between right and wrong, and that they know pretty well what is meant by these words. And if they discuss moral

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problems, it is usually some detailed question about the particular *application* of moral principles which they discuss. Was a man, in a given set of circumstances, right or wrong in what he did? Is suicide ever justifiable? Would a doctor ever be right to administer a deadly drug to a patient suffering from an incurable disease and undergoing ceaseless physical torture? These are the kind of questions which practical moralists generally discuss, and if we had good answers to them all it might be said that we were in possession of a complete body of moral knowledge.

But now suppose that instead of working forwards from moral principles to their detailed application in life, I try to work backwards. Suppose I raise questions about the foundation of these principles themselves. Suppose I ask: what is the foundation of moral principles? Is it true, for example, that right actions are merely those which tend to produce among human beings generally a balance of pleasure and happiness over pain and unhappiness? Or is morality founded upon biological considerations, so that right actions are simply those which tend towards the preservation of the species? Or have moral principles some profounder, less obvious, basis than these ideas would suggest? These, I think, would be questions of that very fundamental and ultimate kind which I should call philosophical.

Exactly similar questions arise from reflection upon the sphere of art. In the moral world we have the antithesis of the good and the evil. In the artistic world we have the antithesis of the beautiful and the ugly, or perhaps, of the artistic and inartistic. These conceptions are commonly taken for granted, just as are the conceptions of right and wrong. What are usually discussed are questions of their detailed *application*. Is this picture genuinely artistic or not? Or is it more artistic than that picture? Is this poem successful or not? Is a certain musical composer justified in introducing into his work discords and other innovations which would have shocked his predecessors? The attempts to answer questions of this kind constitute the branch of knowledge which we call art criticism.

But now suppose that, instead of moving forwards from the principles of art to their detailed application, we move backwards towards their more ultimate foundations. Suppose we raise questions about the nature and validity of the conceptions of the artistic and the inartistic themselves. Suppose we ask: What is the nature of the artistic as such? What is that quality which may be shared in common by a picture, a statue, or a poem, and which makes each of them what we call artistic? What is art? What are its ultimate criteria and foundations? These again would be questions of that fundamental and ultimate kind which no art critic or artist as such ever asks, and which I should call philosophical.

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Turning now to the sphere of science, there are, I think, all sorts of ultimate questions to which science leads back, but which the scientist as such does not usually consider at all.

There is, for example, the question of the nature and justification of mathematical axioms, to which I already referred. Again, science is, or has been in the past, very largely concerned with the *causes* of phenomena. What is the cause of the movements of the planets, of the evolution of species, of ocean tides, of eclipses, of the pointing of a comet's tail away from the sun? And so on.

These are all questions of the detailed application of the principle of causality. But suppose I ask about the principle of causality itself? What, in the first place, is its proper analysis and definition? And then, upon what grounds have I the right to assume that the same causes must always necessarily give rise to the same effects? In that case, it seems to me, I am asking very fundamental and ultimate questions, and I should call these questions philosophical.

Or, to take a very different example, Professor Bridgman, in his book on *The Logic of Modern Physics*, writes regarding science, "The nature of our thinking mechanism essentially colours any picture we can form of nature." There is nothing new in the suggestion that the world as we know it is to a greater or less extent determined by the structure of our own minds. That is an opinion which has frequently been held by many philosophers. The only novelty is perhaps that it should now be a physicist who makes the suggestion. But obviously this raises very fundamental and ultimate questions regarding the relation of our minds and our knowing processes to the world. The sciences profess to give us *knowledge* of the world. But we may raise the more ultimate question: what is knowledge? Is our knowledge of the world a sort of photograph, or mirror image, or picture, of the world as it actually is? This is what most people used to think. But if all our knowledge is coloured by the structure of our minds, it seems obvious that it is not a true picture of the world at all. And it becomes a profoundly difficult question what the relation of our knowledge to reality actually is. And that, I should say, is a very fundamental and ultimate question which belongs to philosophy, and which no specialized science as such ever considers.

Some of the central problems of philosophy, too, are reached by going backwards, not from science, art, morals, or mathematics, but from the everyday knowledge of common sense. But I think I have now given enough examples to illustrate my general contention, which is that philosophy has for its subject-matter the ultimate principles upon which all other branches of knowledge are based; and that all other branches of knowledge necessarily lead back to, and end in, philosophy, if one reflects upon their grounds. No

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matter what subject you study, no matter through what gateway you enter the kingdom of knowledge, philosophy looms in the background. If this view is accepted, you will see that it explains the paradox which I mentioned at the beginning of this lecture. Philosophy has its own special content, these ultimate problems. And yet it is concerned with the whole universe and is entwined with every other subject, because whatever section of the universe your special science takes as its province, that section, and the knowledge of it, give rise to philosophical problems.

Now that we have decided what place philosophy holds in the general scheme of human knowledge, it ought not to be difficult to discover its proper place in education. But first of all, let me deal shortly with a preliminary criticism which is sometimes made. Philosophy, it is said, is an unpractical study. Science yields practical, tangible, results—the telephone, the steam engine, the electric motor. Philosophy yields none, and it has no influence on life. It is, so to speak, all talk.

Perhaps I need hardly point out that, as is obvious, University subjects fall roughly into two classes, those which are of immediate practical utility, such as chemistry and geology, and those which are not. These latter, which have no immediate cash value, include not only philosophy, but also all literature, the classical languages, and the fine arts, not to mention such a subject as religion. These so-called unpractical subjects contain most of what is finest and noblest in human life, because they are concerned not with the production of material wealth, but with the advancement of the wealth of the mind.

Nor is it true that philosophy has no influence on life. It would be easy to show that, even as a preparation for practical life, philosophy has its value, since it sharpens the wits, exercises the reasoning powers, destroys prejudices, and develops the habit of considering all questions with an open mind. I have seen it stated in print (by a so-called practical person, not a philosopher), that the world-war was ultimately traceable to the pernicious influence of the philosophy of Hegel. I do not myself agree with that opinion. It is, I think, an absurd caricature of the truth. But it shows that men do dimly perceive what an immense practical influence the philosophical conceptions of a people, or even of an individual, may exert. And it would be a fascinating study to follow out this line of thought; to show to what extent the wise and the foolish actions of mankind have ultimately depended upon what are, in the last analysis, philosophical opinions. But I must leave that field of discussion untouched. I must return to my proper subject, the place of philosophy in education.

By education here I do not mean the special training required to

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make a man a competent doctor, engineer, or lawyer, however important that may be. By education I mean the process of raising human personality to the highest level which it is capable of attaining, the process of developing all that is finest and noblest in it, the process of turning out first-class human beings.

And if education is taken in this sense, it is not difficult to show that philosophy is an essential part of it, and that without some tincture of philosophy a man is an imperfect human being. For it follows from what I have already said that philosophy is an essential part of all human culture. If philosophy is, as I have tried to show, nothing more than an attempt to throw knowledge back upon its ultimate principles; to think out the most fundamental and ultimate problems which are raised by morals, by religion, by science, by art, and by common sense; is it not obvious that any perfect human culture cannot exclude it? Philosophy is nothing but the most fundamental kind of thinking which a man can do in any branch of study. It lies at the basis of every other subject. It is bound up with all human culture, and is therefore an integral part of any complete education.

It is a mistake to think of the different branches of knowledge and culture as if they existed in watertight compartments, completely independent and isolated from one another. They are, after all, products of one and the same human spirit, and a sufficiently keen insight will detect one and the same human life unfolding itself in them all. Every age has its own peculiar attitude towards the problems which man's environment presents, its own peculiar attitude towards the world. This attitude of any age is sometimes called the spirit of the age. The spirit of an age expresses itself in a diversity of different forms, in the forms of its art, its literature, its religion, its science, its politics, and finally its philosophy. These different forms will usually be found to have the same essential content. That is to say, the philosophy of an age will be found to express in philosophical form the same attitude towards the world which is expressed in other forms in its literature, its art, its science. It is one and the same life which, in a plant, puts itself forth in the different flowers and branches. And literature, art, science, religion, philosophy, are the flowers of the human spirit. Consequently I would say that the philosophy of an age crystallizes in its most abstract form the essential thought and culture of that age, and is therefore a key to the understanding of that age. Let us give a few examples of this.

It is almost a platitude to say that in Greece the philosophy of the Sophists merely crystallized in abstract terms the same tendencies of thought as were everywhere making themselves apparent in the political life of the time, in the dramas of Euripides, and elsewhere.

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What, again, is the famous *Republic* of Plato but an expression in abstract philosophical form of that ideal of a balanced and harmonious personality which is well known to have contained the essence of the Greek attitude towards life?

Another example is to be found in the American philosophy known as pragmatism. The essence of this philosophy consists in its subordination of all the higher human activities, such as knowledge, art, and religion, to purely practical ends. It judges them all by their cash value. Thus it perfectly reflects the predominantly commercial spirit and civilization of the American people.

Turning to modern Europe, I would draw your attention to the fact that during the nineteenth century the essential content of philosophy was identical with the essential content of literature and poetry. In philosophy it took the form of idealism, in poetry of romanticism. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there came in literature that great outburst of romantic poetry which is connected with such names as Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, Keats. At the very same moment there dawned in Germany the great age of philosophical idealism, and this idealism rose to its greatest heights in the system of Hegel. Hegelian idealism expressed in general the same human attitude to the world as did the romantic poets. The system of Hegel was nothing but a vast elaboration of the idea that the finite world in space and time, the world of nature, is not ultimately real, is but a shadow, an appearance, beneath which lies a deeper, a divine, reality. But this idea is also the very indwelling life of poetic romanticism. The spirit of romanticism is epitomized in Wordsworth's famous lines in which he speaks of

a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man.

Wordsworth's reverence for nature is no sentimental vapouring about crocuses and cowslips, but is based upon this belief that nature is at once the veil and the revealer of a deeper divine reality. His vision of the world is the same as Hegel's vision. And this vision Wordsworth transmitted throughout the poetry of the nineteenth century. It inspires in varying degrees the work of all the romantic poets, Shelley, Keats, Tennyson, Browning, and even such an apparently positivistic and anti-religious poet as Swinburne. It finally dies out, I should say, in the early work of the Irish poet, W. B. Yeats, and has now been replaced by a very different attitude.

Parallel, in the nineteenth century, to the stream of romanticism which takes its departure from Wordsworth, there flows the stream

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of philosophical idealism which has its source in Hegel. It passes over from Germany to England, inspiring the work of such men as Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet. It passes over to America in the work of Royce and many others. And in them, I should say, it finally dies out as an original and creative force—notwithstanding that it still finds many admirers and imitators—to be replaced, once more, by a very different spirit.

What is this very different spirit which has now made its appearance both in literature and philosophy? Well, the present age is neither idealistic nor romanticist. There has been a violent rebellion against all that. Romanticism is now set down as sentimentalism. And the present age is above all anti-sentimental. The repudiation of romanticism arises ultimately from the fact that the vision of a deeper reality behind the appearance of the world has been lost. The finite things in time and space, the moving masses of matter, the life of animals and plants and men on the planet, these things, which for Wordsworth and Hegel were mere appearances, are now proclaimed as the only realities. There is nothing behind them, supporting them. They are real in their own right. This is the essential message which is proclaimed by the most characteristic philosophical school of the present day, the school of the realists. The universe of the realist can be obtained by taking the universe of the idealist, cutting away the inner spiritual essence which lies behind it, and leaving only the outward appearance, a sort of lifeless mask, which is now declared to be the only reality. There is no "something far more deeply interfused, whose dwelling is the light of setting suns." There are merely the setting suns and the clouds, and these are composed of oxygen, hydrogen, and what not.

And is it not exactly the same spirit which informs a great deal of current literature? It is no longer the business of literary art to reveal "the light which never was on land or sea." It is now an affair of surfaces and externals. Its message is that a man's life consists of an endless procession of externalities; of smoke and grime; of the streets and the mud in the streets; of offices and houses and money and clothes and hats; of sights and sounds; of pleasures and pains; succeeding each other in a kind of bewildering nightmare. These are the realities, the millions of disconnected experiences of a drab and uninspired life. There is, beneath and beyond them, no indwelling spirit to transform them from the sordid to the sublime. So says the literary realist. And this is what his brother the philosophical realist is saying too.

In this contention between the spirit of the last age and the spirit of the present day I am not now taking sides. The realist may be right for all I know. My point is not that the romantic spirit was better than the anti-romantic, or vice versa. I am only

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concerned to point out that the philosophy of an age on the one hand, and the literature and art of the age on the other, usually express in different forms the essential attitude of that age towards the world, and therefore that their content is the same. And my thesis is, you see, simply that philosophy is an organic part of human culture, one of the natural modes of expression of the human spirit, not something utterly remote and cut off from other branches of knowledge and from the affairs of ordinary life, the idle plaything of a few pedants and recluses.

For not only does the essential thought of each age express itself in philosophy. It expresses itself there, I should say, in its purest form. For whereas in literature and in art you will find the tendencies of the age expressed diffusely, mixed up with all sorts of unessentials, in a chaotic jumble, in philosophy you will find it crystallized out, reduced to its fundamental principles. It is hardly too much to say that philosophy is the master key to human culture; and that in the last resort no full understanding of the great movements of the human spirit—that is to say, no full understanding of life itself—is possible without philosophy. And if that is so, can it be any longer doubted that the rôle of philosophy in education is vital?

But there occurs a doubt to one's mind. It is a common reproach against philosophy that it is nothing but an arena of disagreements. Compare philosophy, it is said, with any of the well-established sciences. Among scientists, of course, there are disagreements. But each of the sciences nevertheless presents us with a large and growing body of established truths. The sciences, moreover, do not remain stationary. They advance triumphantly from discovery to discovery.

Now if you turn your eyes from science to philosophy, what a pitiful spectacle meets your gaze! Philosophers cannot agree even upon the most elementary principles of their subject. They are divided into numerous hostile camps. Philosophy is nothing but a haphazard jumble of contradictory opinions. There must be something wrong with a subject which has always been, and still is, in such a pass. That is the sort of onslaught which the unhappy philosopher has to meet from his friends the scientists. What reply can he make?

I cannot, in the brief space now left to me, deal as fully with this subject as I should like to. I can, in fact, give only the bare headings of what I think would be the adequate reply.

One might, of course, point out that the disagreements of philosophers are often greatly exaggerated; that if one were to draw up a list of matters on which practically all philosophers agree, the list would probably be surprisingly long; that the development of

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philosophy, as of other branches of knowledge, has not been chaotic, but orderly, a well-defined evolution; and that philosophers themselves naturally discuss the points on which they disagree, and are silent on those upon which they agree, thus giving an appearance of greater disagreement than actually exists. There would be some truth in all these contentions. But such a line of defence would, I think, be rather a case of special pleading. One has to admit roundly that there is far more disagreement among philosophers than there is among the men of science. What other reply can we make?

Firstly, it is somewhat oddly overlooked, by those who make this criticism of philosophy, that philosophy is not alone in this matter. It is true that there is a remarkably large measure of agreement in the purely physical sciences. But in the spheres of art, religion, morals, politics, economics, there is, I should say, as much disagreement as there is in philosophy. If philosophers are divided into idealists and realists, into rationalists and empiricists, are not political thinkers divided into conservatives and revolutionaries, communists and fascists, republicans and monarchists? Do they not dispute regarding every possible political principle in theory, and every possible political decision in practice? Are not American economists divided into brain-trusters and anti-brain-trusters? Is not the religious world divided into Christians, Muslims, Buddhists? In moral questions is there not constant and violent dispute as to whether a man in given circumstances ought to have done this or that?

Now what would you think of anyone who should argue that, because there is so much disagreement in the spheres of politics, art, religion, economics, morals, therefore politics, art, religion, economics, morals, are unimportant subjects the study of which ought not to be encouraged? Is it not obvious that, in spite of the disagreements, perhaps *because of* the disagreements, these are just the most important subjects in the world, the subjects which ought above all to be studied by a man who wishes to be a first-class human being? Why, then, should philosophy be selected for special reprimand because of its disagreements?

But that answer, perhaps, does not satisfy. It consists, you may say, only in the blackening of other subjects, not in the whitening of philosophy. And it does not go to the root of the matter. Let us leave politics, economics, and so on, to fight their own battles. Let us speak of philosophy alone, and face the issue. Why *should* there be so many disagreements among philosophers, if their subject is really in a sound and healthy condition? I suggest that the answer is, in essence, as follows. There is a special reason why physical scientists are able to present a more or less united front. They are dealing always with *ponderables*, with crass matter, in other words

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with things which can be measured and weighed. Moreover, they are dealing nearly always with the quantitative aspects of matter, and the questions regarding matter which they seek to answer are mostly questions which can be definitely settled by operations of measuring and weighing. These operations can be fairly easily and accurately performed. And the result is that scientific problems can for the most part be definitely solved.

But philosophy deals mostly with *imponderables*, which cannot be measured and weighed, and the questions which philosophers ask cannot be settled by yardsticks and balances. Take any of the great questions with which philosophers are concerned. Is the world ultimately a product of mind, or is it mindless mechanism? Is there a cosmic purpose, or is there not? Is the world finally rational, or is there an irreducible element of irrationality in it? What is the significance of the presence of evil in the universe? What is the essence of morality? Is there a single absolute moral law or is there not? What is the ultimate nature and foundation of art, and of the sense of the beautiful? Can any reasonable person expect slick answers to these questions as if they were sums in arithmetic? Can they be answered by means of operations with foot-rules and chemical retorts? Is it not obvious that there will always be room for differences of opinion on such matters? And can we expect more than that we should know what the best minds, who have given their lives to these problems, think, notwithstanding that, among them too, there may, and indeed must be, different views?

Philosophy is deeply rooted in human life. It reflects, as I have tried to show, the essential attitudes of ages and of civilizations to the world. And it is little short of idiotic to expect that these attitudes will not show wide cleavages and divergencies. But this does mean that men's attitudes to the world, and the philosophies which express them, are not among the deepest concerns of human culture.

Therefore I cannot hold out the hope that to-morrow, or in five years, or in fifty years, all philosophers will agree. Only a simpleton will entertain such a hope. And only a shallow understanding will condemn philosophy because of this.

In any case, all this about the disagreements of philosophers is, for me, merely a side-issue. My main contention is that philosophy is an integral part of human culture, and whether that culture is divided within itself or not, the study of it necessitates philosophy. Whether we like it or not, we cannot escape philosophy; because, on whatever road of knowledge we travel, philosophy lies in wait for us with its questions.

TAKING SIDES IN PHILOSOPHY

GILBERT RYLE, M.A.

THERE is a certain emotion of repugnance which I, and I hope a good many would-be philosophers, feel when asked the conventional question, "If you are a philosopher, to what school of thought do you belong? Are you an Idealist or a Realist, a Platonist or a Hobbist, a Monist or a Pluralist?"

We all habitually and conveniently employ these and dozens of other similar party-labels. And the standard histories of philosophy aid and abet us in treating the history of philosophy as a series of conflicts between opposing camps or election campaigns between rival factions. We even come to deem philosophers as worthy or unworthy of study according to the particular "isms" of which they are alleged to be, or confess themselves to be partisans. Sometimes quite well-meaning persons actually boast of being "orthodox Hegelians" or "orthodox Realists" as if the notion of orthodoxy in philosophy was a natural and appropriate one.

I fear, too, that in teaching the subject we are prone consciously or unconsciously to give our pupils the impression that they would be well advised not to inform themselves of the views or the arguments of philosophers belonging to this or that school.

Nevertheless, I dislike being asked how I cast my vote, and I want, if I can, to lay bare the sources of this dislike. But I should say at the very start that I am not arguing for eclecticism in philosophical thinking. To my mind eclecticism is only the most corrupt of all the "isms." It is our form of Coalitionism, a parasite on the party system.

The gist of my position is this.

There is no place for "isms" in philosophy.

The alleged party issues are never the important philosophic questions, and to be affiliated to a recognizable party is to be the slave of a non-philosophic prejudice in favour of a (usually non-philosophic) article of belief. To be a "so-and-so-ist" is to be philosophically frail. And while I am ready to confess or to be accused of such a frailty, I ought no more to boast of it than to boast of astigmatism or *mal de mer*. I am, that is, prepared to find myself classified and classified justly as a "so-and-so-ist," only I think that that is something to be apologetic for. My "ism" exists, doubtless, but it is not a banner so much as a susceptibility. So there ought to be nothing in philosophy corresponding to vote-

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casting. The question "How do you vote between this 'ism' and that 'ism'?" ought to be dropped in favour of the question "Which way do your inclinations and biases pull you between this 'ism' and that?"

1. Part of my repugnance comes from this source. To be a member of such and such a school is to cleave to a certain tenet or set of tenets. And for the school to know itself, or be known by others, as a special school, the school, say, of Monists or Pragmatists, its tenets must be contestable. In fact, a set of tenets gets its label from being opposed. It is usually those who think it false who first call it "Realism," or "Rationalism" or "Berkeleyanism." In general "isms" are unnamed until they are contested. They are also, as a rule, unchampioned until they are contested.

To cleave to an "ism" is then to cleave to a disputable position. But what is it to cleave to a position? If it means to entertain no doubts of the truth of the theory, then this is an unforgivable irrationality, if the arguments against it have anything in them at all. And they will not be arguments if they haven't. It is sheer credulity to accept without question a theory which is in any part or degree logically fallacious or imperfect.

But sometimes a logically valid theory is disputed. Probably there still exist militant circle-squarers. So there would be nothing irrational in cleaving to an "ism" the arguments for which were logically unassailable, although assailants in fact exist. But what would this "cleaving" be? Just seeing that the arguments for the theory were valid and those against it were fallacious. On this showing, being a Realist, say, would just consist in seeing that Idealists reason very foolishly. And there would be no more reason for cherishing a school of Realism in philosophy than for fostering a school of non-circle-squarers in geometry. The party would contain everyone who could think straight in philosophical subjects. No philosophers would be outside it. So it would be no philosophic party at all.

Every "ism" that can get to the point of acquiring a name is *philosophically* questionable, and is actually questioned by genuine philosophers. And that means that no philosopher has any excuse for cleaving to it. Any philosopher should see and welcome the logically valid part of its argument; and any philosopher should see and welcome the logically valid parts of the theory of its contestants. And there is nothing left which should convince anyone of the truth of the remainder of those theories—unless a philosopher is to be allowed to believe doctrines because he likes them.

Of course each of us is predisposed to swallow uncritically certain sorts of doctrines which happen to be congenial to him; and it is hygienic to recognize and confess these predispositions. But a

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fraternity of persons of kindred credulities could only constitute a school of "misosophy."

2. Another consideration which I find underlying my distaste for party-labels in philosophy is this. The central issues between the self-announcing "isms" turn out, when the fog of the early engagements is over, to be extremely refined and even academic differences. (I also think that they often turn out not to be genuine philosophical issues either. But I choose not to discuss this point here.) For example, it has been argued and not, I think, contested that the radical issue that splits Monists or Absolute Idealists from opposing "schools" is the question whether relations are or are not internal to their terms. Now the question interests me, and is, I think, soluble. But if asked by a pupil what are the radical problems of philosophy, I could not with an easy mind tell him, "Oh, such questions as whether relational propositions are analytic or not." Or, to take another example, I should feel unhappy in saying that one of the major truths discovered by philosophers is the answer to the question that splits Platonists and anti-Platonists, namely, that general words are significant by being proper names of entities (or the negative, if it is preferred).

Yet the doctrines of principle (adherence to which, as we shall see, is what constitutes schools of thought) have to be fairly narrow and abstract propositions if the "schools" are to be supposed to be standing for anything in particular. So they have to treat their single-plank election platforms as if they were the radical truths of philosophy. The radical topics that philosophy is about have to be represented as of these patterns—whether truths of fact can be deduced from *a priori* premisses (the issue between Rationalism and Empiricism), whether "I ought" is compatible with "I had better not" (the issue between Utilitarianism and Intuitionism), whether the nature of what I know or think about entails that I know or think about it (the issue between one form of Idealism and Realism). And so on.

Now doubtless such questions as these are watershed questions. As we vote on them, so we shall have to vote on many derivative questions. But to say that these are the central questions that face philosophers provokes the comment that they seem very technical specialists' questions. Indeed, they seem to be riddles which we need a lot of special training in philosophy to appreciate.

The chief fruits of the subject seem to be rather small potatoes. Now I am not complaining because these topics are unfit for the pulpit or the market-place; nor yet because they are abstract and logically fine-drawn. These are merits in a topic of philosophical inquiry. No, I am complaining, I think, because questions like these are *resultant* riddles and not *inaugurating* riddles. They are special

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posers which trip us up after we have travelled a good long way; they are not what set us travelling. To change the metaphor, there is the smell of sediment about them, as if they were what the tide has left behind it—after ebbing.

3. However these two grounds for girding at sectarian habits of thought and speech in philosophy are not yet at the root of the matter. The real root of my objection is, I think, the view that I take of the nature of philosophical inquiry. I am not going to expound it in full, but a part of the view is that it is a species of discovery. And it seems absurd for discoverers to split into Whigs and Tories. Could there be a pro-Tibet and an anti-Tibet party in the sphere of geography? Are there Captain Cook-ites and Nansenists?

But before developing this argument it will be useful to clear away some possible misinterpretations of the case for which I am arguing.

(a) I am as far as possible from deploring or ridiculing polemics in philosophical discussion. There could, in my view, be nothing more unwholesome than unanimity among philosophers. The unconvinced are the sharpest critics of an argument, and those who are also hostile are its warmest critics. And an argument which was not tested by sharp or warm critics would be at least half untested. I am only urging that the common motive for unconversion and hostility, namely, allegiance to an "ism," is philosophically unjustifiable and ought to be discountenanced by philosophers. Arguments should be attacked because they are invalid, not because they are "Monistic" or "Pluralistic," "Occamistic" or "Spinozistic."

Philosophy lives by dispute. For dispute is the testing of arguments. But debates under the eyes of Whips test nothing but solidarity.

(b) Nor, of course, am I defending the milk-and-water doctrine that all philosophers are really in the right and really seeing eye to eye with one another. All philosophers make mistakes, and even great philosophers commit howlers. And their mistakes often lie undetected for a long time, or, when detected, retain the credence of their disciples for woefully lengthy periods. It is often desirable that a philosopher should be refuted. What is improper is that he should be discredited for being a Left-Winger, say, or have his fallacies condoned because he is on the side of the angels in the party of the Right-Centre.

(c) There is one way of dividing philosophers into types which is perfectly legitimate, namely, the classification of them as Logicians, Moralists, Political Philosophers, Epistemologists, Metaphysicians (maybe), Jurisprudents, and so on. Certainly these compartments are not watertight, and a philosopher may justly be suspected of philosophic incompetence who ignores all philosophical questions save those in his one pet department. But a man may, like Butler, be predominantly excellent in the philosophy of conduct and motives,

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or, like Berkeley, in the philosophy of perception. There is nothing sectarian or schismatic about such preoccupations.

(d) And for certain ends, such as those of biography or the history of cultures (though not those of philosophy itself), it is often useful and correct to classify philosophers according to certain general casts of mind or temperaments. There are, we are told, the tender-minded and the tough-minded among philosophers; or again, there are those who are constitutionally Platonic and those who are constitutionally Aristotelian; there are the mystical and the matter-of-fact; the "inflationists" and the "deflationists"; those of the prophetic and those of the engineering casts of mind. The fact that we can get a fair measure of agreement between students of diverse sorts, how the major philosophic figures ought to be classified under such heads as these is good evidence that the contrast of psychological types is not altogether fictitious. To some extent the thoughts of the philosophers whom we study are congenial or uncongenial to us according to which of the two psychological baskets they are drawn from.

If we admit that there is some big difference of psychological types of this sort, we can take either of two attitudes towards it. We can say that one of the qualities of mind is a necessary part of excellence at philosophy, while the other is an insuperable disability. Or we can say that both are or can be assets--only assets which human beings can seldom, if ever, possess together. Neither view would justify the existence of philosophical sects. For suppose, on the one hand, that the "prophetic" or tender-minded temperament is a *sine qua non* of philosophic excellence. Then it would follow that no one of the "tough-minded" or "engineering" temperament could be a philosopher. So the gulf would be one between philosophers and non-philosophers and not between one set of philosophers and another. (Astronomers do not boast a party of anti-Astrologists.) And, on the other hand, suppose that both temperaments are assets, so that some are excellent at philosophy because they are of the "prophetic" type, while others are excellent at it because they are of the "engineering" type. Then for the followers of those of one type to campaign against those of the other would be as stupid as it would be for a lover of poetry to declare war on the lovers of prose, or for a mountaineer to blackball from his club all maritime explorers.

Whether the "prophetic" temperament, say, is analogous to blinkers or to long-sightedness there can be no grounds for a philosopher of the "engineering" type to join a faction against the possessors of it. For either they are constitutionally impotent at philosophy, in which case they can be ignored as we ignore phrenologists and fortune-tellers; or else they have a special quali-

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fication for discovering certain sorts of philosophic truth which is denied to those of the more matter-of-fact type, who on their side will have a compensating ability to discover philosophic truths of another sort. And in this case, they are related as the physician to the surgeon, by difference of function and not by conflict of "isms."

But in any case this crude sort of psychological division can only serve to explain causally why some sorts of people are prone not to appreciate either some sorts or any sorts of philosophical arguments and questions, and not to feel either some or any sorts of philosophic qualms. It contributes nothing to the testing of such arguments, to the formulation or solution of such questions, or to the excitation or appeasing of such qualms. Again, it may explain causally why certain sorts of philosophers are congenial or uncongenial to me. It cannot explain what are the philosophical excellences or demerits of their work. (Incidentally, on a point of history, it seems to me that some of the best philosophers have enjoyed both temperaments. Plato, for example, "engineers" in the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Parmenides*. Kant is "prophetic," perhaps, in his moral theory. Leibniz is both a formal logician and a "heaven-sketcher.")

Let us consider more closely than we have yet done what it is to be a member of a "school of philosophy" or a champion of an "ism" or a disciple of a philosophical teacher. For certainly there are people who have been with justice labelled, by others or by themselves, as Epicureans, Wolfians, Kantians, Spencerians, Bradleians, and the like. We speak familiarly and intelligibly of the schools of Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Occam, and of the schools of Hegel, Brentano, and James. Are there not notoriously a Cambridge and a Vienna school? Was there not an Oxford tradition?

If there hadn't existed any such churches, cliques, or cliques, there would have been no sectarian tradition for me to inveigh against. My whole case is that there is a schismatic tradition in philosophy, and that "schismatic philosopher" is a contradiction in terms.

What then is a "follower"? First, there is the deliberately abusive sense in which we sometimes use such descriptions, though it is not the use for which we are looking (namely, the use in which a man might say *with pride* that he "followed" Hegel, or Wittgenstein). We can abusively describe someone as a follower or disciple of Nietzsche, say, who accepts because they are congenial to him those doctrines of Nietzsche which he understands and rejects by ignoring them the views of everyone else. A man who only attends to the views of one philosopher and takes them as gospel because they are to his taste is, of course, neither a philosopher nor a student of philosophy. In this sense of the word to say "I am a disciple of so-

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and-so" would mean "I prefer to shut my eyes to all doctrines and problems save those of so-and-so. I prefer also to shut my eyes to any defects there may be in so-and-so's theory. I swear *in verba magistri*."

Next it might be suggested that what it means to say of someone that he is a follower of Epicurus, or a disciple of Kant, is that he believes all that Epicurus (or Kant) says, and nothing that any other philosopher says, save where he echoes Epicurus (or Kant). But this would be a silly definition of "follower" or "disciple." For no one can remember all the dicta of any but the least copious of philosophers. And no philosophers are completely consistent. And all the best philosophers rebut views which they had themselves once believed. Nor can one disbelieve all the dicta of all other philosophers. For we cannot read, much less remember and much less still understand, all the dicta of all philosophers. And of those that we read and understand we cannot disbelieve all. For some are the direct contradictories of some others. And some are obviously true.

Even if by "follower" we meant someone who is generally disposed to believe whatever he reads and remembers from Epicurus (or Kant), and is disposed in general to disbelieve what he reads and remembers from anyone else, we should have to say that such a man was a worshipper or a parrot, and no philosopher. For on such a definition a "follower" would be one who never thought for himself. And there is no room for credence in philosophy. However, it is obvious that when philosophers or would-be philosophers are described as "followers" or "disciples," it is not ordinarily meant that they are just unthinking "yes-men." What else does it mean?

A third possible and more flattering definition of "followers" would be this. To follow Aristotle, say, would be to see, after rational consideration, that Aristotle's conclusions are true because his arguments are valid, and also to see, after rational consideration, that no other philosophers argue validly for their conclusions.

But even in this sense no one but a fool could claim to be—and not even a fool could be—a follower of anybody. For neither Aristotle nor any other philosopher has failed to produce at least some defective and even fallacious arguments. Nor is Aristotle or any other philosopher the sole discoverer of valid arguments. And no human being could be so acquainted with all the arguments of all philosophers that he could dismiss all of them save some of those of, say, Aristotle as invalid.

A philosopher, or rather student of philosophy of this type, for whom "following so-and-so" consists in seeing the validity of so-and-so's arguments, would have rather to describe himself in terms like this. "I follow Aristotle in respect of arguments A, D, and F,

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but not of his arguments B, C, and E; I also follow Berkeley in respect of his arguments W, Y, and Z, but not of his arguments P . . . V, and X; I also follow Russell on such-and-such points, and Kant on such-and-such others. . . ." And then he would not be, in the ordinary sense of the word, for which we are still in search, anybody's "disciple." But he would be (almost) a philosopher. For the only bias or *parli pris* in his outlook would be one in favour not of persons or congenial doctrines, but of valid arguments.

But even this is patently not the sense in which people actually claim with pride or thankfulness to be uncompromising Spinozists, sound Hegelians, unswerving Pragmatists, loyal Moderate Bradleians, or last-ditch Logical Positivists. To accept the philosophy of such-and-such a teacher (or group of teachers) is, it is rather vaguely felt, something more than merely to find his general temper of mind sympathetic, and something less than credulously to endorse every particular dictum or argument that he ever propounded. A philosophy, such as Hegelianism or Thomism, is something more definite than a mood, and less definite than a cento of propositions, or a sorites of special ratiocinations. It is in some way adoptable or discardible as a whole.

A philosophy, that is, is something which has a general trend; and it is or else it rests on some dominant structure of argument. So it can be in some important sense on the right track, for all that much of its detail may be faulty. Its terminology may be loose and confused; many of its special arguments may be fallacious or incomplete, and yet as a whole (or "system," as it is dubbed in its testimonials) the philosophy of so-and-so may have the root of the matter in it. Conversely (so this vague theory would hold) the philosophy of such-and-such may be altogether on the wrong track, and its wrongness be not a whit compensated by the precision of its terminology or the cogency of its special arguments. The rottenness of the trunk is not excused by the fineness of its foliage.

Further, the rightness as a whole of a given philosophy does not derive from, though it is probably the source of the congeniality of the temperament of its author to us who appreciate it. Its rightness is something rational, and not merely temperamental or emotional. The rightness of, say, Rationalism or Critical Realism or Empirio-Criticism, is something for which the ability to think coherently plus the willingness to think honestly are the necessary and sufficient conditions. Monists, therefore, are radically good at philosophizing, and Pluralists radically bad at it (or vice versa). The members of the opposing school, championing as they do a philosophy which has the wrong general trend, are the victims of a mistake in principle, no matter what acumen they may exercise in questions of detail.

Accordingly every school of thought which is conscious of itself

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as such must and does maintain that the opposing school or schools of thought are in some way philosophically unprincipled. For they are blind to those principles which make its philosophy *a* philosophy and *the* philosophy.

Of course we are not often let into the secret of what these principles are. There is apt to be an almost Masonic reserve about them. Just as in politics Conservatives, Liberals, and Socialists would rather shed their blood to defend than court disaster by unpadding their Joanna Southcote's boxes of principles, so the militant advocates of the philosophical sects generally prefer to attack one another's derivative tenets than to win each other over by exhibiting those truths for the seeing of which rationality and honesty are supposed to be a sufficient condition.

And it must be confessed, in justification of this reserve, that when these principles are divulged, they are apt to bear a close resemblance either to undebatable platitudes, or to dogmatic unplausibilities, for neither of which could a man of sense and mettle fight with gusto.

But are there such principles? And if there are, are they the preserves of cliques? And most important of all, how are they established, that is, what makes it reasonable to accept them and perversity or blindness to reject them?

It can hardly be maintained that they are self-evident axioms—else why does no one publish the first page of our Euclid for us? Moreover, they would have either to be self-evident because analytic, in which case no thinking man could fail to assent, with a yawn, to them; or they would have to be self-evident although synthetic. And the possibility of there existing such truths at all within philosophy can hardly be taken for granted in the face of Hume and Kant.

No, these doctrines of principle, which constitute (it is supposed) both the bedrock and the cement of any reputable "ism," are established, and only established, by philosophical argument. (Or if no reasons can be given for them, they should be confessed by their adherents to be sheer dogmas, which philosophers are at liberty to accept or to reject at the dictates of their palates.)

So let us consider what it is to establish a doctrine by philosophical argument. What sort of an argument is a philosophical argument? Two answers can be dismissed without many words. Philosophical argument is not induction, and it is not demonstration *ordine geometrico*. It is not the latter. For we have no agreed or evident axioms to start with. In the sense of the word "presupposition," in which philosophy is concerned with presuppositions, the goal of its labours is to reveal them. They are not the premisses of its arguments. And certainly philosophical argument is not induction.

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A philosopher is playing at science who culls statistics or experiments in laboratories. To suppose that a philosopher's propositions can be falsified or corroborated by a new empirical discovery is to annihilate the difference between philosophy and the special sciences.

Moreover, inductive arguments cannot yield better than probable conclusions, and (I say it dogmatically) no probable arguments are philosophical arguments. Certainly there is an important sense in which a philosopher's argument may be *plausible*, that is, not obviously invalid. Most philosophical arguments are too difficult for us to know that they are completely probative on first, or even fiftieth, examination. But we may see that they are plausible in a non-derogatory sense. Something (though we are not quite sure what) seems to be proved by certain steps (though we are not quite clear which), in the argument. But an argument which is plausible in this way is not a probable argument; it is an argument which probably (or not improbably) is probative. It has the *prima facies* of a probative argument.

No, a philosophical argument is neither a piece of induction nor a piece of Euclidean deduction. Its pattern may be labelled "dialectical" if we like, though I am not clear that this means anything different from "philosophical." It is or aims at being logically rigorous, for self-contradiction is the promised penalty of default in it.

Now the ability to see that a philosophical argument is rigorous or has the *prima facies* of being rigorous is not the perquisite of any person or team of persons, though of course some people are more capable of philosophical thinking than others.

So the arguments which establish, or are supposed to establish, the "principles" of a system of philosophy are inspectable by all. To accept (or reject) those principles on blind trust (or blind distrust) in the rigorousness of the arguments is partisanship of the irrational sort. If there are questions of principle in philosophy, there is one task primarily worthy of philosophers, namely, to examine the force of the arguments for and of the arguments against such principles without a *parti pris* for or against the truth of those principles. Any serious philosopher would be as grateful for rigorous arguments for as for rigorous arguments against the principles of "Idealism" (say), or "Thomism," or "Logical Positivism."

So if the opposition between rival "isms" is, as both must claim, an opposition on a question of principle, the contestants ought to find in each other the keenest and most helpful coadjutors in the examination of the cogency of the arguments about that principle. A "Thingummist" who is seriously concerned about the validity of the argument for "Thingummism" should find the strongest argu-

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ments of the "anti-Thingummists" the very test for which he craves of whether his own argument is rigorous or only plausible. And then they would not be rivals, but coadjutors in dispute. But the attitude of actual schools towards their rival schools seems to be something different. Content with the case for their own principles, they seem, as a rule, to ignore the case for the prosecution, as if presupposition of those sacred principles was a necessary condition of any argument being valid, including, it is to be feared, the very arguments by which those principles were established.

Of course this sort of attitude is not consciously or deliberately adopted, much less justified. There could be only two ways of justifying it, if justification was sought. One would be to say that there are private revelations of principles to selected and privileged people, so that the hapless majority of philosophers are to be pitied for being, through no fault or deficiency of their own, graceless. The other would be to admit that principles can be adopted according to personal predilection. But the intellectual conscience of the better philosophers would forbid them to immunize themselves from criticism by claiming that their principles are above or beneath argument. The only heresy in philosophy is the belief that there are philosophical orthodoxies.

So far I have spoken as if it was pretty clear what sort of a thing a "principle" is. But in fact it is far from clear. The only account that I can give is this. A philosophical question is a question of principle when it is philosophically much more important than most other questions. And the relative importance of philosophical questions could be explained on these lines that when, given the answer to one question, it is at once clear what are the answers, or of what sort are the answers, to an expanding range of other questions, while the answers to any of the latter do not in the same way throw light on the former, then the former is a question of principle relative to the latter.

Or else, when in the case of a range of questions it is clear that none of them could be answered, or, perhaps, even be clearly formulated before some anterior question is answered, then this is a question of principle relative to them. The notion is simply that of one question being logically prior or cardinal to a range of other questions. It is tempting, but it would be too rash to say that there is one absolutely first question, or one set of absolutely first questions. Relations of logical precedence among questions are moderately easy to get fairly wide agreement about; but not so about absolute primacy.

A question of principle then is just an important or very important philosophical question. And that a question is important or very important is something for and against which there can be plausible

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and sometimes probative arguments. Often it is not contested that a question is important, though every suggested solution is hotly contested.

But there is no difference in kind between arguments on more and arguments on less important philosophical questions. The sort of logical rigour demanded is the same.

Nor must we say that the less important philosophical questions are not philosophical questions. This would be self-contradictory. Certainly there is room in philosophy for ingenuity on minor points. We need our deft joiners as well as our engineers and our prophets. Though at the present moment I am inclined to think that we are suffering from a spate of over-ingenuity. Indeed, of the two prevalent infections to-day, over-respectability and over-ingenuity, I am not sure which is the more enervating complaint.

DISCOVERY IN PHILOSOPHY

It is my opinion that there is an affirmative answer to the cynically meant question, "Do philosophers ever discover anything?" The allegation that they do not is partly due to the fact that the champions of the "isms" never acknowledge defeat. And indeed they are not often defeated. For their battles are usually sham battles. My view is simply this. Every rigorous philosophical argument is a discovery. And in a looser sense of the word "discovery," even every plausible philosophical argument, is a discovery. A valid philosophical argument is itself the revealing of something, and something of the sort of which philosophy is the search. Every philosopher who produces one new philosophical argument has made a philosophical advance. But it is not just the *conclusion* of his argument which is his discovery; it is the total argument for that conclusion. (Many histories of philosophy are worthless just because they think that, for example, Hume's philosophy can be presented, like pemmican, by cataloguing his conclusions. But if all we needed to learn from Hume's thinking could be propounded in the dozen odd sentences in which we would state Hume's conclusions, we should properly blame him for burying them in his ocean of other words. Whereas for his *argument* the Treatise errs in the direction of ellipse.)

When a philosopher or his commentator is asked to summarize what he has discovered, a bad mistake underlies the very posing of the question. It assumes that just as the astronomer's discoveries can be published to the world in a sentence or two, namely, sentences stating the new facts that he has discovered, so the philosophers ought to be able to tell us new facts. But philosophy does not discover, or look for, new matters of fact. In a sense, which I shall not

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try to elucidate, the philosopher throws new light, but he does not give new information. And the light that he throws is resident in the rigour of his arguments. Anthologies of the quotable dicta of the great philosophers pretend, sometimes, to be encyclopaedias of the "results" of philosophy up to date. But they illuminate no one who has not himself followed the same lines of reasoning as they had done.

But if this, or something like this, is true, how can there be in philosophy "isms" pitted against "isms"? If, for example, we take Monism and Pluralism to be two accredited and antagonistic "isms," then the Monist, if he is a philosopher at all, will be bound to say either that the case for Pluralism contains some plausible or probative philosophical arguments, so that the Pluralists will have discovered something which he had missed; or that Pluralism contains no philosophical arguments which are either plausible or probative, in which case it will not be a philosophical theory at all, and will not therefore be an antagonistic philosophical theory. Even if he alleges that the case for Monism is probative, while that for Pluralism is merely plausible and fallacious—and this would, I suppose, usually be the allegation of the one "school" against its rival—he should confess that there must have been defects in the presentation of the case for Monism, else how could the case for Pluralism have looked plausible? How can an argument *seem* to refute a patently unanswerable case? The case for Monism, if really unanswerable, ought to be made patently unanswerable. So the existence of Pluralists will at least have done philosophy the service of advertising the fact that the case for Monism is either answerable or not patently unanswerable. In either case the Monist, if he is a serious philosopher, would give the Pluralist the credit for having made a philosophical discovery on a question of principle. And then the feud between the "isms" is over, and we are left with a serious dispute on questions of philosophical importance. Instead of saying, "I can't argue with Pluralists, for they are philosophically unprincipled," the philosophically minded Monist will say, "I can't argue profitably with anyone but a Pluralist. He is the only person who is keen to examine the rigorousness of the arguments on our questions of principle." And the sect-labels would be dropped.

I have said that there is no philosophical information. Philosophers do not make known matters of fact which were unknown before. The sense in which they throw light is that they make clear what was unclear before, or make obvious things which were previously in a muddle. And the dawning of this desiderated obviousness occurs in the finding of a logically rigorous philosophical argument. Something that was obscure becomes obvious to me in the act of

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seeing the force of a particular philosophical argument. Nor can I make a short cut to that clarification by perusing the conclusions, but skipping the reasoning of the argument.

Anyone who appreciates the argument *ipso facto* gets the clarification. Though, of course, it is often very hard to appreciate involved and abstract arguments, like that which constitutes the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

But if a philosopher does succeed in finding for himself and transmitting to his readers a new and valid philosophical argument, then he has made something obvious for mankind. The obscurity which he has overcome is, apart from collapses of cultures, dead from that time on. His arduously achieved discovery becomes a public truism, and, if it is of any importance, becomes crystallized in the diction and the thought of educated people, even though the great majority of them have never read a word of him. The historian who wants to find out what Aristotle or Locke "discovered" must see what public truisms existed after the philosopher's work was done which were not even the topic of a clearly recognized question before he began it. Now when such a clarification has been effected and a previously unseen truism has become a part of the ordinary intellectual equipment of educated men, the discoverer of the truism will seem, on retrospect, to have been talking platitudes. And just that is his great achievement, so to emancipate men from an obscurity that they can regard as a platitude what their predecessors could not even contemplate clearly enough to regard as a paradox.

Those very parts of the work of Berkeley, say, or Hume, to which we vouchsafe an unexcited "Of course," are the discoveries of Berkeley and Hume.

But there can be, and are in fact, no faction-fights about the public truisms which are the real legacy of effective philosophizing. We do not marshal ourselves into Liberals and Conservatives about the points which a philosopher has made obvious. On the contrary, we contest about points which he has left contestable, points, namely, where he failed to make something obvious. We fight for or against some of his doctrines which are not truisms just because he has failed to establish them by probative or patently probative arguments. We enlist ourselves as his "followers" on the points where he was unsuccessful in clarifying something. He is the leader of a party in those very paths where he is still blindfolded.

I conclude with a few concessions.

1. Although, as I think, the motive of allegiance to a school or a leader is a non-philosophic and often an anti-philosophic motive, it may have some good results. Partisanship does generate zeal, combativeness, and team-spirit. And, when these impulses are by

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chance canalized into the channels of a non-spurious philosophical dispute, the hostilities and militancies may aerate the waters and even drive useful turbines.

2. Pedagogically there is some utility in the superstition that philosophers are divided into Whigs and Tories. For we can work on the match-winning propensities of the young, and trick them into philosophizing by encouraging them to try to "dish" the Rationalists, or "scupper" the Hedonists. But this is a dodge for generating examination-philosophy rather than philosophy.

3. The "ism" labels remain, of course, applicable and handy, as terms of abuse, commiseration, or apologia. It is a neat and quick way of indicating the blinkers of a would-be philosopher to say, "He does not consider such-and-such an argument or type of argument, but then, poor fellow, he is a die-hard Idealist (or a sound Realist, or a whole-hogging Pragmatist)." And we, too, shall be, with perfect justice, allocated to new or old-fangled "isms."

For, being human, we are in philosophizing as elsewhere, partial to views from irrational motives, such as vanity, personal devotions, local patriotisms, and race-prejudices.

I am only urging that the employment of "ism-labels" should be reserved for our intervals of gossip and confession. They should not occur in philosophical discussions.

4. A big service that has been done to philosophy by the philosophical sects has been in respect of the technical terminology of philosophy. Philosophers no more dispense with technical terms than do plumbers. But language traps are the source of errors and confusions in philosophy. So a fairly copious supply of alternative and disparate founts of jargon is a considerable safeguard. And the occasional essays in inter-translation which occur when, for instance, a convinced anti-Thingummist tries to expound or criticize the views of a Thingummist are admirably fog-dispelling about the jargons of both, and not infrequently even about the philosophical problems themselves.

5. An important part of philosophical thinking consists in the hypothetical trying-out of theories—seeing what would follow from the assumed theory, how far other theories would or would not be compatible with it, and so on.

Now much of the exploration can be done by a person who firmly believes the theory, although he has no good grounds for it. But whether he consciously adopts it as a not impossible theory, or is so irrationally imbued with it that it constitutes his inescapable "point of view," he can follow out its consequences with profit to the subject. Sometimes the added enthusiasm which comes from belief, however irrational, stimulates the exploration where it would have flagged in the absence of that credence. But none the less the disposition to

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be convinced of ill-founded or unfounded doctrines, or unconvinced of well-founded ones, is a "misosophical" disposition.

6. It is often claimed that the major "lesson" that we ought to learn from a philosophical leader is not so much a doctrine or set of doctrines as a Method; and what unites a "school" is not unanimity about conclusions, but agreement in the practice of the Method. We are to follow the example, not echo the pronouncements of the founders. Now though it is not easy to say what we mean by a method of philosophizing, it seems to me clear that it does mean something. If there is more than one method of philosophy, or more than one strand in the method of philosophizing, the revealing of a new method or a new strand in the method is one of the biggest sorts of discovery that a philosopher can make.

However, that a proposed or exhibited method is a proper method or the proper method, or part of the proper method of philosophizing, is not a truth of private revelation, or a matter of personal taste. It is a philosophical proposition, and one on a question of "principle." So a school which claimed to be, and alone to be, on the right track in virtue of its monopoly of the true Method would only be a special case of what we considered before, the pretended monopoly of philosophical principles. The rival sects would again be separated only by rival pretensions, unless they join in exploring the case for and the case against those pretensions. And then they are not rivals.

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THE purpose of *Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung*,¹ by Aloys Wenzl, is to provide a rational explanation of the world which shall give us greater insight into its nature than either common sense or the natural sciences can give us. Philosophy, Professor Wenzl says in his introduction, springs from the desire for a *weltanschauung*, for insight into the significance of life. But it also springs from a desire for *rational* explanation, and aims at objective validity. It proposes to give a truer, more complete, and more intelligible account of reality than appearances provide. This idea of a more intelligible explanation underlies the whole of Professor Wenzl's book. We want more than knowledge of empirical facts, we want knowledge of reasons (*verstehen aus dem Grund*), or, as he often puts it, insight (*einsichtig verstehen*). We want to see that though things seem to be contingent, they are really necessary. Different types of explanation will satisfy this need. There is mathematical deduction in which propositions follow from axioms. On the other hand, we get insight through awareness of psychical relations, and in particular the relation between end and means. Professor Wenzl foreshadows his conclusions by pointing out that no mathematical explanation can account for change. Complete understanding of the world is only possible in psychological terms.

I shall now give a brief outline of how Professor Wenzl reaches his main conclusions and what they are. It should, however, be understood that his discussion is very detailed. In considering a point, he suggests a number of alternative views and discusses each. The second section of this book is epistemological. There can be no metaphysics unless there is a real world. We are justified in assuming that there is, for our sense experiences guarantee the existence of real things. But they do not tell us about their "inner nature." Our knowledge of this depends on inference, and is expressed in the hypotheses formed by the natural sciences and metaphysics. Professor Wenzl believes that metaphysics uses the knowledge obtained by natural science but goes beyond it, and this belief determines the scheme of his book. In section three he surveys the conclusions of natural science, in so far as relevant to metaphysics. In the final sections he considers these conclusions in relation to each other, and the further hypotheses to which he believes that they lead.

We shall find, he says in his third section, that physics has contributed a great deal to our desire for rational explanation. It has explained complex appearances in terms of simple realities. Classical physics treats the world as a system constructed out of elementary entities and fundamental laws. The elementary entities are in space and time though we do not perceive them. They are strictly measurable, and the fundamental laws are mathematical. Modern physics has replaced this picture by another in which we get "ideal objects," "mathematical structures" forming a four-dimensional continuum in which space and time have been translated into quantitative but not perceptible properties and relations.

Biology and psychology lead us to the second kind of explanation, to the

¹ *Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung*. Felix Meiner. Leipzig, 1936. Pp. xi + 374.

insight we get in awareness of psychological relations. Professor Wenzl believes that empirical facts require us to accept the hypothesis of a purposive factor or *entelechy*, directing organic processes. He opens his biological survey with a detailed discussion of the controversy between mechanists and vitalists. The latter base their position on the occurrence of certain phenomena which we can sum up as purposive reactions to changes of situation. These phenomena, Professor Wenzl concludes, certainly require a teleological explanation of some sort, and he finds Driesch's hypothesis of an entelechy the most satisfactory. But the word "entelechy," he adds, only has meaning if it stands for a purposive and psycho-physical factor, which directs organic development in accordance with a plan. Finally, after considering psychological problems, in particular the mind-body relationship and unconscious processes, he supposes there are several subjects in any one individual which unconsciously direct organic and psychical activity. He ends this section by discussing free-will, and maintains that there are cases of undetermined choice.

Professor Wenzl has now reached the point for metaphysical hypothesis. The survey of empirical conclusions has presented a number of puzzles. There are a number of points which have to be fitted together and, above all, we have to ask how physical and psychical factors can interact. For physical things appear in space and time and can be treated mathematically, and psychical beings lack both these properties. How can things so essentially different interact with each other. How can we get insight into the interaction between physical and psychical? Professor Wenzl finally answers this question by a wide extension of the entelechy hypothesis. We are puzzled, he says, by a number of facts such as adaptation, unconscious mental processes, the development of species, the interaction between physical and psychical. They will all be explained if we assume that all reality is psychical, and that psychical beings form a hierarchy in which the lower are directed by the higher. After accepting this hypothesis, Professor Wenzl develops a "metaphysics of expression" according to which physical conditions (mathematical structures which *appear* in space and time) express psychical states and relations.

Umgang mit Dichtung,¹ by Johannes Pfeiffer, contains some very sound views about poetry, and Dr. Pfeiffer includes a great many poems to illustrate his points. He opens the discussion by contrasting two uses of language. On the one hand we may simply speak about a subject, while on the other hand the subject may be transformed into, or as we may also put it, be presented in the words. When this transformation occurs, language is poetic. The words then are all important, and no others could communicate exactly the same content. Thus the ultimate criterion of a poem is that we cannot translate it without loss.

We can understand why this is so by considering what is communicated. Language which simply speaks about a subject asks us to think and know, but poetry asks us to feel and experience. It communicates a mood or attitude (*Stimmung*) as distinct from an idea. Dr. Pfeiffer makes a good comparison between poetic language and expression through voice or gesture. It reveals an attitude in the same kind of way. And this accounts for its being untranslatable. The verbal form is kernel as well as shell.

Dr. Pfeiffer points out that words express a mood both by their sound and meaning (in a wide sense). On the one hand we have rhythm and melody, thus for example syllables of high pitch excite a light and cheerful mood, while those of low pitch express care and sorrow. On the other hand, we have

¹ *Umgang mit Dichtung*, Felix Meiner. Leipzig, 1936. Pp. 76.

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imagery. Poetry, in most cases, uses a great many images. This does not mean that it simply paints word pictures, for it uses images of movement. Images, used metaphorically, express a mood by acting as symbols.

We may, however, be tempted to think that a mood is something unimportant. And in that case we may mistakenly think that the solid worth of a poem lies only in its ideas. But a mood is a self-revelation. It illuminates the more secret depths of experience. And thus the "truth" of a poem lies in its success as a revelation.

Dr. Pfeiffer then discusses the criteria of poetry. The first question we have to ask about a poem is whether or no it expresses a mood successfully. We can talk about piety, as Dr. Pfeiffer points out, and thereby show how little pious we are. What then are the ways in which a poem can betray itself? This is the question which he now considers, and about which he makes a number of interesting observations. He classifies his criteria under three pairs of opposites: (1) genuine and not genuine (*echt* and *unecht*), (2) original and derived (*ursprünglich* and *nicht-ursprünglich*), (3) *gestaltet* and *geedet*. Thus, for example, a poem fails to be genuine when there is discord between its theme and its tone, and fails to be original when it simply takes over conventional phrases.

These are aesthetic criteria, and it is these which a poem must satisfy in the first place. But there are also ultra-aesthetic criteria. We must first ask whether a poem is successful in its expression, and then whether it expresses something valuable. Does it reveal a profound or superficial attitude? In the former case it means more to us than in the latter.

HELEN KNIGHT.

CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY¹

This volume, Professor Muirhead tells us in his Foreword, was suggested to him by an Indian friend (his joint editor, we suppose) and welcomed by him "as a continuation of the series on Contemporary British and Contemporary American Philosophy" after having persuaded himself that in India present-day philosophy is not (as many think) mere tradition, but that in that country, "owing partly to the inherent genius of the race, partly to a fructifying contact with Western thought, the tree of philosophical knowledge has recently put forth fresh flowers and fruit."

The book cannot stand a comparison with the twice two volumes it is meant to "continue" and rather confirms the opinion that present-day India, having earned international fame in art, mathematics, and even natural sciences, has not as yet produced a constructive philosopher likely to be enrolled in the international galaxy. To do it justice we must, however, remember that the idea of philosophy as a progressive science has just begun only in India to shake the deep-seated belief in the "ancient wisdom" as unsurpassed and unsurpassable.² Only a few decades ago a Brahmin

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*. By M. K. Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, Swāmi Abhedānanda, K. C. Bhattacharyya, G. C. Chatterji, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Bhagavan Das, Surendranath Dasgupta, Hiralal Haldar, M. Hiriyanna, S. Radhakrishnan, R. D. Ranade, V. Subrahmanya Iyer, A. R. Wadia. Edited by S. Radhakrishnan, D.Litt., and J. H. Muirhead, LL.D., F.B.A., Professor Emeritus of the University of Birmingham. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 375. Price 10s. Library of Philosophy, General Editor: Professor J. H. Muirhead.)

² Which in some respects it very likely is. It may, e.g., well be doubted whether the concept of the absolute *can* be carried further than has been done in the Neutral Absolutism reached (from the common Vedāntic Spiritual Absolutism) in the Upanisad mentioned at the end of this review.

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philosopher (descendant and namesake of the famous Appayadīksita), who had the courage to frame his own Brahmasūtras, was for that believed to have become crazy. "Die Wahrheit war schon längst gefunden" (Goethe) is even now the almost general persuasion in India. All that, according to it, is in this Dark Age left for the philosopher to do is to comment on or, at the best, find a new way to the inheritance of the past. Considering this, the volume before us shows indeed a remarkable progress. The old position is still held by but few of its contributors. Most have successfully conceded to the blood-transfusion from the West, and some will be found to have entirely freed themselves from the shackles of orthodoxy.

The Foreword informs us that the fourteen essays are "all written by philosophers of about forty-five years of age." This is a curious lapsus (fortunately). For, as a matter of fact, nine out of the fourteen contributors are born between 1861 and 1877! It may also be found interesting that "besides philosophers known to be attached to Hinduism, several Moslems were approached, but for different reasons excused themselves," and that there is a single non-Hindu among the contributors, viz. the author of the last essay, who is a Parsee.

The volume opens with a credo of Mr. *Gandhi* covering a single page. Next *Rabindranath Tagore* gives us an idea of "The Religion of an Artist" in a paper full of pithy sayings of which the following may be quoted for characterizing his standpoint: "My religion is essentially a poet's religion"; "Abstract truth may belong to science and metaphysics, but the world of reality belongs to Art"; "The world as an art is the play of the Supreme Person revelling in image-making." The last sentence, as will be noticed, is in keeping with the common Vedāntic view that the meaning of the world-process for an unchanging highest reality can be expressed, if at all, by the word *līlā* (play) only.

Hereafter come the properly philosophic contributions arranged in the alphabetical order of the names of the contributors. Most of the latter give also some information, partly quite interesting, of their philosophical evolution, which latter is with R. D. Ranade the very subject of his paper ("The Evolution of My Own Thought"). It seems convenient to begin our review with the three papers pleading for the Vedānta (Advaita) as the most perfect system of philosophy and then deal with the more independent contributions, of which five are outlines of the system of their respective authors and the rest engaged in some special problem.

Swāmī Abhedānanda (pupil of Rāmakrishna and successor of Vivekānanda), writing on "Hindu Philosophy in India," extols the monistic Vedānta (Advaita) which is, according to him, both more critical and more sublime than Kant: the former "because it shows the phenomenal nature of the Kantian ego, of his forms of intuition and of his categories of thought," and the latter because it proves that the Thing-in-itself of the objective world and that of the subjective world are one. It is the "most complete system" of philosophy and the best also from the religious point of view, considering that "religion is nothing but the practical side of philosophy and philosophy is the theoretical side of religion."

Dr. Bhagavan Das, of Benares (born 1869), Vedāntin like Abhedānanda, summarizes, in his long paper, "Ātma-Vidyā, or the Science of the Self," after a brief "confession of faith," his reasons for the latter as expounded in his several books, such as *The Science of Peace*, *The Science of the Emotions*, *Praṇava-Vāda or the Science of the Sacred Word*, *The Science of Social Organisation*, and *Ancient Versus Modern Scientific Socialism*.

V. Subrahmanya Iyer, of Mysore (born 1869), is another champion of the

idealistic Vedānta. His paper, "Man's Interest in Philosophy: an Indian View," begins with the question "What is Philosophy?" to which he answers that it is for the Indian not opinion (*matam*) but truth (*tattvam*) (which reminds us of the Buddha, for whom *dṛṣṭi*, "view," i.e. speculation, was tantamount to "wrong view"). "Progress in philosophy does not mean in India the attainment of new concepts of ultimate truth, but the starting, as knowledge advances, at higher levels and the finding of less difficult approaches, if possible, to the same peak of *Tattvam*" (p. 323; opposition to Fichte). The bulk of the paper is engaged with the theory of the "three states" (*avasthā-traya*, viz. waking, dreaming, deep sleep), which is, according to our author, the back-bone of the idealistic Vedānta. The metaphysical aspect of this trinity, we are told, has not been understood by Western philosophy for which the waking experience is the only standard of reality. It is all-important to distinguish Awareness from the "I" which belongs only to that of which we are aware (mental contents), and Reason from intellect, which latter is "Reason limited to the experience of waking and dreaming states." "Reason, which comprehends deep-sleep also, rises above duality." That is to say: "absolute non-difference in thought or knowledge," as "actually realized in deep-sleep" (!), proves "non-duality in existence or being."

Hiralal Haldar (late Professor of Philosophy, Calcutta), whose principal publication is *Neo-Hegelianism* (Heath Cranton, 1927), declines, in his paper "Realistic Idealism," to be described as a Hegelian, though admitting the Hegelian basis of his thought (due mainly to the influence of Green and Caird). His realism is expressed in the emphatic statement that "the opposition of mind to its object is the very basis of knowledge," his idealism in disallowing to make this opposition absolute—for the latter means ignoring that "things exist in virtue of the *relations* in which they stand to each other" (cf. Lotze)—and qualifying the unity as "spirit self-distinguished into the knower and the known." Hegel was wrong in believing "that the Logic exhaustively discloses the contents of reality"; for "the categories of human knowledge must be supplemented by others not at present known to us." "Things existing in time and space and excluding each other are limited, but in their ideality, as minds, they are all-pervading and omniscient." The conception of the many omnipresent and eternal selves, as held by the Indian pluralistic systems (Jainism, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika), is, therefore, wrong only in not viewing these as component factors of the one Absolute mind. For "the Absolute cognizes the world in an infinite number of ways from the standpoints of the countless things the minds of which are confluent in it without detriment to their distinctness."

A delightfully plain study (the only one, by the way, which makes no use of Indian philosophy) is *Common-sense Empiricism*, by G. C. Chatterji (Professor of Philosophy, Lahore), who, after having, during the War, sat in Cambridge at the feet of McTaggart, Moore, and Russell, has reached the conviction: "I can never return to a faith in a Timeless Absolute . . . barren formalism, which has no bearing whatever on the essential task of Philosophy, which is to reflect upon life and seek to guide and illumine it." He is "neither a subjective nor an objective idealist." Perception itself implies for him "the existence of extra-immediate entities or objects," every feeling or emotion also being "invariably directed towards an object" (and thus there being no evidence for an "Absolute consciousness"), while as to the nature of the object he holds that Idealism has failed to prove "that the world of external reality consists solely of psychical matters of fact." Bradley, according to him, has been inconsistent in urging that Reality must be mental or spiritual; for "in his Philosophy Matter and Mind are really on a par," which means

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that it is neither Materialism nor Idealism, but "rather more akin to what Mr. Russel calls Neutral Monism." The exact properties and laws of external nature have to be determined by Physical Science, not by Philosophy. The Body-Mind problem belongs to those difficulties that "are of the philosopher's own making"; "that minds can act upon bodies and vice versa" is the datum of experience from which we should start. As to "value," it "is an objective and not a subjective property," the three phases of objective reality we come in contact with being "external nature, other minds, and values." The author finally espouses the hypothesis of Emergent Evolution (conceiving of nature as a procession of events), without, however, allowing to use it (as did Lloyd Morgan and others who have introduced this conception) as an argument for the existence of a Creator.

"Getting sick of Absolutism" in favour of Emergent Evolution has been also the lot of another Cambridge student, viz. the now well-known historian of Indian Philosophy, *Surendranath Dasgupta* (Principal of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta), whose thoughtful paper, "Philosophy of Dependent Emergence," is his début as a constructive philosopher. A philosophy worthy of the name can according to him be only one based on the whole field of experience and such metaphysical concepts, as can explain experience. He therefore declines not only Spinoza and Hegel, viz. for their starting from *a priori* notions, but also the Vedānta in that it confines itself to a few special kinds of experience. He does not admit either that experience shows us an unchangeable perceiver or any unchanging entity at all and agrees with the Buddhists in looking at "mind" as a series of processes, but against them holds (with Moore) that awareness and its objects are two different things. As to causality, he declines the two views (common in India) of the identity of the causal entity with the effect (which means denying the process as such) and as the causal process as a making explicit what was implicit (which is deduction and not causation) and regards, with the Nyāya and Buddhist philosophy, the effect as a new emergence. The term "dependent emergence" looks, indeed, like a literal translation of the much-discussed Buddhist term *pratītyasamutpāda*. The complicated elaboration of the theory can be only hinted at in the following. The causal elements or diverse relations involved in a causal process, when leading up to an emergent quality or relation or relational complexes, are called by our author, for the sake of convenience, the "basis" of the emergents. The basis may but need not be a constituent of the emergents, and even, if it is not, may remain as a co-operative factor in a certain sense. The relation between the basis and the emergent qualities is "unique and inscrutable." "Relations exist as ultimate facts," but the qualitative nature of the fact is nothing but the emergence of one or more relations from relational complexes." "Relations are both external and internal; when they contribute to the projection of an emergent they are internal, and when they do not, they are external." It reminds us once more of the Buddhist formula of causation, viz. the *interdependence* of its two links called "name-and-form" (= mind-and-body) and "consciousness," when we read that, while "the body-complex is the basis of the emergent life," it is "itself also an emergent of the life-process-complex," neither of the two being intelligible as prior to the other, and both of them are "determined" by the mind-complex. In epistemology our author advocates, of course, the psychological attitude (with no consideration of epistemology in the Kantian sense) and, in particular, what he calls the "denotative theory of knowledge" teaching that our knowledge does not correspond with the object, but denotates it only like a word denoting the thing it refers to. The paper concludes with a discussion of "value" and "purpose."

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A. R. Wadia (Professor of Philosophy, Mysore) is one more Indian (Parsee) trained in England (Oxford and Cambridge) and left cold by "the Absolute Idealism of Bradley-Bosanquet type," though he "could never be anything but an Idealist." His "Pragmatic Idealism" may be called Vedāntic in so far as, according to it, "God is the personified aspect of the Absolute, the mind in which everything lives and moves"; and it is Indian also in accepting as the one satisfactory solution of the problem of evil the belief in Karma and metempsychosis. It is, however, thoroughly un-Indian in (1) advocating an Absolute that "itself is growing," because "the growth of the parts cannot but affect the whole—the Absolute—if there is a real organic relationship between the whole and its parts"; and (2) strongly rejecting asceticism as a means for overcoming evil and recommending instead the development of a consciousness of the brotherhood of men.

R. D. Ranade (Professor of Philosophy, Allahabad) regrets having no complete system of his own to offer and invites us to guess, from extracts from his writings in chronological order, what it might become like. His evolution, as outlined in his paper, "The Evolution of My Own Thought," begins with a spiritual monadism and reaches in his latest work (reviewed in *Philosophy*, 1934, pp. 111 f.) a monistic Vedānta with emphasis on mystical experience.

K. C. Bhattacharyya (Professor of Philosophy, Calcutta) gives us his *Concept of Philosophy*, by which he holds to go "on the negative side . . . much further than Kant," while on the positive side toning down his agnosticism. He declares philosophy to be threefold, viz. "philosophy of the object," "philosophy of the spirit," and "philosophy of truth," corresponding respectively with the three higher "grades of thought" called by him "pure objective," "spiritual," and "transcendental." Philosophy, then, is not concerned with the lowest grade of thought, viz. "empirical thought" which involves "reference to an object which is perceived or imagined to be perceived." "The contents of these four grades of thought may be provisionally called fact, self-subsistence, reality and truth." The object, philosophically, "is distinguished from the object as 'fact' (i.e. in science) by being intelligible only in reference to the subject." "Spiritual consciousness is not mere consciousness of reality but is reality itself." It is "introspection" = "enjoying understanding," i.e. "a form of the theoretic consciousness that implies an abjuration of the objective attitude." It includes religious experience as a consciousness of the over-personal self. But it differs from "transcendental thought"; for "reality is enjoyed but truth is not." "Transcendental thought is the extra-religious consciousness of a content that is neither objective nor subjective," i.e. of the Absolute, which "is conceived rigorously as truth in (Advaita) Vedānta." This position is claimed by the author to be "practically the reopening of the entire epistemological question of the meaning of thought and knowledge," because it means "on the one hand that the self is unthinkable and on the other that while actually it is not known and is only an object of faith, we have to admit the possibility of knowing it without thinking." For, "metaphysics . . . including logic and epistemology is not . . . literal thought."

M. Hiriyanna (late Professor of Sanskrit, Mysore), critical editor and excellent interpreter of Indian philosophical classics, proposes in his paper, "The Problem of Truth," not to discuss exclusively, as is generally the case in studies on this subject, the nature of ultimate truth only, but rather introduce to the problem by first of all discussing knowledge "distinguished

¹ An awkward compound used, apparently, in the sense of "existence in correlation to a subject." The author seems to have had in his mind some such Sanskrit compound as *ātma-samsīha* "based on the self."

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as either true or false from the common-sense point of view." He finds a convenient starting-point for this in the two *Mīmāṃsā* theories of error describing error respectively as incomplete apprehension and misapprehension (briefly set forth already by the author on pp. 313 f. of his book reviewed in *Philosophy*, 1933, pp. 305 f.) and from them proceeds to deal with relative truth, degrees of truth, and absolute truth. Knowledge is made "true" by being found to harmonize with the rest of our experience. But "sensa also, like objects and relations, may be false ("perspectives of the real"). Any truth even may be regarded as relatively false. Still, to avoid universal scepticism, we have to recognize an absolute standard by which knowledge is judged. This brings in the idea of comprehensiveness: the several kinds of truth may be viewed as representing degrees of truth, "a higher degree of it meaning greater completeness in the view it gives of reality."

Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy (of the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston) contributes a paper "On the Pertinence of Philosophy," consisting of two chapters headed, respectively, "Definition and Status of Philosophy, or Wisdom," and "How Divers Wisdoms have considered Immortality." The paper is abstruse and overloaded with details and footnotes, as unfortunately most of the many writings of the learned author. Chapter 1 is engaged with the kinds of philosophy (including "revealed truth") and the "differentia of religion and metaphysics." "The most urgent *practical* problem to be resolved by the philosopher . . . is to be recognized in a control and revision of the principles of comparative religion, the true end of which . . . should be to demonstrate the common metaphysical basis of all religions." Chapter 2 considers, among other things, "aeternity" as the state of being, e.g., of the so-called angels (*devas*) who are eternal as regards the immutability of their nature and understanding, but still partake of time in regard to their awareness of before and after, etc., and their independence of local motion.

Sir S. Radhakrishnan (Vice-Chancellor and Professor of Philosophy, Andhra University, Waltair), writing on "The Spirit of Man," pleads for the necessity of a religious revival and (1) discusses the religious implications of metaphysics. Though in India, according to him, "philosophy is essentially practical, dealing as it does with the fundamental anxieties of human beings," the neglect, by Indians generally, of the "essential duty of service to men" shows that they "have not the slightest idea of the true nature of religion." "Religion may start with the individual, but it must end in fellowship." There is a need for a "religion of the spirit." How can it be met with? By raising the human mind to its "spiritual status," i.e. "the immediate intuition of his unity with the eternal." "We must recapture the intuitive powers that have been allowed to go astray in the stress of life." This does not mean "anti-intellectualism." "Intuition which ignores intellect is useless." Being "the response of the whole man to reality," "it involves the activity of reason also." "It stands to intellect as a whole to a part, as the creative source of thought to the created categories." (2) "Philosophy cannot ignore the testimony of religious experience to the nature of ultimate reality." "For philosophy of religion, the central problem is to reconcile the apparently conflicting views of the supreme as eternally complete and of the supreme as the self-determining principle manifesting in the temporal process," i.e. to define the relation between the Absolute and God. This relation our author wants to be understood in a somewhat different way from both Sāṅkhya and Bradley. "While the Absolute is the transcendent divine, God is the cosmic divine." "God is the . . . consciousness that informs and sustains the world, . . . its ground, which as a thought or a possibility of the Absolute lies beyond the world in the universal consciousness of the Absolute."

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"God can only be a creative personality acting on an environment which, though dependent on God, is not God." "The Absolute is joy; God is love." "The question of immanence and transcendence does not arise with reference to the Absolute." "When the creator and the created coincide, God lapses into the Absolute." (For the description of the Absolute as "joy" compare the Vedāntic Absolute described as *sat-cit-ānanda*, i.e. "being, spirit, joy," and, for the last sentence, the end of the first chapter of Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanīya-Upaniṣad, where the Absolute, called the Fourth, viz. in regard to the "three states" mentioned above, is characterized as "world-extinguishing" and "God-swallowing," *īśvara-grāsa*.)

F. OTTO SCHRADER.

NEW BOOKS

Creative Morality. By LOUIS ARNAUD REID, D.Litt., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Durham at Armstrong College, Newcastle. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 270. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

Professor Reid leaves us in no doubt as to his views on the conduct of an ethical inquiry. In his Introductory Chapter he contrasts two philosophical methods, that of abstraction, appropriate to mathematics and pure logic, which proceeds from special aspects of the world of experience, by logical construction of precisely defined concepts, to a knowledge of their mutual relationships; and the converse method, which works not from part to whole, but from whole to part, clinging resolutely to the concrete experiences from which these abstract concepts were derived, by means of intuitions, clarified indeed on the higher levels by intellectual analysis, but preserving throughout immediate contact with the original object of apprehension; and declares himself to be in favour of the latter. He is fully aware that many, over and above the Logical Analyst, will anathematize him for his choice; but even the metaphysical worm will sometimes turn, and challenge the claims of logical formalism with the claims of life. If—such is Professor Reid's contention—the notions of Right, Duty, Good, which all agree to be fundamental in ethics, are studied in their concrete setting in man's moral practice, they will be found to be "expressive" of a system of meaning that carries us far beyond any abstract definition—indeed, whether they are definable or not is of quite secondary importance—and far beyond the limits of the particular actions to which they are applied. For on the one hand, their meaning is grasped by an intuition that is not merely intellectual, but an activity of a man's entire personality, including his emotions and his will. We are all familiar with Professor Alexander's doctrine that we come to know by acting and with M. Bergson's that the deeper emotions are pregnant with representations, and even beliefs, which have as good a claim as any other to reveal truth. Professor Reid distinguishes the "language of emotion" from the "emotive language" of the Logical Positivists, in that the former is the expression of "the total emotional state of mind," which includes cognition and conation, and "always conveys information of significance, and never mere emotion-feeling" (30). Further—and this is the author's main thesis, developed throughout the book—a concrete view of moral action shows it to draw inspiration from the vision, however vague and indeterminate, of an ideal of good, that is at once immanent in and transcendent of the agent's intention. He entitles his work *Creative Morality*, using the term "creation" with full awareness of its ambiguity and limitations (107-9), in that sense of "creaturely creativeness" in which we apply it to the activity of the artist. He means, as he himself tells us (107), much what M. Bergson means by "open" or "dynamic" morality. "Creative morality is embodiment in intentional action of deeply and widely significant good" (147). Morality is exhibited *in concreto* on different levels, illustrating what Professor Collingwood, in his *Philosophical Method*, has called a Scale of Forms; and each step in the ascent is an advance in expressiveness or creativeness. The highest grade in the scale is attained in the *praxis* inspired by religion.

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Everything, of course, depends on the way in which this doctrine is verified in detail. We may say at once that the further the argument proceeds, the clearer and more convincing does it prove. Professor Reid takes his start from the issue, very familiar in recent ethical discussions, of the relation between Right and Good. His own view may be summarised as allied to that of Mr. Joseph and Professor Stocks, though with somewhat more liberal concessions to the positions of Professor Prichard and (especially) of Dr. Ross. Rightness, we are told, is intrinsic to moral action, being constitutive and not consequential (152-3); but it stands also in intrinsic relation to goodness, which is a consequential or, in Dr. Ross's phrase, a *toti-resultant* character (150-1). Of course, this does not imply that rightness means conduciveness to good, or that the relation between them is one of external means to end. Professor Reid devotes much care in the earlier chapters to rebutting this interpretation. But the content of duty is that "of my opinion of the optimistic" (57). Professor Reid accepts Professor Prichard's more recent doctrine that the action amenable to moral judgment is the "setting ourselves" to do something rather than the actual production of a result, that it is, in other words, the "intention"; though he argues, in our opinion convincingly, against Prichard and Ross (as Mr. Joseph also has done) that motive is integral to the action thus "intentionally" understood. "Every action," he writes, "is a continuous whole, from its inner side to its outer, the inner side being motive and the outer being intention" (74). If this be not so, then Professor Prichard's view that what ethics is concerned with is the setting of ourselves to do an action, is "less than the needle point of an abstraction" (75). True, ought implies can, and we cannot *always* summon motives at will; but we can sometimes, and when we can it is part of our duty to evoke them. The kernel of Professor Reid's admirable discussion in chapters 3 and 4 is contained in the following sentences (67): "I *ought* (to do what?)—to do my *duty* (what is the content of my duty?)—which is to act according to my opinion of the Right, from the best motive it is now possible for me to summon. *Right* action is the best possible action under the circumstances, best from the point of view of objective effectiveness for good, and best subjectively in that it is the action of the best kind of character moved by the best kind of motive." He never questions that "in ethics the problem of good is always the supreme problem" (99); and in chapter 10 he posits as the "two fundamental judgments of value which seem both to be necessary presuppositions of any moral thinking or acting at all, and to be immediately assented to as true" (157), (i) that there are in the world qualities of better and worse, and (ii) that I *ought* to promote the better (or best). Of this second intuition more presently. The point is that right and duty, being what befits the practical situation in the light of good, do not merely imply "desire for the realization of the maximum of particular good" in the given situation, but express "a dominating ideal sentiment whose depth and significance it may be quite impossible to fathom and impossible to state" (114). This ideal furnishes the content for the formal principle of duty, which on the higher levels of conduct is found to be more and more subservient to content, and in religion is almost wholly transformed into the love of God.

If we offer one or two criticisms, they may serve incidentally to fill certain gaps in this bare outline. Professor Reid has no illusions about the ambiguity of the term "right"; as is clear from the distinction already cited between the objective and subjective measures of optimistic value and the restriction of "ought" and "duty" to the latter (56). Ought implies can; and, seeing that the issues of action for good are largely uncontrollable and beyond our ken, how can it be a moral obligation to do what is *really* right (i.e. objectively optimistic)?

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Right, we are told, is transitive, a bridge between morality and its objects which, though relevant to morality, lie outside it (55-6). But what is meant by the "relevance" of what admittedly lies outside the scope of moral judgment? If I do my duty and the uncontrollable results prove to be not optimistic but the reverse, my act is wrong only in a wholly non-moral sense and right in the only sense relevant to morals. Professor Reid seems anxious to secure at all costs the objectivity of right; but this anxiety is surely to be allayed through reflections on the realm of ideal value rather than on the realm of fact. True, we are told that "rightness is not itself a value but is the character of a fact possessing value," and that "judgment of rightness is not in *itself* judgment of value, but judgment of fact" (153). But is there such a character as "rightness" at all? To determine it as what is "fitting" in the practical situation is either morally irrelevant or (if *morally* fitting be meant) tautologous; it merely carries us back to the controversies of the eighteenth century and to Fielding's portrait of the Reverend Mr. Square. Is it not high time for the word "right" to be excluded from the discussion, as serving only to darken counsel; and for attention to be fixed on the concrete fact of moral experience, "I ought, or ought not, to do this"? It then becomes clear that obligatoriness (to say nothing of "rightness") is no character of actions, constitutive or consequential, but the recognition by a personal subject of a categorical imperative.

Secondly, as regards the term "good," Professor Reid follows Dr. Ross in holding that goodness is a *toti-resultant* property of facts in preference to Mr. Joseph's view that it is not a quality of the subject, but its form (149-52). To say, as does Mr. Joseph, that the goodness of the poem is identical with the poem and "that the only definition of its goodness is really the poem itself" is perhaps precarious; but Professor Reid presses his objection too hard when he charges the writer with tautology. Mr. Joseph is not in the habit of making tautological assertions; he leaves that to Dr. Wittgenstein and the Logical Positivists. What he means is that the goodness is not one property side by side with others, but that, in Cook Wilson's phrase, it "covers the whole being" of the subject. If this be so, it can hardly be consequential. Whatever we may say about finite goods like a poem, in the case of God goodness is surely constitutive; as Mr. Joseph himself points out, that God is good means not that He *has* but that He *is* goodness. Moreover, on the highest plane of human goodness, the *virtus infusa* of the scolastics, expressly referred to by Professor Reid, love (*caritas*) is declared to be the form which inspires and transfigures the whole character and practice of the Christian believer. And this seems to be just the view developed to such good purpose in the later chapters of this book. The earlier identification of the formal principle in morality with duty, to which goodness supplies the content, calls for revision; love of the good also, and even in a higher degree, gives form to moral and religious conduct. Once more, if rightness be the constituent character "by virtue of which the fact possesses goodness or value" (153), the goodness or value being consequential on the rightness, what is this but a reversal of Professor Reid's central doctrine through the subordination of "good" to "right"? How, if rightness be thus the ground of a thing's goodness, can the "I ought" be "dependent upon good," or the desired escape be found from the Kantian "rigorism of 'duty for duty's sake' "? (163-4).

No; Kant cannot be easily dismissed: *expellas furca, tamen usque recurret*. Our third criticism concerns the relation between right—or rather, let us say, duty—and good. That "the good ought to be done," where the doing, i.e. the setting ourselves to do, lies in our power, and the greater good as against the lesser—this is, for Professor Reid, a self-evident truth. We note in passing

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his interesting remarks on the *Seinsollen* (154-6), with critical reference to Hartmann; the phrase "ought-to-be," he holds, is meaningless apart from the "ought-to-do," and though legitimate as a corollary from goodness, is not required to mediate between good and duty. Here the connection is immediate: "it is enough to say directly 'You should do X,' and if a reason is required, the answer is 'Because X is good,' or 'X will be good if you do it'" (155). But is this true? Are not sense of duty and love of ideal good distinct as motives, especially when, following Professor Reid's method of inquiry, we consider them in integration with concrete experience? He admits, indeed, that "the broad distinction remains" between the two types of life (235 n.). To vindicate their mutual implication, he is driven to assume—gratuitously, in our opinion—that in all acts prompted by love sense of duty is unconsciously active below the surface. "Without some sense of duty (of the 'due') the morality of love would not be morality at all, but impulse" (*ib.*). "We must, I think, deny that the difference between conscientious action or action from a sense of duty, and the other two types"—i.e. action from desire of good and from desire of pleasure—"is really a difference between morally good types of action at all." For if the latter are "desires independent of the thought and influence of duty, they are not morally good actions at all" (129). Yes, if, with Kant, we limit morality to acts done for duty's sake—and there is much to be said for this restriction; though, if we adopt it, we must recognize, as Kant did not, the equal, and possibly superior, value of acts done *sub ratione boni*, without consciousness of obligation. But an act motivated by love of a rational good needs no infusion of duty to be redeemed from impulse. As Professor Reid says elsewhere, "in making a judgment 'This is good' . . . we pass . . . to underlying principles" (168). Of course, love of good needs regulation by sense of duty, when in a given case it tends beyond the mark, though where the object is good absolute or God, excess of love is hardly possible; but the sense of duty, when thus provoked, must surely be conscious and explicit. The motive, in the given case, is now not love, but obligation. Nor is desire of pleasure to be confused, as Professor Reid seems to confuse it (e.g. 126, 188), with love of good, though on a lower moral plane; for good, like duty, is a regulative principle, distinct in kind from the natural impulses which serve as material to its informing activity. Desire of pleasure, sense of obligation, the love of God are not different levels of dutiful or moral actions (130). Nor is the man who does his duty without the inspiration of love to be branded as "morally defective," an "unprofitable servant" (131). Love may well be the higher motive—that is another question; but the man who fulfils his obligation simply because he knows he ought displays therein his moral worth. As the author elsewhere admits, "it is absolutely and entirely moral to pay a debt to a tradesman" (130), but normally at least the payment is unattended by any emotion of love. Professor Reid hardly seems to us to realize the full significance of duty. In itself, and not through its dependence upon good (201), it is a self-transcending principle. Further, in willing each particular duty, we therein will duty universal. It is surely error to say: "A duty done is a duty done, but love must go on expressing itself, and without this love dies. Duty might at a stretch be called pluralistic, love monistic" (237). If anything, it is the other way round; the "ought" goes on expressing itself inexhaustibly; while love—not even excepting the love of God—is, as the scolastics taught, always of the absolute good as reflected in finite and defective goods, and is therefore at least *in hoc praesenti statu*, pluralistic. Nor does duty universal need to have recourse to good for its content. True, "real morality is always individual, historical, unique" (133). Duty and good alike are formal; but it is equally true that both alike individualize

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themselves of their own power in the presence of particular situations of fact. The dualism of ethical ideals to which these (and other) considerations point, a dualism to be resolved only by religion on lines which the author himself indicates (231), is, we know, anathema to most philosophers. To those who, like Professor Reid, deny its existence, the only appeal is in the well-known words of Cromwell: "My brethren, I beseech you in the bowels of Christ, believe it possible that you may be mistaken."

We have not left ourselves space to do justice to the later chapters, on the proof and validity of judgments of ultimate good (c. 11), and on the relationship between the moral and the religious life (i.e. 12-15). Moral judgments claim truth; the criterion in the case of particular judgments is logical coherence within an ethical system, supplemented by coherence with the "dominating value" of the system in question. But what of the case where systems clash? "Ultimate judgments of value cannot be proved"; "if asked to judge which of two *kinds* of moral life we believe to be *better*, we can only reflect very carefully, and, putting aside prejudice and summoning all sincerity, say: 'I judge this to be better than that' " (171). In the last resort, the appeal is to a rational intuition, which loses nothing of objectivity because it expresses the vision of the mind and character of an individual. The chapters on religion are perhaps the most illuminating and valuable in the whole treatise. It is so easy in these high matters to descend to triviality that we cannot but appreciate the restraint, the insight, and the distinction of thought and expression with which they are here discussed. Professor Reid draws with a firm hand the dividing line between the genuine autonomy of morality and its transmutation, on a higher plane, into the *praxis* informed by religious *theoria*. The informing principle of the religious life is Love in its supreme expression as *Agape* (here and elsewhere Professor Reid fully expounds the difference of *Agape* from *philia* and from *eros*), the God-given virtue that covers the whole field of religious conduct. Primarily, it is man's response to the Divine *Agape*: "Our own love of God is not our own love, but God's Love (*Agape*) in us which we 'enjoy' and 'live through' " (223). Yet, if it were merely God's Love, Professor Reid goes on to say, "it would be God's Love of Himself." Man's response must be as real as the inspiration. It was St. Bernard, in one of his sermons on the *Canticles*, who hazarded the thought that in God's Love *for man* and man's for God the term love could be affirmed, not as in the case of wisdom or goodness, merely by analogy, but, though differing vastly in *degree*, univocally. The activity in both cases is the same *in kind*. The suggestion affords a welcome escape from the difficulties that beset the *via analogica*. Secondly, from the love of God flows the love of man as man. Professor Reid is at one with M. Bergson (and others) in tracing the ideal of the love and service of humanity to its sole source in religion (238). Secularist humanism has ever masqueraded in borrowed garments. Perhaps this is the reason why, as Professor Reid rightly argues against Dr. Oman, it cannot be characterized as inevitably ego-centric. The author makes no pretension in these pages to treat either the moral evidence for Theism or, save by way of illustration, the specific doctrines of Christianity. He has some excellent remarks on the moral basis of religious belief and unbelief (219 ff, 244, 247), on humility and the sense of sin (c. 13), and on the quandary of the sceptic, who is moved to an admiration of the religious character despite his conviction that it rests on an illusion. He concludes that, on a full realization of the issue, the sceptic will find himself unable to retain his judgment of value in the face of truth (248-50). Our sole ground for cavil in these last chapters is with Professor Reid's perverse (as it seems to us) determination to detect, even on the level of love towards God, an

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undercurrent of moral obligation. Assuredly Religion teaches duties towards God; but they have no place, as Aquinas knew, and Dante, beyond the sphere of man's temporal sojourning, and even here they mark the point where, owing to human frailty, the motive of love proves inadequate as a guiding principle of conduct.

The foregoing criticisms must not be understood as qualifying our general appreciation of the importance and value of this most interesting book. Rather they should be taken as an indication of the stimulus it will offer not only to serious students of moral philosophy, but to the wider thinking public.

We have noted a few misprints: P. 64, 3rd line from foot, *for* "the sethings" *read* "these things"; p. 114, l. 10, *for* "roughtly" *read* "roughly"; p. 122, 4th line of 3rd par. *for* "have" *read* "has"; p. 192, note 1, l. 2, *for* ἀγάπη *read* ἀγάπη; p. 203, l. 10, *for* "propriation" *read* "propiitation."

W. G. DE BURGH.

Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi. Fasc. XIV. Liber de Sensu et Sensato: Summa de Sophismatibus et Distinctionibus. Nunc primum editit ROBERT STEELE. (Oxonii e Typographeo Clarendoniano. MCMXXXVII. Pp. xviii + 221. Price 17s. 6d.)

The hitherto unknown *opuscula* here conjoined by the diligence of Mr. Steele are very different in text and are taken from different MSS. The first from a MS. in the British Museum (Add. 8786) is a regular commentary in the scholastic manner on Aristotle *περὶ αἰσθητικῶς καὶ αἰσθητῶν*. The contents will not, I think, tend to lend much support to the once fashionable notion of Roger as an anticipator of modern physical science born out of due time. It is true that in discussing the various senses and sense-qualities, unusually full attention is given to points on which the medieval 'Arabs' (Alhazen, Avicenna, Averroes) are found trying to improve on Aristotle by taking account of facts which he might have seemed to ignore, and true, again, that Roger naturally gives a good deal of prominence in discussing vision to his own not very clearly conceived or expressed doctrine of the tendency of the 'visible species' to self-multiplication. And it is interesting to observe that he apparently desires to 'hedge' on some issues where Aristotle had taken a side. If I understand him rightly, he is not prepared to dismiss altogether the Platonic view (that of the *Timæus*) that colours are literally 'flames,' and he seems to hold, as Aristotle did not, that 'light' and 'colour' may be species of a common genus, though, if so, that genus is itself only called 'light' for want of a really appropriate name. But when all is said (even in the case of the Aristotelian doctrine which he clearly finds most difficult of digestion, that of the instantaneous transmission of light), he will never frankly admit to any defect in 'the philosopher.' Whatever looks like one must be got rid of by a logical *distinctio* at all costs; even where the medical writers seem most clearly to have added to our knowledge of the facts, it must be maintained that, not being natural *philosophers*, they are incompetent to say anything about the causes of the facts they record, and Aristotle's account of these causes must be simply accepted. The attitude is that of a 'reactionary' rather than of a genuine 'progressive.' Indeed, it is hard to say what real progress could have been made by one who clung as pertinaciously as Roger to the notion that a *sensum* is at once something corporeal emitted from a body and yet has somehow a more 'spiritual' *esse* than the body which emits it.

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To judge by the only evidence available, that of the printed text, the MS. has been much more carefully written than the Amiens MS. from which so many of the *opera inedita* have been taken. There are comparatively few gross palpable errors, and I am not sure that the most striking of these would not prove on re-examination to be due to an editor struggling with a microscopic script rather than to the scribe. Thus, to take the worst instances, in pp. 131-4 the word *leve* (polished, Aristotle's *λεῖον*) used of sonorous bodies, appears at least five times as *lene* (soft), though I should have thought it immediately obvious that e.g. a ball of wool cannot be used as a gong. So p. 91, 21 where Mr. Steele prints the meaningless *Hec actu(a)li ad presens digrediendo*, what the scribe meant to write, and I should say probably will be found to have written, was not *actuali* but *attuli*, 'So much I advance by way of digression.' And there are not a few places where there seems to be a failure to provide a word (perhaps written contractedly) with the grammatically necessary case-ending, or to correct a verbal slip due to preoccupation on the scribe's part (e.g. 15, 12, *auditus* must surely be an oversight for *visus*, which the sense demands). The one really serious difficulty with which the reader will have to grapple is the eccentricity of the punctuation which often completely perverts the author's sense. It looks as though the MS. had been followed in this matter, without any pains having been taken to ascertain the meaning, as though the producer of an *editio princeps* had done his duty by merely correctly transcribing what is in his MS. and leaving it wholly to the reader to make sense of it. One may excuse a weary palaeographer for taking this view, but the University of Oxford should surely have found a scholar to read the pages before publication attentively enough to prevent the frequent occurrence of full stops in the midst of a sentence, or their omission where the sense absolutely demands them.

The second treatise is from a different MS. (Digby 67 in the Bodleian) and is of a very different character. It is a discussion, in connection with the logical exercises of students in the early years of their university course, of difficulties connected with the use of the word 'all,' and the distribution of subject and predicate in propositions. (Mr. Steele might have illustrated the application of the name *sophismata* to these exercises by reference to the probably still current description of students in arts of the second year as 'Sophisters.') The interest of the discussions, except from a purely historical point of view, seems slight, and the MS. is evidently much inferior to the other. Mr. Steele remarks that it is made difficult by ambiguous *compendia* and that it has *lacunae* (more numerous, I suspect, than those he has actually marked). It is also clear to me that in many places it must either be corrupt or have been wrongly deciphered, since the results as printed make neither grammar nor sense. Thus I would suggest, e.g. that the meaningless *actum* at 138, 1 is the remains of (*predi*)*catum*, the word really wanted, that the equally meaningless *possit* of 140, 30 really represents (*dis*)*positio singularis*>, that *universalitate* at 153, 8 should be *universitate*, *naturam* at 160, 24 *materiam*, *pali* at 148, 15 certainly *pali(enti)* I could offer a fair number of other slight corrections which seem to me necessitated by the immediate context, but I prefer to say as little of the work as possible, since, owing to insufficient acquaintance with the subject-matter, I find its meaning in any case often obscure. It is patent, however, that this treatise also would require very thorough repunctuation to be fully intelligible, even where there is no reason to suspect the text. (Thus, to take only one example, what is the sense of 148, 24 *cum signum non sit opposita dispositio, set magis idem verbum negativum*, etc.? How can the signum "all" be a negative word? But put a comma after *negativum*, and you get the sense "since the sign (of quantity)

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... is rather the *same* vocable ("men" and "all men" are, in a sense, the same), a negative will not make the term stand for non-entities").

A. E. TAYLOR.

The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. By ISRAEL KNOX. (New York: Columbia University Press. London: Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xi + 219. Price 12s. 6d.).

This book serves the double purpose of an exposition and a criticism of the aesthetic theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The bibliography testifies to a scholarly thoroughness in the mastery of their writings, of those of their prominent critics, and of outstanding modern contributions to the subject of aesthetics. Its author develops the central thesis that the sin of these philosophers was to subordinate their aesthetic theory to the demands of a philosophical system or metaphysic, and that all their errors flow from this initial substitution of an imaginary map of the world of knowledge for one they might have drawn after actual exploration of its geographical features. Thus Kant's *Critique of Judgment* bridges, by means of the appreciation of purpose in aesthetic and teleological judgments, the gulf yawning between Nature as apprehended by scientific theory, and Freedom as experienced through the supernatural agency of reason as a moral impulsion; the phenomenal and the noumenal are at last brought face to face through the teleological. In the panlogical idealism of Hegel art manifests the substance of reality—the Idea—in a sensuous and individual form, and exhibits the gradual emancipation of a logical content in its progressive evolution from the symbolical, through the classical, to its apogee in romantic poetry. But both Art and Religion are finally supplanted by the Philosophy of Hegel. According to the arch-pessimist Schopenhauer, Art is the first stage on the journey towards salvation through ascetism; it reveals the Platonic Ideas that objectify the ubiquitous Will for those who can detach themselves from their private interests and become immersed in the pure, selfless contemplation of reality.

The exposition is in itself an admirably concise and clear historical summary; though to do full justice to these doctrines three volumes would have been more adequate than one. It would, besides, be generally agreed nowadays among writers on aesthetics that what Fechner called "the Method from Above," beloved of nineteenth-century metaphysicians, was completely obsolete. Now the real weakness of Mr. Knox as a critic is that he lacks a definite, consistent, and carefully thought-out viewpoint of his own. He has assimilated a vast quantity of material, but it is not as yet thoroughly digested by the process of personal reflection. It would be only natural for the author to develop his own views on the firm basis of his wide historical learning; and then he may find that metaphysics, though no longer, as heretofore, the starting-point, has become the common terminus of aesthetics and all other studies of value in so far as their originators can lay any justifiable claim to a philosophical handling of their subject.

LISTOWEL.

Roger Fry and Other Essays. By HOWARD HANNAY. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 208. Price 6s.).

This Collection of Essays on aesthetical topics is distinguished by a limp clarity of style and a solid commonsensical quality of judgment that should

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recommend it to laymen as well as to philosophers. The most profitable chapters are those that deal with modern theories and schools of painting. Mr. Hannay is adamant to the plea that painting is at its best a kind of geometry in line and colour, and rightly relegates abstract patterns to their legitimate pre-eminence among the minor arts. The thesis that the classical schools of painting have never exhibited a sharp divorce between form and content, between an intellectual or emotional theme and the contours or volumes through which it can be represented by pigments, is one that stands the test of actual observation and would rescue genuine originality from the byways of eccentricity and fruitless experiment were it taken seriously to heart by the fraternity of painters. His exposition of Roger Fry's theory of painting does less than justice to the broad-minded eclecticism of that rare critic. In accusing him of lapsing into a lopsided formalism, he seems to forget the delightful appreciation of caricature in the pages of *Transformations*, and the frank admission there that "psychological volumes" are not alien intruders upon a finished canvas. I am inclined to think that Mr. Hannay's anxiety to prove that what is best in modern art conforms to the canons of the classics—in itself an impeccable contention—leads him to read into certain pictures more than their authors intended. He is surely exaggerating the representative element in Cézanne, the last of the giant impressionists, when he speaks of "the tragic intensity" of some of his portraits.

The stimulating discussion of creative imagination in science, history, and art suffers from one crippling defect; it tackles this immensely difficult problem from a logical rather than a psychological angle. Dr. L. Rusu's little read *Essai sur l'Imagination Créatrice* is a contribution to its solution that no modern student should neglect, and its attitude reveals by contrast the fatal methodological error of neglecting the psychological approach to the functioning of human imagination. The qualified subjectivism of the following chapter shows in an interesting way how epistemological idealism can be freed from dependence on metaphysical idealism, and that this view sheds more light than realism on the spontaneous fusion between what is actually perceived and what is added from the mind in the aesthetic perception of an object.

The concluding essay on *Standards of Taste* comes as a sad anti-climax. Those who deny the existence of any rules or standards for assessing the merits of a work of art are denying simultaneously the very possibility of aesthetics. For the work of description and explanation peculiar to science furnishes *ipso facto* laws for the identification and production of its object. The aesthetician's job is to distinguish his norms from the precepts of medicine, the laws of engineering, the recipes of cookery, etc., not to wave aside a necessary consequence of exact knowledge. It is true that Mr. Hannay does his best to fill the gap by substituting good taste for abstract canons as the touchstone of aesthetic value. But a cursory glance at the history of criticism surely displays the amazing vagaries and aberrations of so-called taste. May I remind the author that the bulk of his own book is an effort to establish a critical standard and to apply it to the art of painting?

LISTOWEL.

The Philosophy of Relativity. By A. P. USHENKO, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 208. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

This book, which is intended primarily for philosophers, may be described as an attempt to review the nature of physical reality in the light of the

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theory of relativity. To the physicist it is recommended as a possibly new interpretation of his equations. A summary of the theory is given, and the problems discussed include those of the basic categories of nature, the representative and presentative theories of perception, the nature of change and of measurement, and the physical reality and general philosophical status of space-time. There are five appendices, in which certain relevant points, such as the identification of matter with curvature, Zeno's paradoxes, and the logical positivists' analysis of propositions, receive comment.

The writing, though lacking distinction, is clear; the account of relativity is, in the main, accurate, in spite of a few statements such as "Relativity explains that time and motion are merely two different ways of looking at the same thing"; and there are some acute remarks on certain of the subjects dealt with. Those who share the author's standpoint will find much in the book to give them pleasure and profit. As a non-scientific treatise, written by a philosopher for philosophers, on questions that derive what importance they possess from other than empirical sources, it is undoubtedly worth reading.

From the point of view of the scientist, however, or that of the reader who is interested in problems to which both science and philosophy can make significant contributions, the book appears in a different light. The trouble is not so much that it is inaccurate or illogical as that it is inhomogeneous. It drags relativity, so to speak, into an atmosphere in which it cannot breathe, with the result that we have two unconformable sets of ideas forced into an unnatural union. Relativity is a scientific theory, generated and developed in the traditional, orthodox manner proper to scientific theories, and as such it is quite unfitted to give evidence concerning any philosophical questions which, like those here discussed, are essentially independent of scientific discoveries.

One or two examples must suffice. A prominent question throughout the book is whether space-time is real or not. The fact that science is not interested in this question does not, of course, necessarily preclude a philosopher from discussing it, but what it should tell him is that if he does so he cannot legitimately claim that the meaning of space-time for the physicist has any bearing on his problem. Conceptually, space-time has for the physicist precisely the same meaning as Newton's laws of motion; each provides a language in which the facts of physics may be expressed. If the relativity language is used, the facts are expressed as curvatures or world-lines, and if the Newtonian language is used, the facts are expressed as forces. The physicist almost invariably uses the latter language, but for the most general problems he finds the former more convenient. Now appears the philosopher in search of reality. If he means by reality the conceptions which the physicist finds most generally applicable in a restricted field of research at the present stage of development, then he must conclude that space-time is real, just as twenty-five years ago he would have had to conclude that the force of gravitation was real. But Professor Ushenko does not mean that: he means by reality "the traditional definition, viz. reality is independent of the mind." Except that mind must be unreal, this tells us nothing, and certainly relativity throws no light at all on the question, "Is space-time real?" when reality is defined in this way.

Closely connected with this point is the question of solipsism. Professor Ushenko seems to imply that relativity is incompatible with solipsism, whereas one of its cardinal features is its conformity therewith. Relativity identifies "another observer" with "myself using a different co-ordinate system." If there is another observer whose experience of mechanical events I cannot myself describe simply by changing my co-ordinates, relativity leaves him

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entirely out of account, however "real" or "independent of the mind" he may be. Thus an observer moving faster than the critical velocity is ignored in relativity because his view could not be mine.

Again, in discussing motion, Professor Ushenko has in mind something quite distinct from motion as conceived both in relativity and in classical physics. He is concerned with the merging together of perceptions at different instants, but in science there may be no such merging together, and in fact only a single perception. Thus, the proper motion of a star, which is shown by comparison of isolated observations taken perhaps fifty years apart; the radial velocity of a star, which is shown by a single observation of the position or colour of a spectrum line; and the flash of a meteor, which is perceptually a continuous change of position with time, are all indistinguishably grouped together as "motion." The motion with which Professor Ushenko is concerned is therefore something quite different from motion as it is understood in relativity, and in dragging relativity into his book he is simply confusing his treatment of what is essentially a non-scientific problem. Whether his problem is of importance or whether, as the logical positivists might say, it is merely nonsense, need not concern us. The point here is simply that it is quite independent of relativity.

The fact is that there is no philosophy of relativity any more than there is a philosophy of the electromagnetic theory of light or of the mutation theory of the origin of species. The relation of any scientific theory to philosophy is simply the relation of science in general to philosophy, and that is not at all affected by the advent of relativity. It may, of course, be clarified by scientific progress and shown better by means of one scientific theory than by means of another, but that is quite a different matter. In discussing the concepts peculiar to relativity as though they had a special meaning for the philosophical theory of perception or the problem of the ultimate nature of reality, Professor Ushenko is, in our opinion, mistaking their significance. For this reason we cannot regard his book as a valuable contribution to its professed subject, in spite of certain incidental merits.

HERBERT DINGLE.

The Philosophy of James Ward. By A. H. MURRAY. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1937. Pp. xii + 196. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

The best years in Ward's long and strenuous life were spent in the attempt to find a philosophy that should include the religion of a thinking man (at the top), but never lost the scientist's savour of the nature of things. To this he devoted his great intellectual powers with an intellectual candour that has seldom been matched, and he had the experimentalist's temper and training as well as a very wide knowledge of the biological and other experimental sciences. It would be a calamity if his views were allowed to pass into the twilight of merely antiquarian interest. Many of them, for instance his insistence that the macroscopic should be regarded as a statistical aggregate of microscopic constituents, were even prophetic of a very modern attitude. His great *Psychology*, although too philosophical for current tastes and too closely argued to reward a merely desultory study, is a model of a type of inquiry the neglect of which is a great loss to the present age. And certain theological scientists like Dr. Tennant or the Bishop of Birmingham take Ward's philosophy very seriously indeed.

Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that a philosophy so full of human interest, dealing with such a variety of perennial problems in a form that is not untopical, should have elicited comparatively little in the way of

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detailed commentary. The reason may be in part that Ward wrote in a style which, although it was pointed, clear, terse, and sometimes even vivid was too condensed and too obviously burdened with too great a load of relevant material to be easy to read or even to quote. Another part of the reason may be that theological writers in this country in the recent past have been more eager to accept all that the scientists say, and to proclaim (without argument) that science and philosophy are blood brothers than, like Ward, to try to struggle towards solid ground by vigilant criticism of science, philosophy, and religion too. Certain modern physicists, it is true, have been generous in this matter, giving an unconsidered blessing to crude philosophies and vague religious hypotheses. But no one who likes that kind of thing could have much interest in Ward.

I think, then, that the present book is most welcome, and I should like to think that it is timely. The author has made a most careful study of Ward's work, of its contemporary connections, of its aims, development, and internal affiliations. He has documented his book very well. His narrative is lucidly arranged. His exposition is vigorous and likely to catch and to keep the reader's attention. Indeed, there is only one major criticism that I am disposed to make. It seems to me to be unfortunate that the author is one of those people who know so very well what genuine philosophy is, and consequently can afford to treat Ward's struggles with the subject so very much *de haut en bas*.

Quite probably Ward's philosophy was "not always as profound as it might have been," and some of Mr. Murray's reasons for dissatisfaction may be very good reasons. Ward may have put too much individual psychology in the wrong place, he may have been over-concerned with the philosophical importance of a common-sense interpretation of "experience." His idealism in various ways may have been rather too timid and rather too sticky. But Mr. Murray seems to be hinting all the time, and he tells us explicitly at the end that Ward's pluralism, Kantianism, occasional "psychologism," etc., are due to the fact that he never understood what (universal) "mind" was, although he knew quite a lot about his own mind and about other people's minds. "Mind," according to Mr. Murray, "in some way, one does not know how, seems to be able to grasp universals and relations which transcend the immediacy of the given fact. It is this characteristic of mind, known to all thinkers through all the ages, which is important for philosophy."

Mr. Murray can scarcely mean that there is *no* transcendence of the immediacy of the given fact in Ward's psychology and philosophy. He means that there isn't enough of it. In short, he means that philosophy, in the strict sense, is exclusively concerned with universal "mind" and that all thinkers through all the ages have admitted the fact (even, I suppose, when they were anti-Averroists). It follows rather easily that Ward wasn't a "thinker" although something like thought occasionally overflowed his naturalism and his scientific bent.

JOHN LAIRD.

A Creed for Sceptics. By C. A. STRONG, LL.D. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1936. Pp. viii + 98. Price 6s. net.)

Professor Strong is already known as an exponent of Critical Realism; but he feels that he has so far failed to impress his contemporaries—a curious but not infrequent phenomenon in the philosophical world. Claiming that his doctrine has now probably reached its final form and that it "differs

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in a number of respects from any other" with which he is acquainted, he essays once more in the present volume, the slimness of which is no indication of its value, to state his philosophical position regarding such topics as sense-data and perception, being and becoming (in French, presumably because the chapter appeared originally in a French publication?), and Free-Will (in a chapter which consists of an extract from Voltaire on this subject). Affinity with Bergson and James, who are expressly mentioned, and to some extent with Schopenhauer is apparent.

The lack of response by his contemporaries, to which Professor Strong refers, is, it must be confessed, understandable. The exposition is extremely difficult to follow, not merely because of the theory set forth and the concentrated nature of the argument but also because of the terminology used. Apart from his own use of the term *feeling* which involves a departure from the traditional meaning, the latter being suggested by himself to be an obstacle to the acceptance of his view, but which he is quite entitled to adopt if he believes it to conform more accurately to the facts, the occurrence of such terms throughout the discussion as data, feelings, sensory impression, sensation, the meanings of which are not correlated, tends to produce confusion. Nor is it easy to grasp his distinction between the *characters of real things* and their *nature*, even when one does grasp that he intends to find in *feeling*, as he interprets it, the clue to their *nature*. In view of his plain statement as to his purpose, it is unfortunate that such a degree of obscurity marks his exposition that it is difficult to assess his actual achievement.

His express objective is to defend knowledge from the challenge of scepticism. His fundamental position as a Critical Realist is that datum and object are distinct. This non-identity is used by the sceptic to cast doubt upon the existence of the object. (If this is so, could Hume, to whom he refers as a sceptic, be really a sceptic, seeing that he very clearly asserted that philosophy could have no grounds for accepting such a distinction?) To meet this doubt we are given a somewhat intricate theory. The doctrine of representative perception is rejected, if it means that the real thing is *inferred* from the datum. The latter is said to be purely mental (p. 59); it is made of feelings which in their turn are "internal, subjective, and real"; it is yet "external, objective, and merely apparent" (p. 25), it is largely produced by reactions on the part of the self and has only a *petitious* externality, for we react "as if a feeling which bears the impress of an external thing were the thing"; it is a picture "which is taken as identical with the real thing" but which is not the real thing because it is the knowledge of it; as a picture it depicts objects, and we know the latter only through the picture. In spite of the supposed evidence for the distinction between datum and object—evidence which suggests a time-lag between datum and the state of the real thing—a datum is yet said to depict "a real thing as it is at that moment and as it appears from that point of view."

In the face of so much *fiction* and *as ifs* it is not easy to see how scepticism has been met. The conception of *intent* is made to bridge the gap between datum and object; it is doubtful, however, whether it is a bridge at all but only a magic wand. Reactions on the part of the self do not provide any clear explanation, for to what are the reactions made? In the end Professor Strong is merely laying stress upon practical requirements and the instinctive belief that objects exist, and to this a sceptic would be in no way opposed. In fact the author is not sufficiently critical. It seems that his theory, like so much theory about and on the basis of sense-data since the time of Locke, starts from data that are defined in terms of *known* things, *known* relations and distinctions between things, instead of adhering strictly to the task

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of showing how such knowledge can be explained on the basis of the data. A psychologist is probably more apt than any one to err in this respect. Psychological experiments may provide evidence for and render intelligible the notion of *intent*; but, as the psychologist is working within the framework of a datum and a *known* object and a *known* distinction between datum and object, can his psychological notion of intent be admitted to provide a solution to the prior epistemological issue?

B. M. LAING.

John Locke and English Literature of the Eighteenth Century. By KENNETH MACLEAN. (Newhaven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1936. 11s. 6d. Pp. viii × 176. Price 2 dollars 50; 11s. 6d.)

The main theme of this entertaining work is set forward in its opening sentence: "The book that had most influence in the eighteenth century, the Bible excepted, was Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*." The author sets out to demonstrate this thesis by apt and frequent quotation from eighteenth-century writers, and by referring these passages back to their source in the *Essay*. He does not claim to be a philosopher, and we are not to expect any philosophical exposition of the *Essay* itself in these pages. He contents himself with the barest statement of Locke's doctrines, quoting frequently. On the whole this statement is free from error, but superficial and inadequate. In particular the account given of Book IV seems to be weak. It is to be feared that the student of literature will not get a very clear idea of Locke's theory of knowledge from this section. Elsewhere also one or two points need to be questioned. I cannot follow the argument that "the denial of innate ideas . . . definitely questions God's benevolence and kindness" (p. 19-20). Again, is it not an over-statement to say that Book III of the *Essay* "presents in brief space a complete philosophy of language" (p. 103)? Book III is certainly more important than some writers have been ready to admit, but Dr. Maclean surely makes too great a claim for it.

However, it is not the author's primary purpose to expound Locke, but rather to trace his influence on the chief literary works of the eighteenth century and this Dr. Maclean does with considerable skill. He is obviously very familiar with the period and is able to bring forward considerable evidence in support of his thesis. There can be no doubt that writers like Pope, Addison, Swift, and Sterne were deeply indebted to Locke's *Essay*. In particular Dr. Maclean is interested in the relations between Locke and Laurence Sterne. His explanation of the use which Sterne made of Locke's theory of time is admirable. Interesting also are his discussions of such matters as the comparison between brutes and men, the association of ideas, and the relation between wit and judgment in eighteenth-century literature. Students of Locke will be grateful to Dr. Maclean for this careful piece of research.

R. I. AARON.

The Silver World: An Essay on the Ultimate Problems of Philosophy. By AEGIDIUS JAHN, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 392. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This book is described as the English edition of a work written in 1930-31, recast and expanded in the next year. Its author, according to the flap of the jacket, is a native of Pilsen, who since 1920 has been inspector of Czech

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public instruction in Austria and has written actively upon epistemological and other such subjects. In his preface Dr. Jahn tells us that he has been profoundly influenced by Anglo-American philosophy, particularly as regards its favourite (objective) starting-point, although he himself is a mid-European who finds German philosophy "intellectually more accessible," despite its predilection for idealism. Of recent writers Mauthner, Vaihinger, Reininger, Reichenbach, Einstein, and Müller-Freinfels have impressed him the most.

The book itself is of a type rather unfamiliar in contemporary English philosophy. If I dared to run the risk of misconstruction, I should describe it as a piece of high-grade philosophical journalism. By this I do not mean that it is amateurish, for it is serious and knowledgeable and technically adequate. Nevertheless, as cricketers would say, it uses the long handle. It is definitely propagandist. It chooses its terms and its metaphors to startle and to perturb. It is ferociously atheistic, savagely "anti hoministic," uncompromising in its repudiation of the ultimate (and especially the absolute) in metaphysics and in epistemology.

Its broadest outline is somewhat as follows: We have O-philosophies (i.e. professedly objective ones) and S-philosophies (i.e. mentalistic ones). The first type is strictly impossible because we can never be "ego-free" in our knowing. Nevertheless, we can scarcely doubt that there was and will be something before our birth and after our death. S-philosophy, on the other hand, inevitably founders on the rocks of solipsism. It is responsible for all false anthropomorphisms (including "substance," all nouns, and even "being"). Yet since we cannot avoid every particle of S-philosophy in epistemology, that study is doomed, and metaphysics with it. Metaphysical questions either lead nowhere or are lost in impenetrable mist or are swallowed up by a "black absolute." Their message, if they could have one, would just be death, and that, too, would be the message of an O-philosophy if we could reach it. The universe is mostly void, too empty even to be dead. Where it is not void it is seldom alive. Where it is alive, life is short and sad.

Nevertheless, Mr. Jahn believes that it is possible to walk with some security in what (forgetting metaphysics) we might call the valley of empirical being. He also believes that although "absolute good" is as much of an absurdity as "wooden iron," a relative ethics for man and his companions among the higher animals is not absurd and is even practicable. Suffering unites them and should enable them to alleviate their lot before they are carried feet-foremost to their graves. If there be progress within the next ten million years or so during which man may perhaps survive, the world should become "silver" although at present (with its wars, follies, and cruelties) its metal is very much baser.

This thesis is presented with vigour and gravity and makes use of much learning, mostly modern and scientific although also older and quite frequently Eastern.

While I find it difficult to believe that the difficulties inherent in this agnosticism-cum-realism are adequately met (i.e. to believe that the author does not profess to know too much to make metaphysics quite inaccessible, or alternatively does not profess to know too little to warrant his confidence in a silver or about-to-be-silvery world of the plains) I should like to call attention to the range of his arguments and to their frequent acuteness and solidity. For proof of this the reader must go to the book itself. A short review would be unfairly eclectic.

JOHN LAIRD.

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Mind, Medicine and Metaphysics. The Philosophy of a Physician. By WILLIAM BROWN, D.M.(Oxon), D.Sc.(Lond.), F.R.C.P. (London; Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. viii + 294. 7s. 6d. net.)

This is a collection of essays dealing in a popular fashion with a number of important questions relating to medical, moral, religious, and, to a lesser extent, metaphysical problems, from the point of view of a psychologist who is also a philosopher and a practising physician. Nowhere in *Mind, Medicine and Metaphysics* does Dr. Brown explicitly set forth his philosophical creed; he implies it rather as a background against which he develops the various topics of which he treats. But, just as he strikes the clarion note of faith on the first page of his book in the chapter headed "Psychology and Medicine," so he ends the volume on the same note when discussing "The Survival of Personality" in the last chapter. Despite all their failings and diseases, Dr. Brown is an optimist, or at least a meliorist, in his outlook upon human individuals and humanity as a whole; but his philosophy, so far as it may have a practical outcome, is to be attained only by way of an autognosis more far-reaching than that of Socrates, for it must extend beyond the confines of the conscious mind to reveal the very depths of the unconscious itself. Such knowledge "brings self-control," and this in every direction and circumstance of life, in sickness as well as in health, in inner moral strife against instinctual revolts as well as in social adjustments and international relations. It is this thread running through the book that makes it possible to include chapters on such diverse topics as psycho-analysis and the physical treatment of disease, sex control, free-will, confession, peace and war, and the Group movement, without leaving them, as it were, a mass of fragments and loose ends. There are two Appendices, one on the development of psychology and the inauguration of the new psychological institute at Oxford, and the other containing reprints of three letters from the Author to *The Times* newspaper on the psychology of peace and war.

F. AVELING.

Growth of the Mind in Relation to Culture. By C. LAMBEK. (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard. 1936. Pp. 143. Price Kr. 6.50.)

This is an interesting and able essay. Its thesis is that "For cultural development the same laws hold good as for individual growth and decline . . . at the present stage of culture the whole question of progress hangs upon the mental factors" (pp. 108 and 98). Mental activity (the source of which the author traces wholly to depressive influences) and mental coherence are the two desiderata of culture, the latter being the more important. The significance of association in mental life he takes to be grossly exaggerated in consequence of "the utter lack of results shown by psychology in the study of all forms of volitional phenomena" (p. 63). "To-day," he adds, "most of us have more associations than are good for us. Brains that are full up with many things are apt to produce only superficial thoughts. What we need to-day is not more varied contents in the stream of thoughts, but its control and regulation" (p. 64).

Of the social order he is (justifiably) pessimistic. "The idea of obtaining stability in the outer world must now be regarded as obsolete, our only hope is to obtain harmony in the inner world, in the form of a coherent self, and thus attain an existence more worthy of mankind" (p. 82). Yet of man's nature he is (to my mind excessively) optimistic. In consequence he appears

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to overstress the subjective side of mental life. It is a truism that no one can sense my sensations or think my thoughts; but is it equally true that, "Nature has made each individual organism into an instrument upon which others can play only to a slight extent" (p. 78)? Is it not the case that the majority of us are not in the least opaque either to the sight or the suggestions of others; that we are in reality all too easily moulded into the shape our propagandists desire? Certainly the more substantial the personality the less transparent and pliable, and certainly the ideal is that all men be substantial personalities; yet the reality falls sadly short. Men can be (and are being) played upon to an almost unlimited extent. Nevertheless Mr. Lambek's contention that it is only through independence that culture can flourish is no doubt right. In sociological subjects it is less than ordinarily possible to keep ideals and facts from mixing, and Mr. Lambek errs, if he errs at all, in this respect alone, in a manner which is entirely creditable, and which in no degree diminishes the value of his vigorous and lucid little book. The translation, presumably made for the manuscript, is generally clear. I have noted the following slips: p. 22, l. 10, insert *h*; p. 36, l. 31; for *c* read *s*; p. 50, l. 15, insert *o*; p. 72, l. 31, insert *e*.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Sensationalism and Theology in Berkeley's Philosophy. By INGEMAR HEDENIUS. (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells Boktryckeri-A.B.; Oxford: B. H. Blackwell. 1936. Pp. 238. Price 10s.)

Under this somewhat strange title Dr. Hedenius has written a really interesting critical account of the development of Berkeley's philosophy. It is a particular pleasure to welcome this book by a Swedish scholar, for though Berkeley has stimulated much fruitful study in Germany, Italy, and France, he has heretofore formed the subject of but little first-hand research in Sweden.

The essential task which Dr. Hedenius sets himself in this inaugural dissertation is to examine the connection between the doctrine of spirits ("theology") and its epistemological basis ("sensationalism"). He considers that though the obvious contradiction between sensationalism and theological metaphysics in Berkeleianism would seem to split this system into two incompatible parts, yet it seems evident that Berkeley himself saw some logical connection between the doctrine of spirits and its epistemological basis, the doctrine of ideas. After submitting to a searching critical analysis Berkeley's own works as well as the views expressed by various thinkers upon them, Dr. Hedenius reaches the conclusion that Berkeley's system, to a much greater extent than has generally been assumed, forms a consistent whole in which the various theories, epistemological as well as metaphysical, are found to have an intimate logical relation to each other. Considered from this standpoint, Berkeley's philosophy lends itself naturally enough to treatment under four heads entitled by Dr. Hedenius Immaterialism and Empiricism, Sensationalism as a Metaphysical Doctrine, Berkeley's Theological Metaphysics, and Immaterialism as a Basis for Morality.

Perhaps the most valuable part of Dr. Hedenius's book is the last, in which he expounds and criticizes Berkeley's ethics. Students of Berkeley usually pass over his ethical theories rather cursorily. Berkeley wrote more on ethics than is generally realized. The *Commonplace Book* teems with suggestive remarks which probably give some idea of the argument of the lost Part II of the *Principles*, *Passive Obedience* is, in the main, an ethical

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treatise, two of the essays in the *Guardian* and three of the dialogues in *Alciphron* are chiefly concerned with morals, and there are a few hints in the *Principles* and *Siris*. Dr. Hedenius deserves gratitude for his very careful examination of this aspect of Berkeley's thought. I could have wished, however, to see a fuller treatment of the question of the relation of mathematics to ethics. Morality, for Berkeley, may be demonstrated as "mixt" or applied mathematics. It was fresh in his mind that Newton had applied mathematics, with wonderful success, to the solar system; and it required no great stretch of imagination to hope for significant results from the application of mathematical methods to the study of human conduct.

The author's general conclusion is that the metaphysics of immaterialism forms a philosophical basis for all the essential points of Berkeley's ethical system. In an entirely natural way Berkeley's theological metaphysics, which are based on sensationalistic epistemology, result in a theological theory of morality. And the wish to strengthen this ethical system was one of the most important motives behind Berkeley's philosophical speculation.

G. A. JOHNSTON.

Kierkegaard et la philosophie existentielle. LEON CHESTOV. Traduit du Russe par T. Rageot et B. de Schloezer. (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 384. Price 25 fr.)

Chestov, a Russian philosopher in exile, known principally in this country for his book on Dostoevski (*In Job's Balances*), here writes on Dostoevski's contemporary, and in many ways kindred spirit, the Danish poet-philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. Those interested in contemporary philosophical and theological movements on the Continent will have been aware of the importance of Kierkegaard as the primary inspirer of the "existential" dialectic of Heidegger and Jaspers, and in a rather different way, of the Barthian "Theology of Crisis." We may be glad that we can now have access to his writings in more possible languages (besides Chestov's book and the German translation, *Gesammelte Werke*, published at Jena, a series of English translations by D. F. Swenson has begun to appear from the Oxford Press). Kierkegaard is a riddler and a prophet. He rebels against "speculative philosophy," which he thinks aims at the objective theoretical attitude of a detached spectator, in the name of an "existential" philosophy of faith, which (like that of Dostoevski's characters) is distilled out of the *extreme* subjective experience of the man who lives it. We may feel that his attacks on speculative philosophy, and particularly on Hegel, amount at times to an almost pathological hatred; that "the wisdom of the world is foolishness before God" can most rightly be felt by those who have a loving appreciation of that wisdom. Whether when its destructive attacks have shot their bolt, the Existential Philosophy has in it the germ of a new kind of constructive metaphysic it is perhaps too soon to say. But just as, even in its negations, the "Theology of Crisis" is proving itself a fighting faith for the Confessional Opposition of the German Protestant Church, so I have no doubt that in contemporary philosophy Kierkegaard and the philosophy of *Existenz* are forces to be reckoned with.

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

A History of English Philosophy. By W. R. SORLEY. (Cambridge: University Press. 1937. Pp. xvi + 380. Price 8s. 6d.)

This book is simply a cheaper reprint of a work published in 1920 and therefore does not require as extended a notice as it would on its original

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appearance. Had the author been spared a few years longer he would, I suppose, have taken the opportunity of a new edition to make changes, but, as it is, the work seems to have been reprinted without alteration. However, the book is so admirable as it stands that I cannot imagine there would have been much scope for serious amendment, unless indeed he had enlarged his account of some of the philosophers. The number of authors treated is from the nature of the case too great to admit of a thorough or detailed discussion of their views, but, within the limits set by its large field, its function is fulfilled completely, and as a general introductory survey putting together the different English thinkers or as a book of reference for summing up briefly the views of minor thinkers whom the student has not had time to read, it should remain a standard work. An additional recommendation is its fine literary style which makes the book far more readable than one usually expects a history of philosophy to be, without in the least detracting from its philosophic merit.

The history extends from A.D. 800 to A.D. 1900, but the mediæval period is compressed into thirteen pages. The relative space given to the different philosophers is about what we should expect except that the most recent, e.g. Bradley, are treated much more briefly than others, and I was surprised to find Richard Price dismissed with only one page. With the leading philosophers a good deal of space is given to biographical details. The book is based upon a series of chapters contributed to the Cambridge History of English Literature, and no doubt, as this suggests, it would be useful for students in the English as well as in the Philosophy departments of our universities. The author completely resists the temptation, to which historians of philosophy sometimes succumb, of treating the history of philosophy as a dialectical process leading towards the vindication of their own philosophical theories and presents the views of the different thinkers in a thoroughly objective manner though not refraining from brief criticisms.

A. C. EWING.

Philosophy and Revelation in the Work of Contemporary Jewish Thinkers.
By Dr. A. LICHTIGFELD. (London: M. L. Cailingeld. 1937. Pp. xii + 163. Price 7s. 6d.)

The title of this book in two respects disappoints expectation. One is justified in expecting a discussion of the relation of philosophy to revelation, but the two subjects are for the most part juxtaposed, and an illustration of the Jewish standpoint on the subjects, but the only common bond of the writers referred to seems to be their common Jewish descent. It is only in Section V, "Theological Thinking," that these expectations find in any measure fulfilment. Of these writers Martin Buber seemed to be the most interesting, and for that reason to deserve fuller treatment. There is nothing distinctively Jewish about Henri Bergson and Samuel Alexander; and the only reason for their inclusion seems irrelevant to the purpose of the volume. The philosophy of both is so familiar that they might have been omitted, and the space might have been devoted to the less known writers, the reference to some of whom is tantalizingly brief. One would have been grateful for a volume which showed how 'orthodox' Judaism vindicated its adherence to the Torah in view of modern Biblical scholarship, and offered a philosophical exposition of its ethical monotheism in terms of modern thinking. Failing that, the writer would have been well advised, as already indicated, in omitting the philosophers who show no distinctive Jewish traits, dealing more

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adequately with those who do. His treatment is often very scrappy, and the author's own comments are casual. The book lacks organic unity, although he arranges his material under the headings Philosophy of Reason, Philosophy of Life, Phenomenology and Theological Thinking. I find the relegating of a mass of notes to the end of each section irritating and the inclusion of some of them distracting. He has brought together a great deal of valuable material for a book, and one is grateful for his diligence, but he has not made a book of it, of continuous interest or dominant purpose, and that failure one regrets, because one would be glad of the opportunity now of expressing sincere appreciation of the contribution of Jewish thought to the world's truth and wisdom.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Principles and Laws of Sociology. By Professor H. A. PHELPS. (London: Chapman & Hall; New York: J. Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1936. Pp. xii + 544. Price 20s.)

In its very excellence, this comprehensive and scholarly volume does not make for easy reading. Its piling of generality on generality is not always a contribution to lucidity. It is more patient than pungent. A fair example of its style would be the following: "For this reason, in the whole pattern of human population, population itself may be regarded as the principle. From this point of view, the fact of population or of populating is simply reinterpreted to mean growth, decline, or maintenance upon a stationary level. This substitution is admissible because it is highly possible that the main fact of growth (whether it is ultimately a biological, social, or bio-social process) may never be submitted to precise inductive determination. In this sense, population itself is a principle, somewhat resembling the principle of evolution or relativity, since it is a fusion of knowns and unknowns."

"Social and societal patterns" constitute the "sociological omnibus." "Patterns are classifications of related phenomena in a closed or limited framework," and "The pattern approach remains a sociological omnibus because there is no one precise order or arrangement of relationships and interactions that can prove of equal use to every phase of sociological interests." Part III (pp. 191-408) reviews the patterns of population, ruralization, urbanization, industrialization, mobility, social organization, social class and status, social disorganization, and cyclical fluctuations. It is claimed for each pattern that it "is subject to tentative explanation by its own characteristic combination of factorial and component items and by a representative principle."

Perhaps it is the value of suggested sociological principles that is especially baffling. We are offered a select alphabetical list, containing such terms as Accumulation, Adaptation, Association, Coercion, Culture, Cycles, Diffusion, Transmission, Variability. "This list could be extended to include almost any noun that means process, or in their methodological references to words indicating a technique of induction." One major principle or explanation may be employed to define the main feature of interaction in each of the patterns, as for example, in population, a principle of growth; in rurality, a principle of bio-social adjustment; in mobility, a principle of movement and continuity. There is a suspicion that reality may be but confounded by the multiplication of terms.

More cogent is the emphasis on the possibility and value of sociological law. A pattern having been "factored" into its elements, these may be dis-

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covered to be related in a manner that admits of prediction and control. Sociological laws are of three kinds. Quantitative laws may be precise—like Dalton's formula of maladjusted population, Hart's regression equation, Pearl's curve of population growth, Engel's laws of standard of living, and the verbal formulae of Douglas concerning suburbanization and of Cooley concerning transportation. Examples of indeterminate quantitative laws would be Fairchild's law of the standard of living, McKenzie's law of fluidity, Young's formula of rural-urban migration, Huntington's law of the selectivity of migratory movements of population, Sorokin's law of the comparative life-span of the social institutions, the Malthusian law of population. Qualitative laws may be illustrated by Sims's law of rural standards of living, Reeve's law of social convulsions, Whelpton's law of birth rates, and Durkheim's law of suicide. There are, thirdly, laws of functional dependence, such as Bogardus's law of tension and conflict, the Le Play sequence, Durkheim's law of family contraction, and Mill's law of business cycles. The book ends with two conclusions. "The first of these conclusions is that there is an infinite number of social laws in the phenomena of sociology. The second conclusion is that these social laws are sociological to the extent that they are logically conceived."

The final chapters—on Symbolic Sociology, and The Changing Scope of Sociology—may be recommended as of greatest philosophical interest. But why a treatise on Sociology should be more deserving of notice in a philosophical journal than, say, a treatise on Botany—this question as to the philosophical status of Sociology is perhaps more fitted for an article than for a review.

The book is well documented and indexed. The author offers it as "a summary of the sociological literature available to me up to March 1935, with the exception of a few bibliographical references to more recent literature."

M. KAYE.

The Social Contract: A Critical Study of Its Development. By J. W. GOUGH.
(Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, London: Humphrey Milford, 1936.
Pp. viii + 234. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

What this book offers is an outline of the history of the social contract theory from the earliest times to the present day. Since so many thinkers require to be considered, none of them can be considered at any length; and there is naturally little space for the critical discussion which we are promised in the sub-title. Indeed, not one of the fifteen chapters is exclusively devoted to a single thinker; and it is only in the introduction and conclusion that any attempt is made, except by way of incidental comment, to estimate the general significance of the idea of contract. Nor has it been found possible to say much about the relations of the theory to the historical circumstances which influenced, or were influenced by, its various formulations. Mr. Gough has, however, been able to bring together all the important thinkers who have advocated or criticized it; and the chief interest of his book lies in the success with which he has exhibited the interrelations of their ideas and made possible a synoptic view of the whole development of the theory. Especially interesting are his expositions of numerous lesser thinkers who, though not widely known except to students of history, are important both in themselves and as having anticipated some of the principal contentions of their better known brethren. It is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the historical purpose of the book that it should have no general thesis and little continuity of argument beyond what is provided by the succession of names. But even

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philosophers cannot be indifferent to a theory which, for several centuries of European history, has provided the framework for all serious thinking on politics; and they should find much to interest them in an exposition which enables them to view its development as a whole and to see that the great thinkers whose names they usually associate with it are only the most eminent examples of a tendency of thought that expressed itself in numerous predecessors and successors.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. By KARL MANNHEIM. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1936. Pp. xxxi + 318. Price 15s.)

This is a book distinguished both in matter and in manner. The breadth of its erudition is displayed not merely throughout the text, but in a classified bibliography covering twenty-three pages. The translators are to be congratulated for conveying a style of lucid compactness.

The thesis of the book is generally familiar. Its German forerunners are fully acknowledged by the author himself, and in a useful preface Professor Louis Wirth traces similar views among English and American sociologists and philosophers. But here the thesis receives a most pertinacious and luminous elaboration, and an abundance of subtle and challenging illustration.

Sociology of knowledge is the outcome of ideology, and is itself subject to that social conditioning of thought which is the main object of its revelation. The "particular conception of ideology" exposes the opponent's social, economic, religious, and philosophical views in their conscious and unconscious psychological determination. The "total conception of ideology" adds to these psychological conditions the discoverable relevant complex of social and historical factors. It is thus that the Marxist brands the opposition as ideological. But in "sociology of knowledge" the thinker confesses to an awareness of his own subjection to manifold determination. Everyone without exception is confined to a thought which is "relational." The same term means different things for people of different times, of different classes, of different groups. "Liberty" had a different significance for those who fought for European Liberalism from what is allowed it by modern Marxists and proletarians. It is similarly difficult to be "objective" with respect to the relation between theory and practice in politics. One's conclusions will be determined according as one is a liberal, a conservative, a communist, a fascist.

Yet Professor Mannheim does not reject objectivity. But the degree in which this may be attained has to depend on the possible synthesis of particular view-points. If, then, there is to be political objectivity, there are required academics aiming at political synthesis, thereby being distinguished from the schools of political parties concerned with the propaganda of fanaticism or predatory opportunism. The existence of the politically detached intellectual indicates that such academics may already be staffed. Scholars are no more the monopoly of the ecclesiastical and governing classes; and springing from all classes, and stimulated by physical, economical, and intellectual mobility, at least a certain number of them may join forces for the pursuit of political objectivity; for certainly their career has revealed to them the prevalence of partiality. Yet when (p. 144) Professor Mannheim declares that "To-day more than ever it is expected of such a dynamic middle group that it will strive to create a forum outside the party schools in which the perspective of and the interest in the whole is safeguarded," we cannot help wondering as to who

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expects this. Is it possible that the author has forgotten for a moment the advancing bands of Communism and Fascism?

In contrast with ideologies which in their impracticability are exploited by the ascendant class with a view to maintaining the prevailing social order, there is the Utopian mentality whereby through its seeming impracticability the submerged but aspiring class seeks to modify or shatter the prevailing order. In so far as Christianity is distributed as opium for the people so as the better to enslave them, it is ideological; but with those who would realize its gospel of universal fraternity here and now, it is a Utopia. But the Utopian mentality also is historically and socially conditioned. The Chiliastic impatience of the Anabaptists, the optimistic "progress to reason" of the Liberals, the "objective Reason and Perfection" of the Conservatives, the perfection to be achieved by violence at the moment of capitalist collapse as envisaged by modern communism—all these are brilliantly reviewed. But what Utopia is left for the modern intellectual emancipated from all delusion concerning the possibility of individual origination? Indeed, the exposure of the complex conditioning of all knowledge and aspiration is itself required for the possibility of efficacious freedom. "We could change the whole of society to-morrow if everybody could agree. The real obstacle is that every individual is bound into a system of established relationships which to a large extent hamper his will. But these 'established relationships' in the last analysis rest again upon uncontrolled decisions of individuals. The task, therefore, is to remove that source of difficulty by unveiling the hidden motives behind the individual's decisions, thus putting him in a position really to choose. Then, and only then, would his decisions *really* lie with him. All that we have said so far in this book is meant to help the individual to disclose these hidden motives and to reveal the implications of his choice" (pp. 234-5). Even so, the disappearance of Utopia is glanced at as a possibility. "We would be faced then with the greatest paradox imaginable, namely that man, who has achieved the highest degree of rational mastery of existence, left without any ideals, becomes a mere creature of impulses" (p. 236).

That this book does not yield any abiding pacification of the quest for reality and objectivity, still leaves vivid its wealth of philosophical suggestion.

M. KAYE.

The Concept of Time. By LOUISE ROBINSON HEATH. (U.S.A.: University of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1936, Pp. xiv + 235. Price in Great Britain, 13s. 6d. net.)

This book has a refreshing quality, partly because it is simple, straightforward, and untechnical, partly because the author's unlagging zest sustains the reader's attention throughout. For its first five-sixths (or so) the book is the story of temporal theory from Greek philosophy and science to modern science and philosophy. The story, in view of its ramifications, is told with commendable brevity, and the author's emphasis upon the continuity of her tale is, on the whole, not exaggerated. The rest of the book discusses the (metaphysical) "reality" of time and the analysis of its meaning in two short chapters, of which the second is the more important. In it the value of a pragmatic-operational view is suggested, especially if time have *several* meanings in use. The treatment is tentative but not diffident.

The author is careful, but makes odd little slips. Thus she consistently spells Northrop's name "Northrup," gives Lotze an unnecessary diacresis, and prints "*aeorum*" for "*aeuum*." She also gives R. B. Haldane an "H" that was not conferred at baptism.

JOHN LAIRD.

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The Development of Religious Toleration in England, from the Accession of James I to the Convention of the Long Parliament (1603-1640). By W. K. JORDAN, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 542. Price 21s.)

This volume is a successor to the author's previous work upon the same subject, during the period from the beginning of the English Reformation to the death of Elizabeth. A third volume is projected to complete the task. Those who are familiar with the earlier work will expect that the high standard exhibited there should be maintained here, and they will not be disappointed. Dr. Jordan moves amidst the tangled undergrowth of this intricate subject with the easy mastery of a man who knows all the paths. He begins with the dominant groups, Anglican and governmental, and the beginnings of "Anglo-Catholicism," although one regrets that a term with a recognized modern connotation is employed in quite a different sense, as will be shown by mentioning that the alternative title is "Arminianism." The problem of toleration was twofold, embracing both Dissenters and Romanists. Dr. Jordan passes to the minority groups, Puritan, Separatist, Congregational, and Baptist. Then he reviews the lay attitude, that of the Latitudinarians, Moderates, Sceptics, and Erastians. Finally, he discusses Romanist thought, its claim to toleration, and the politico-religious issues thus involved. In any historical journal a lengthy review would be demanded. As the philosophical interest of the book, though by no means absent, is indirect, it is enough to say that it represents a very high order of research, and one that forms an illuminating background to the study of Hobbes and the reactions which his unwelcome candour provoked.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

God and Man. Four Essays in the Nature of Personality. By EMIL BRUNNER (London: Student Christian Movement Press. 1936. Pp. 180. Price 5s.)

Dr. Brunner writes as a theologian, not a philosopher, so that interest in this book for the readers of *PHILOSOPHY* is indirect. Yet a philosopher can be no more unconcerned with developments in theology than can a British politician be unconcerned with the domestic situation in Germany, or the "Swaraj" movement in India. The chief interest of this book is its help in clearing up the relation between Brunner and Barth. Brunner contests Barth's position on four main points. These are the declaration that sin has effaced the divine image in man; that there is no general revelation of God in history, nature, or conscience; that man's fallen nature has no point of contact with God's redemptive work; and that the new creation is not the perfecting but the destruction of the old fallen nature. Barth's reply is simply that he refuses to discuss natural theology as it is no part of true theology. Barth is a reactionary, but we must view him against the background of contemporary Germany to understand the inwardness of his reaction. Brunner, as a Swiss, has not faced the same situation. That Barth's theology should become general in the Christian Church is surely impossible, but as a reaction it is significant and of value. Dr. Cairns, the translator of the book, contributes an excellent introduction.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

An Interpretation of Christian Ethics. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. 1936. Pp. 256. Price 6s.)

This is a book of interest and importance. Its interest lies in the frank and even aggressive manner in which it states the question with which it is primarily

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concerned. Its importance is in its incisive criticism. Dr. Niebuhr knows how to pull down the walls of Jericho, even if he does not promise equal success as a builder of the walls of new Jerusalem. With nicely-balanced impartiality he chastises orthodoxy and Liberalism alike. He has all the Hebrew prophet's sense of the sinfulness of the world. Orthodoxy—the Augustinian tradition seems to be what the author has in mind almost exclusively here—has a place for sin but a poor sense of sins. It inclines to regard the *tabus* of the morality of the day as the chief index of sin. Certainly in the Victorian age swearing was to many a worse sin than sweating, and financial charity compensated for lack of Christian charity. Liberalism, on the other hand, has been so busy proving its acceptableness to the "modern mind" that it finds when the task is accomplished the "modern mind" has changed, and is forced to begin anew. It confuses social idealism with the Gospel, sin with the slum, and righteousness with the reasonable. The heart of the book is the chapter on "The Relevance of an Impossible Ideal," a striking and provocative title. This shows what the author believes to be the right way, that of the Prophetic Religion of Jesus. The standard is impossible, but indispensable. It sets the Infinite before the Finite. Because man is finite, the infinite is impossible, but because he is always led beyond the finite, it is a necessary conception. Dr. Niebuhr has no place for morality without religion. However passionately the moralists claim their independence of religious considerations, history shows that morality without religion is ineffective for good. "What men are able to will depends not upon the strength of their willing but upon the strength which enters their will and over which their will has little control." Many books on Christian Ethics are colourless and unimpeachable. Whatever may be thought of this, and however much disagreement it provokes, it represents a challenge no moralist should ignore.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Surprise and the Psycho-Analyst: A Study of the Conjecture and Comprehension of Unconscious Processes. By THEODOR REIK. Translated from the German by MARGARET M. GREEN. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1936. Pp. vii + 294. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

Dr. Reik is a psycho-analyst of mature experience, and his book is intended mainly for psycho-analysts. The publishers claim that it can be easily understood by the lay-reader, but of this I am doubtful. Even philosophers whose work lies in other fields may have difficulty in "comprehending" it according to the author's standard of comprehension.

Nevertheless, it is of the first importance to philosophy, since it treats of the unconscious mind, the uncomprehended hinterland of which our conscious thought and life is but the fringe, and in which all our real discoveries are made. The book is a study of the conjecture and comprehension of unconscious processes, an attempt to describe the psychological process of cognition from *within*. It is essentially a record of an *experience*, the experience of making analytical discoveries, and describes the discipline and the suffering which the analyst must accept as a condition necessary to the discovering of anything new to himself in this field. Dr. Reik emphasizes the fact that discovery is no mere objective or technical problem, and that our comprehension and even our technique are a precipitate of a previous unconscious experience shared by the analyst and the analysand. The analyst's ability to comprehend the unconscious processes of others is limited by his own character, even when his ego is not to the fore. It would seem that one of

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the most important factors is the individually varying relationship of the conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious systems in the individual. This makes it clearly necessary to truth that every philosophy should be regarded as a "whole," and be considered from two main points of view, firstly as a projection of the philosopher's own unconscious processes, and secondly as a formulated and comprehended precipitate of his experience. The relationship between the two should be the relationship between the philosopher's pursuit of ultimate truth and his *sense of the finite*, as stressed by Professor Hallett in his lecture "On Being a Philosopher" (reproduced in *PHILOSOPHY* in January, 1937).

In Dr. Reik's opinion the quality most important for an analyst (and presumably for any philosopher) is that he should excel in moral courage or inner truthfulness, rather than in technical ability alone. The root problem of neurosis is not fear, but shock; the memory trace of the prime shocks of the human creature is at work in fear. Apart from special trauma in later life, most of the prime shocks are those associated with and immediately following upon birth, the *first experiences* of the human being. There is an analytical correspondence between these early biological experiences and the later processes of cognition, and our cognition is limited by the fears which still safeguard us against comprehending the experience of these prime shocks. The deepest knowledge is not to be had if one shrinks from purchasing it with personal suffering. "Suffering, consciously experienced and mastered, teaches us wisdom."

Dr. Reik's presentation of his theme might have been less diffuse, it if were intended purely for the *experienced* analyst. His method of repeating and elaborating his theme in various guises, however, is not out of place in a book which is attempting the difficult task of bringing into the conscious mind of the reader some comprehension, and not merely conjecture, of the depth and extent of the unconscious. One wishes that he had devoted more of the book than a very brief chapter xx to his underlying theme of "The Shock of Thought," and described in some detail the reactions of the newborn human and the significance for character formation of his first experiences. This chapter needs linking up with the work of Otto Rank on "The Trauma of Birth." Interesting discoveries are now being made on this level by a number of English workers, led by Dr. Jane Suttie.

Dr. Reik's reference to the importance for the unconscious of sense-perceptions that are now consciously disregarded and obsolete invites a correlation with Professor Jung's concept of archetypes, and suggests a biological foundation for much that has been observed empirically and used for purposes of therapy in an anagogic way, especially through the interpretation of dreams. In this field, too, one would have been glad if Dr. Reik had gone into more detail.

The author has shown great moral courage in presenting a theme that is almost beyond the reach of description and in striving to describe processes which are, in part, incapable of expression in words. He shows that analysis involves "an emergence of secret things that were not only unspoken but never spoke," and leaves us wondering with him whether we do not need a whole long life in which to reach some degree of psychical mastery of what we experience as children. One important key to real mastery he leaves with us: "the deeper planes of the ego can be reached only by a roundabout way, through an object. . . . In beginning to comprehend another, we discover a clue to ourselves."

Such a book as this cannot be lightly criticized; it needs to be experienced, in life as well as in the reading of it; and criticism should wait upon experience.

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My own experience, within its own much narrower limits, bears witness to the truth of most of what Dr. Reik affirms.

B. D. HENDY.

Sense and Thought : A Study in Mysticism. By GRETA HORT, M.A., Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 262. Price 8s. 6d.)

This is not an easy book to read or to review, but it is one of real originality and makes a distinct contribution to the study of the problems, metaphysical and psychological, presented by mysticism. The difficulty of the book arises from the two-fold, or even three-fold, nature of its subject-matter. It is primarily a study and an interpretation of *The Cloud of Unknowing*, and, though it does not attempt to solve detailed questions of text or of authorship, it does involve an understanding of its meaning, both in itself (not always an easy matter) and in its relation to mystics of other types, such as St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross. Side by side with this there is a detailed attempt to expound the mystical experience of this unknown medieval writer in terms of modern psychological theory, mainly of the type of which Professor Bartlett is an exponent. It is indeed upon Professor Bartlett's work that the writer, herself a Cambridge scholar, depends, at one point very explicitly. With these two main interests there is also a strain of a more purely philosophical kind, and it is not always very easy to tell when the philosopher is intruding upon the dominant psychological interest of the writer. Those readers who are not philologists will find themselves faced with a further problem if they endeavour to understand Verner's law, but fortunately such understanding is not necessary. The point of the illustration can be taken even by those who cannot follow the relation between spirants and accents and consonant-change.

The most valuable element in the book is the psychological. A constructive analysis of the mind of this curiously abstract medieval writer is carried through with great persistence, and with real probability. The genesis of his conception of the 'Cloud' is found in earlier sources which he knew, especially in the Victorines, and not in any pictorial imagery of his own, for, it is argued, he was a writer of the type whose images are rather kinaesthetic than visual, so that the effective element which dominates his approach to God does not bring with it any body of conceptual thought. 'Unknowing' exactly expresses the 'Cloud' which is his way to God.

It is admitted in the course of the argument that parts of the book were written before Professor Bartlett's striking conception of "Schemata" in behaviour was taken into account. Whether the use here made of the process described as "turning round on a schema" is not rather too enthusiastic, later writers on mysticism must decide. It is made to serve as giving an account, and even an explanation, of the "subtleness" and "ghostliness" which in *The Cloud of Unknowing* are the condition of union with God. Because the schemata are parts of the organism which constitutes man, and yet are constituted in full relation to that which lies beyond, we can see, in the case of the mystic, that to be "oned in him that is all" is a fundamental expression alike of the being of God and of the being of the mystic. The application of this principle to the cryptic sentence "for as nothing may be without him, so may he not be without himself" is too long to set down here, but it is one of the most original and most successful pieces of interpretation in the book.

It is a pity that this conception of the schema is not introduced in the earlier chapters. It would have rendered unnecessary what is at least difficult, and perhaps really confused, in the attempted analysis of the action of what

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are called, not very happily, "conative conceptions," a phrase which introduces the elements of conation and cognition in a form which makes the thread of clear thinking about them very hard to hold.

Despite the clever piece of analysis in the last chapter, it is not very easy to say with what metaphysical conception of God the writer is herself operating. She claims her unknown author for a Platonist, for one who at least in part of his thinking about God is "operating with the conception of the Absolute" on lines which foreshadow the thought of Bradley and Bosanquet. But this part of her task is barely more than suggested. The main interest throughout is psychology, and psychology cannot deal with ontological problems. She has carried through the psychological analysis in a manner which is original and fruitful. When that is done we are still left with the greater question unanswered. What is the ultimate character of that Reality to which the mystical experience points?

But it is always a little ungracious in a reviewer to complain that a book does not answer questions that are not really within its scope. The main purpose of this book is certainly fulfilled and future writers on mysticism must needs take it into account.

L. W. GRENSTED.

Personal Realism. By JAMES BISSETT PRATT. (New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1937. Pp. x + 387. Price in England, 15s. net.)

Mr. Pratt, as was shown in this *Journal* (No. 46, p. 155), belongs to the Right Wing of the contributors to Critical Realism, and he is a tried and favourite author to a wide public in questions of philosophy and of theology. In the present book he surveys man's philosophical beliefs from the Far East (of the past) to Massachusetts of the present, not forgetting Europe, but reminding that continent of the "typically European fashion" (192 n.) in which Wenzl and von Hügel ignored prior American rights to the term "critical realism."

In rough outline, the plan of this book is firstly to secure its charter by examining the categories of terms, relations, substance, etc.; secondly, to establish a metropolis of dualistic realism; thirdly, to occupy the neighbouring metaphysical territory, and to explore the more remote regions in a tentative way. As one would expect, the book is written with vigour, candour, and a certain charm. It makes small parade of learning, but is written by a competent scholar for an audience assumed to be pretty knowledgeable. On the other hand, it is sparing of technicalities and could be read with pleasure and with profit by those who are intelligent enough to remember that they are amateurs.

On the whole, the early chapters on the categories (selected) seem to me to be rather less successful than the others. They are not, of course, "very dull," as the author fears in his preface, but they are at least semi-detached from one another, and instead of moving smoothly tend to clank like the coaches of a train that isn't fully under way. The central chapters of the book are quite different in this respect. The interest is sustained and close in the author's entire argument from his eleventh chapter, "How Explain Our Experience?" to his fifteenth (inclusive), "The Alternative to Realism." The general tenor of this central argument is that human experience private or inter-subjective, is inexplicable without conditions outside it, that the balance of probability is in favour of the existence of a world of non-experiences understood in the natural way of spatio-temporal things and causes, that dualistic realism is much more defensible than the first realistic

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movement in England in the present century, than the monistic New Realism that succeeded it in America and than the present fashionable theory of Objective Relativism. Indeed, Mr. Pratt is very confident indeed regarding his ability to dislodge these other realisms.

He is also, however, a *personal* realist. In him the Right Wing is *very* right. It relies on the *Cogito* with a self that is transcendently and also empirically real. Indeed, he seems to be more fully convinced of the truth of personalism than of realism for he holds that the serious choice in metaphysics is between (personal and dualistic) realism, Absolute or Personal Idealism, and "possibly" Panpsychism. "My mature opinion is that the solution of the world riddle narrows down to a choice between Realism and Absolute or Personal Idealism, and that neither of them will ever be proved false and, therefore, neither of them will ever be proved unquestionably true. The question between them is one of relative probability; and so many factors are involved in the judgment of probability that I doubt whether this question will ever be settled with objective certainty" (p. 217).

In this belief the author leaves epistemology for Metaphysics. Examining the mind-body problem he concludes that the ego is an active participant in the matters that concern it. Knowledge, psychology, and the phenomena of volition prove a self that is more than a stream of consciousness or a succession of passing thoughts, and the last of these demands some kind of freedom. It may even demand a self that is (at least naturalistically) unbegotten. In the final chapter Mr. Pratt defends certain "over-beliefs" (which are more than mere conjectures) of a theistic type, and appears to suggest that the realism of his central argument is unlikely to be a continuing city, since it all but compels us to seek a better. It is a tribute to his candour that he remains precisely where he is.

JOHN LAIRD.

Problems in Chinese Education. By VICTOR PURCELL. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1936. Pp. viii + 261. Price 10s. 6d.)

The growing literature on Chinese education is a sign that its problems are not only numerous but also unsolved. Mr. Purcell has called attention to several of the most significant issues with the detachment which is often denied to the Chinese and the learning which so rarely encumbers the foreigner. It is some years now since a League of Nations' Mission of Educational Experts completed their admirable report, in which, while not excluding the question of language and its relation to education, they refrained, with commendable restraint, from the discussion of an issue which they felt to be one for the Chinese alone to decide. Mr. Purcell, equipped with a knowledge of Chinese, both written and spoken, has concentrated his main research work on the problem of language. Can the Chinese language be used as a medium for the transmission of Western ideas, in particular of Western science? A great deal of evidence is produced to show that the resistance of the language is formidable, but the conclusions which he draws are inconclusive. The strong militarist and nationalist tendencies in modern China make urgent a study of the purposes of education and in this connection the author deals extensively with the *San Min Chu I*, a book which he considers to be the Bible of modern China and the foundation of the educational system. It is necessary to respect the analysis of Sun Yat-Sen's works while disagreeing with the assumption that they are of such importance. Perhaps the most significant question dealt with is that of the relation between the spirit of Western and of Chinese civilization. Must the one be sacrificed to the other?

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Is it to be fusion or diarchy? And how will the fusion, if such it is to be, be reflected in the curriculum?

Mr. Purcell has attempted to put these questions in their proper perspective. His first chapter covers the Old System, the examination curriculum, the respect for authority, the spirit and purpose which informed the whole structure. The second covers contact with the West and traces first the growing realization among governments and individuals of the need for reform and secondly the shape which this took at different periods. The author then draws up the problem as he sees it. And he sees it, not as study of educational programmes, methods, curricula, and pedagogics, but as a more subtle matter of the form which Western ideas assumed when they were received into the Chinese language, the adaptation of the language itself to foreign conceptions, the attempts to simplify the language in the interest of mass education and cultural revolution, the resistance of the old system to the onslaught of the West and the sort of ideas which have in particular been selected as conveyors of the foundation of Western strength. This leads on to a consideration of the Language Problem. By taking general and sociological terms and first defining them in English, the author shows that Chinese translations do not convey in any adequate measure the same meaning. And this is due, he argues, partly to the fact that the Chinese language does not admit of logical modes of thought, partly to the specific associations of the ideographs chosen for purposes of translation. In many cases, of course, the Chinese have nothing in their life or institutions remotely corresponding to the terms they have to translate. The difficulties are therefore serious. But the author's conclusion, that for the purpose of teaching Western ideas, especially science, the best course would be to adopt English as a medium, is hardly worthy of his discussion, for he is forced to admit that Orientals cannot acquire English in addition to their native tongue. To suggest, without discussion or research, that Basic English is the way out, is unconvincing, and seems indeed to be an afterthought, for it is not mentioned again. In fact, at this point his whole argument breaks down, for it is impossible to know where the author stands.

It is disconcerting, to say the least, when the author suggests Basic English as the medium for the transmission of Western ideas yet includes in the closing paragraph of the same chapter the following quotation from Karlgren. "The day that the Chinese discard their written script they will surrender the very foundations of their culture." Does he or does he not agree with this? If he does then surely he must make out a stronger case against the Chinese language than he has done, for he admits that it is developing and expanding rapidly. And what is the point of a long historical introduction to the problem if all these other considerations, political, social, and economic are not focused on the heart of the book? If he does not agree with Karlgren, it is difficult to explain the concluding chapter in which he suggests that students should study the traditional literature, with special emphasis on calligraphy, for five hours a week and a modern practical system for the remaining twenty-odd hours. The traditional study is to be subjective and the modern objective. Transition is to be made easy by changing costume when passing from the one to the other. It is as if we were asked to attend school in Hebrew dress for the morning Scripture and change to modern dress for chemistry and physics. And the further advice that no system can be made effective until the Chinese feel dismay at the non-realization of any programme that they have undertaken, in fact, that they should practice the most valuable of the Confucian virtues, "sincerity," might bring a warm and familiar glow to the heart of Doihara or Araki, but is in no sense justified

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by the facts or discussion in this book. The gap between programmes and practice is due to the specific distribution of political power, not to race characteristics. Legislative bodies in China may be compared with Royal Commissions in England; the groups that actually control the government are perfectly capable of putting their programmes into practice.

Mr. Purcell's inability to come to any conclusion worthy of his knowledge and hard work is due to lack of method. He lacks scientific historical training. His picture is formal and conventional, not dynamic. No historian can agree that Chinese political unity was due mainly to the common written language; language was a common factor during periods of unity and disunity. The Empire was made possible by the completion of the Grand Canal and the Examination system. Again, it is not criticism to say that Chinese education has not succeeded in producing enough public spirit to maintain in good repair a highway of any length, the capacity to deal effectively with flood, famine, or afforestation, or enough official integrity to secure any appreciable portion of the revenue for national purposes. A society produces only the institutions that it requires and they are not the same for an Oriental agrarian society and a modern industrial State. Nor is it possible to accept the statement that the final cause of missionary failure under Ch'ing was the jealousy between the Jesuits and the Dominicans. The final cause was that Christianity challenged the very basis of Chinese society, a fact clearly shown in the Imperial edicts of the period. That Mr. Purcell has not carefully examined the old society is shown most clearly in his analysis of dynastic renewals. It is one of natural causes. Famine creates distress, which, owing to bad organization, is not relieved, and desperation leads to disorder. Under a strong government the centres of trouble are isolated, under a weak one they spread, and in extreme cases, when the dynasty is effete, it is overthrown. If foreign invasion occurred at the same time, the "interbreeding of conqueror and conquered resulted in a vital impulse and a renewed culture." Manchus and Chinese, to take one example, did not interbreed to any extent (it was expressly forbidden) till the end of the dynasty, and what "vital impulse" the Manchus added to Chinese culture, apart perhaps from the pig-tail, is best left to the imagination. And what causes famines? It is difficult to control those due to drought, but those due to floods are more often than not aggravated by neglected dykes. So the inefficiency of government and the extent of "natural disasters" are directly connected. The vital question to answer is why the government is weak at one time and not at another. The clue to this can be found in the growth of population, the development of a landed bureaucracy which becomes increasingly torn between its duties as tax-collector and its interests as landlord, the social consequences of the development of internal trade, changes in land tenure, and so on, not in the theory that dynasties become effete. The Ch'ing began with a minor and ended with a very capable Empress Dowager. It was Ch'ien Lung, usually considered one of the greatest of the Ch'ing Emperors, who, as a result of his reckless expeditions and suppression of minorities, to say nothing of his starvation of intellectual life through a rigorous censorship, left to his by no means incapable successor a country internally exhausted and externally surrounded by enemies. The famine-effete theory does not fit the facts.

Examples of *a priori* thinking, of which the author accuses the Chinese, could be multiplied indefinitely. Sometimes it is mere lack of knowledge that leads him astray. He says that Japan has answered in the negative the question as to whether or not one can adopt the motor-car or the wireless without at the same time adopting representative government or trade unionism. Yet it is common knowledge that the whole purpose of Japanese education is to

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teach Western technique without exposing students to the spirit behind it and that her representative institutions are mockery. Countries that come late to capitalism do not go through the classic stages of those in which it originated.

The Chinese language presents obvious difficulties to the translator. The author has shown these difficulties very clearly, but he is on safer grounds when dealing with scientific than with general terms. Considering the impossibility of China ever giving up her ideographs, however, the suggestion that English should be used is academic. Attention can be more profitably directed to the problem of making translation effective. At the moment development is sporadic and uneven; the need for a strong centralizing body to direct and classify the new trends has already been realized and partly satisfied. Mr. Purcell is quite right in pointing out that Wen Li does not encourage the growth of the logical faculty, but there are, even at that, all kinds of Wen Li, and he has chosen the poetic rather than the documentary style. But he does admit that it does not follow that Chinese is incapable of logical arrangements. This, to my mind, destroys his conclusion that English must replace Chinese in the teaching of Western ideas. The new Chinese language, the language used in scientific, literary, and historical work, to take only a few examples, is in no way constricted by the artificialities of style. On the contrary, it is crude, ugly, and the sentence formation loose to a degree. Sometimes the language will settle down to a more standard form, but the changes which have already come about are sufficient evidence that the ideographic script will never be discarded; the Chinese can and do express everything they wish. The old bureaucratic Empire did not need an exact language; the bureaucrat had a vested interest in ambiguity just as lawyers have in legal jargon or doctors in their Latin prescriptions. The coming of Western forms of organization and technique have undermined the mandarin; the new State must be based on literacy, propaganda, and modern technique. Economic and social forces are therefore on the side of growth and the surest sign that the Chinese language is adequate to meet all the demands made upon it is the existence of a society for the preservation of the old literary style.

So much for the language. The long chapter on the San Min Chu I seems hardly worth the effort, for this book is certainly not the basis of Chinese education; instruction in the Three Principles is as formal as their observance. The critical work that the author has done on this adds little, therefore, to the discussion. It is unfortunately true that Chinese education is being moulded by forces other than those which the author has taken into account, and although, of all people, the Chinese are the most willing to listen to the philosopher, he who would seek to give guidance would do well to acquaint himself with the share that we have taken in driving this great people along the paths of nationalism and militarism. Order in the East waits on order in the West. Consideration of such factors would not have led the author to the amazing conclusion that "So long as Chinese parents send their children to school in this unseemly dress (the semi-military uniform with a peak cap) there can be no serious improvement in Chinese education."

G. E. TAYLOR.

Revue Néoscholastique de Philosophie: vol. 36. February, 1934. *Hommage à Monsieur le Professeur Maurice de Wulf*. (Louvain: L'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie. Pp. 546. Price 70 frs.)

The revival of interest in medieval philosophy, which has been a notable feature of present-day thought, is due in large measure to the excellent

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historical studies of the great Schoolmen which have appeared during the last forty years. The name of Professor de Wulf is undoubtedly one of the best known of those who have opened to us the treasure-house of medieval thought

This special number of the *Revue Néoscholastique* is a fitting tribute to the work of Professor de Wulf on the occasion of his fortieth year of teaching. The lasting influence and fecundity of these years may be judged by the first contribution to this *Festschrift*, "L'œuvre de Monsieur de Wulf," by his close collaborator and colleague, Professor L. Noël of Louvain, and by the second contribution, "La carrière scientifique," which contains a bibliography of 26 pages. The standard of the articles which form the remainder of this large volume is very high, but it is quite impossible to discuss any of them in the limits of a review. It is even impossible to enumerate them all. Perhaps a choice may be made which, without revealing all the rich and varied subjects connected with the history of medieval philosophy to be found in this volume, may give some idea of the interest of this collection of essays. The names of the authors are themselves a warranty of scholarship. We find, for instance, Edward K. Rand: "The supposed Commentary of John the Scot on the *Opuscula sacra* of Boethius"; Martin Grabmann: "Eine für Examinazwecke abgefasste Quaestionensammlung der Pariser Artistenfakultät aus der ersten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts"; Pierre Mandonnet: "Saint Albert le Grand et la 'Philosophia Pauperum'"; E. Gilson: "Sur quelques difficultés de l'illumination augustinienne"; D. E. Sharp: "Thomas of Sutton, O.P., his place in scholasticism and an account of his psychology"; E. Longpré: "Le ms. 139 de la cathédrale de Valencia. Etude sur les réportations de Duns Scotus," etc. In fact, an act of homage worthy of the illustrious historian of philosophy to whom it is dedicated.

M. C. D'ARCY.

Obiter Scripta: Lectures, Essays, and Reviews. By GEORGE SANTAYANA. Edited by JUSTUS BUCHLER and BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ. (London: Constable, 1936. Pp. ix + 238. Price 10s. net.)

In this volume the editors have selected sixteen pieces of Mr. Santayana's, and have appended a complete bibliography of his published writings. Mr. Santayana himself contributes a brief but memorable preface.

The sixteen pieces include his celebrated Herbert Spencer Lecture of 1923, and also an address read at the tercentenary celebration of Spinoza's birth. Of the others, six were originally published in technical American philosophical journals and the rest, with one exception, in periodicals like *The Dial* and *Life and Letters*. The dates for the whole collection extend from 1902 to 1932.

The volume will be indispensable to anyone who desires to compose a monograph (or a treatise) on Mr. Santayana's philosophy, not for its bibliography only but also for the evidence it gives of the growth of its author's characteristic conceptions—essence, substance, intuition, animal faith, the place of phenomenism, representationism, and a sort of sub-metaphysical "naturalism." Much unity in his life's aim also becomes apparent. In his own words (although with some alteration of their intention) he has striven long and nobly in the cause of "sacred material conditions" and endeavoured to show how the spirit may be "at home in this world and not merely a captive or a fugitive."

To those whose interest in Mr. Santayana is less professional I should suggest that the book will be savoured best if it is tasted intermittently at propitious moments. Otherwise feelings of strain may accompany the reader's

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revolving attention to a rapid diversity of themes. And even a desultory perusal would catch the pure brightness of verbal jewels. "Look long and be brief"; "The suasion of the symbol"; "Death for the pragmatist simply is burial." But Mr. Santayana himself has some pleasant things to say about jewels, and why ladies succumb to their spell, and why they dazzle us but hide themselves. The magic of these pebbles, delectable though it be, is only a tiny gracious embellishment of the subtler, consuming charm of a philosophy whose dominating characteristic is *gravitas*.

JOHN LAIRD.

Life Here and Now: Conclusions Derived from an Examination of the Sense of Duration. By ARTHUR PONSONBY (LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE). (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 289. Price 10s. 6d.)

This book falls roughly into two parts, the first being a discussion of time and of our sense of duration, with particular reference to the variety and instability of our temporal experience. The material assembled under these heads, and the author's comments thereupon, are highly interesting. Apart from useful practical suggestions on the use and "making" of time, the conclusion reached is, in effect, the somewhat disappointing one that, "Whether it depends on physical, mental, or emotional factors, or on psychological, moral, and spiritual factors the Sense of Duration is perhaps the most important part of our make-up."

The second part digresses among themes of a social and political kind, in which Lord Ponsonby is always stimulating: their derivation, nevertheless, from "an examination of the Sense of Duration," is scanty. There is a long chapter on Immortality, and the question runs through the whole book. Here and elsewhere the author discloses the strange (but not peculiar) assumption that "the more serious and thoughtful sections of the community" are with him. This tone links ill-assorted opinions—those, for example, of Lord Ponsonby and of the *Morning Post*!

As analyst of time we might have expected Lord Ponsonby to be critical of Lord Ponsonby as reformer. This is not the case. He recurs to the misleading analogy of "clearing the ground" of "outworn creeds," otiose institutions, and the like. But what "clearing of the ground," one can only ask, short of the impending race-suicide, is possible for actual, time-conditioned man?

Notwithstanding its dual nature, this is a readable and interesting book. It is offered as an alternative to the author's reminiscences, which, otherwise, he might have written. In view of Lord Ponsonby's unrivalled opportunities and exceptional gifts in the reminiscence art, may we not hope that he will now, after all, write those reminiscences?

RALPH E. STEDMAN

Philosophy of Our Uncertainties. By GUSTAV E. MUELLER. (Norman, U.S.A.: University of Oklahoma Press. 1936. Pp. xii + 236. Price \$3.00.)

This is a book of very considerable significance. Its author, now a member of the University of Oklahoma, is a philosopher of manifest power and penetration, and a writer of force and pungency. The style, staccato and epigrammatic, is of one substance with the argument. This is a far-ranging offensive defence of a philosophical idealism in the direct Hegelian line—Hegelian notwithstanding the author's denunciation of "absolute" idealism. As such it is quite the most persuasive, and in parts the most convincing, essay I have read. The theme is developed in a spirited, even an original, fashion, and it

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is as manifestly erudite as it is free from the burden of erudition. It is briefly and generally expressed in the author's own closing paragraph:

"The symbol of philosophy is the circle, the circle of circles. A dialectical universe is manifesting itself through many situations, in each of which its problematic and dialectical character is experienced in a different perspective, in a different modification. But the circling movement of philosophy is also an ascent. Reality as object led to life as mind, ethical life rose to the blessed innocence of beauty, freedom of the world met its limitation in the absolute Being experienced in religious symbol-language, and ontology thinks the dialectical logic of the whole."

Dr. Mueller's negative or destructive arguments (e.g. against the "Four Fallacies of Scientism") are, in my judgment, more cogent than his constructive ones (which hinge chiefly upon the ontological argument in its most general—or Hegelian—form); while the almost infinite variety of instruction and suggestion one can gather on the way is of greater value than either his *mappa mundi* or his journey's end. Space will not permit a criticism of his detailed discussion; nor, in some important connections, can it be fairly attempted on the basis of the inevitably brief sketch of special problems provided in this ambitious essay. In general, however, this brevity does not preclude an adequate, if cleverly condensed, account of the several branches of experience from the standpoint of the author's principles, or from what he calls "the standpoint of philosophy."

I venture the judgment that too much weight bears upon the term "dialectical" in this argument. It is not that one tires of the mere word, but that one wonders just what it means when used of "the whole." The author renounces the kind of idealism which reduces the hard differences and distinctions of the world to "harmonious mush"; and he insists that the whole contemplated by philosophy is "a dialectical tension of irreconcilable and irreducible opposites." Yet, we are told, it is also a "unity and a reconciliation." This unification and reconciliation of irreconcilables and irreducibles, by the merit of "dialectic" seems to me little advance upon what Dr. Mueller describes as "mush." I have no hesitation, however, in commending this book to readers of *PHILOSOPHY*: it is quite the most powerful essay in idealism (the author prefers the title cosmological vitalism) that has appeared for some time.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Head, Heart and Hands in Human Evolution. By R. R. MARETT, D.Sc., LL.D.
(London: Hutchinson & Co. 1935. Pp. 303. Price 10s. 6d.)

In this book, Dr. Marett, Rector of Exeter College and Reader in Social Anthropology at Oxford, has collected a number of his addresses, lectures, and papers. They are arranged in three main parts. Part I deals with the leading ideas in the study of sociology. It contains three chapters on the antitheses: (1) Evolution and Progress, subordinating evolution as a category of ordinary biology, to progress which is a distinctly human attribute proved by history to be real; (2) Fact and Value, allotting to the sociologist the task, not of framing judgments, but of presenting the facts in such a way that they can be used for the criticism of values; (3) Race and Society, expounding shortly the biological basis of race and then advising the sociologist to concentrate on society rather than on race. Part II treats religious feeling, thinking, and acting, and illustrates these by chapters on particular examples, e.g. on totems, charms, etc. Part III gives an account of the rôle which the human

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hand, i.e. the progress of technology, has played in the development of mankind. The fundamental idea underlying and fusing into a unity all these miscellaneous contents is the belief in the progressive triumph of spirit over matter and in the creative mission of mankind to guide evolution towards the aim of an organized life scheme centred on a supreme good, comprising truth, beauty, and righteousness. Since, however, the progress of mankind does not advance along one straight line, but rather along many tentative tracks, studies of this kind should produce in us a spirit of tolerance of variety in human affairs, especially when dealing with the task of educating the uncivilized.

F. A. E. CREW.

John Stuart Mackenzie. Edited by his WIFE. (London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 176. Price 5s.)

Contemporary philosophy owes much to J. S. Mackenzie. Reflection was the principal business of his long and strenuous life. He was learned, he had wide sympathies, he had a strong concern with politics not only as a subject of academic study, but as a sphere of practical social action; he was accessible to new ideas, and he was throughout constructive in aim and temperament. This little book adds nothing to the statement of his philosophy. But it reports the main events and circumstances of his life—some of which, as e.g. his early voyaging to South America, are probably unknown to many of his colleagues and friends. A considerable part of the book is by his own hand—notes which he made in preparation for a "biographia philosophica." These have been skilfully edited and augmented by Mrs. Mackenzie. Professor Muirhead has contributed a characteristically illuminating "foreword"; and Dr. W. Tudor Jones an interesting chapter on Mackenzie's professorial work at Cardiff.

H. J. W. HETHERINGTON.

The Social Sciences: Their Relations in Theory and in Teaching. (London: The Le Play House Press. 1936. Pp. 222. Price 5s. net.)

This book is the report of a conference held in London in September 1935 under the joint auspices of the Institute of Sociology and the International Student Service (British Committee). The subject of the conference is sufficiently indicated in the title; and the main body of the book consists of symposia, by recognized experts in the respective subjects, of the relations to the social sciences of history, political theory, economics, and sociology. It also contains a foreword by Professor Ernest Barker, an address on "Sociology to-day" by Mr. J. A. Hobson, a report by Mr. T. H. Marshall on the teaching of the social sciences in British Universities, and a summary, also by Mr. Marshall, of the discussion of that report which took place at the conference. As might be expected, there is considerable disagreement between the contributors to the volume; nor does any definite conclusion emerge from it. But most of the contributions are interesting in themselves; and the whole volume is welcome evidence of the vitality of the social sciences and of the interest taken by those who teach them in the important problems which concern their nature, purpose, and interrelations. A further volume on the same subject is, no doubt, to be expected as a result of the second conference which was held in September 1936.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

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Of Human Freedom. By F. W. J. SCHELLING. Translated with an Introduction by JAMES GUTMANN, Ph.D. (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1936. Pp. lii + 128. Price \$1.50.)

The translator remarks that no other modern philosopher of Schelling's importance has been as little accessible to students unable to read the original. Dr. Gutmann has selected the "Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom and matters connected therewith" as a suitable introduction to Schelling's metaphysics, and he succeeds in translating it in a manner that reproduces the meaning and also illustrates the temperament of the writer and the atmosphere of his times.

The translator's Introduction gives a brief account of Schelling's life and qualities, and emphasizes his importance as something more than an intermediate stage between Fichte and Hegel.

There are passages dealing with the nature of the copula that raise problems fundamental to modern logic but the present-day student, for whom this translation is intended, will probably find Schelling more interesting as exemplifying the philosophical accompaniments of the Romantic Movement than as contributing to the solution of philosophical problems.

W. A. SINCLAIR.

The Self in Psychology. By A. H. B. ALLEN. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1935. Pp. 282. Price 10s. 6d.)

The author declares himself at the outset to be in favour of a "self-psychology," and says, "The main object of this work will be to see whether some positive content cannot be ascribed to selfhood, whether it does not have effects in actual experience, which can be described." It does not appear that he is more successful in the former task than other writers have been who start from the subject-object relation in cognition. Though he makes out a strong case for the necessity of the conception of a self as subject, and claims that it is an immediately experienced fact, he can say little more about its intrinsic qualities than that it is capable of enhanced or diminished intensity of consciousness. His very careful discussion rather reveals the abstract nature of this conception. He is more successful on the functional side, arguing in detail that the self actively maintains its conscious level by differentiating the objective field, and entering into relations with other selves. To this extent it shapes experience. All purposive action proceeds from the self.

Holding that the self is present in all mental activities, Mr. Allen is led to extend his treatment over a wide range, and there is really more said about cognition than about the self. These discussions are always germane to the central theme, but if there were more variety of emphasis in statement the structure of the book would be clearer. None of the material is very novel, but it is useful to have so much brought together in a single volume for thoughtful and unbiased review.

A. W. WOLTERS.

The Social Thought of the Ancient Civilizations. By JOYCE O. HERTZLER, Professor of Sociology, University of Nebraska. (London: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. 1936. Pp. xv + 409. Price 24s.)

Here we have a spaciousness of declamation rather than of argument, an induction for philosophy rather than philosophy itself. We see the wise men of antiquity taking the essential good for granted; their mission is to secure

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that it be respected in its scattered detail, as this seems evident to them in their station and prejudice, in their passion and aspiration.

Professor Hertzler's book is rich in skilfully selected and arranged quotation, and the concluding chapter usefully summarizes the main characteristics of the thought reviewed. This new volume may be read with profit alongside Professor L. T. Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution*. Its aim is to reveal the indebtedness of our present civilization to the colourful procession of social thought which contributed so much to the Hebrew, Greek, and Roman civilizations themselves. "The importance of the phenomena of culture diffusion has not been sufficiently taken into consideration in the history of thought, especially social thought." The practical wisdom of the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Hittites, Persians, Hebrews, Indians, and Chinese is not the less arresting and provocative for its ignorance of the methods of science and philosophy, and we have accepted it for our working heritage notwithstanding the shyness of our acknowledgment. "Though this pre-Greek thought is ancient, immature, fragmentary, and non-scientific, it contains the germs of practically everything that is valid in social science thinking. The ancients have stolen most of our good ideas."

Yet these good ideas were after all ineffective for the purpose of mass transformation. Large human groupings have had their distinctiveness and have had their day. The sociologist observes as a defect of ancient social thought that it is more concerned with the salvation of the individual in society than with the nature and possibilities of society itself. Though what is required for good government is by no means neglected, the main appeal is to the individual to do what is right if he would have health, wealth, honour, tranquillity, and length of days. But that society and the state may in some sense be valuable in themselves is a possibility which does little to dispute that the individual should still seek for good even though the social order seems doomed to decay. Those prophets and thinkers of the past who seem to have limited their hopes to a chosen "remnant" may perhaps be appraised as revealing a perception of realities not less profound than their social despair. Professor Hertzler is clearly a Westerner still retaining faith in progress. Yet Lao-Tse is not the least of the ancient sages.

M. KAYE.

The Scientist in Action. By WILLIAM H. GEORGE, MSc., Ph.D. (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 355. Price, 10s. 6d. net.)

This book is the result of the author's efforts to solve for himself many of the problems in the philosophy of science, and especially those concerned with the connection between mathematics and physics. He favours what he calls the theory of patterning, similar to views advocated by Mach, Kirchhoff, Karl Pearson, and Hobson. "On the patterning theory of science, classifications, laws, and theories are regarded as ways of arranging facts. They are biological products of scientists, each of whom has his own unique internal (biological) and external environment" (p. 191).

While science is, of course, an activity of a group of the higher apes—and many learned writers on the philosophy of science seem to forget this—the reader will be disappointed if he expects an analysis of the effect of the internal or external environment on scientific theories and why the patterning is done in a certain way in one epoch and differently in another. The author does not clearly distinguish between mathematical, physical, and functional theories of nature, and this renders obscure a large portion of his treatment, e.g. that on the difference between wave-mechanics and classical mechanics.

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Again, he does not bring out the profound difference between deductive science and the mixture of induction and deduction which is the foundation of scientific method, as Bacon so clearly demonstrated, and which Northrop has so brilliantly developed in his *Science and First Principles*. In fact, induction and deduction do not appear in the index.

Dr. George obviously has a wide knowledge of scientific literature, and there are many varied, and sometimes amusing, quotations, and he is not afraid to expose some of the nonsense which masquerades as science in recent publications. He does not stress, however, the value of careful definition in science, and he is himself confused by a problem which depends upon lack of it, viz. whether a whole is more than the sum of its parts. The book follows the best scientific procedure in having precise references and useful summaries, and includes a very interesting chapter on the future of experimental research.

G. BURNISTON BROWN.

The Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected. A Study of the Arahan. By I. B. Horner, M.A. (London: Williams & Norgate, 1936. Pp. 328. Price 12s. 6d.)

This is a technical study in a limited field, yet as a further attempt to dig up the roots of primitive Buddhism, it is of more importance than might seem. Mrs. Rhys Davids's challenge to the ordinary interpretation of Buddhism has stirred others, among them Miss Horner, and in the main her work goes to support the contentions of Mrs. Rhys Davids that Buddhist doctrine, as we now have it, is as far removed from the teachings of Gotama as, shall we say, the doctrines of the Council of Trent were from those of the Synoptic tradition? The concept of the arahan, the saint, of Buddhism, is shown by Miss Horner's investigation to have been of somewhat slow growth. In Mahayana Buddhism interest in the concept of arahan died away, in view of the ideal of becoming a Buddha. Hinayana Buddhism taught that arahanhood could be attained on earth, but by so doing was obliged to restrict the conception according to the circumstances of earthly existence. How this came to be is traced by Miss Horner with much patient detail. Those who are interested in early Buddhism will find in this careful study more than the mere title indicates, for, incidentally, it gives a picture of much of the general development of that faith as well. It is, moreover, a model of research method in its subject.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Books received also:—

- Yoga Vasishtha. The Story of Queen Chudala and Sermons of Holy Vasishtha.* Translated by H. P. Shastri. London: Faval Press Ltd. 1937. Pp. 170. 3s.
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- M. BISHOP. *Pascal. The Life of Genius.* London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd. 1937. Pp. x + 398. 12s. 6d.
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- G. WELLS. *Appeal to Common Sense*. London: Methuen & Co. 1937. Pp. viii + 262. 7s. 6d.
- M. J. ADLER. *Art and Prudence. A Study in Practical Philosophy*. New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1937. Pp. xv + 686. 5 dollars.
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WHERE IS PHILOSOPHY GOING?¹

PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD, LL.D., F.B.A.

Some years ago Max Planck published a small book with the title *Where is Science Going?* in vigorous protest against the idea that the doctrine of relativity in general and the new quanta physics in particular mean that "the quest of the absolute becomes eliminated from scientific progress." That it seems to be time to raise a similar question with regard to philosophy was suggested to me at a recent conference held at Farnham Castle on the relation between science and philosophy, at which the new school of logical positivism was strongly represented by some of the ablest of the younger men. In listening to what they had to say on this youth movement, as they described it, I felt that the few hours left for the discussion of their view were insufficient to enable its critics to make the best of their case, and I am glad to have this opportunity of indicating more fully the grounds of the difficulty which, with others, I feel in accepting it as the final word on the scope and function of philosophy.

The origin and development of the movement of which this doctrine is the outcome is writ large in the course that philosophical thought has taken during the last half-century in the University of Cambridge. Henry Sidgwick was by general admission its most influential thinker from the seventies to the end of last century. He was himself a staunch, if a cool-headed and cautious supporter of the traditional view of philosophy as concerned with the whole range of human life, and therein not less with judgments of value and the norms they imply than with judgments of fact. The former like the latter have their source in the common reason of mankind

¹ An amplified form of an address given at the Annual Meeting of the British Institute of Philosophy on June 30, 1937.

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and are susceptible of the same accuracy of statement as they. "It is the primary aim of philosophy," he wrote, "to unify completely, bring into clear coherence all departments of rational thought, and this aim cannot be realized by any philosophy that leaves out of its view the important body of judgments and reasonings which form the subject matter of ethics."¹ In spite of this declaration, Sidgwick himself made no attempt in his great book on *Methods of Ethics* to carry out any such programme, but on the contrary renounced it as beyond its scope.²

This left it open to his most distinguished follower, G. E. Moore, while still renouncing all forms of naturalism and holding that the idea of goodness has an objective meaning independent of our individual feelings and desires, to deny that it is capable of further analysis, or of being included in a comprehensive system of philosophy of the kind that Sidgwick had in view. The instability of this position led Bertrand Russell first to take the further step of denying the independence of our ideas of value of our own subjective feelings. "Questions as to values," he wrote, "lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge. That is to say, when we assert that this or that has value we are giving expression to an emotion, not to a fact which would still be true if our personal feelings were different";³ secondly, and as a corollary of this, to exclude from the purview of philosophy all reference to practical or aesthetic interests. "What it (philosophy) can do when purified of all practical taint is to help to understand the general aspects of the world and the logical analysis of familiar but complex things. It offers in its own domain the kind of satisfaction which the other sciences offer, but it does not offer a solution of the problem of human destiny or the destiny of the universe. . . . What it brings with it is a sense of power and a hope of progress more reliable and better grounded than any that rests on hasty and fallacious generalizations as to the nature of the universe at large."⁴

It was this view that was seized upon by Russell's brilliant pupil, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and carried a step further still in the denial to ethical and aesthetic predicates of any real meaning.

The essence of the view in this its fullest developed form, so far as our question is concerned, is to rule out from the field of profitable discussion, and therefore from philosophy, all reference to anything that falls beyond the world of facts which are verifiable to the

¹ The passage is quoted by Whitehead in *Science and the Modern World*, p. 176, to emphasize the impoverishment which philosophy suffers on any other view in being deprived of its "proper rôle as a constant critic of partial formulations."

² *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

³ *Religion and Science*, p. 230.

⁴ *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914), pp. 17 and 30.

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intellect by logical processes. This is not to say that there is no field for discussion beyond the limits of the special sciences. There still remains the criticism of the terms and categories employed by them, which have been taken over on credit from ordinary language and are infected with the same obscurity and ambiguity from which it suffers. There is thus a wide field for philosophy not only in the co-ordination of the results of the different sciences but in the clarification of their common language. What we are warned against is any attempt to extend the function of philosophy to include judgments about good and bad, higher and lower, as touching upon matters beyond human ken. That we do as a matter of fact make statements about what is good and bad, better and worse, is not denied. What is denied is that these statements are more than an expression of our own feelings about things or our attitude to them; in other words, that they are judgments in any true sense of the word, instead of being merely our feelings masquerading in the form of judgments. Otherwise they express nothing and are, strictly speaking, unmeaning, "senseless" (*unsinnig*) in Wittgenstein's phraseology. But to do Wittgenstein himself justice, he had no intention of denying that there *is* a meaning behind them or even that there are indications of it in the world. "There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical."¹ Moreover, he had the insight to see that logical analysis in the end is hoist with its own petard. "My propositions," he concludes, "are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me, finally recognizes them as senseless."² As well they may be, seeing that logical truth is itself a term of value and therefore in the end meaningless. But these admissions failed to make much impression on his younger followers. They had tasted blood in the critical part of Wittgenstein's teaching, and were hot to follow up the trail to the death of traditional philosophy as it has come down to us from the time of Socrates.

What are we to say of the grounds upon which this evacuating theory rests?

Before attempting an answer I should like to say for myself that, with regard to what might be called the *positive* as contrasted with the *positivist* side of these contentions, I see no reason to doubt that logical analysis, as interpreted by the school, will show itself to possess all the value for science that is claimed for it, and that, even on the more negative side, there is a distinct gain in so clear a recognition of the fact that the natural sciences *qua* natural can have nothing to do with questions of value in the classes of things with which they deal. It is an old contention of philosophy that the science, e.g. of biology, has no right to speak of higher and lower, instead of merely simpler and more complex, and that it

¹ *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, p. 187, prop. 6.522. ² *Op. cit.*, p. 189.

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merely stultifies itself by doing so. But to admit this is one thing, to hold that there can be no rational discourse as to anything that cannot be verified as given fact, and accordingly to deny that there can be any accurate thinking as to what it is right to do or to feel about things, situations, or ideas is quite another. In view of any such denial it is surely time to recall Plato's great saying, which Sidgwick took as the motto of his book, to the effect that "it would surely be absurd to exert ourselves to attain accuracy with regard to things of little worth while denying that the greatest things are those that are susceptible of the greatest accuracy." The Platonic view may have been interpreted too much in what Mr. Gilbert Ryle, in his delightful article in the last number of *Philosophy*, has called an inflationist sense. But that it is wrong in the main is a conclusion to which some of us would consent to be dragged only by the most convincing chain of reasoning. What are the considerations on which this extreme form of deflationism, or as I would rather call it, defeatism, is founded? I will select three which seem to me to have been chiefly responsible for it.

1. The first is an argument founded on the claim of philosophy to be, like science, a theoretic study engaged in the search for truth; from which it is taken to follow that, as there can be no truth about anything but fact, philosophy can be concerned with nothing else but this. "I regard philosophy," writes a supporter of the main thesis of the school, "as a theoretic inquiry in pursuit of truth. Valuations are not theoretical assertions claiming to express truth. The question whether the thing has value is not to be determined by any criterion quite independent of our actual valuations."¹ With the first part of this statement there can be no quarrel. Philosophy is theory. It aims at truth about the nature of the world and our experience of it. In view of any attempt to mix up edification with it, as has been too often done, it is well to have this clearly stated. It is further true that valuations are not theoretic expressions claiming to represent truth in the sense in which judgments of fact do so, or to be amenable to the same criteria. But on what ground more solid than a mere verbal assonance can we go on to say that there can be no theory about what is right or wrong in morals, beautiful or hideous in aesthetics, no standard by which such judgments may be vindicated as having a truth and justice of their own? I believe there is none at all. Reserving the further consideration of this whole point for a moment, I pass to a second ground which has more substance in it.

2. It is that of the difficulty of attaining any true impartiality on subjects into which valuation other than that of truth of fact enters, and which touch our emotions so deeply as do those of right

¹ W. D. Lamont, *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, xv, p. 226.

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and wrong, good and bad, beauty and ugliness; and of the tendency of our systems of ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics to be an index of our wishes rather than of our honest thoughts. I believe that Mr. Russell and others of his school have done well to warn us against this perversion; but the warning has not been left to their generation to give. Ever since Socrates declared that the uncriticized life is not worth living, it has been a constant refrain in the works of the older philosophers. It is now some fifty years since writers so different as Sidgwick and Bradley called the attention of my own generation to the extent to which our national philosophies were, in the words of the latter, "choked with prejudice." But they never believed, and would have stultified their own intellectual endeavours if they had believed, that it is impossible to carry an impartial truth-loving attitude of mind into subjects that touch our emotions even at the deepest. All that they asked, and all that metaphysical philosophy now asks, is permission to take its life in its hands and be judged like science itself by its success or failure in the solution of its problems. It is right that when we propose to cross a stretch of wood or moorland we should be warned of the thickets and bogs that will beset us. But to be forewarned is to be forearmed, and the goal we have in view may be something for which it is worth while to take the risk. If we take to heart Goethe's great maxim, "*Sich dem Halben zu entwöhnen und im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu wohnen,*" and recollect, as Whitehead puts it, that the true rôle of philosophy is "to be the constant critic of partial formulations," we may consider ourselves fairly safe in our adventure.

3. But undoubtedly the main influence that has operated in the formulation of the new positivism has been the dominance in the mind of a particularly brilliant group of Cambridge men of the interest in physics and mathematics, the attitude of mind which these studies demand, and the logic that underlies their methods—leading to the suspicion of the credentials of all propositions which, like those that express value, are insusceptible of verification by the same processes of reasoning. I have already quoted Russell's statement of this position. Younger writers have only rung the changes upon his text, and sought support for it in a long line of writers, past and present, British and foreign, who since Hume have adopted a similar uncompromising empiricism. Can their contentions really be maintained (I do not say in the face of what the great line of philosophers from the beginning have taught on the subject of goodness; their right to teach anything at all is just what is challenged, but) in the face of our everyday experience? Is it really true that there can be no rational discourse on anything that cannot be verified as given fact, or deduced from definitions and axioms,

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and that there can be no intelligent criticism of what it is right to do or to feel about situations or things.

I believe that, as in the other considerations already mentioned, there is an element of fundamental truth mixed up with exaggeration and error in this doctrine. It certainly is true that our sense of the value, unlike our sense of the observable qualities, of things is primarily a response of the emotions to something in the object, as apprehended by sense and intellect, of which it is the bearer. But this does not and cannot mean that the response is to something which only touches us superficially, and which, beyond the emotion, has no further import for us as rational beings. On the contrary, it means that it is the response to something which touches us at a level deeper than knowledge, and appeals, as knowledge does not, to the whole personality—something with which, as rational responsible beings, we are concerned at least as deeply as we are with the truth of our knowledge of actual fact. This being so, the response is never merely emotional or beyond the reach of the censorship of a self which "looks before and after and pines for what is not"—which can judge of the appropriateness (what I have already called the "truth") of the attitude, whether of will in the world of practice or of feeling in the world of aesthetic appreciation. Behind the emotional expression there is always the sleepless sense of a being who has to be *satisfied* with what he does and feels, as well as with what he thinks, and who in the end can be satisfied with nothing which does not correspond to a criterion of what is in itself the best. It is surely a fact of our everyday experience that we subject our ideas about what it is good, or what it is our duty to do, or, again, our desires and feelings about things, ideas, and situations to criticism, suggested either by our own further reflections upon them or by what is pointed out to us by others. Immediate feelings of pleasure or pain may perhaps be beyond the reach of argument. But that our moral and aesthetic reactions can be altered and are constantly being altered by such criticism is surely the commonest of experiences. How often after consideration do we ask ourselves whether we really desire a thing or whether a thing really deserves our admiration as beautiful in nature or in art.

Appeals to the idealist writers of the early part of the century are not likely to carry weight with the new school. They certainly had not its already extensive literature before them. But they attacked in advance with characteristic trenchancy its central dogma, as when Bosanquet wrote: "There may be some justification for supposing that you cannot be argued into or out of a simple experience of pleasure—though unquestionably in many cases you can—but to suggest that it cannot be argued and explained in what lies the power of objects and ideas ultimately to satisfy a mind—in

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what lies their value to a mind—seems contrary to everyday experience as well as to the whole bearing of aesthetic, ethic, and metaphysic."¹

It may well be that the criterion of what I have called "the best" which underlies such criticism is difficult to discover. Philosophers have worn themselves out in their efforts to discover it, and there is still large diversity of view among them about it. But it seems to me mere defeatism, least of all becoming in a youth movement, to declare the search for it vain and useless. This would be to give up the hope of ever obtaining rational insight as to what constitutes the wisdom of life, and offers a way of escape from the troubles and confusions that have beset men in every age, and beset them in a peculiar way in that in which we ourselves live. Let me quote the words of a great philosopher, all the more acceptable because he is a German and belonged to the great philosophical age in Germany:

"For what good," asks Fichte in a letter to Jacobi,² "is the speculative standpoint and the whole of philosophy therewith, if it be not for life? Had humanity not tasted of this forbidden fruit, it might dispense with all philosophy. But in humanity there is a wish implanted to behold that region lying beyond the individual; and to behold it not merely in a reflected light but face to face. The first who raised a question about God's existence broke through the barriers, he shook humanity in its main foundation pillars and threw it out of joint into an intestine strife which is not yet settled, and which can only be settled by advancing boldly to that supreme point from which the speculative and the practical appear to be at one. We began to philosophize from pride of heart, and thus lost our innocence: we beheld our nakedness, and ever since we philosophize from the need of our redemption."

I will end with another quotation from a very different writer, whose name, after what I have already said, you may have a difficulty in guessing. "Knowledge if it is wide and intimate brings with it a perspective in which values are seen more clearly. Even more important than knowledge is the life of the emotions. A world without delight and without affections is a world destitute of value. These things the scientific manipulator must remember. All that is needed is that men should not be so intoxicated by new power as to forget the truths that were familiar to every previous generation. Not all wisdom is new, nor is all folly out of date."

¹ *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 297. For the application of the same principle to art see the same writer's quotation from Nettleship in *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 42 foll.

² Quoted Wallace's *Logic of Hegel* (Translation), p. 394.

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The words are Mr. Bertrand Russell's¹—the fruit surely of a ripper wisdom than those above quoted. I commend them to those of his followers who have been misled by the others.

Coming back to ourselves, I believe that there is nothing more important at the present time than to keep philosophy on these broad and hopeful lines, instead of seeking to evacuate it of all reference to the meaning of our lives here and to questions of what makes them worth living, and turn it into a merely logical discipline. To accept such a limitation of it would be equivalent to offering as the only alternatives to the pure naturalism, against which the best minds of our time are in revolt, either a return to tradition and authority, a region in which we have to accept what we are told and to think for ourselves at our peril, or a mystical appeal to an inner light, a region in which anything can be thought and nothing can be either proved or disproved. There is surely a better way, and it is one at least of the functions of anything that aspires to the name of an institute and a journal of philosophy, to lend a helping hand to those who are in search of this better way.

¹ *The Scientific Outlook* (1931), p. 278.

GREAT THINKERS

(XII) DAVID HUME

B. M. LAING, M.A., D.LITT.

DAVID HUME, a member of the well-known Border family of Home, was born on April 26, 1711. After a period of preparatory training he matriculated at Edinburgh College in 1723, although he may have entered earlier. His course during this period is obscure; according to his own statement the curriculum was mainly literary; on leaving College he records that his interests lay predominantly in this direction, and, being left to his own choice, he was able to indulge his inclinations. An attempt to train him for a legal career ended in failure; and he continued to live at his ancestral home of Ninewells, to the west of Berwick, for some years, devoting himself with all the ardour of youth to the excogitation of what he conceived to be a new philosophical idea. There ensued, partly, there is reason to believe, as a result of intellectual over-exertion, recurrent ill health; and safety was sought in a more active commercial career. The latter tried out at Bristol, ended after a few months.

His next step was to take up residence in France, first at Rheims, then at La Flèche, where he composed the *Treatise of Human Nature*. In 1737 he returned to England and entered upon negotiations for the publication of that work, an event successfully accomplished in 1739 and 1740. He was greatly disappointed over the lack of recognition given by the public; this failure seems to have influenced, in part at any rate, the future direction of his activities. He blames himself largely for the result, considering that he had been too hasty in publishing; to some extent he assigns it to a lack of metaphysical interest on the part of the public. He seeks to meet the latter factor by writing in a more popular way upon more popular subjects, the consequence being a series of moral and political essays in 1741-42; and he attempts to meet the former cause by recasting the *Treatise* into such a form as to make a popular appeal, the result being published in 1748 and ultimately called the *Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding* and followed in 1751 by a corresponding revision of the third book of the *Treatise*. The moral and political essays were a success, but there was comparatively little popular interest in the *Enquiry*. In 1752 he published the *Political Discourses* which gained him a reputation, especially on the continent. The outcome was that, apart from the *Dialogues*

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Concerning Natural Religion and the *Four Dissertations*, including the *Natural History of Religion*, which were probably all prepared even by this date, the former alone being published posthumously and showing evidence of frequent revision and amendment, Hume deserts metaphysical speculation in favour of history.

The *Enquiry* has generally until recently received more attention than the *Treatise*; it is written with greater directness and ease, both in regard to language and exposition; but it is concentrated upon one main issue, namely the problem of causation, the *Treatise* on the other hand in addition dealing with the nature of and problems involved in Space and Time and containing also a lengthy discussion of the belief in an external world. But the argument of the *Treatise* is difficult to follow, in spite of Hume's literary ambitions. It manifests the spirit of the pioneer—even in tackling History Hume feels himself to be a pioneer—who, however, gets somewhat lost because unable to master fully the lie of the land; and it ends with an ingenuous confession of failure to give meaning to certain fundamental issues. This confession, which few philosophers are honest enough or courageous enough to make, combined with the large amount of destructive criticism expressed in the course of the argument, has been considered to be evidence of the philosophical bankruptcy of his principles. The apparently negative character of his views induced Thomas Reid at an early stage to enter the field with the theory that his doctrine was sceptical and was the logical consequence of the "ideal theory" as stated particularly by Locke and Berkeley—an interpretation which has justification but which by implication fails to do justice to what Hume himself saw clearly.

Hume, as well as his intimate friends, felt that his philosophy might be, or was, hostile or offensive to prevailing sentiment in religion and philosophy. He had reason to know this on several occasions in Scotland where the theological atmosphere showed itself distinctly unfavourable to him. Such hostile reaction, however, though understandable in the light of eighteenth-century conditions, is irrelevant to the real character of his teaching and constitutes no argument against it. To have convictions and to adhere to convictions is one thing, which Hume never denied; to inquire into the foundations of such convictions, which Hume sought to do, is another. His concern is with *evidence*—its nature and application; and it is permissible to suggest that the examination of certain issues, such as mathematical ideas, cause and effect, an external world, a self, moral and political ideas, liberty and necessity, and even miracles, the discussion of which has provoked so much resentment against him, was conducted primarily with reference to the question of evidence and not from the purpose of deliberately destroying prevalent convictions. It is true that modern philosophy—

indeed all philosophy—had been concerned with this question, as appears from the efforts, stimulated by a fairly vigorous sceptical theory which denied that *any* evidence of a nature decisive in any one direction existed or could be found and which, perennially rearing its head, offered a continuous challenge to find a criterion of truth and to show its effectiveness in application, to provide an answer. But in the eighteenth century, especially on the continent, the problem of evidence is explicitly discussed as a problem; Huyghens and s'Gravesende devote attention to it, the latter in an essay entitled *Sur l'évidence*; and it is such a problem that interests Hume. From this point of view the essay on Miracles, which Hume had intended to incorporate in the *Treatise* but eliminated therefrom in response to friends, finds a natural place in that work and need in no way be regarded as a careless or deliberate insult to the susceptibilities of other people.

Rigid insistence upon evidence can lead very easily, as is seen not merely in the case of professing sceptics themselves but even in the case of Descartes and of Locke, to doubt regarding a greater or a less number of commonly accepted beliefs. Its effect on Hume is in some respects similar; but, unlike them, he has present to his mind the fact that, even when a belief is not justifiable logically on the evidence, that belief nevertheless may be entertained. This fact cannot be ignored, for it is philosophically interesting; nor can the belief in question be summarily dismissed as doubtful or as false, for something has contributed to its formation and it suggests that belief is not primarily a rational or a logical affair. It is necessary therefore to carry out an analysis of beliefs in order to discover what factors contribute to their formation. Thus Hume at the very beginning of the *Treatise*—and he ends the volume on the same note—insists upon the point that man, besides having knowledge, is also the knower and that consequently “human nature,” which gives the title to his first work, has an important bearing upon the character of the sciences. By approaching philosophy with this in mind he believes he is preparing “an almost entirely new” foundation for a complete system of the sciences. He may seem in doing so to be confusing logic with psychology or the question of validity with that of origin, a charge frequently made against him. It is not true, however, that he discards logic as traditionally understood; it is equally not true, it may be remarked in passing, even though contrary to widely accepted interpretations, that he is primarily a logician, such an interpretation being based on a misunderstanding of what he is doing when he discusses inductive inference. His whole discussion moves within the framework of prevailing logic comprising intuition, deduction, and induction, with the accepted distinctions between them. What he does emphasize

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is that there comes a point where this logic reaches its limits and requires to be supplemented by an additional theory. But this innovation points not to his discarding logic but to his being an epistemologist whose problem arises because of the rigid application of that logic and who is very much concerned to get the public to appreciate the issue which he himself is convinced is inherent in human knowledge and belief.

A feature emerges here which serves to distinguish Hume from the sceptics, with whom he has so frequently been identified. These utilized logic in order to destroy the foundations of knowledge and they did so specifically by showing that the ideas present in the sciences were contradictory and generally by contending that if logic is subjected to self-criticism no standard of logical evidence could be sustained. There is this much affinity between Hume and them that he accepts a considerable amount of their destructive criticism—in fact, as recent investigation has shown, incorporates it almost literally in his own discussion. Examples of this are his criticism of mathematical ideas such as points and infinite divisibility, the statement of atheism and materialism by Philo in the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, and, in less obvious form, in his critical examination of certain views of causation and of certain theories regarding the existence of an external world. In other cases the weapon which he uses for destruction is one forged by the sceptics. But it is safe to say that so far as Hume expresses destructive criticism of widely accepted beliefs he has borrowed the materials and no originality can be claimed for him. Hume, in so far as he is critical, is repeating what had already been said. On the other hand, however, he did try to emphasize that he had a constructive suggestion to make; there are signs in his correspondence and in records of his behaviour that he was surprised and disappointed at the non-recognition of what he sought to say. The criticism and destruction are carried out in order to clarify a problem and suggest a solution. The constructive part may be meagre and largely tentative; in places it may be unacceptable; Hume himself finally expresses doubts concerning some of it; but whether he failed or not, he is concerned with a problem that remains.

Hume's problem has its origin in the fact that in all sciences and quasi-scientific studies such as politics and ethics not merely do certain processes of reasoning occur but there appear certain ideas and beliefs without which the reasoning could not be carried on and would not have the character which it does possess. Mathematics or rather that branch of it called geometry—for Hume confines himself mainly to it—is a good instance of demonstrative reasoning; but he does not, except incidentally for the special purpose of emphasizing its difference from induction, enter upon a

detailed examination of such demonstration. He concentrates on the ideas characteristic of mathematics and accepted as essential to it in the eighteenth century: they were those of points and infinitesimals and the relations of *equality*, *greater than*, and *lesser than*, the former involving the ideas of space and time. They were the subject at that time of great philosophical interest and vigorous controversy, much of it linking up with the ancient Zenonian arguments concerning infinite divisibility. The development and successful employment of the conception of infinitesimals made the controversy important because that conception constituted the key of the position from which mathematics was being successfully applied to the explanation of physical processes. It seems curious but it is vouched for by mathematical philosophers that the apparently highly rational science of mathematics rested until quite recently on no logical foundation. The philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries found themselves unable to put a logical construction upon mathematical ideas. Bayle argued, in favour of scepticism, that they were through and through contradictory. None of the three possibilities—that space is made up of mathematical points, that it is made up of atoms (physical points), that it is infinitely divisible—could be logically defended.

Hume accepts the destructive argument of Bayle, carried out on a basis different from that expressed in Hume's criterion of the truth or soundness of an idea, which criterion therefore must be regarded as in no way providing the motive at this point—nor probably at other points—for Hume's supposed critical destructiveness and scepticism. He does not, however, stop with this scepticism of Bayle. He believes, soundly enough, that the mathematicians, in speaking of limits and infinitely small quantities, were getting at something important but the difficulty was to interpret what it was they were talking about. Whatever it was it was not something which had been reached by a process of demonstration, for in that case the process of reasoning could be stated; but no such reasoning was known nor could it be found. At the same time Hume, impressed by the applicability of mathematics to nature and its usefulness as an instrument in the hands of the physical, experimental scientist for giving precision to his results, in this respect adopting one of the two alternative views about mathematics which had been much discussed at least from the time of Galileo, is influenced by the consideration that any interpretation of mathematical ideas must be one that accounts for such applicability. He is not the only philosopher of the eighteenth century to stress this consideration. It leads him to find the source of these ideas in observable entities or sense-data; and instead of his criterion of truth being responsible for his theory of mathematics it is his view of what is demanded

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of mathematics that accounts for the criterion he accepted. This demand could be met—in his opinion could alone be met—if points, for instance, *existed*. Later philosophers¹ of the present day maintain a similar position when they object to the definition of a point as a *limit* of a series on the ground that there is no certainty of the *existence* of such a limit. Unless points exist, according to Hume, and therefore have magnitude, then lines, areas, and generally space could not be said to exist; and consequently mathematics and the application of mathematics to the interpretation of nature would remain inexplicable. The conception of a point as that which has no magnitude must thus be rejected. There were those who, like Leibniz, held that infinitely small quantities exist, but there is, according to Hume, no evidence that they do; such a conception lacks definiteness and precision and is actually a confusion with the idea of the *indefinite*, based on the repetition of the process of division carried on indefinitely by the imagination. In actuality there is a limit to divisibility. The view that mathematical ideas are merely “in the mind” will not account for their applicability to nature. All these difficulties are met and the requirements of mathematics are satisfied, in Hume’s opinion, by the conception of the *minimum visibile* or, to include touch, the *minimum sensible*—a notion revived from ancient Epicureanism. Above all such a notion guarantees the *existence* of points; they are the limits of visible or tangible series. On this basis Hume seeks to define space; points so defined are capable of juxtaposition; and he believes that the view renders the conception of space free of contradictions and makes mathematics consistent.

It follows that the conception of infinity is untenable and that, as Hume expressly states, it is not necessary to Mathematics—a consequence which leads to an extreme *finitism* on which mathematical opinion at present is divided. His suggested solution rests on an empirical basis. The ideas of equality, greater, and less are likewise derived from observation and comparison of entities. A common objection, which Hume seeks to meet, is that to derive mathematical ideas in this way is to deprive mathematical objects of that perfection and absoluteness which are essential to the precision, accuracy, and certainty characteristic of mathematics. He gives a simple and direct denial to this claim for perfection in mathematical objects and for precision, accuracy, and certainty. The idea of such perfection is based on the indefinite continuation of the process of comparison by the imagination which gives no more “perfect” object. He does not, however, raise the question whether the denial of precision, accuracy, and certainty in mathematics is necessarily required by the denial of “perfect” objects,

¹ E.g. Broad, *Scientific Thought*, p. 42.

and whether these characteristics have some other foundation, the idea of perfectness in straight lines, in equality, and so on, being irrelevant to the matter. He seems so obsessed by the usefulness of mathematics in application that his theory is primarily concerned with questions posed with reference to that issue.

Though Hume restates in the *Enquiry*¹ the substance of this view of mathematics elaborated in the *Treatise*, nevertheless in the former² he also puts forward a doctrine quite Cartesian in character and difficult to make consistent with it. "Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid, would for ever retain their certainty and evidence." Mathematical certainty and evidence are thus not to be understood by reference to what exists, but are a matter of perception (or intuition) of relations between ideas. Yet, of course, *all* ideas are ultimately on his theory derived from observed entities. The distinction between "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" which is by no means easy to understand on the basis of his philosophical position is relevant to his view of mathematics; but it is also made to mark the difference between mathematics and physics and to draw attention to the distinctive problem involved in the latter. It is an acceptance of the prevalent eighteenth-century distinction between the two sciences, mathematics in fact being then regarded as providing a completed support for physics. It has to be understood, however, so far as Hume is concerned, in the light of the distinction expressed in the *Treatise* between variable and invariable relations. It is evident, of course, that though our idea of a stone may be derived from observed stones, yet we could never from a consideration of our idea of a stone perceive or intuit that it was at the distance x from another stone or that it was covered with moss. The relation of distance between stones is a variable one. In mathematics it is otherwise; the relation of the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle, for instance, to the sum of the squares on the other two sides is one that is constant for all such objects. The difference lies in the fact, obscured by the ambiguous word *relation*, that, as Hume recognizes by his reference to *proportion* though not emphasizing its importance, the mathematical *relations* in question are *ratios* and differ from the *relations* referred to in the other cases. Now ratios involve a comparison of *relations* by virtue of their magnitude; a triangle, an angle, a circle are all primarily a matter of relations (spatial) between lines; and geometry is a formulation of ratios between lines or between angles. In this respect mathematics is essentially relational in character. To reason geometrically it is thus necessary to perceive or intuit the relations which are to be compared and are the basis

¹ Sect. xii, Pt. ii.

² Sect. iv, Pt. i.

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of ratios. The certainty of these ratios is not dependent on any reference to existence; but their applicability to nature or the applicability of mathematics to the interpretation of nature, presupposes that they are ratios between relations which are observed or are observable in nature, though such applicability may not be exact.

The problem connected with physical science is one concerned with the discovery of *relations* in nature or between existences and primarily, according to Hume and probably the prevalent view of the time, with one kind of relation, namely that of cause and effect. He accepts as a fact, never questioned by him, that science is the search for causes; and he is also prepared to admit throughout that causal conclusions are "justly made." This point is of importance because it signifies that he is not trying to *prescribe* meanings of terms to the scientist but is seeking on the basis of the scientist's own work to find out what meanings are to be given to the terms. A search for causes presupposes that there are causes or rather a belief that there are causes and that what characterizes a cause is known or believed to be known. The end of Hume's long and elaborate discussion in Part III of the *Treatise* shows very definitely that he was seeking a definition of the word cause, a statement of the characteristics which anything, to be a cause, must possess; at the same time he was concerned with the term as used by the scientist or as it entered into the body of knowledge, not with some metaphysical *causality*; and consequently any definition must be also one that had applicability in science. In these respects the issue is exactly parallel to that examined in the case of mathematics; only it is more complicated, for obviously, in view of the laborious efforts required, causes are not as causes directly perceived or intuited; the causal relation between events or objects is not a sense-datum. It is complicated also because there enters for consideration the causal principle "every event must have a cause" and this in turn raises a question regarding the basis of conclusions formed by generalization.

Hume is not the first historically to raise these issues involved in a science of nature. The sceptics of ancient times had argued that the *pros* and *cons* remain equally indecisive on the question of the existence of causes, and part of their argument refers to the difficulty in using the idea of cause. In the eighteenth century writers, such as s'Gravesende in Holland, in a *Discourse on Evidence*, distinguish between mathematics with its certainty based on demonstration and physical science using analogy or induction, based on the principle of the uniformity of nature, though they were ready to maintain that physical science did thereby attain a certainty, even if different from that of mathematics. They sought

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to demonstrate the principle of the uniformity of nature by means of a knowledge of the existence of a Divine Being; and the latter knowledge was in turn established demonstratively in the manner of mathematical knowledge. Hume does not adopt this somewhat Cartesian position; and the reason is probably to be found in the rejection of innate ideas by Locke, backed up more especially by the impressive achievements of Newton, whose experimental science became dominant in Hume's time. But for him, in consequence, a grave problem ensues. The eighteenth century had committed itself to the empirical or experimental standpoint; and the empirical method must be taken seriously. His much maligned essay on Miracles can in consequence be seen in quite another light and the place intended for it originally in the *Treatise* becomes intelligible. The procedure of accounting for the uniformity of nature by reference to the Divine existence and character must be reversed; the latter must be established inductively; and being the conclusion of an inductive inference, it must rest on the principle of the uniformity of nature, if this is the basis of all induction. The clue to the Divine existence must, in fact, as is argued in the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, lie in the presence of constant and uniform laws in the universe: that work discusses just the possibility of building up a knowledge of God on this basis by means of analogy, said to be the only possible means. In the essay on Miracles one part of the discussion is devoted to maintaining that on such a view it is impossible to accept the idea of miracles, for the idea or definition of the latter involves the Divine Being and yet also involves an interruption and hence a denial of the uniformity of nature or the constancy of physical laws which constitutes the main evidence for the Divine existence. To believe both in miracles and in the teleological inductive argument is thus logically contradictory. The uniformity of nature cannot accordingly be established demonstratively by means of a knowledge of the Divine Being. Nor can it be defended inductively, in the manner of other inductions like physical laws, for any such attempt must use the principle itself. Nor is it intuitively certain. Thus the three possible traditional ways of defending it are closed.

The relation of the idea of the uniformity of nature to the principle of causation has been a matter of considerable controversy. Hume considers that the latter is the basis on which we are able to transcend present experience, that it is thus the foundation of induction and generalization; and hence it follows that in his opinion it fulfils the function supposed to attach to the principle of uniformity. The uniformity in the universe is due to the presence of causes in that universe; to establish the principle of causation is thus to account for uniformity. For this reason the idea of causation

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is the more fundamental. Nevertheless, Hume is unable to admit that the principle of causation "whatever begins to exist must have a cause," is either intuitively certain or capable of demonstration; it is not the former because of the peculiar nature of the relation in question, a nature contrasted with that of mathematical relations and also because a causal relation is not a sense-datum; it is not the latter because any attempted proofs, at least hitherto given, presuppose the matter at issue. To this it may be added in support of Hume—what is in accord with his view—that where the ideas are not clear or the meaning of the terms is not decided there cannot be "intuition," and that an attempt to prove the existence of causes presupposes already the idea of a cause and of causation and points to its having been derived in some way prior to any demonstration. It is obvious that it cannot be inferred inductively seeing that it is supposed to be the basis of induction.

Such is the critical and destructive part of Hume's discussion on causation. Statements are so frequently made that he denied causation or made causation subjective with the consequent denial of the possibility of inference and of knowledge that his further discussion requires careful attention. He starts from the fact or supposition that the science of nature is concerned with the discovery of causes, and he formulates the meaning of the term cause by reference to its use in scientific investigation. He finds that that meaning is complex, for it involves spatial and temporal relations; a lighted match is a cause of an explosion only if it is related in a specific spatial way to the box of powder and if it is lighted prior to the explosion. But another and very important component, which Hume, far from denying, makes one of the main issues in his argument, is *necessity*. What is this necessity? Though it may seem an irrelevant over-refinement, yet it is requisite to distinguish two things. Necessity is asserted in the proposition "every event must have a cause"; what is here asserted to be necessary is the universal presence of causal relations between events; and, as already seen, Hume can find no justification for this assertion. There is, however, another necessity, namely, as a character of any causal relation between two objects or events, in virtue of which the occurrence of the one must ensue from the occurrence of the other. Possibly there has been a belief that necessity in both respects was being asserted in the proposition "every event must have a cause," the second being implied in the word *cause*. Nevertheless, there are the two senses. Hume admits the second, and for this reason, in order to elucidate its nature, proceeds to consider the more specific question how we decide that a particular x is the cause of y or that y must happen as a consequence of x or how we infer one from the other. His answer, given in terms to secure conformity with his

demand that an idea must be validated by reference to observed entities, is that this necessity is a habit of expectation generated by experience of the frequent conjunction of x and y . It is possible, however, that his language fails to express the nature of the result he reached by his analysis.

The problem of causation has generally been considered to be a problem of inference, and Hume also connects the two. Yet in spite of this prevalent belief what the exact relation of the two is is not very clear. What is a mere truism is that the search for causes or causal relations presupposes a belief that there are such in the universe: this accounts for the behaviour of searchers but has no relevance to inference. One interpretation is that the causal principle guarantees the validity of the conclusions reached inductively. This it simply does not do; and Hume in asserting so was right. It is impossible to find in the principle any evidence that any specific assertion of a causal relation between two objects or events is true; and it is likewise impossible to infer from it what objects are causally related. It is a curiosity of philosophical literature that it is supposed man has a knowledge of causal laws and that yet there is so much dispute about the nature of causation or the meaning of the term cause; if we do know causal relations, there need be no controversy. Hume reversed the preceding interpretation, he maintained that causation is to be interpreted in the light of inference, not inference in the light of causation—a procedure which may be likened to the modern mathematician's interpretation of space on the basis of the character of mathematical equations. What Hume is therefore saying is that necessity is epistemological; this assertion might still be the basis for asserting its ontological status also; but Hume rules out the latter possibility so far as knowledge of nature goes, though his statements do frequently suggest that in nature there may be more ultimate connections to which our knowledge does not reach, in which case, however, they remain irrelevant to our inferences. Necessity is known only as a peculiarity of inference, not of things; it is a characteristic of the relation of the *knower* to a proposition because of the evidence for his accepting it. The world simply *is* so and so; there is no *must* present in it. What are observed are uniformities, and the building up of science consists in formulating wider uniformities by a process of generalization based on analogy. These observed uniformities play an important part in inference, constituting the premisses of the latter; they must not be confused with the idea of the uniformity of nature which is often said to be the principle of induction or of generalization. Hume denies this claim on behalf of the principle, for, far from providing a basis of inductive inference, it simply expresses what the mind or imagination is doing; it is a statement

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about the nature of generalization, not a statement about the universe that justifies generalization. The essential nature of the imagination is to generalize. Even in the formulation of causal laws generalization is involved, for when a causal relation has been found to exist between a specific a and b , it is concluded that it holds between any a and any b at any time at any place. The maxim "same causes, same effects" is not one that justifies generalization but one stating again the nature of generalization.

Such a view, it has been objected, fails to guarantee certainty. This objection assumes, contrary to the history of science, that scientific generalizations do possess certainty, and it also assumes that when a causal relation is asserted to hold between a and b that assertion is certain. It is no objection to Hume that he does not assign to science a character that it may not, or even does not, possess or that no scientist would now claim for it. Many regular sequences, even that of day and night at one time, have been taken to be causal relations; but Hume's theory is quite capable of dealing with such erroneous beliefs, for the discovery of causes is an experimental adventure and the erroneous belief is corrected—and can be corrected only—by additional data or evidence. On the basis of experience rules can be built up to regulate investigation, and Hume's formulation of rules in the *Treatise* for this purpose is apt to be overlooked. A more serious objection—still however assuming certainty, indeed an absolute certainty, in scientific propositions—is that regular sequence and Hume's theory of inference fail to account for inferability, deducibility, implication, for which something more than regular sequence is required. If, however, as the critic admits, this something more is not known, then it must be declared irrelevant to inference and what is required for inference. If regular sequence does not account for inferability, as it occurs in science, it is permissible to suggest that inferability does not rest at all on causation but on something else, namely on the possibility of treating the sequence quantitatively and thus of applying mathematics, thereby introducing into experimental science a certainty which is derived from and characterizes mathematics. A criticism that may be made against Hume is that, holding inductive inference to be the same wherever it occurs—the same in the case of the animal, the plain man, and the scientist, of the rudimentary science and the highly developed science—he sought the nature of causal inference in what was common to all these cases, and having to be content with the irreducible minimum thus found, failed to do justice to the distinctive features of the more developed sciences with their quantitative methods and reasoning based on quantity. On the other hand, the modern research scientist, on reflecting over his procedure, finds much of the philosophical

controversy about causation unintelligible or irrelevant, and demands no more than observed uniformities and some such notion as that of a pattern or scheme. It is true that the modern scientist may think of causality and determinism in relation to inference; yet a consideration of the instance of electrons (or contemporary ultimate entities) where *both* velocity *and* position seem unknowable at the same time and which troubles the scientist because in consequence he cannot predict the position and velocity at a later moment, shows that the clue to causation or determinism in nature lies in the character of inference and also that such inference involves only factors such as position and velocity, there being no factor in addition expressible as causation. From this it follows that the theory of causation should start from the necessity characteristic of inference, a necessity which is epistemological; and what should be kept in mind is whether this necessity can be accounted for only by supposing causality in nature or simply by the data, especially in their quantitative aspect, which are present to the mind of the reasoner.

Hume in his theory of causation is making use of the same criterion as he uses in his discussion of mathematics and for the same reason, namely, not merely to define a cause but also to define it in such a way as to provide evidence for its scientific applicability to nature. Connected with this criterion is Hume's much criticized maxim that whatever is distinguishable is separable. This is not an assertion of atomism, epistemological or otherwise, for that interpretation confuses *separable* and *separate*. Its significance is not positive but negative and is to be understood in relation to the idea of *evidence*: its function is to guard against assuming or asserting relations between objects when none is observed or when relevant evidence is lacking. Hume's formulation of the criterion itself to the effect that every idea is a copy of an impression or sense-datum is not defensible and in the course of his discussion he shows some recognition of its inadequacy. The idea of causation with which he is so much concerned is one which cannot be said to be a copy of an impression; nor is his distinction between simple and complex impressions and between simple and complex ideas free of difficulty. The complex idea of causation cannot on his own theory be a copy of a complex impression. Many scientific ideas, like that of an electron, could not be said to be merely copies of an impression, for it is doubtful if an electron is observed. The idea of an electron is no doubt based upon something observed but there enter into it constituents derived by analogy with simpler observed entities. Nevertheless, Hume is right if, allowance being made for his speaking in the language of the eighteenth century, he intends to stress the principle of observability, taken to imply that an idea must rest

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on something observed, that in having impressions we are in touch with *existence*, and that the belief or conviction which attaches to ideas is something ultimately traceable to impressions. Ideas, if they claim to refer to existence or to the actual universe must be verifiable, as contemporary Logical Positivism insists; but the verifiability is not always a simple matter of finding an impression of which it is a copy: it is often a matter that involves the need of tracing the processes—deductions and analogies—by which the idea has come to be formulated on the basis of a datum that may be very unlike the idea. Since Hume lays stress upon language, the issue may be modernized by substituting the term *meaning* for the term *idea*. A word has a meaning; and a statement, involving several words, may have a meaning, or it may have none, even though each component word may have one. *Prima facie*, there is a distinction between *meaning* and *validity*: in fact an apprehension of meaning is a pre-condition of establishing the validity of a statement. Consequently to show that a word, like *dragon*, has a meaning because that meaning can be reduced to observed factors such as a certain shape, size, tongue, fire-breathing, is apparently not equivalent to showing the validity of that meaning, validity signifying here applicability to existence in nature. This lack of equivalence may easily be overlooked; yet it is the source of a special difficulty. Hume meets it in his theory by treating the questions of the meaning of a word (that is, an idea), the validity of that meaning (or idea), the derivation of the meaning (or origin of an idea) as interdependent questions or even as one question. It is a misunderstanding of his problem and of his argument to criticize him for ignoring the question of validity or of confusing it with the question of origin.¹ His answer is that the meaning of cause, the validity of this meaning, the origin of this meaning, and the discovery of causes are all linked together: an answer which illumines the “paradoxical” procedure of his argument. Causation has to be defined in the light of the process of discovering causes, and the definition of causation indicates the process whereby causes are to be sought. He thereby not merely gives a meaning to causation but provides a theory regarding the verifiability of that meaning and thus of its validity.

The causal relation, according to Hume, is the basis of all knowledge of matters of fact. Yet there is one matter of fact—or presumed to be so—namely the existence of external bodies (and of a self), for a knowledge of which that relation seems to fail; and either such existence is not a *matter of fact* or else the causal relation is not the sole foundation of such knowledge. Hume’s discussion is

¹ Kant is concerned with validity and links this question with that of origin. But he never discusses the *meaning* of causation.

difficult to follow, its drift is not easy to grasp, and the general interpretation has been that he argues for a sceptical conclusion, namely that existence of bodies is not a matter of fact—at any rate not known to be so—and that his theory of causation, plus his criterion, leads him to it, thereby the inadequacy of both being revealed. In the course of his argument he distinguishes between the *vulgar* view and the philosophic view, the latter insisting upon a difference between datum and object unrecognized by the former. The vulgar belief obviously cannot therefore rest on a causal inference from the datum to the object; nor, Hume contends, is the principle of causation applicable to a case where object and datum are in question, for that principle holds only between perceptions.¹ Yet the belief is entertained and an account of it must be given. In attempting this he lays stress upon *constancy* and *coherency* as characteristics of impressions, combined with the working of the imagination which transforms resemblance of impressions into sameness or identity, which thus creates a belief in a constant and continuing impression, and which, in accordance with its nature noticed elsewhere by Hume, overcomes the difficulty due to interruptions in impressions by generalizing the observed continuity into a complete continuity. In this way the supposition of a continued and independent existent is reached, and the supposition enables experience to be rendered coherent. Apart from the rôle played by coherence and constancy, which may be better understood by reference to a much more elaborate treatment of the problem in a recent work² and which raise questions about what and how much is to be considered as *given*, Hume himself decides that such an account does not provide a sufficient defence of the belief; for, in the first place, it shows that the idea of a *continued* existent, from which that of an *independent* existent follows, rests on a confusion of resemblance with sameness; and, in the second place, the operation of the imagination points as in the case of mathematical ideas to the notion of an external and continued existent being only the notion of an imaginary ideal and does not guarantee that there are such existents or that a world of external bodies exists. Philosophy, on the other hand, shows that impressions are not independent nor continuant, a conclusion which so impresses it that it proceeds to insist upon a distinction between sense-datum and object, on the basis of which it attempts to establish by a causal argument, illegitimate in Hume's view, the existence of a world of bodies. It is, he considers, inevitably doomed to scepticism.

His treatment of the idea of a self follows generally parallel

¹ Professor G. E. Moore in *Philosophical Essays* considers Hume's contention weak; it seems valid within the framework of Hume's doctrine.

² H. H. Price, *Perception*.

lines and ends with a similar conclusion. The result of the argument is that the idea of an independent, continuous material universe and the idea of a self cannot be theoretically defended. Whether Hume's theory ends in scepticism, as is generally held, depends however on the interpretation of what Hume is doing. The issue, as he states it, is how we can claim to know there are bodies on the basis of sense-data, to which in view of his criterion they must be reducible. His treatment of this issue rests on the assumptions that data are *internal* and *occurrent* (or fleeting) and hence distinct from each other. The latter assumption is supported, other evidence being lacking, by the *prima facie* character of data; and though it gives rise to special difficulties for a theory, it is not without justification. It is otherwise with the former assumption. If data, as data, do not give externality and independence, as Hume admits, neither do they give internality and dependence. The distinction, in fact, is a philosophical one and presupposes a known distinction between mind and body; the latter distinction must therefore have been effected on some basis other than the former. Hume recognizes this when in the *Treatise* he maintains that the philosophical theory rests upon and has no more validity than the vulgar view possesses. Philosophy in undermining the common-sense view is actually undermining its own foundations. In the *Enquiry* he states even more emphatically that the philosophical view, making use of the idea of causation, can by no possible argument be justified. But if this is so, the only supposed evidence for the internality of sense-data disappears. Hume himself sees clearly here as well as in his examination of modern philosophy in the *Treatise* that this philosophical theory of sense-data leads to scepticism; and Reid's discovery about the tendency of the "ideal theory" was not a novel one. Hume in consequence ought not to have accepted the internality of sense-data in his account of the vulgar view. The posing of his problem would then have had to be altered. He would have had to show that data had characteristics which provided a basis for grouping them into mind or minds on the one hand and into bodies on the other. His apparently sceptical conclusion is thus due to his becoming confused in his presuppositions because of his permitting a philosophical doctrine to enter into them and proves neither a sceptical intention nor the final inadequacy of his type of method. He is simply unfaithful *both* to his criterion *and* his view of causation, as well as to his declaration in the *Treatise* and in the *Enquiry* that the ultimate cause of impressions is inexplicable by reason.

It is possible, however, to find in Hume something more constructive, hinted at in his enumeration of three views—the vulgar, the philosophical, and the true, the last being one which will approximate to the first. Hence presumably something of the account

given of the vulgar view will remain in a true philosophy. In spite of a supposed scepticism, he is accordingly found saying that the *self* is a causal system of perceptions; and this assertion can be applied equally to bodies. Such a declaration is consistent with both his criterion and his view of causation. What he attacks deliberately is the *theory* that the self is a simple, indivisible, unchangeable entity or substance in which qualities inhere; the effort to know the self never reveals or discovers any such self but only a system of perceptions. A parallel view can be taken of bodies and is supported by many of his statements. Such an interpretation finds further confirmation in the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* where Cleanthes maintains a view of this kind against Demea and particularly against Philo the sceptic, whose arguments presuppose traditional ideas. No rigid demarcation can be effected between different systems, even between that system which comes to be labelled a self or mind and those systems labelled bodies, or collectively matter. Nevertheless, perceptions can be roughly delimited into systems. Bodies cannot, any more than the self, be known otherwise than as fundamentally temporal in character; they are never known as fixed, permanent existents. Permanence belongs to them only because and in so far as they are systems. Strictly therefore there is no metaphysical issue distinct from and additional to the issue pursued by mathematics and physics, the latter being both an acquisition of a knowledge of bodies and the method whereby the existence of bodies is established and the meaning of the term defined.

The necessary restriction of the present discussion to Hume's theory of knowledge does not imply that it is more important than his ethical and political theories, though this relative estimate has generally been expressed, largely by the neglect of the latter. Historically his ethical and political views have considerable significance in regard to the nature and foundation of ideas and institutions and an increasing amount of present-day theory is reasserting much that was already set forth by Hume. It is true that his theory of knowledge is general in character and for that reason it is more fundamental than the more specific studies of morals and politics and determines Hume's treatment of the latter; but for the same reason they contribute to an understanding of his theory of knowledge.

On a review of Hume's work it is necessary to acknowledge not merely his acute, penetrating, and challenging destructive analysis, in which if he is not wholly original he is certainly a master and which exposed certain fundamental issues involved in human knowledge, but also his pioneer spirit in elucidating scientific ideas and defining scientific terms so as to be applicable to the task of

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scientific investigation and thereby at the same time clarifying the nature and foundations of human knowledge. Not merely Kant with his idealism and Reid with his realism but also pragmatism and contemporary logical positivism—not an insignificant progeny—find in Hume a progenitor.

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PROFESSOR T. M. KNOX

THE great philosophers have generally held that there was some kind of interdependence between philosophy and practice. An unexamined life, they have maintained, is not worth living; and if there is to be anything to examine, life must first be lived, i.e. a practical experience is a propaedeutic to philosophy. But although Plato, for instance, thought that the task of government could be well performed only by the philosopher, he does not seem to have thought that fifteen years' practical experience had any beneficial influence on the philosopher's subsequent work of philosophic contemplation. Aristotle explicitly prefers the theoretical to the practical life, and the resultant divorce of theory and practice leads to quietism and so to ethical scepticism.

In such a scepticism much contemporary moral philosophy languishes, and it is perhaps worth while to call attention once more to the benefits that accrue to both philosophy and practice from their close and vital association. Practical life, devoid of the guidance of philosophic principle, falls into confusion and ineffectiveness; philosophy, abstracting itself from what men do, can issue only in failure to discover any principles to guide human conduct. Such a sceptical issue in philosophy is generally a sign of life and advance, because the price of the discovery of new truth is the doubting of what has been taken as true hitherto. But that doubt ceases to have much claim on consideration when it culminates, as it does in some contemporary writers, with the substitution, for the modest "I cannot understand," of the dogmatic "there is and can be nothing there to understand." If, however, we are to escape from a sceptical outcome of ethical inquiry, and find principles which may be of service in a troubled and conflicting world, we must learn from the market-place as well as from the cloister, and draw our material from the rough and tumble of everyday life as well as from the more rarefied regions of philosophic speculation. To limit itself to the pure air of those regions is the characteristic defect of much contemporary moral philosophy; for, although the problems of ethics arise only out of men's actions, contemporary ethics concentrates its main attention not on action, but on the analysis of

¹ This essay is the substance of an Inaugural Lecture delivered on December 1, 1936, from the Chair of Moral Philosophy in the United College of St. Salvator and St. Leonard, St. Andrews.

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certain concepts, notably those of right, good, and value, and holds that the understanding of moral conduct is subsequent to and dependent upon knowledge of the nature of those concepts. Thus, knowing and not doing becomes central in ethics, and the inquiry is directed along the path which leads ultimately but surely to scepticism by way of such paradoxes as "We never have any reason to suppose that an action is our duty,"¹ or "A man can be morally good although he does wrong acts."²

To turn ethics into an analysis of concepts, however, is an error of method, for it means using the method of mathematics, a method whose success is dependent on its being applied to a subject-matter that is either abstract or hypothetical. It is no less an error of method to attempt to construct a *science* of human behaviour,³ for to employ in the study of action a method found useful in the study of nature is to ignore the difference between an occurrence in nature and a human act; the one is simply observed, the other must be understood from within, in the sense that we can look inside the mind of the agent and discern the processes of thought which led him to act as he did. The movements of the stars are events which we can observe, but all the understanding which we can have of them is to know the laws in accordance with which they take place. But, if we thought that, by this merely external observation, we could come to an understanding of human action, a biography would content us if it were a mere recital of the dates and events in its subject's life. The very existence of biography as a study of character, and of history as the understanding of the past, is testimony enough to our conviction that there is something about human action which differentiates it from everything else in the universe, namely the fact that men know what they are doing, as the stars do not, and have reasons for what they do, as jelly-fish have not. There is as close a connection between the self-conscious personality and his acts as there is between his thoughts and the words in which he expresses them; of that fact the student of ethics must never lose sight, and if he is to see it aright, his eyes must be those not of the mathematician or the empirical scientist, but of the historian.

The historian—and the moral philosopher—mean by *action* not simply what is sometimes called behaviour, i.e. the event which can be observed *ab extra*, nor simply the intentions or motives or thoughts which lie behind or lead to the behaviour, or the event, or the thing done; they mean both of these together, for they are the subjective and objective sides of the same thing, just as unin-

¹ Moore: *Principia Ethica*, p. 149.

² See e.g. Ross: *The Right and the Good*, pp. 155-156.

³ See Collingwood: *Human Nature and Human History*, in the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. xxii, and Fite: *The Living Mind*, esp. pp. 24-55.

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telligible in isolation from each other, as the concavity and the convexity of a curve. It will follow from this view of action—the view implied by the very existence of history—that the most elementary truth about a man's actions is that they are done consciously and so are deliberately chosen. To see that this view is true we need only reflect that we make a distinction in the events of our lives between what happens to us and what we do, and that the ground of this distinction is choice. The precondition of choice, however, is self-consciousness; for to choose means to be conscious of ourselves as choosing, and to be conscious of alternatives between which our choice may be made. And this consciousness must be reflective, that is, it must involve memory and imagination. It must involve memory, for just as we could not be conscious of present happiness except by contrast with unhappiness experienced in the past and now remembered, so we are conscious of ourselves only by contrast with an experience of the world and of our own past. It must involve imagination, since alternative courses of action to meet a given situation do not yet exist and must therefore be imagined if they are to be apprehended at all.

It follows that to study choice is the same thing as to study action, for just as action is the unity of a subjective process of thought and an objective event, so choice is a fusion of the subjective with the objective, a reflective process of choosing with an act chosen. It is important to notice, however, that since choice is a unity, its two sides, the choosing and the thing chosen, do not succeed one another either temporally or logically; in the choice both sides are simultaneously actualized, just as are concavity and convexity when we draw a curve. It is therefore not open to us to say that the value of one side, either the choosing or the thing chosen, is dependent on the character of the other, for that would be to give priority to one as against the other. Now, some moralists maintain that what is good is good only because we choose it; while others say that our choices acquire merit only if we choose what is inherently good. Both of these views isolate the choosing from the thing chosen, and judge the one by reference to the other; and against both of them I am arguing that no such isolation of one side of choice from the other is possible, for neither side exists prior to the other, and that the two sides must be judged either correlatively or as a single whole.

When it is said that it is my choice which endows its object with goodness, what is meant is that goodness is simply subjective; but if goodness is subjective preference and nothing more, then that preference must be based on feeling, which is private and individual, and not on reason which is objective and universal. But to suppose that all our action is based only on feeling or intuition, and not on

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thought, is absurd. For, if it were, we could never be in any doubt about what we wanted, since to doubt is to think, whereas it is because such a doubt really exists that we are offered a hard choice when we are told to do as we please. To tell a man what to do simplifies his life by exempting him from the trouble of making up his mind what he wants. When we find ourselves in a quandary with no preference for walking on the cliffs or on the sands, and we wish to take a walk, we toss a coin in order to have *some* reason for doing one thing and not another. Nor need this surprise us, for we have seen already that to choose means to choose reflectively and so thoughtfully and with reasons for our choice. It is only by leaving these reasons out of account that the subjectivist is able to deny all objectivity to goodness; but to leave them out of account is like trying to write a history of the Reformation without reference to Luther.

The objectivist, on the other hand, admits that I have reasons for my choices but insists that these are grounded in the object chosen, and he thus ascribes to the object the priority which the subjectivist ascribes to the choosing. But in so doing he ignores the element of creativity in action and presupposes that, when we choose, we select one alternative from amongst many that are somehow presented to us from without, already endowed with a characteristic rightness or wrongness in themselves. It is true that there is a certain superficial plausibility in the view that some of our choices are of this nature; for instance, it may seem to be the case, when a clerk in a Government department, minuting a document, is invited to indicate a preference for one of two courses of action, that one of them shall be inherently preferable to the other, and that his preference will be right or wrong in so far as it accords or not with the objective character of the alternative chosen. The same may seem to be true when a friend asks us which of two posts offered to him we would advise him to accept. It is instances like these, where a clear-cut issue is put before us for our decision, which objectivists in ethics usually select to justify their point of view. But to take examples of this type alone betokens too restricted an experience of practical life. For in many cases, and these are crucial in any attempt to understand action, the alternatives are not clearly defined at all until the choice is made. The objectivist leaves out of account the creative process of thought by which we gradually make up our minds what we want or feel our way to a decision, for it is during this process that the very alternatives, from amongst which we choose, actually come into being.

To minute documents put before one, or to answer questions clearly framed, calls for no exercise of initiative. On the other hand, progress in administration whether in a business or a University depends not merely on dealing with queries put on an agenda paper

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by someone else, but on striking out new and untried paths. It is the idea which no one yet possesses that makes money for an industrial concern or advances learning in a University. Similarly, the building up of a vigorous personality is dependent on the exercise of the initiative which makes a man impatient of being a mere cog in a machine; and to achieve anything in philosophy or in any other study means not simply choosing between alternative theories propounded by other scholars, but giving a new thrust to the discussion or embarking research on a fresh and unfamiliar programme. The characteristic excellence of the managing director of an industry as distinct from that of his second in command, is just this capacity to initiate something and to keep his business alive and progressive by moulding its activities afresh in the light of some original and productive idea. To suppose that thought is simply the perception of objectively existing truth or that action is choice between fixed alternatives is to ignore the creative element always present in them both but most clearly visible when they both rise to their highest in initiative. On initiative, on vigorous, forward-looking, creative action depend an individual's strength of character and the progress of man and his institutions. But the peculiar difficulty of initiating anything new in either thought or action is precisely that of having no ready-made alternative courses of action between which to choose. Initiative is first the visualization and then the gradual definition of alternative lines of advance. As a man of initiative gradually makes up his mind in which direction next to shape his own life or to guide the advance of the institution under his care, as he devises one possible solution after another for the immediate practical problem which his forward-looking activity presents to him, alternative possibilities for action become clear to him in a more and more crystallized form; but they may never be quite clear to him until the moment when his final decision is made; that decision is the moment of choice and in it are simultaneously actualized the choosing, the thing chosen, and the things rejected. The eventual choice may actualize not any one of the possibilities previously framed and entertained, but rather some combination of them, and it is only upon the result achieved, upon both sides of the decision taken together, that a moral judgment may be passed. To endow with an objective rightness or wrongness the inchoate possibilities, whose very definition takes place only during the process of feeling one's way to a decision, is as superstitious as to suppose that there is a place where all the old moons are kept.

Therefore, when a man initiates a new course of action his reason for choosing one way and not another is not his apprehension of an objective character of goodness inhering in the object of his choice. But it does not follow from this that initiative can be exercised for

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no reason at all. We have already seen that a man's actions are unintelligible apart from his thoughts and that it is the error of subjectivism to ascribe what men do merely to the operation of irrational impulse, and so to reduce all history and biography to myth or fairy tale. It is true that our decisions sometimes seem to be intuitive and to spring from a flash of insight and not from reasoned calculation; but when we are asked to choose between fixed alternatives, we must remember that they have become fixed only as a result of someone's vision and the process of initiative which has just been described, and similarly, when a decision seems to have been taken immediately without any process of thought, we must not lose sight of the fact that it has actually been mediated through a whole character and the past experience which has made that character what it is. When we get to the top of a hill the view bursts upon us instantaneously; but in order to enjoy that vision, we first had to put ourselves in a position from which it could be seen. In a quick decision, however unconscious of the fact we may be at the time of making it, our whole personality is implicit, a fact presupposed by biography as an attempt to understand, and to see as a pattern, the character of an individual and the events of his life.

The study of initiative thus reinforces and amplifies the conclusions to which we came earlier about the nature of action and its implications, namely (i) Action as choice is dependent on the reflective self-consciousness of the agent, and this means that he has reasons for what he chooses, though these may be present to his mind in varying degrees of clarity at the time of acting; (ii) those reasons are not grounded in the nature of the object chosen, since action is bringing into existence what does not exist already, and so it cannot be *subsequent* to the apprehension of objective characteristics already pre-existing in what it *creates*; and (iii) consequently, the value of what we choose is the correlative of the value of our choosing, neither prior to it as its reason, nor subsequent to it as its product.

This third point now requires further elucidation. To choose is to value one thing higher than another, or to think one thing *better* than another, and it follows, therefore, that as we reflect on our choices we can see implicit within them a standard of value or a conception of goodness. The things that we have chosen are those that we call good. But we have seen already that if one side of choice is judged, either the choosing or the thing chosen, the same or a correlative judgment must be passed on the other side. If, then, the things that we choose are those that we call good, the process of thought by which we come to choose them we must also call good. If we wish to reserve the description "good" for the agent himself, we may, if we please, attribute excellence to his thinking by calling it "reasonable" and to his course of action by calling it "right," for these

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are *correlative* terms; but it will not be open to us to describe a man and the things that he does or the thoughts that he thinks in *opposite* ways; that is, we may not describe a man as good and his acts as wrong, for that will be like calling a coin a penny on one side and a half-crown on the other. If we criticize what a man *does*, we must pass a similar criticism on what he *is* or *thinks*—but before criticizing we must take account of the fact, just stated, that goodness is implicit in choice as such, and that consequently every individual and what he chooses at whatever time are in some sense good.

This view will seem distorted to those who are quick to pass adverse moral judgments on what people have done without first taking into account how they came to do what they did. Such judgments of acts in isolation from intentions are made, however, by those whom we stigmatize as "censorious," and they are made despite the fact that without taking a man's motives into account we cannot ascertain what it is that a man has done; if this were not so, a jury would never be faced with deciding whether a man's crime was manslaughter or murder, and we could not account for the fact, familiar to the historian, that the history of the events in a man's life cannot precede a judgment of his character, but can be ascertained only *pari passu* with the gradual formation of that judgment. To condemn people out of hand because they have done wrong in this or that way is often indicative of moral fervour which is not undeserving of respect, but which, in its impatience to judge, ignores the fact that if a man is worth judging even adversely, there is something of goodness in him; if he is accused of committing moral evil, the very accusation implies that he is *good*, in that he is at least a moral agent. Similarly, the theory that is worth refuting must at least be a theory, an attempt at truth, and more than an attempt, because, being thought by someone, it is an attainment of truth to some extent and in some degree. Evil is not unreal, nor is it an illusion; but its reality consists in the fact that it is an attainment of good, so far as it is chosen, though of too little good. We do not trouble to argue with an imbecile who is under the delusion that he is the Emperor of China; we do not condemn the slate which falls from a roof and kills a man, still less do we try to reform it; an argument can appeal only to the rationality within a man; moral suasion can appeal only to a moral agent by reference to whom alone have moral judgments any meaning. The drunkard, choosing to get drunk once more, is choosing good, since temporary relief from misery is all the good he knows. But to that extent he does know good and is good, or it would be absurd to say to him "be a man," or to tell him that his act is wrong, or to attempt to reform him. "There dwells a soul of goodness in things evil," if we will but refrain from hastily condemning them and try instead to understand them. All men

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seek after the good¹; God is not mocked; but some men are so blinded by unreason that the good is hidden from them under the disguise of some temporary gratification or the pursuit of some selfish advantage.

This does not preclude us from calling a man bad, but so to judge him means that we reject not only his way of life as wrong, but also his thoughts or motives as blind or unreasonable; at the same time, however, if we look at him from his own point of view as his biographer does, we shall have to admit that his badness is due to his deliberate choice, and that therefore in his own eyes what he chooses is good, just as his choosing is reasonable. To admit that his choice is reasonable from his point of view, and yet to assert that it is unreasonable from the point of view of an outsider sounds paradoxical, for we expect that what is reasonable shall commend itself as such to all intelligences. The paradox is removed if we reflect that, just as there is some goodness in every action, though too little in the actions which for that reason we call evil, so there is reasonableness in every man's thoughts, though too little in those that we call unreasonable. For however poor a man's reasons for acting may be, they are still reasons, and it is their presence which differentiates the action in which they are present from an animal movement or an event in nature. What we call evil is the attainment of good, though too little good, or too low a degree of good.² What we call unreasonable is the attainment of rationality, though too little rationality or too low a degree of rationality. This implies a doctrine of degrees of goodness and degrees of rationality, and the very mention of *degrees* in rationality should prevent us from confusing the rationality which we have been finding in man's actions with *raisonnement* or ratiocination or discursive thought.³ To say that the bad man is unreasonable does not mean that he is illogical, so much at any rate we should have learnt from Aristotle's *Ethics*. To judge whether a man's reasons for acting are good or no we must test them with the yardstick of history, not with that of formal logic or of mathematical reasoning. The formal logic of the Pharisees could see no reasonableness in the plea that to pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath day was reasonable because the Sabbath was made for man. What is reasonable action at one time or place for one individual may not seem to be reasonable for another person at another time or place, and the question whether a given course of action is reasonable must be addressed to *someone*. He may answer that it is reasonable *to some*

¹ In the sense implied by Aristotle: *E.N.* vii, 13, 6.

² In this section on the nature of evil, I am greatly indebted to Collingwood: *Essay on Philosophical Method*, esp. pp. 82-84.

³ On the difference between reason and ratiocination, see e.g. De Burgh in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1936-7, p. 8.

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extent, thus adopting the view that rationality in human affairs admits of degrees; but what extent of rationality he allows to it will depend on his conception of rational action as such. That is to say, to admit that the bad man's act is good to some extent, and his thinking reasonable to some extent, means acknowledging some ideal or standard of goodness or rationality (i.e. of rational action) by reference to which the bad man's degree of achievement can be measured. Such a standard or ideal or norm is implicit in all our thinking and all our choosing. To be conscious of ourselves as thinking is to be conscious of the distinction between truth and falsehood, to aim at the one and to shun the other. To be conscious of ourselves as agents is to be conscious of the distinction between good and evil, to seek one and avoid the other. It is the standard of truth which guides our thinking and the standard of good which guides our choosing. But these standards are not external to man; if they were, we would first have to know their nature before we could either think or act; it is absurd, however, to make knowledge a precondition of thinking, and we have seen that to make knowledge a precondition of acting is to make action unintelligible. As a man looks back over his past thoughts and actions, he can perceive the standards of truth and goodness that are implicit in them, and so his conception at any time of what truth and goodness are, is dependent on what he has thought and what he has chosen. It is as true of the voluptuary as it is of the saint that what he takes to be good is dependent on his own achievement and his own character; what he seeks is dependent, that is to say, on what he is, or, as Pascal puts it, we seek God only because we have already found Him.

To think at all implies the presence within thinking of a standard of truth, to choose at all implies the presence within choice of a standard of goodness; but our conception of what these standards are varies as we look back and reflect upon past thoughts and past choices. We condemn our past choice as bad. Our reason spurns it as unreasonable. We have learnt better in the meantime. Yesterday's good fails to satisfy us to-day and is rejected as evil. This happens constantly in our experience, because the world is constantly changing. It changes because life is action, and action, as we have seen, is creative, is the initiation of new states of affairs; and this creative initiative is an aspect of thought as well as of action, for we have seen throughout that action and thought are inseparable. Thought is not always the perception of necessary connections in a real world already existent whether we think it or not; just as action is bringing into existence good that does not exist already, so thought at its best is calling new truth into existence.

What is the spur to this creative process? There can be but one answer, namely the clash between the ideal implicit within man's

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nature as thinker and agent, and his present actual achievement. What calls forth the exercise of initiative whether in thought or action is the perception of something lacking in our present situation. We see that what we have achieved in thought or action promises or implies more than it fulfils. As we reflect on our past choices we see implicit in them a standard of goodness or rationality which is not made fully explicit in anything that we have yet chosen or in the character which we have so far formed. In thinking, a man strives to express the ideal of truth present in him as a thinker; similarly he strives in his actions to translate into reality the ideal of goodness which is implicit as a standard in the choices that he makes. This effort never wholly fails, since goodness is to some extent present in every action—no man entirely denies his manhood or escapes altogether from rationality—but the effort never wholly succeeds, for no one action is adequate to express the whole of the ideal, and perhaps it is because of this inevitable failure that a doctrine of the goodness of man's nature is not contradicted by the doctrine of his original sin. The consciousness of this failure of any single act to express the ideal is the spur to further action. If it were a complete failure it would not be a spur but a deterrent; if it were not a partial failure, there would be no need to act again.

Progress in thought or action is thus dependent on dissatisfaction with the present. This dissatisfaction is the result of reflection on past choices, and the discovery of the ideal implicit in them. Our conception of the ideal, we have seen, is relative to our present achievement—a voluptuary and a saint conceive it differently. To some the ideal presents itself as pleasure, to others as utility; but it is at the bar of reason that these varying conceptions are judged, and rationality is thus the final court of appeal for actions as well as thoughts. Nor need this surprise us since we have seen that to condemn a man's course of action as bad imposes on us the duty of showing that the thought that led to it was unreasonable. It is rationality which must decide on what occasions the choice of pleasure or utility can be justified, and the good life is the one which is conscious of making its choices in the light of reason. Hence "be reasonable" is a moral imperative; and "be a man" is the same imperative re-worded, since, as we have seen, reason is the nature of man, and it is the reasonableness of men's actions which differentiates them from everything else in the universe. To accept such imperatives as moral, however, is to examine our lives and those of others in the light of reason, and to do this will save our moral judgments from subjectivity. For we shall claim reasonableness for them and so be prepared to submit them to reasoned criticism. In this way we shall agree with the objectivist that there is something objective or universal about morality, but, by insisting that,

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when reasons are advanced in favour of anyone's course of action, it is we ourselves who are to be judges of their cogency, we shall do justice to the claims of the subjectivist also.

This study of action and what it implies may be summed up as follows: To act is to choose reflectively; to reflect is to have reasons for acting; to have a reason for acting is to aim at achieving something by acting. We could have no such aim if we did not feel some dissatisfaction with our present condition. It is this dissatisfaction which compels us to exercise initiative and create some new state of affairs which will better express the ideal revealed to us as we reflect on our past choices. This ideal is nothing but the rational or self-conscious nature of man. The more creatively rational a man's aims are the nearer he approaches to the ideal implicit within himself, and the more understanding he gains of its character. The existence of such an ideal or standard of preference is thus revealed to us as we reflect on the nature of choice and study our own actions and those of others; it is revealed, that is to say, in the study of moral philosophy. A philosophical study cannot stop short, however, with the discovery of an ideal guiding our action; it must go on to criticize it and so to deny or affirm it; and, whether we deny or affirm, we shall be forced, the more reflectively we act, to frame our objectives and make out choices accordingly. Just as to discover a valid way of reasoning affects our actual thinking because we at once think in accordance with it, so the acceptance or rejection of an ideal of conduct similarly and necessarily affects our practice. Therefore, although the philosophical study of action, as a part of philosophy, aims at elucidation, not edification, it cannot elucidate without incidentally but directly influencing what we do, and it is for this reason that it was implied at the outset that ethics could give guidance in a conflicting world; for Aristotle was not so far wide of the mark as has sometimes been supposed when he said that the object of ethics was practical, to make men good, and so to make them happy.

REFLECTIONS ON PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*

THE REV. ALFRED E. GARVIE, M.A., D.D., D.Th.

IN his greatest work (*The Republic*) the greatest thinker of his era, if not of all time, Plato, writing in one of the greatest, if not even the greatest epoch in the intellectual, artistic, and literary history of mankind, held up a mirror not only to his own age but to every age, not least our own, in the glowing radiance of his unsurpassed genius. This essay is an attempt to look on the world around us with his searchlight. Addressing on this subject a select company of educated and intelligent men and women, I discovered that several of them had attempted but had failed to read through *The Republic*. They could not see the wood for the trees, lost their way, and gave up the quest. Re-reading the book this summer holiday (my first acquaintance with it was made nearly half a century ago), I could understand their difficulty, although I did not allow myself to share their defeat. I am not attempting the ambitious task of expounding the argument, or interpreting the philosophy, but keenly aware of, and alive to the world in which we live to-day, its difficulties and dangers, problems and challenges, I offer some reflections on Plato's writing which the renewed study in preparation for the address referred to has brought. I am emboldened to do so by the plea of the President of the Institute that philosophical principles should be shown in practical application. It should have not only wings to soar in the rarefied air of abstract speculation, but feet to step firmly on the solid soil of concrete actuality. The word *philosophia* itself shows that its purpose is not the pursuit of truth for the sake of knowledge only, but also its capture for the guidance of life.

The writing of the book covered nearly twenty years of the philosopher's life, during which he had painful disappointments in his outer experience of the world around, but rewarding developments in the inner world of his own mind; the comparison of the later with the earlier books shows a movement from concern about politics to interest in philosophy; is it rash to suggest that the disciple of Socrates advances to become the original, independent master? The tone may become more despondent but the conviction grows more sure. Just as Isaiah of Jerusalem, disappointed in his hero, Uzziah the king, turned to God, and had the vision which made him a prophet (Chapter VI), so Plato turned from temporal facts to eternal truths and became a philosopher, whose thought detached itself more and more from the earth of imperfect images, and

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attached itself to the perfect ideas. As prophet Isaiah continued to influence the policy of his land; as philosopher Plato held aloof from politics. He was not what, according to the late Lord Rosebery, Oliver Cromwell was, "a practical mystic," with, as a Scottish trade sign ran, "home above, business below." This my understanding of Plato, which I trust is not mistaken, suggests two reflections in relation to our own age. It has been an age of danger, difficulty, and disappointment. The existing order of society is not "delivering the goods," prosperity at home and security abroad; and disillusionized by facts men are searching for the truths that can guide and guard life, a view of the world and a standard of life which will end the present distress. Personally I hold that Christianity in its modern interpretation and application can offer both; but this is not the place to justify this belief. I do not know any philosophy that will "foot the bill," this big cheque drawn on the bank of speculative thought. Communism on the one hand and fascism on the other offer solutions of the problem. The one advocating violent revolution, and the other violent defence of the *status quo*, "the god of the things that are." Both require dictatorships, whether of the proletariat or of the Führer or Duce. Both are irrational *myths* which it should be the task of philosophy by a searching scrutiny to expose in their unreason. But reason must not be critical only, it must be constructive also, as Plato sought to be. While I am convinced religion alone can afford the constraining motive, philosophy may supply the guiding plan. We must with Plato continue to believe that there is discoverable a world-view which is true, and a standard of life which is right unless man's history is a tale

Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury

Signifying nothing.

(*Macbeth*, Act V, Scene 5.)

For such a discovery of what the world means and life ought to be is a primary condition of the recovery of our age from its present sickness. Here I must content myself with the conviction, without any further attempt to prove *that* it can be done by showing *how*. Plato's philosophy does not seem to have had any influence on politics, and indeed one must candidly confess that it is impossible to see how his truth would work. He was the mystic, but not the practical mystic.

My second reflection, then, is that we must steer the bark of our *practical mysticism* between the Scylla of the *detrinaire* and the Charybdis of the *opportunist*. If we are to "hitch our wagon to a star" we must not be star-gazers only, or wagon-drivers only, for the star must be such that a wagon can be hitched to it, and the wagon such that it can be hitched to a star. Although the word *compromise* has a suspicious sound, yet in the application of principle

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to practice it is not merely a painful necessity to be deplored, but a condition of individual development or social progress which must be frankly accepted. From Plato's contrast of *ideas* and *images* we must advance to Aristotle concord of *form* and *matter*. His dualism of desires and intelligence must be transcended in the recognition of the unity of personality, or, to adapt his figure of speech, the steeds of desire and the charioteer of reason may be brought into accord. Modern psychology recognizes the possibility of *sublimation* as well as the actuality of *rationalization*. I must now qualify the concession I made in speaking of his truth. What does not work is not *true* at least for the time and the place. Abstractly true it may be concretely false; the application of the principle might in its failure bring into discredit the principle. Lest I should be drawn into a discussion of a side issue, I shall not here confess whether in my judgment pacifism is, or is not, an instance of this distinction. If I may be pardoned a personal reference, I have in my book *Can Christ Save Society?* drawn a distinction between the Christian Ideal and the Christian Conscience. The one sets the goal, the other marks the course to it; the one defines the ultimate purpose, the other prescribes the immediate duty; the one is interested in the strategy, the other is concerned about the tactics of the moral and religious campaign in human history. It will be admitted that to-day we have few philosophers who are practical politicians and still fewer politicians who are competent philosophers. If the combination were more frequent, Plato's idea of the philosopher as ruler would not seem so absurd, as to most people it seems to be; and wisdom would be justified by her works.

We must, however, recognize that under existing imperfect conditions, there must always be some measure of compromise between the ideal and the actual; the moralist will insist that there will be the maximum *practicable* application of the principle, the opportunist will be too readily content with the *minimum* imperative application, and the *doctrinaire* will insist on the maximum conceivable, whether practicable or not. If I may venture on an instance of the opportunist policy: the National Government professes its ardent devotion to the League of Nations and its principle of collective security, but to many prudent observers they seem to show a preference for the *minimum* rather than the *maximum* practicable application. The history of the past seems, however, to justify vision and courage even in politics. Is it not now generally recognized that the pro-Boers were right, that the grant of self-government in South Africa has been justified, that the delay in granting Home Rule to Ireland and the consequent continual repressions have sown seeds of hate of which the harvest is being still reaped, that the Treaty just signed with Egypt might have

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been concluded at an earlier date with mutual advantage? Wisdom after the event, however, is not heroic, and often proves costly. We still need the inspiration of Plato's idealism.

The opportunist may be quite honest in his intentions, and nevertheless he may be "rationalizing" his motives; he may lack the self-knowledge which would disclose to him that he was giving respectable reasons for disreputable courses. Plato's description of the deterioration in forms of government leads me to other reflections. The deterioration does not necessarily take place in such successive stages, as are described; timocracy, oligarchy (or plutocracy), democracy, despotism, need not follow one another, but may be tendencies and influences in a State which could not be simply described by any of these terms. There never has been, and there is never likely to be, a Government which could claim the proud title of an aristocracy in Plato's sense, although there have been, and may still more be, approaches to it. In many lands of Europe the lowest stage of despotism has been reached, and that has its ideology, which has its ardent advocates and passionate devotees. An attempt may be made to sketch this rationalization. The supreme value is the notion: unity, security, prosperity are essential to the realization of that value; democracy has failed to secure these; dictatorship promises to achieve them, for only thus can the unity, on which security and prosperity depend, be guaranteed; one race, one State, one party, one policy, one leader are essential to the fulfilment by the nation of its destiny; this is the idea which has captured the mind of Germany in so far as it is vocal. The State is, and must be, "totalitarian," in claiming authority (whether it exercises it in all spheres or not is a matter of expediency and not principle) in the total life, work, and so far as can be, even the thought of the people. In this country democracy has not so completely failed as to make this reaction to despotism an immediate danger, and all political parties are still professing their belief in and fidelity to it; but there are some ominous signs that attempts to make revolutionary changes by force would meet resistance by force. "The inevitableness of gradualness" must be recognized, if disaster is to be averted. Such caution does not, however, mean contentment, or acquiescence in things as they are. The motives which, according to Plato, lead to such deterioration are present and patent in our legislation and administration. There are ambitious politicians (timocrats) who are moved not by the unmixed motive of devotion to the common good, but covet honours and power; and their exclusion from office leads them to mischievous activities. The reader will not need any vivid imagination to present to himself several persons now conspicuous in public life. When an Honours List is published, when a Cabinet is being formed or reconstructed, when

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an election is being held, timocracy can be detected by the keen eye "naked and unashamed," or only with the fig-leaf. A man may covet honour or power, and may nevertheless use his elevation wisely and well; and thus timocracy is not the most sinister form of political deterioration. Much more dangerous and harmful is the influence of avarice, the greed for wealth, and in that greed many desires are blended, a craving for luxury and ostentation, an ambition for the honour or the power wealth can purchase. There are the idle rich, but they are less of a political danger than the busy rich—the masters of finance, industry, and commerce, whose trade or business or profession is their politics, who use the resources under their command to influence legislation and administration in their own private interests. "Protection" affords a golden opportunity for intrigue; a lower tariff on their "raw materials," a higher tariff on their "finished goods" not for the public benefit but for their private profit is their object in their interventions in politics. Opposition, open or disguised, to the passing or the carrying out of laws which afford safe and healthy conditions for labour, is regarded as legitimate, for "business is business." The gross misrepresentation of the aims and ways of the Labour Party are the foul weapons used in the warfare of the classes against the masses. I have not joined the Labour Party, but such motives and such methods demand condemnation as a danger to the State.

That Plato's unhappy experiences of popular government in Athens led him to place democracy lower than plutocracy or timocracy neither condemns nor commends his judgment. So far men have found that every form of government has its defects; but as anarchy would be still worse, we must ask ourselves which is likely to have fewest defects. "Government of the people for the people by the people" as a definition of democracy is an ideal, but has never been an actuality; and yet it is an ideal as none of the other forms of government is, and if we can educate our masters, morally as well as intellectually, it might even approach the ideal of an aristocracy. At least, in view of what the English people is, we need not abandon the hope of an education which would lead the masses to choose from among themselves or even the classes leaders, fit and worthy, and to follow their leading. But that democracy has failed in other lands, although it is the interest of dictators to exaggerate that failure, must be admitted. Partisanship has been the weakness and the undoing of democracy. Individual and class interests have been so asserted as to divide. The Labour Party, even if it is concerned with the welfare of the great majority of the nation, is a "class" party, and some of its adherents are unreasonable partisans. This division is being recognized as a hindrance to giving effect to what the greater part of the nation wants. It is not only intellectual defect, but also

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moral perversity which makes partisans; and it is only education in the widest sense, not of a class as Plato advocated, but of the people as a whole which can change democracy from a peril to a promise.

The restriction of the education to a class is one of the limitations in which Plato—great as he was, a heritage of all ages and not only a treasure for one—shows that even genius cannot transcend its contemporary environment altogether. His acceptance of war and of slavery must also be recognized as defects of his vision. Islam has included slavery in the social order, for which the Koran prescribes regulations. Christianity did not at first condemn the institution of slavery, but it proclaimed a conception of the relation of God to man, of the value of man, and of the obligations of man to man, which was implicitly its condemnation. Slavery, such as was at the economic basis of Greek society, has no present interest for us, except as an obligation to secure its suppression wherever it still survives. But we must confess that, apart from certain modifying influences, modern capitalism with the dominance of capital and the dependence of labour, has involved a wage-slavery the acquiescence in which may be censured as a defect in vision of what a society should be. Although Plato in his description of the formation of the community gives primary place to the supply by human labour of physical necessities, yet he assigns to toilers and traders an inferior position; and he seems to cherish the same prejudice against this class as a constituent in the community as he has against the desires as elements in human personality. His segregation of classes is not a rigid caste system, as he allows a promising child of the lowest class to pass to the higher, and to be educated for functions there. In modern communism it is the proletariat that is exalted and the *bourgeoisie* which is abused. A class warfare is to be waged with a view to a classless society. Apart from that extreme, political thought to-day is bound to appreciate the importance of economic activities, and cannot assign an inferior position to those who are so engaged. I have already referred to the political danger of the illegitimate influence of private economic interests in public policy; but that adequate consideration must be given to the regulation of these economic activities in the interests of the community is one of the most urgent of the tasks laid on the State. Man does not live by bread alone, but he must have bread to live. That much legislation and administration must be concerned with the bread question needs no detailed illustration: it is so patent to all. What Plato seems to have ignored, and what some political theories to-day are inclined not to recognize adequately, is that not the classes only, but the masses also, must not only be enabled to live, but also to live well, and to live well they must have more than bread. For the

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auxiliaries, and much more fully for the guardians Plato recognizes the need of education, the development of body and soul for their respective functions. In the earlier books individual education seems to be subordinated to social functions, but in the later books that subordination falls into the background, and what is contemplated is not only a citizen in time, but a denizen of eternity. What must be included in any social ideal whatever is not only the subjugation of nature to supply human necessities and the regulation of social relations, but also the development of human personality as having an intrinsic value, and not only in social relations. We have compulsory general education; but still the error lingers that this education may retain a class character, and may be determined by social position or prospects. The opposition to the raising of the school age to fifteen, the tardiness in reconstruction in accordance with the Hadow Report, the exemption allowed where beneficial employment can be offered as an excuse from continued attendance at school—all indicate that we have not yet got beyond Plato's limitation. *Civilization* in adequate provision for the material necessities and even comforts of the entire population, *culture* for the most appropriate development of human personality available for all according to capacity, and *community* or such effective regulation of social relations as will approach as nearly as possible to a harmonious unity, in which all will be for each and each for all—that seems to me the ideal which modern political philosophy must formulate in the spirit of Plato.

In his exposition Plato has a city with its necessary and dependent country around it in view, not a nation, still less an empire. But he does recognize a wider community among Greeks so far as to distinguish between them and "barbarians." He regards war among them as civil war; it is *στάσις* and not *πολέμος*, and the victors must not enslave the vanquished, burn their houses, nor waste their fields. This is a limitation which fact, sentiment, conviction must set aside. The racialism of the National Socialist Party in Germany is an anachronism, and so, under the impartial scrutiny of a rational and ethical philosophy, must appear all exclusive and intolerant nationalisms. Stoicism advanced beyond Plato in recognizing the spermiatic reason in all men, and Roman jurisprudence in its acceptance of a *jus gentium*. Philosophers have had visions of a universal peace and a solidarity of the human race. And the world danger to-day seems to offer the alternative: Do this, or perish! Any philosophy prostitutes itself when it offers itself as a rationalization of racialism or nationalism.

Plato assumes that auxiliaries and guardians so trained will be sufficient and efficient for the defence and the direction of the State; but in our more complex modern society, with its increasing differen-

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tiation of functions, there seems to be a need for a distinction of organs; and Rudolf Steiner has advocated a *threefold State*, an organ for each of its functions, economic, cultural, and political. It is certain that not every man in Parliament, and not even every member of the Cabinet (if any), has been by his education equipped for competent dealing with all the problems with which the State is to-day called to deal. But against a complete segregation of functions thus proposed two objections held. The interests and activities in the three spheres mentioned can be distinguished, but not separated. Oneness is necessary to man's wholeness. The defect of some economic specialists is that they have had before them the abstraction of the economic man, whose sole end of existence was to produce or to consume wealth, and other essentials of his personality have been neglected. That some vocational training may have a place in education as well as general culture needs to be acknowledged. All industry and commerce cannot be regulated by the State to the exclusion of individual enterprise, and the less the State seeks to control culture and leave it freedom the better. But integration must accompany differentiation if confusion and conflict are to be avoided. However desirable may be Advisory Councils, composed of specialists and experts, there must be a central authority to co-ordinate the different functions, and rulers must be, for reasons already shown, if possible, a combination of philosopher and man of affairs.

The growing despondency of Plato, his flight from temporal actuality to eternal ideal, shows pessimism and not optimism; deterioration seems man's doom rather than progress his destiny. Spengler has advanced the theory that Advance and Decline is the law for every civilization or culture. Niebuhr accepts the dualism of moral man and immoral society. Many voices are heard warning us that the next war will be the end of our civilization. Certainly an unqualified optimism is as unreasonable as an unmitigated pessimism. The world situation is full of danger, distress, and disappointment. But may not the wider vision of philosophy give renewed courage? Without committing ourselves to the Hegelian extravagance that the real is all and always the rational, that sin is the antithesis between the thesis of innocence and the synthesis of virtue, that mankind's fall is a fall upwards, reason as well as faith bid us hope that the age-long, world-wide toil and travail of mankind will not end in tragedy but that mankind's sacrifice will yet bring salvation. But only if men will eschew folly and follow wisdom, and may not philosophy as a world-view and standard of life make some contribution to the deliverance and the triumph?

PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND VALUE

W. D. LAMONT, M.A., D.PHIL.

THE first part of this article deals with two questions¹ raised by Professor Muirhead in his interesting review of the volume *What Can Philosophy Determine?*

In my answers I shall be presupposing certain views which Professor Muirhead probably does not accept; and this applies particularly to my answer to his second question. To explain what these views are I have written the second and third parts of the article.

Both the present replies and also the position I adopted in the symposium to which his questions refer, are influenced by the fact that, recently, I have been trying to clarify my own ideas about the function of philosophy and of moral philosophy particularly. It is possible that, owing to this preoccupation with a related subject, I approached the subject of the symposium in a somewhat confused state of mind; and that sometimes, when I was talking about the relation of philosophy to value, I was really thinking about the relation of moral philosophy to practical moral judgments of right and wrong.

Perhaps, therefore, the second and third parts of this article, dealing with philosophy and moral philosophy respectively, will not be considered out of place. The views I express are, of course, tentative; and I should be extremely interested to know how far others agree with or differ from them. If it were possible to reach conceptions of philosophy and ethics which would be generally accepted—a vain hope, perhaps!—that would provide one step at least towards answering the question, “Can philosophy determine what is ethically or socially valuable?”

I

(1) Professor Muirhead's first question refers to the view I held as to the nature of value judgments. I will not attempt any defence. I spoke as though a “valuation” were a state of mind or “attitude” which could be quite devoid of cognitive character and theoretical implication. Whatever may be the difference between “value judgments” and other types of judgment, I now see that a criticism of my paper by Mr. Stout is sound—the criticism that what I said about valuations cannot be true if (as I also maintained towards

¹ *Philosophy*, vol. xii, No. 45, p. 117.

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the end of my paper) theoretical opinions can influence and change valuations. Such influence can be exerted only in so far as valuations have a theoretical reference or implication.

The view I am now abandoning to its fate was given an important place in my argument, and I am not at all sure how much of the general argument falls with it. But I shall not go into that question now.

A more moderate position I adopted in Section III¹ of my paper seems reasonable. Any belief, statement, or judgment, it was said, may be considered in either of two ways—either as a *theoretical assertion* or as a *fact*. I should say, therefore, that however much valuations may have theoretical references, valuations may also be considered as facts to be explained; and the question whether philosophy is competent to determine what is ethically or socially valuable cannot be answered until we know what the primary function of philosophy is. Is philosophy primarily concerned with valuations as theoretical assertions, or is it primarily concerned with them as facts? That is to say, Is philosophy mainly interested in discovering what *is*—in general or in particular—good and right; or is it mainly interested in discovering how and why men judge that certain things are good and right? Quite clearly the main problem set for the symposium must remain obscure and indeterminate until we are agreed on the answers to the following questions: What is philosophy? How does it differ from science? What is the relation of philosophy to ethics or moral philosophy? What is the difference between a theoretical study and a practical art?

(2) Professor Muirhead's second question only confirms my suspicion that no advance is possible until we tackle some of these preliminary questions. He asks² whether the argument that "because philosophy is itself theoretical it can only deal with theory" does not rest on a play of words like the statement "the driver of fat oxen should be fat." Actually I do not hold that philosophy deals with theory because it is theoretical. Science is a theoretical inquiry; but I do not hold that it is concerned with theory in the sense in which philosophy is. The contents of scientific study are empirical facts, and the business of science is to formulate theories which will render those facts intelligible. On the other hand, the contents of philosophical study are the theories formulated by the sciences, together with the general beliefs, faiths, and speculations of humanity in general; and the business of philosophy is to bring those theories and beliefs into relation, and to see that fundamental inconsistencies in men's views of the universe are overcome.

I proceed now to develop this conception of the nature and function of philosophy.

¹ *What Can Philosophy Determine?* pp. 220–1.

² Page 117.

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II

The Nature of Philosophy. Professor Muirhead¹ suggests that the contemporary "desire to evacuate philosophy of much of its traditional contents" may be due to a spirit of defeatism. Personally, if I conceive the scope of philosophy to be more restricted than did the Idealists, I am inclined to attribute this, not to a spirit of defeatism, but to an optimistic belief in the co-operative character of the many activities in which the human mind engages. I believe that philosophy does help us to understand reality, but I do not think that this is a distinctive mark of "philosophy" as opposed to "history" and "science." Many Idealists speak as though they believe that, while philosophy is the search for "ultimate truth" and the apprehension of "Reality," science can discover only some kind of inferior "partial truth" about "appearances." Whether the difference between the view of Idealists and the view I present is very profound remains to be seen; but it seems to me that they do not—or, at any rate, did not in the past—take a sufficiently appreciative view of science, and that they are apt to make claims for philosophy which imply that it is a sort of lonely Elijah amongst the prophets of Baal. Elijah's extreme pessimism, said the Lord, was hardly warranted by the facts of the case.

I believe that the knowledge of reality is the aim of all intellectual activity, and that the various branches of research and inquiry co-operate in pursuit of this end. Philosophy, science, history, etc., each performs a certain function in this joint enterprise.

What is the function of philosophy? I think that the simplest way of answering this question is to look at the matter, in the first place, historically.

Originally, history, philosophy, and science were not distinguished from each other as they are at present. The further we go back in human history the more do we find them merging into each other. For primitive man, e.g., historical and scientific and philosophical explanation tended to be much the same thing. Questions about the "nature" and "essence" of things were not clearly distinguished from questions about "origin." "Explanation" was to a great extent made up of myth and fable—this constituting a great part of the philosophy of our ancient ancestors.

Again, if we take science as we know it to-day—or rather the collection of the sciences—and trace these back to their origins, we find that each science has developed out of what was originally part of the content of "philosophy."

I ought to say that the generalizations contained in the last two paragraphs are made without my having undertaken any very

¹ Page 116.

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exhaustive study of the subject. I think they are true, but leave the experts to decide.

If they *are* true, then they show that philosophy was, in the earliest ages, *the* search for ultimate truth, *the* study of Reality. This does not mean that history and science were doing something else. There was no history or science other than the embryonic history and science contained in philosophy itself. Philosophy was thus, originally, the search after knowledge or truth in its entirety.

As experience and knowledge expanded, however, it was found that, in the treatment of any group of related problems, a stage was reached when little further advance was possible until these problems were studied in relative isolation from others, and with a greater emphasis on research into relevant empirical facts. It is at this stage that science, as distinguished from philosophical thinking in general, emerges. Specialization begins and continually increases as civilization develops. Indeed, one important aspect of the history of philosophy itself is the history of the birth of successive sciences—mathematics, chemistry, physics, biology, and, quite recently, psychology and various social sciences. Nowadays we so naturally think of science and philosophy as two different things, working by different methods, that we are prone to forget that the distinction did not always exist.

Now, if all that I have said be true, one important inference to be drawn is that what might truly be said of philosophy in primitive and ancient times is no longer true at the present day. Philosophy *was* the search for ultimate truth; but now it is only one of the agencies working towards this end, having a special function in a co-operative enterprise. We can best see what philosophy to-day is by trying to make clear to ourselves the function it actually performs.

What function does it perform? In trying to answer this question, we must, I think, consider philosophy as it is practised by professional philosophers. No doubt there is a sense in which it is true that all men are philosophers. It is true that all men to some extent, and in a kind of unsystematic fashion, perform those mental operations which are characteristic of philosophizing. But it is also true that, in precisely the same sense, all men are scientists. We all, in an unsystematic way, use the methods of observation, inference, and experiment by which the scientist achieves his results. But if we are to draw any distinction between philosophy and science, then by philosophy and science we must understand the philosophy of philosophers and the science of scientists, strictly so-called; for, if we are to understand the essential difference between these two types of inquiry, we must take them as they are steadily pursued by those who make them their special business.

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Now the first point to bear in mind is one which has already been mentioned—that philosophy was, but no longer is, the all-inclusive search for truth.

The second point I would make seems to follow from the first—the point that, when we subtract from the sum total of all intellectual investigation those inquiries which belong to particular sciences and to history, then what remains is the province of philosophy. Perhaps this is a crude way of arguing, and perhaps a great number of qualifications ought to be entered here; but I think that the general point is sound.

What, then, is left when all these special inquiries have been subtracted? There are, it seems to me, two important tasks left for philosophy.

In the *first* place, there remain all those problems which may in the future—one by one—become so well-defined that they can profitably be made subjects for relatively isolated study. That is, there are those problems which may some day become the contents of new sciences. There is the problem of the relation of body to mind; the question of personal survival after death of the body. There is the question of freedom. There are various questions relative to morality and religion, fundamental problems in epistemology—and so on. All these questions, or certain aspects of them, will sooner or later become so clearly capable of being separated from irrelevant issues, and certain fields of empirical fact will be so clearly relevant to our beliefs about these questions, that they can be separated off from general philosophical issues and be investigated by the appropriate scientific methods. But it is certain that, at the present day, we have not reached a stage at which this is possible. Concerning these matters we have “faiths,” we speculate and we form beliefs on grounds which are not particularly clear even to ourselves. Some of us are content to accept answers to them on the mere authority of the “wise,” or after the most superficial thought.

A most important function of philosophy is to keep alive speculation about these matters. The speculation is at best confused; but the more confused it is the more important is the task of keeping it going. It is essential that we should not sit down under “mysteries” or dogmatic “solutions” which cannot be reasonably defended. To do so would have two evil consequences. It would render impossible the acquiring of genuine knowledge about the particular matter in question. It would also hinder advance in knowledge on other matters as well. Whilst certain topics may be isolated for *relatively* separate treatment, this isolation can only be relative. Beliefs which we hold on one particular subject have implications which “slop over” into other subjects. Certain religious attitudes

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and theological systems, e.g., tend to discourage progress in biological and anthropological studies.

In the *second* place there remains for philosophy the task of correlating the general conclusions reached by the separate sciences. This task is, in a way, simply a particular aspect of what I have described as philosophy's first function. The most straightforward, though not necessarily the easiest, part of philosophy's task in this respect is the thinking together of the results of specialized inquiries into a total point of view. The work of correlation is greatly complicated, however, by the fact that sometimes theories evolved by a number of different sciences simply will not fit together. The implications (or apparent implications) of a theory evolved by science A, which "slop over" into the province of science B, sometimes contradict the apparently well-founded theories evolved in science B itself. In such situations the work of the philosopher is dialectical—the "criticism of hypotheses." His business is to discover, so far as he can, just where the contradiction lies, and to insist upon a re-examination of the clashing theories. Someone has blundered somewhere; and, until that blunder is corrected, "reason is divided against itself" and hampered in its progress towards a coherent whole of knowledge.

The claim of philosophy to exercise this office of criticism of scientific theories is sometimes regarded by scientists as a piece of impertinence. Certainly it may be advanced in a form which implies that the philosopher can "put the scientists right"; and that, I think, is something which philosophy cannot do. On what grounds could the philosopher pretend to be able to "correct the conclusions of science"? Scientific theories are built up primarily to explain a certain range of facts; and a false theory can only be "corrected" in any *positive* sense by the expert who is familiar with these facts, i.e. by the scientist himself. The only kind of "correction" which the philosopher can do is to point out the contradictions which exist between the theories evolved by different sciences. His correction takes the form of negative criticism. He shows that the different theories contradict each other, and says that *therefore* one or other of them (possibly both) is mistaken. The positive correction—the remoulding of the theories and the positive resolution of the contradiction—can only be got by referring the matter back to the appropriate specialists, and asking them to do their jobs again a little more carefully.

From what has been said, we can gain some idea of the methods appropriate to philosophy. The methods of science are observation, construction of hypothesis, experimentation, and formulation of theory. For science the main test of a theory is empirical verification. Philosophy, on the other hand, takes as its material the theories of

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scientists and the beliefs and faiths of ordinary men. It tries to think them together into a consistent world-view. The main question for it is not whether these theories and beliefs square with empirical fact, but whether they square with each other. Its test is the logical principle of non-contradiction. We cannot, of course, separate philosophy and science off from each other by a clear line of demarcation, any more than we can draw a sharp line between the province of one science and that of another. The difference is perhaps mainly one of approach. Science looks at its theories in their relation to empirical facts, and philosophy looks at those theories in their relations to each other.

I believe that this view of the nature and function of philosophy accords pretty well with the work which philosophers actually do perform. Certainly its function so conceived is limited—limited in a way similar to that of the “mission” of Socrates, perhaps. But if the philosopher recognizes that he is simply doing a particular piece of work in a co-operative enterprise, believing that other equally important tasks are being performed by other people, he can be quite as optimistic about the ultimate result as they can who hold the “Elijah” conception of philosophy’s nature and function.

III

Moral Philosophy, or Ethics. Now where does moral philosophy or ethics fit into this scheme? Is it philosophy, or is it science, or is it something different from both? I believe that the discussion of ethical problems is carried on at present mainly by philosophical rather than by scientific methods; but I also think that we shall not get very much further in solving the problems of ethics until some at least of its problems are approached in a more scientific spirit. Moral philosophers do not, as a rule, concern themselves much with the extensive collection and discriminating study of the empirical facts about the behaviour and judgments of mankind. They spend most of their time studying and reflecting on what other moral philosophers have written. They tend to make broad generalizations about “morality” and the “ordinary moral consciousness,” and to draw more or less logical inferences from these generalizations. They are much given to fraternal strife in defence of their speculative nostrums.

These remarks are not made in any cynical frame of mind. I believe that, at present, many of the major problems of ethics cannot be treated in any other way, owing to their nature and to their relations with those vague comprehensive beliefs and faiths which it is the business of philosophy to keep in the arena of disputation.

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May the strife and the speculations of the moral philosophers continue, then!

At the same time, I think that there are at least *some* questions in ethics which could be approached in a more scientific spirit; and I believe that it would be very valuable if moral philosophers would now give considerably more attention to marking off and investigating those problems in ethics which are concerned with questions of fact. I am not pleading for anything revolutionary in the methods of ethical study. What I have in mind has been done to some extent by moralists in the past. I am only suggesting that a stage has been reached when it is this side of the moralist's work which must be done far more adequately if we are to get anywhere at all.

Perhaps a single example will serve to bring out my meaning. I have suggested that moralists might mark off and investigate more fully those ethical questions which deal with matters of fact. Take, for instance, that generalization with which Kant begins the first section of the *Grundlegung*: "Nothing . . . can be called good without qualification, except a good will." He proposes to elucidate the principles involved in the common notions of morality, and he takes this generalization to be a most essential part of the "common rational knowledge of morality." It is, for him, a basic *fact* that this statement represents what all ordinary decent moral persons believe. T. H. Green follows Kant in holding that, as a matter of plain fact, this is a deliverance of the "ordinary moral consciousness." Now, when so much—so much indeed that is criticized—in the moral theories of Kant and Green is traceable to their acceptance of this initial assumption, would it not be of real use if moralists would make a proper attempt to assess the evidence for this view of Kant and Green? The question is purely one of fact, and is capable of being answered with a "yes" or "no," if moralists will undertake the labour of an empirical investigation, and decide according to the evidence available.

If we were to make a survey of all the problems commonly dealt with in moral philosophy; and, after deciding which ones demand for their solution some answers relating to matters of fact; if we were to adopt the proper scientific and historical methods for dealing with these factual questions; there is no predicting the amount of benefit which might accrue to ethical studies. Green himself, in spite of his suspicions of empiricism, was alive to some of the advantages of historical and sociological studies, as a test for the truth of ethical theory, as is shown in his chapter¹ on the Greek and Modern ideas of Virtue. Writers such as Hobhouse and John Dewey, and other moralists in America, have seen this even more clearly.

¹ *Prolegomena*, Bk. III, chap. v.

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It may, of course, be said that, interesting as such historical and anthropological studies may be, they are not moral philosophy. The moral philosopher's business (it may be asserted) is not to discover what men suppose, or have in the past supposed, to be right, but to show what they *ought* to think right, or what *is* right.

This raises the question as to moral philosophy's function. Moral philosophy is, in the long run, I believe, an aid to us in making up our minds about what is right or wrong. But while it may be of practical help in this way, its particular function is not to make moral judgments, but to render moral judgments intelligible. Mathematics, if we are to be guided in our view of mathematics by Professor L. Hogben, arose out of the practical needs of ancient builders, sailors, and craftsmen. But there is a difference between the study of mathematics and the building of temples or navigation of ships—the difference between a theoretical study and a practical art. An analogous distinction must, I think, be drawn between the study of moral philosophy on the one hand, and practical moral judging or evaluation on the other. Moral philosophy arises out of a practical need. Moral philosophy is the reflection on moral judgments and moral standards—a reflection forced upon us by the curious implications of some of our judgments respecting right and wrong. But while this reflection does, in the long run, help to determine what our future judgments will be—just as the study of mathematics and other “pure sciences” will make a difference to the way in which we build temples and bridges—its particular function is not to make these judgments, but to help us to understand the nature and implications of the judgments which men have made or do make. And if this be the function of moral philosophy, I do not understand how it can do anything other than deal with what men have actually thought, and do actually think, good and right.

I am not prepared to follow Dr. Ross in holding, as he apparently¹ does, that the human mind “has in fact an *a priori* insight into certain broad principles of morality”—that we do not merely think, but really *know* something about moral questions, to the extent of being able to say (concerning these broad principles) that what we *think* to be “so” really *is* “so.” I do not feel quite easy about such a doctrine; but I do agree with Dr. Ross² that, so far as the function of moral philosophy is concerned, its business is not to prove or disprove the “main moral convictions of mankind” (I should be inclined to omit the word “main”), but to accept them as a starting-point. Unless I misunderstand them, Kant and Green would concur in this.

No doubt many who accept this general statement with respect to the function of moral philosophy would still hold that, neverthe-

¹ *The Right and the Good*, p. 14.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 21 note, and 39-41.

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less, moral philosophy must proceed to make moral evaluations. They would hold that the "main moral convictions of plain men" are to be regarded, not as *facts* or *data*, but as "*a priori* knowledge," or "axioms" or "self-evident truths," or something of the kind—as something from which true inferences as to what is right or good or our duty may be drawn by moral philosophy. That is, moral philosophy would deduce further truths *following* from these main convictions, not merely truths *about* them. In my view, on the contrary, moral philosophy should regard these convictions as empirical facts—the material which is to be explained. Even the criteria or standards which the moral philosopher finds implicitly or explicitly governing these judgments are, for him, not subjects of valuational assessment, but are rather fields for further study. For example, if he finds that a certain class of judgments implies a hedonistic criterion, and that certain other judgments imply "personal perfection" as the criterion, it is not the business of the moral philosopher to ask himself: "Now, which of these criteria *ought* we to use—which is the higher or more adequate?" His function is to discover, if he can, the environing conditions which influence the use of one criterion rather than another.

In the process of this inquiry he will, no doubt, bring to light many significant facts; and the results of his investigations may (I am confident that they will) indeed influence humanity towards retaining or abandoning certain standards and modes of judgment. Research might show that various conceptions of the moral standard tend to displace one another in a significant order according as certain non-moral qualities of character and economic conditions develop and change. I do not say that research *will* show this. I only say that this is a possibility. But, whatever such investigation may show, I believe that it will have repercussions on men's practical moral attitude. It may, as Dr. Ross suggests¹, weaken what were hitherto moral convictions, and give rise to others. But the moral philosopher is concerned neither to strengthen nor to weaken these convictions. He is not concerned to say "This is the standard you ought to use"; or "This is what you ought to think good or right"; but rather to show how your use of this standard, or your thinking this particular type of action good, is related to other facts about your life and social and material environment.

This, I say, is the view I hold about the nature and function of ethics. It may not find very general acceptance, and I should welcome criticism of it. But there are at least some philosophers who hold that ethics should begin by accepting, as its starting-point, the "main convictions of the plain man," and that ethical theory has to fit itself to them, and not them to itself. Is it not evident that all

¹ *The Right and the Good*, pp. 13-14.

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who hold such a view—whether they regard these moral convictions as “*a priori* knowledge” or as “factual data”—must assume that there are in fact certain “main convictions of the plain man,” and must assume also that they know what the plain man’s convictions are? Is there not also a pressing need for us to make sure that what we call the views of the plain man are not merely personal convictions shared by a relatively small class of persons. We simply cannot make sure on this point by even the most exhaustive interrogation of our own individual minds. We must go to the trouble of making inquiries. We must adopt empirical methods of inquiry, and collect evidence before we make generalizations about what are and what are not convictions of the plain man. It is this aspect of ethical studies which I am suggesting must be done much more systematically, and to which much more attention should be given at the present day. There are, I say, some very important matters of fact about which moral philosophers make large assumptions, and, wherever possible, ethical theory should be founded on something much more solid than assumptions.

[NOTE.—This paper had been completed before Professor Stace’s article on “The Place of Philosophy in Human Culture” appeared in the July issue of *Philosophy*. My view of philosophy corresponds fairly closely to what Professor Stace calls the “trunk and branch view”; and his principal ground for rejecting this conception is that he believes philosophy to have a special content which distinguishes it from all other subjects, and which can never become the subject-matter of any particular science or sciences.

While lengthy comments would be out of place in this short note, I may say that I do not find what Professor Stace has said convincing. For instance, most of his “fundamental and ultimate philosophical questions” which concern morals (p. 308) are, in my view, most appropriate subjects for scientific and historical inquiry; and I fail to see how *any* question about what *is* (as distinguished from what *ought* to be) can be eternally excluded from the provinces of science and history. Again, granting that science and history are not competent to pronounce on what *ought* to be, is not Professor Stace assuming without adequate discussion, that philosophy is so competent?]

COLOUR

H. WALLIS CHAPMAN

WHENEVER we read any philosophical work dealing with the nature of qualities, the status of universals, or similar problems, we find continual references to colour; redness and blueness meet us on every page. Even Whitehead, whose obscurity is, at least in part, due to his avoidance of particular instances, condescends to cite colours as examples of "eternal objects" and other cases will occur at once to every reader.

The reason of this is clear, colours are the only sensible qualities which have definite and independent names. There are descriptive adjectives enough for sounds, but the only definite names are those of the notes of the scale, which are clearly inadequate; such words as "roar," "shriek," "howl," have nothing like the definiteness of "red" or "yellow"; such definiteness as they do possess is largely owing to their expressive and emotional associations, and we shall see later that that is what might be expected. The nomenclature of tastes and smells is rudimentary. Names of shapes are largely geometrical, not sensible. The names of the tactile sensations are more definite, but they are not independent as the names of colours are, they simply denote the degree and direction of the resistance offered by the surface touched; you can say that "hard" means "difficult to thrust the fingers into" and "sticky" means "difficult to withdraw the fingers from," but you can frame no similar definitions for "red" and "blue."

It would seem, therefore, that something may be learnt by a careful analysis of our experience of colour and the manner in which we use words relating thereto. I am not going to criticize any of the current physiological theories of colour, whether three-colour or four-colour, but the fact that such theories are possible is important; its significance will appear later.

I will begin by considering what we mean by the colour of an object; it is often urged that this cannot be a property of the object, as it varies with the illumination. For example, a rosy face seen by a sodium flame appears yellowish-grey. This shows that we must distinguish between the colour of an object and that seen on some particular occasion when the object is viewed, but it does not follow that there is no property of the object which may be called its colour.

Furthermore, even when the object and the illumination are the

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same the colours seen by different observers may differ; the strongest instance is colour-blindness, when one man says that a thing is brown and another that it is green, but minor differences are common; disagreements about slight shades will occur to anyone's recollection. This argument raises two questions, which must be carefully distinguished. When A says "This is green and that is brown" and B says "No, they are both green," there is clearly a difference somewhere and we can inquire into the cause of that difference; but can we also ask, "Is A's perception in pronouncing a thing green like B's in pronouncing the same thing green?" or has such a question no meaning? For the present we will confine ourselves to the former of these problems. In such a case we have no direct evidence of a difference in the physical situations in the two cases, such as we have when a change in the illumination alters the apparent colour of an object; we know of no difference in organization between the eyes of a colour-blind man and those of a normal man. Still it seems reasonable to suppose that there is a difference and that it may be discovered some day. Moreover, certain drugs will induce differences of perception of the same type, and the administration of the drug is certainly a physical event. We can therefore say that, although we cannot prove that differences of perception of this sort result from differences in the physical situation, there is a strong presumption that they do so and no evidence to the contrary.

It appears therefore that the colour perceived on any particular occasion is a function of the whole physical situation including the object perceived, the illumination, the medium, and the physical condition of the percipient, but not that it is mental in any sense in which any thing perceived is not mental. The staunchest Berkeleyan must admit that the distinction corresponds to a real difference, although he holds the ordinary ideas on the subject to be inadequate and erroneous.

If, however, the colour perceived is a function of the whole situation, what is the colour of the object? We cannot say that so much of the perception is due to the object and so much to the rest of the situation, and, if we cannot, it seems that we might say that the situation has colour, but not the object. Yet "the grass is green" certainly means something, and I will try to explain what.

But before I do so there is another question to be considered. If we cannot point out any difference between the normal and the colour-blind eye, by what right do we call one normal and the other colour-blind? Is it a mere matter of counting heads? This is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with any philosophical question.

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An answer may be based on what has been called "the principle of maximum discrimination." When two men are given wools to sort as a test of colour-blindness, one will separate them into a number of sets, but the other may subdivide some of these sets, distinguishing wools which the first has confounded. Similarly things which in ordinary daylight are distinguished as red and black may be confounded by the light of a sodium flame, or in the first grey of the morning. In each case the normal vision or illumination distinguishes colours which the other confounds. Of two observers the one who can see all that the other does and more also may fairly claim a superiority either in organization or in environment. We thus obtain a test of a normal vision or a good light free from subjective taint. The more distinctions are revealed the better is the sight or the light as the case may be.

There is, however, a difficulty. If the colour distinctions seen by one man or through one medium always included, or were included in, those seen by or through another, our principle would, theoretically, solve all questions. But this is not the case: a normal man may say, at least at first sight, that two objects are the same shade of pink, when a colour-blind man readily distinguishes them as different shades of blue; a piece of glass which confuses the colours of a landscape will distinguish a flame containing sodium and potassium from one containing sodium only. In such cases our criterion of normality seems to fail. We can, however, say that we are right when we assert a distinction, wrong when we deny it, and that the normal sight is only the one which perceives most distinctions, and thus approaches most closely to an imaginary super-observer who combines all distinctions. The physicist may here say, "There is no need for such an imaginary super-observer, we have a real one in the spectroscope," or, to quote Sir James Jeans, "Science is possessed of a colour scale which is entirely independent of the imperfections of human perceptions. The scientist will not say that light is red, except as a brief and convenient way of making a rough statement; in his more scientific moments he will speak of light of wavelength of, say, 0.00006562 cm., and in doing so will specify a shade of colour in a way which is perfectly objective . . . underlying every red we perceive there is a true objective red associated with either the object we perceive or its illuminant."¹

But this will not solve our difficulty; what the spectroscope analyses is not the colour perceived, but the light associated with it. That this is a real difference is shown by the fact that Sir James's statement is no longer true if "yellow" is substituted for "red." Red, or a particular shade of red, is associated with light of a

¹ *New Background of Science*, p. 19.

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definite wavelength, and any difficulty in identifying the precise wavelength accompanying the perception may be ascribed to imperfection of the sight. Yellow, on the other hand, may be produced in two different ways; it may be due to light of a definite wavelength or it may be due to a mixture of red light and green light. Here the disagreement between the eye and the spectroscope is of a type different from that which occurs when the spectroscope distinguishes two shades of red which the eye confuses. In the latter case the sameness to the eye is the last term of a series; we can have two sets of red patches approaching nearer and nearer in colour until they became indistinguishable to the eye, while the spectroscope would still detect a difference; at some further point the spectroscope would fail, though we might have other reasons to believe that the wavelengths were not absolutely equal; in any case the eye and the spectroscope would agree in asserting that the colours of the two sets approached more and more closely. In the case of the yellows nothing of the sort occurs; the red and the green into which the spectroscope analyses the composite yellow are no more like the monochromatic yellow when the eye sees a close resemblance between the yellows than when they obviously differ. The eye therefore asserts a definite relation of which the spectroscope knows nothing; if light of the wavelength corresponding to the monochromatic yellows did not occur in nature we could still say, as we do now, that red and green made yellow, but such a statement would have no meaning spectroscopically. We can thus distinguish the case of the yellows confounded by the eye and separated by the spectroscope from that of the pinks confounded by the normal man and separated by the colour-blind. The colour-blind man matches two pinks with two blues which the normal man distinguishes from each other and from the pinks, so that the latter sees three shades where the former only sees two, and even if such blues never occurred in nature, so that this test failed, the colour-blind man could never make a statement which had no meaning to the normal. We must conclude then, that, although the spectroscope gives interesting and important information as to the conditions and concomitants of colour, it has nothing to do with the theory of colour perception proper.

Such a distinction occurs in the case of other qualities, though it is not often that it can be so clearly proved. What Whitehead calls the "shapeiness" of a shape is not the same as its geometrical form. We must distinguish roundness from circularity or sphericity; the one is the perceived shape and corresponds to the perceived colour, the other is the geometrical form and corresponds to the spectroscopic analysis; the relation of the shape to the geometrical

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form is as much an empirical discovery as that of the colour to the wavelength.¹

We must, therefore, return to our direct perceptions of colour and our super-observer who combines distinctions seen by all real observers. Such a super-observer is, of course, mythical, but he is not mere mythology; he is no more mythical than the isolated philosopher building up the universe out of his own experience, as Descartes tried to do. We cannot discuss colour, or anything else, except by the help of words, and words essentially convey the experience of others as well as our own; so we must not be surprised if our conclusions cannot be expressed in terms appropriate to any actual, or even possible, single observer.

We can now define the colour of an object; it is the colour seen when the object is viewed by vision of the greatest power of discrimination in circumstances permitting of the greatest discrimination. But this colour is not actually seen, or is seen only by accident. The necessary observer is, as has been pointed out, a myth, and if any other person actually did see the colour in question he would not know it, or, at best, could only do so by comparing his perception with the result of an inference.² Indeed, we shall see later that it is very doubtful whether the statement that one observer sees the same colour as another has any real meaning, and this

¹ "Nous sommes dans une classe de 4^{me}, le professeur dicte; le cercle est le lieu des points du plan qui sont à la même distance d'un point intérieur appelé centre. Le bon élève écrit cette phrase sur son cahier; le mauvais élève y dessine des bonshommes; mais ni l'un ni l'autre n'ont compris; alors le professeur prend la craie et trace un cercle sur le tableau. 'Ah!' pensent les élèves, 'que ne disait-il toute de suite: un cercle est un rond, nous aurions compris'" (Poincaré, *Science et Méthode*, p. 129).

² In this paper I am using the words "infer" and "inference" in a somewhat different manner from that now usual. "Inference" is now generally confined to conscious processes, and for this usage there is much justification, as it emphasizes certain important distinctions. On the other hand, it conceals certain distinctions which are important for my purpose. The assertion "this leaf is green" is no more the result of conscious inference than "I am seeing green," but there is an important difference between them; the latter can, with a little explanation, be made to satisfy the Cartesian test of certainty, but the former never can. That it may be valid it is necessary that there should be, if not an actual, yet a possible inference. Between the data and the conclusion can be inserted, at least theoretically, a number of steps, and the result will be an inference in the strictest sense; moreover, if these steps could not be inserted, or the inference were incorrect, the assertion would be false, or at best only accidentally right, right as an answer drawn from a lucky bag might be. I shall usually say that such assertions or conclusions are of the nature of inference or contain an element of inference, but as these phrases are rather lengthy I may occasionally have to use the word "inference" by itself. It is a defect in philosophical language that it contains no word to express the distinction I mean, but I know of none.

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doubt becomes still stronger when one of the observers is imaginary. In short, the colour of an object is not perceived, but constructed. This will become clear if we consider how we assign a colour to an object. If the object is only seen once our statement that it has a particular colour is vague and doubtful; it depends entirely on the judgment (expressed or implied) that the circumstances in which the object was seen were not likely to have interfered much with our perception of the colour, or else that they were likely to have introduced a change of a particular sort, for which we have allowed. In either case the basis of our statement is not mere perception but perception *plus* inference; but if we say "it *looked* red," i.e. the colour we saw on looking at it was red, no element of inference is involved, and we are not really making a statement about the colour of the object, only about one of the circumstances from which the colour is to be inferred. When we see the object again and again we do not, if we try to be accurate, say more than that "it *looks* the same," i.e. the colours seen on the different occasions have a general resemblance and the colour of the object has probably the same resemblance to them all, while for scientific purposes we must go through an elaborate comparison and realize that even then we have probably not attained absolute accuracy.

Of course the colours perceived on particular occasions are not constructions, they are the elements from which the colour of an object is made up. Neither do colour names always denote construction. When I say "this leaf is green," I make one or more, probably both, of two different assertions (a) "the colour perceived by me on the occasion of looking at the leaf is green," and (b) "the colour which would be perceived by the best sight on looking at the leaf in the best light is green." The colour referred to in the second case is not perceived by me and may well never be perceived by anyone. But "to be green" is something which can be asserted both of the perceived and the unperceived colour.

We will therefore consider what we actually communicate by means of colour names and how it is done. In the first place we notice that "I am seeing green" or "this which I see is green" are statements of a different type from "that object is green" or "the grass is green." The former are dependent on perception and memory only, the latter involve an element of inference. Accordingly no other person's evidence is relevant to the former, no one else can confirm or deny them; but "that is green" or "the grass is green" can be assented to or denied, confirmed or confuted. It is, therefore, statements of this type which are fundamental in communication, for it is only by means of them that the others can be understood. The first thing to be noticed is that such statements do their work through the mediation of objects, for we can only explain a colour

appellation by indicating an object which shows the colour. Yet the colour of the object is not the fundamental conception, for the office of the object is to identify, not the colour, but the occasion on which the colour is perceived. If we were to describe something as "yellowish-grey, like a rosy face seen by sodium light," the description would be enough for anyone who had had the necessary experience, but we should be denying, not asserting, that the colours of the two objects referred to were the same. We therefore find ourselves still dealing with colours perceived on particular occasions, and our fundamental statement is "the colour seen on occasion A is like (or unlike) that seen on occasion B." It is by means of such statements as these that we explain our use of colour terms (I do not mean that we necessarily learn the meaning of colour terms originally through such formal statements, only that any process of learning colour terms must, if schematized, be schematized in this way). There is, however, a specially important combination of statements of this type, namely "A is different from both B and C, but more like to B than to C." These are the basis of our whole nomenclature of colour; when we say that a penny stamp and a pillar-box are both red we do not mean that they are indistinguishable, but that each is more like to the other than to anything we should not call red. It may be objected that a purple-red and an orange-red may be less like to each other than they are to a distinct purple and orange respectively, but I think that in such a case we feel that to apply the same name to the two colours is, to say the least, unfortunate; the cause of our doing so will appear in the sequel. The statement above may therefore stand, but we must inquire whether this is all we mean or whether we can, by means of colour resemblance, communicate something more than colour resemblance. Examination of the words we use for colour may help us here. To indicate a colour for which there is no recognized name, there is obviously nothing but to give an example. (A spectroscopic analysis is, as we have seen, a statement about the conditions for the appearance of the colour, not about the colour itself.) Such examples may be conventionalized; when we speak of "cherry-red" or "apple-green" we think of cherries or apples, but recognize that particular sorts are involved; the children's joke about a "cherry-coloured cat with rose-coloured feet" (a black cat with white feet) illustrates this. A stage further are such words as "lilac," "violet," or "orange"; they are generally used without conscious reference to the corresponding objects, but such reference is very near, and would appear at the slightest question. "Purple" illustrates another stage; it is undoubtedly named from the murex dye, but we rarely think of the dye when we use the word, in fact few of us have ever seen it. When we come to such words as "red," "blue," and "yellow,"

we can only say that it is probable that in the first place they denoted objects; all trace of what these objects were is lost.¹ Now what are we to conclude from this? Shall we say that as some colour words undoubtedly contain a reference to objects, such reference must be supposed to be present in all such words, although the memory of it has vanished? or shall we rather infer that as some colour words can do their work without reference to particular objects, every such word really conveys something distinct from any object, and that the reference to a definite object, or sort of object, where it occurs, is merely accidental, or rather the scaffolding retained when the house is complete? The latter view is the realism of the man in the street, the former the more learned theory.

A piece of evidence on the nominalist side which has not been much noticed is the extraordinary fluctuation in the meaning of colour names. The *New Oxford Dictionary* tells us that "blue" is probably the same as the Latin "flavus"—"yellow"; the variety of things described as "purpureus" in Latin literature is notorious; but perhaps the most curious instance is an Arabic saying quoted in Clerk-Maxwell's letters, "There are three green things—meat, wine, and gold." If such words as yellow, blue, and green denoted distinct entities, we could imagine occasional difficulties over a border-line case, but such transformations as these would be hard to account for. It is true that names of material objects shift strangely; the names of trees in the Aryan languages are an excellent example: *φῆγος* (oak) = *fagus* (beech), *fraxinus* (ash) = birch, and so on. But in such cases the experience which determines the names has generally changed too. A tribe passing from one region to another would find new trees in place of the old, and it would be easier to use the old names than to invent new, but with colours this would not happen, the sky is blue and blood red everywhere.

But this raises a further difficulty; if the names of colours do not denote definite entities but simply collections of particular perceptions, on what principle are these collections made? Such statements as "A is different from both B and C, but more like to B than it is to C," may suffice to arrange the colours seen on different occasions, even to order them in a continuum of any number of dimensions, but they will not give a reason for dividing this continuum into portions denoted by different names, or for preferring one such division to another. As the geometry of a sphere gives no means for locating any place on it and we must choose a meridian of Greenwich on non-geometrical grounds, so our ordered colour-continuum requires grounds going beyond colour-resemblance for choosing particular regions of it to bear special names. Such grounds

¹ See *New Oxford Dictionary*.

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can be found in the interests of the users of the terms in matters other than mere colour-resemblance.

In this way we may explain the repugnance which the ordinary man undoubtedly feels to regarding "red" as simply a name for a collection of particulars, or, what is really another aspect of this repugnance, the distinction between "red" and "redness." It is plausible to say that "red" as a mere adjective is simply a name for all red objects, but "redness" or "red" as a substantive seems to convey something more. And this is true; "red" means, not only that the object referred to is like certain other objects, but that some of these objects have a special importance which has impressed itself on our minds and our way of looking at things. The colour-sensations which group themselves round massive or impressive experiences, the green of the leaves, the blue of the sky, the red of blood, will seem to form natural classes and give rise to special colour names.

The distinction, therefore, between "redness" and the mere adjective "red" is that "redness" includes the emotional reaction to objects resembling certain typical and important objects; it is by no means a simple term as is sometimes supposed. The distinction becomes clearer on noticing that it is only the colours connected with massive or impressive experiences which readily give rise to such abstracts; "redness," "blueness," "blackness" are familiar, but "purpleness" and still more "lilacness" and "orangeness" could only be made on the analogy of the others, no one feels a need for them.

"Yellow" will repay special consideration; as explained above, it may be physically compound, but psychologically it is as simple as "red" or "blue." Compare it with "purple"; no one is astonished at hearing that purple is a mixture of red and blue, but it is a shock to most people to be told that yellow is a mixture of red and green. This is intelligible on our theory because yellow, being the colour of sunlight, of gold, and of corn, is strongly charged with emotion, so we do not feel it to be like green or red, while there is no such obstacle to feeling purple to be like red or blue.

To recapitulate: the name of a colour has a twofold reference; firstly to a collection of perceptual situations, of occasions which are seen to have colour-resemblance, and secondly to an important and representative set of these occasions which have in addition an emotional resemblance. This emotional resemblance is not necessarily the result of direct experience, it may result from communication by others;

This my hand will rather
The multitudinous seas incarnadine,
Making the green one red

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is vivid and impressive to many whose experience does not go beyond a cut finger.

The colours as perceived by any observer form a manifold ordered by relations of resemblance. As these relations have a structure which is approximately the same for the great majority of observers, and as corresponding relations hold between occasions which are recognized on other grounds as similar, communication and agreement are possible. Colour names denote portions of this manifold, and the manner in which these portions are selected is arbitrary in so far as the manifold and its ordering relations are concerned. It is determined by the past experience, emotional history, and common tradition of the users, and these are sufficiently uniform to insure approximately constant division of the manifold. This renders, not only communication of colour facts, but a uniform colour vocabulary, possible. Any unusual divergence between the experiences of different speakers causes them to make different divisions of the manifold, and we find such discrepancies as I have described. Nevertheless, the experiences common to all humanity are sufficient to ensure a general scheme of colour terms, and to cause the discrepancies to be noted as exceptions.

The part played by the emotional element in the use of colour terms is illustrated by the poetical use of "red" as an epithet of flame. Of course flame is to some extent red, but in any accurate matching of colour by far the greater number of flames would prove to be yellow or orange. The reason for the epithet appears to be that it is really used to emphasize the elements of violence and destruction, which are associated with red for other reasons. The Arabic saying to which I have referred may perhaps be explained on similar lines; its true meaning would then be that meat (a luxury to many Arab tribes), wine, and gold produce excitement and exhilaration like that felt on the sight of an oasis in the desert.

The use of general terms for colours therefore demands a common physical experience and a common emotional experience. Of these the former is the more fundamental; we can imagine a race of beings whose range of vision and power of colour discrimination were the same as our own, but who would divide the spectrum in a manner quite different from ours, making more or fewer "psychological primaries." Such beings would have a colour language into which ours could not be translated, but nevertheless an understanding would be possible. If the physical basis failed there would be no more to be said.

We will now consider the question "Can a colour be defined?" Imagine a man sensitive to light of every wavelength visible to the ordinary man, and to differences in intensity of light, but without any perception of difference of wavelength, so that the world

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is to him purely monochrome; in short, let his eye function like an orthochromatic plate. In what sense, if any, would it be possible to define a colour so that such a man could understand and use the definition? We will for the moment waive the difficulty arising from the fact that the same colour may arise from different wavelengths and say that "green" is the name for light of wavelength lying between definite limits. Our supposed observer could then verify that chlorophyll is green and follow any discussion on the connection between its colour and its function of synthesizing sugar, but he would not be using the conception of colour any more than a normal physicist does when he discusses the properties of infra-red or ultra-violet radiation, which cannot be seen and have no colour. It would seem that in thus defining a colour the thing to be defined has slipped through our fingers. And yet the definition appears to meet Professor Stebbing's requirements¹ that the expressions must be asserted to be equivalent and that the defining expression must contain more words or symbols than the defined expression. This, however, depends on the sense we give to "equivalent"; if we mean "equivalent in extension" the conditions are satisfied, and the next step is Russell's view that definitions are purely typographical conveniences; in this case it would not matter whether the concept of colour is employed or not. Nor does it from the scientific point of view; for scientific purposes equivalence in extension is the only equivalence that matters, and the names employed are mere implements to be used and rejected at our convenience, but we cannot say this in any other connection. We thus have another ground for rejecting Sir James Jeans's view that colour can be defined by wavelength.²

Let us then try again; can we tender a definition which would help our imaginary being to understand

Annihilating all that's made
To a green thought in a green shade?

To a certain extent, yes. Tell him that green means "leaf-like" and he will have some appreciation of Marvell's couplet. It would connect itself with the summer shade and "the banners of the vanguard of the spring." But his appreciation would be incomplete, as he would know the resemblance between grass and leaves by report only, and not by direct perception, nor would he see the difference between the trees in summer and in autumn. Of the two deficiencies the former is the more important; for scientific purposes

¹ *Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 423.

² I imagine that Sir James would admit this, but say that his definition was offered for scientific processes only; my point is that such a definition ignores the element by which colour is colour.

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direct knowledge and reported knowledge are equivalent, if they were not, scientific progress would be impossible; but where emotion is concerned the difference is enormous. It would follow that if the significance of a colour name is partly emotional, as has been maintained, a definition of a colour may not be useless but is necessarily inadequate.

We will now consider the problem of universals as exemplified in colour. In so far as we are concerned with the relation of a general colour name to the various shades covered by it we must give a nominalist answer. A scheme of colour names divides the colour-manifold into a number of regions which are determined, not by any intrinsic character of the manifold, but by the experience of the imposers of the names in respect of matters other than colour on occasions when colour also has been present.

• If, however, we turn to the other meaning of universal, according to which a particular shade of colour is reckoned as a universal, and the instances of its occurrence as particulars, or, in Whitehead's phraseology, we consider the colour as an eternal object, the problem is different. In the first place, have we any right to say that a colour actually recurs in space or time? and how do we know that it does so? When I look at my blotting-paper I may say that two portions are of the same shade of pink, but on closer examination I may perceive a difference; even if I do not I can never be sure that a better sight, or a better light, would not reveal one. But this refers to the colour of an object, and, as has been shown, the colour of an object is an abstraction, or rather a construction, having much in common with a mathematical point. We must therefore turn to the colour perceived on a particular occasion and recollect that it is a function, not merely of the object seen, but of the whole situation. There is, then, no inconsistency in saying that the same colour appears in two places at the first glance and is replaced by two colours on closer observation, for the effort of attention which reveals the two colours is not mental only, but also physical, and can be perceived as such; a behaviourist would say that it is physical *only*, but we do not need to assert this; we only need to say that a perceptible physical change occurs, and this will readily be conceded; the physical situation being thus changed, it is reasonable that the colour perceived should be changed too.

It appears, then, that there is no appeal from the judgment that two colours seen by the same person at the same moment are the same, but the grounds on which we have come to this conclusion show how little meaning or value it has. In the first place, we must give up all hope of showing that two persons ever see the same colour, for the difference in the physical situation when two persons look at the same object is presumably greater than that arising

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when one person regards an object with increased attention; it is of course conceivable that the differences in the situation would cancel out and leave the perception unchanged, but even if this happened there would be no means of knowing the fact. Neither does this conclusion involve solipsism; to avoid solipsism it is necessary and sufficient that two persons can identify the same occasions, not qualities of the occasions. If A says, "On occasion X I perceived a colour like that I perceived on occasion Y and unlike that I perceived on occasion Z," B can identify these occasions and say whether his experience was similar or not, and we have seen that all communication about colour is fundamentally of this type. Whether the colour seen by A on any of these occasions was the same as that seen by B is simply irrelevant, and, for the purposes of their communication, meaningless, as long as the relations of likeness and unlikeness hold among the colours seen by each. •

We will now turn to colours seen by the same person on different occasions. Here we do seem to have a definite consciousness of identity which is impossible when different persons are involved. But consider such a statement as "Those curtains will just match the sitting-room carpet—no they won't, it is too red," and suppose that the change of opinion arises not from closer inspection of the curtains but from a change in our remembrance of the carpet. On a theory of psycho-physical parallelism the change in remembrance would be accompanied by a physical change, and the case would be like those already considered, but this change is not directly perceived, like that accompanying increased attention; but it is only introduced *ad hoc* to account for an event otherwise known, and it is the nature and source of this knowledge which we are investigating. It may be said that we only have an instance of the well-known fact that memory is fallible and corrigible by memory, but what the instance proves is that the apparent consciousness of identity is fallible, and need not prevent us from denying the identity if we find reason to do so. And there are such reasons; the apparent identity may not obey the formal laws of identity; it is possible to have three colours A, B, and C such that A is indistinguishable from B, and B from C, yet A can be distinguished from C. It might be thought that this was an error to be corrected by further inspection, but, as has been pointed out, in trying to do this we pass from the colours perceived to the colours of the objects observed; the discrepancy in the original judgment remains and is incorrigible. Of course this is not the only case in which it is necessary to admit that direct judgments may be wrong, but such judgments usually have an external reference. In this case there is no such reference, our judgment is of something directly perceived and has no reference except to this something as perceived. These difficulties can be

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avoided if it is really meaningless to speak of numerical identity or difference between the colours perceived on different occasions, absolute colour having no more significance than absolute position. The fundamental perception will then be, not "this occasion has this or that colour," but "this occasion has more or less colour resemblance to these other occasions." Colour-resemblance will be a specific type of resemblance directly perceived, but as it essentially admits of more or less our former difficulties vanish. Whitehead's "eternal objects . . . haunting time like a spirit" would seem to vanish too.

The importance of our earlier discussion of colour names is now clear; if they were really simple, as is usually supposed, the theory I have just set forth would be very difficult to maintain, for such simple terms would denote entities of the sort which I have denied; but if "red," for example, is a term of extremely complex reference, grounded, not merely in simple perception, but in the whole history of the race, there is no reason why it should denote a simple recurring entity.

The position thus reached is like one suggested by Russell¹ but rejected on the ground that it is necessary to admit one type of universals, namely relations, so that it is unreasonable to object to admitting qualities as a second type. If, however, my arguments are sound, there is a real distinction between the two cases, and it may be necessary to hold a realist theory for one and a nominalist theory for the other. I do not, however, propose to examine Russell's theory of relations.

¹ *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 149.

SOME PROBLEMS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TEMPORAL PERCEPTION

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PERHAPS it is unfortunate that, no matter what problems a psychological investigator elects to attempt to discuss, he is almost always confronted by a number of different and often conflicting points of view. The twisting paths revealed by these may one day be found to unite into a broad road, but most of them have as yet been insufficiently explored. Certainly problems in the psychology of temporal perception seem to lie in many different directions, according to the ways in which they are approached. It would be possible, for instance, to take the mass of experimental work, always patient, sometimes brilliant, which has had a fairly continuous history since Czermak, in 1857, building upon Weber's researches into space perception, planned and began to carry out a programme for an investigation of the estimation of short time intervals. But then, within the limits of a short article, nothing else would be possible, and although it is high time that somebody who has more sympathy and insight than most of the critics have displayed attempted a review of this work, I think that this would hardly be the proper occasion. Or again, it would be possible to try to describe the investigations which have been made of how and when the dawning intelligence of the young child begins to make temporal distinctions, or to understand and use the conventional time measures which are current in its world. That also would occupy much space and answer but a few of the questions which I desire to raise. Once again, the attempted constructions of the theoretical psychologists could be surveyed. In that case, too, nothing more could be done, and the theories, taken from their context and expressed very briefly, would appear ingenious and puzzling rather than convincing. From all of the past history of investigation and speculation in this realm I hope that I shall profit; but I shall devote myself in detail to none of it.

There is, however, one question which is bound to force itself upon anybody who surveys the mass of work that has been done, and may form a very good starting-point for discussion. Nearly all the scientists and theorists who have studied the basis of our experience of time have assumed that it is necessary to begin with exceedingly small units. Experimentalists have again and again demonstrated that there is a brief interval—round about 0.6 second in our con-

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ventional time measures—which the normal person can appreciate and reproduce with remarkable consistency and accuracy, and have tried to build everything upon this. The genetic psychologist has turned his sleepless and unwavering eye upon the animal or the infant to find the first sign it makes of noticing a difference between what is “now” and what was “just now,” and has said that here is the basis of all temporal distinctions. The theoretical psychologists, in ways that must have sorely puzzled all intelligent students of psychology, have written about a “unitary experience of duration,” about a “psychical present” in which everything is momentary and yet some things follow one another. Sleight of language is to many a psychologist what sleight of hand is to the conjuror. He will put things together and give them one set of names, and then he will take them apart and give them another set of names, and in this manner may succeed in persuading himself and others that he has made some noteworthy discovery.

Perhaps the basic temporal responses have nothing necessarily to do with the brief and fleeting moment. One thing is certain, and that is that *all* psychological distinctions, and the temporal distinctions among the others, are possible only when behaviour, reactions to external stimuli, have already become highly and firmly organized. Moreover, all psychologists agree with nearly all other people that temporal distinctions are bound up with memory. Then the psychologist has looked for the most elementary kind of memory reaction, and often he has fixed upon what he calls the “primary memory image.” A man listens, say, to the boom of Big Ben as it strikes the hour. Every stroke is treated as a unit, yet within each unit are differences: the sound of the stroke rises, fluctuates, falls, passes on to the next. At every instant something is “here” as an image, and something else as a percept. Of course this would not help us in the least unless we had already learned to make the distinction between the image when it occurs and the percept when it occurs, so that we know that a percept refers to something that can be treated as objectively present—in a spatial sense—whereas the image need not do so. And that distinction also would not help us either, because it might mean that what is perceived must be treated as “here,” but what is imaged may be treated as “there.” What we want is something to tell us that the percept is “now,” whereas that which the image indicates was “then.”

These considerations apart, however, there seems no good reason to believe that primary memory images do actually develop in every experience in this automatic and immediate manner. You give a dog a biscuit when he is not hungry and he goes off and buries it, returning at once to his game, or his sleep, or to whatever he may have been doing. The biscuit does not worry him any more till a

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long time afterwards, when perhaps he suddenly rushes off and digs it up again. For the young child, more often than not, the passing stimulus seems to induce a fleeting reaction which has no immediate echo. Anybody who has tried to study the primary memory image in the average adult, in the accredited fashion, will have been depressed to find how very often he can get no evidence at all of its occurrence. The psychology of time may be bound up with the psychology of memory, but that it has much to do with the primary memory image seems unlikely. And if this is the case, perhaps also basic time responses have less to do than people have thought with brief time intervals.

Let us therefore begin our search again, with this principle firmly in mind: that there is *nothing* psychological which has not already behind it a long history of biological, physiological and neurological development. This is to say, that primary and basic temporal distinctions presuppose a vast amount of organization of reactions before they can be made at all.

Now there is one feature about the organization of organic reactions which is impressive and from our point of view looks promising. It is that all relatively simple organization of animal and human reactions tends to be sequential, the sequence following an order of original occurrence. For this there is a great amount of evidence in chain reflexes and in circular reactions; in the ease with which stereotyped sequences of bodily movement can be set up and the consistency with which they are maintained; in the way in which incoming afferent sensations are utilized, in the order in which they occur, to guide succeeding responses; in the large part that relatively fixed serial habits play in daily life. There is psychological evidence also in the fact that early, or primitive, recall tends to be rote recall, and in the fact that when bits or blocks of reactions and experience get dissociated they tend to produce the undeviating repetition of items of isolated behaviour, of a few obsessive ideas, or of whole stretches of reaction and experience that have definite chronological sequence and limits.

It is obvious that the mere fact that series are established possessing a fixed succession is of no help. We have to try to understand how the properties of established organizations can "enter consciousness," can become known, and, in this case, known as possessing temporal qualities. In general the more thoroughly established a mode of organization is the less is that mode of organization known. If we watch an ordinary person learning to dance, or to play a musical instrument, to make a skilful stroke in a quick game, or to weave a pattern of movement in an industrial task, we find that very often he counts: "One, this"; "Two, that," "Three, the other thing," and so on. Each component movement and the position of

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it in the series is picked out. But as skill appears counting disappears. The expert may be able to tell the succession of his movements only with difficulty, when he is challenged; sometimes only by watching somebody else, or by artificial aid like that of a slow-motion moving-picture. It is as if in learning we catch at the temporal properties of the components of the series which we learn, only to lose them, sometimes completely, when the learning period has passed.

This much, at least, is clear, that an organism might possess a number of thoroughly organized reactions, and each organization might in fact show a precise chronological sequence, yet if all that the organism did was to unroll these sequences in the appropriate environment, nothing about their nature would ever become known to that organism. It would be a creature well adapted perhaps, behaving capably, but without a psychology. Even were it the case, for instance, which it is not, that *every* momentary experience were a sequence of percept, primary memory image and prepercept, nothing whatever would come out of that. The ordered series must fail, an accident must occur, it must be broken up, bits must be taken out of it, in order that their significance in the whole may be realized and not merely operate.

There are two sorts of series, of vast importance in human activities, which very readily slip into fixed sequential arrangement, and the second is only a special form of the first. They are bodily movements, and word series. Another fact about them which is of intense psychological interest is that of all human reactions they are the ones most used and of greatest use in social life. In ritual and in dance, in play and in practical activities, group individuals from time immemorial have fitted movement to movement in co-operative effort. In communion or dispute words form almost the most important of all social links.

To try to clear up the next point of the argument I will take an illustration at a fairly high level which may perhaps sound a little artificial, but which will, I hope, bring out the essential principle involved. Suppose two people enter some form of co-operative bodily activity, a dance if you like. The series of movements follow one another in a regular sequence, and for every movement of one person there is a proper corresponding movement of the other. Now suppose that these two people have different reaction-times, or have been trained differently, or are at different stages of practice, or at any rate show one or other of the large number of individual differences which may affect their performance. At some point or other they will be out of step. It is no use beginning all over again—a device which lots of people try in such circumstances—because the same thing will happen once more. To set things right this organized

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series of movements must be broken up, and each person or both of them must find what parts of it led to inefficiency. Also in this case a spatial correction is not enough. It will not do for one to be here and another to be there; one must be here and the other there *simultaneously*.

The principle is that there have to be at least two series of adjustments the various items of which must synchronize if the series are to proceed smoothly. For one or more of many possible reasons certain items fail to synchronize. This challenges analysis, and the result of the analysis is that certain items are picked out of the series and corrected. If the series are of movements spatial correction is not enough, temporal correction is also essential. With human beings, whenever any character of an event is picked out, is forcibly selected, because it has practical significance, it tends to get a name. So the temporal distinctions, which are objectively there all the while, gain names, and are now there for the performer as well as there in the sense that they affect performance.

So far I have written as if the typical way in which we come to be able to make temporal distinctions is bound up with some social situation. Very likely it is true that the making of time distinctions is, psychologically, fundamentally a socially determined response. But here I should wish to avoid dogmatism. Let me take another illustration—also, I am afraid, rather a complicated one. It is a common trick of writers of detective stories to introduce obscurely certain detail near the beginning of their record which turns out to be extraordinarily important in the end. Now I read many detective stories, and I have a rooted objection to turning over pages backwards and looking up what I have already read. Let us use the word “image” in its widest of all senses to include any method of referring to an object or event, the external concrete stimuli for which are not immediately present. Then when I am near the end of the story I may find myself completely stumped and unsatisfied unless I can, in this sense, form an image of something that occurred near the beginning. Of course this image and my reading of the last chapters of the book may both be “now,” or simultaneous; but in many cases the events of which I am reading and that which is imaged cannot be. “Yes,” we may say, “but perhaps the events read about are ‘here,’ while those imaged may be ‘there,’ and then this spatial distinction will solve our difficulty.” But in many cases this will not work. For example, the image may have to do with intense activity on the part of somebody I know to be dead. I can solve the difficulty only if I treat that which is imaged and that of which I am reading as parts of a single stream of interest some of the items of which are “then” and some are “now.” Which are to be treated as then and which as now are no

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doubt dependent upon many complicated considerations specific to whatever case we are taking.

Again, my illustration has involved facts which indirectly are of social significance: a developed form of language and of writing. It may be, however, that these are not really essential. We could perhaps take any form of serially organized activity: the movements required to get from one place to another, or those of attack, or of house building. Always we have to remember that the making of temporal distinctions presupposes a highly developed organism, with many avenues of connection with its environment. For such an organism any environment is a world in rapid change, and all kinds of unexpected stimuli may break in to upset the ordered performance of an established reaction series. Whenever that happens the series will go wrong unless it can be broken up and corrected at some particular point. And precisely because the function or importance of any item in such a series depends not merely upon its place in a spatial arrangement, if it can be assigned one, but also upon its position in a successive and interest-determined order, the breaking up of the organization brings those temporal distinctions which express such a position into prominence and into awareness.

The view then demands three things:

- (1) The organization of reactions into successive orders.
- (2) The breakdown of such organization as a result either of social incompatibility, or of rapid and unexpected environmental change.
- (3) The consequent practical necessity to readjust some part of the organized reactions, the characteristic method of which, at a human level, is to pick out some of its items and to learn to realize the factors upon which their functional efficiency depends.

It follows that the basic time distinctions, in a psychological sense, have no necessary connection with objectively short time intervals. Indeed, both the probabilities and the actual evidence of genetic studies rather strongly suggest that time distinctions first tend to be made in reference to intervals which objectively are long ones. To the young child, and for that matter to the average adult, "time" normally means, not "just now," but "long ago" or, derivatively perhaps, "far ahead."

There is almost always a tendency, in regard to any general psychological problem, to search for an explanation which will cover all possible cases. More often than not this is a mistake. There is, for instance, no single origin of temporal distinctions. Sometimes what prompts the search for them is a lack of harmony in co-operative effort, sometimes it is a sudden and unexpected change of environmental stimulation, sometimes it may be a clash of testimony about certain practically significant events, and sometimes, perhaps, it may be the swift surging up of some definite sensorial image which

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conflicts notably with whatever is being done or perceived at the moment. Only two general conditions seem to be essential: the first is the formation of organized chains of successive activities through the operation of some biological or psychological interest; and the second is the occurrence of *anything* which prevents or obstructs the performance of such activities. This, however, means that the discovery of time differences is by no means a purely intellectual affair, for it depends fundamentally upon a prior organization of reactions by interest, or some other active process of that order.

That movement series and word series are particularly apt to form stable and effective sequences is interesting in another way. Both of them possess the character of being very easily conventionalized. So that we should expect to find that any distinctions the discovery of which rests largely upon them would themselves speedily yield fixed and conventional measures. This expectation is certainly realized in the case of temporal distinctions. Whether, as I suspect, the discovery of time differences is bound up with social situations or not, certain it is that their conventional treatment is firmly linked to the development of language, and especially to the use of words for counting and for numerical distinctions. A large chapter in the psychology of time is a chapter also in the psychology of language.

This development of time measures and a time language immensely influences the discovery of time differences on the part of the young child born into a relatively settled social group. It is true that we cannot point to "yesterday" or "a week ago" or "tomorrow" as we can to chairs and tables and people, but that there are names for these which will be accepted by the child as he accepts other names, makes his task of realizing time differences vastly easier, and changes its character, too, in ways which I must not now stay to describe.

The discovery of time differences always involves a practical difficulty which cannot be set right merely by spatial adjustment, or by the application of anything that may be known in a direct descriptive sense about common objects. Apparently, before we can know anything about time, we must be able to make space references and to distinguish object from object. The single perceptual reaction of vision, of touch, of hearing, of movement seems to carry with it already some spatial character, and some object reference. But time demands an organization of reactions, and in the sense in which I used the term just now, "images" also are required. It is perhaps odd that most people should at once accept whatever has a direct sensory basis as "real," or valid, or objective, in a way they question when more complex mental processes come into the picture. Yet we all tend to do this, and though to follow this line of thinking would soon take us far beyond the bounds of psychology, we may

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find here, very likely, one of the reasons why time often is considered to be in some way less "real" than space or than objects.

Even supposing that what I have written is intelligible enough and convincing enough to be accepted, I can easily imagine that someone will say: "Yes, but all you have written of is the way in which those distinctions which are called temporal come to be made. What about the fundamental time *experience*?"

Here I must confess a very strong scepticism. I doubt whether there is, properly speaking, any time experience at all. I think people talk about duration and the like as an experience, because they have already decided that it is impossible to know that events are in time unless there is an experience of time.

Here the experimentalists certainly ought to be able to help, and it is worth turning to a very brief study of their characteristic procedure. They have been concerned mainly with the estimation, recognition, or reproduction of short time intervals. The customary method is to present an observer with an interval which is initiated and terminated by an agreed signal, it may be of sounds, or of lights, or of any other mode of sensory stimulus. For some purposes it is customary to talk of filled and empty intervals, but it was very soon pointed out that no interval is really empty. Any response set up by a physical stimulus has its own history of development, maximum intensity and decline. Suppose the second of two successive stimuli is presented in such a way that its response begins to develop just before that to the earlier one has declined beyond a certain amount, the interval can be repeated by the observer with remarkable accuracy. But all experimentalists agree that it is not this arrangement which gives a characteristic "time experience," when this phrase is used, but an interval which is longer or shorter than this. If it is longer a certain tension is set up, which has its own sensorial and mental character. If it is shorter the terminal signal produces a peculiar response as if something has not been properly completed. Then the interval is often said to "feel long" or to "feel short," and what this means is that something is occurring between the signals which is affected when the terminal signal is given.

To understand what this is we must consider the conditions and instructions of the test itself. The observer knows that he is to get two signals in succession which he must treat as belonging to one series. If he fails to do this the experiment has no point in it whatever. The giving of the first signal then sets up an attitude which can be best described as one of waiting for the second. This waiting has its own sensorial and imaginal characteristics, and it is these, as they are affected by the final signal, which are experienced. It is, in fact, always the filling of an interval in relation to the particular interest

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operating at the time which determines what is called the experience of time. Thus an objectively long time interval suitably filled may appear short, unsuitably filled may appear long; an objectively short interval, unsuitably filled may appear long, and suitably filled may appear short. The time characteristics of an interval as we look back upon it may, as everybody points out, be entirely different, and this is because the interests of retrospect are rarely those of performance. If this is true it follows that, in these cases at least there is no need to assume an *experience of time* properly speaking. That which gives time its character of continuity, so that we treat it as something more than the events which fill it up may be the fact that in a psychological sense it is a function of interests at least as much as it is of intellectual analysis.

If this general approach to some of the problems of temporal perception may be accepted, it follows that time distinctions, as we know them, are not to be treated as a remarkable invention. They are a discovery, a true feat of the development of mind. Once they have been discovered, particularly once they have become conventionalized, human control over the world in which we live is vastly enhanced, and man is helped to move as a master within the clash of change and event which makes up his life.

ADDRESS BY VISCOUNT SAMUEL TO THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

HELD IN PARIS, AUGUST 1-6, 1937 (*Translation*)

I FEEL sure that I am expressing the unanimous feelings of all the foreign members and associates of the Congress when I offer our warm thanks for the most kind welcome that has been extended to us. The great Exhibition has brought a succession of representatives of all the nations to the city which has been for many centuries a metropolis of the world's civilization. It is right that they should dwell, not only on the material manifestations of that civilization, but also on its achievements and its strivings in the realm of intellect. At this International Congress of Philosophy your foreign guests are happy to offer their tribute to the resplendent culture of France.

Among the rest, the British Institute of Philosophy feels it a privilege to participate, particularly since the Congress is dedicated to the memory of Descartes. The greatest contribution of Descartes was the promulgation of his philosophic method, and his method had many points of resemblance with that of our own Francis Bacon. Between the two there was, not indeed an identity, nor even perhaps an alliance, but certainly an *entente cordiale*. We are glad to remember that Descartes was invited to England by King Charles I, who offered him an important post. But for the outbreak of the prolonged and disastrous Civil War, that invitation, it seems, would have been accepted.

Descartes was a precursor. "Le génie," said Victor Hugo, "est un promontoir dans l'avenir." Descartes had genius of that order. He was original above all. He had a healthy disrespect for the philosophers of his own day. Nothing is more dangerous in philosophy than dogma and orthodoxy. The world has suffered much from the tendency to identify philosophy with the study of the classic philosophers; as also to identify religion with religious history, or thought in general with scholarship. As Maurice Barrès has said, "Voilà le meilleur moyen de tout savoir et de ne rien comprendre." We can best imitate the great men of the past, not by repeating their thoughts and their teachings, or copying their deeds, but rather by studying their methods and emulating their originality. We can best imitate Descartes by not being his imitators.

It must be confessed that philosophy in our times has no great influence on the course of events. The ordinary man never thinks

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about it. He passes philosophy by; hears it only as a confused murmur of distant voices. The chief reason for this is obvious; it consists in the difficulty and obscurity of much philosophic writing. "La métaphysique," said Michelet, "c'est l'art de s'égarer avec méthode." Many modern philosophers write in an esoteric language of their own. The ordinary man having either to learn the language or to dispense with the philosophy, usually chooses to dispense with the philosophy. It is true that neither the ancient Greeks nor the modern French need plead guilty to this defect. It has been well said: "La clarté est la souveraine politesse de qui manie une plume." French writers usually follow this rule of literary courtesy—the illustrious Honorary President of this Congress, Professeur Henri Bergson, is a conspicuous example. They offer a welcome contrast to the ruthless obscurity of many of the learned writers of some other nations. If philosophers wish to be followed, they must first consent to be understood.

The age of Descartes was a time of uncertainty. Men were painfully groping their way towards new conceptions of the universe, of life, and of morals. It was the birth of the modern era. We are living to-day in a similar epoch, giving birth perhaps to a world that will be different again. A confusion of thought is the mark of our time. The impact of modern science on the old theologies has now affected all classes and almost all nations, and bewilders mankind. The new proximity of races formerly far apart has added to the confusion. The soul of man is troubled. It is seeking some stable abiding-place.

In the confusion there arises a movement which seeks a way out, not in a return to ancient authority, nor yet in a patient rational examination of our difficulties and a resolute effort to solve them. It is a movement marked rather by an anti-Intellectualism, a "Retreat from Reason"; which relies on mere intuition, on unsupported assertion; is animated by a kind of *mysticisme laïque*. This movement, as we may all see, is bringing the world into great peril. It produces a primitive barbarism in the realm of ideas. If modern civilization falls, as fell the civilization of Rome, it will be due to the attacks, not of barbarians from without, but of barbarians from within.

From such a fate the ordinary men and women, in all countries, must act in order to save it. They need leaders; the leaders themselves need direction; it is for a wise, a courageous—and a comprehensible—philosophy to give that direction. "Philosophers," said Bacon, "are like the stars, which give little light because they are so high." Let them come nearer to earth; let them deal, not only with epistemological problems of the nature of thought, but also with the foundations of ethics and of civic action. To turn ideas into events is the function of statesmen and of citizens; to find the

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right ideas is the function of politics and economics. But who is to set the goal to politics and economics? It is Philosophy, aided by her sisters, Religion and Science. A troubled and anxious world, wandering confused, needs her ultimate guidance. May it be forthcoming.

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PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

A RE-PUBLICATION of the whole of the work of Marsilio Ficino, being an impossibility, Kristeller¹ has presented students with a monumental *Supplementum Ficinianum*, in which he brings together everything that was not included in the Basle edition, which he takes for his basis, everything, that is to say, that he has been able to trace in the course of a very thorough search made in numerous Italian and foreign libraries. In a learned introduction there are prefixed to the edition three indexes, of the codices, editions, and works of Ficino, and with each work is given a concise account of its origin, purpose, and fortune in the world. There follows the collection of Ficino's writings, some unpublished, and some having already been published sporadically, but omitted from the Basle edition. The final items are two indexes of proper names quoted in the Basle edition and in the *Supplementum* respectively.

The reason why such a large quantity of Ficinian material came to be left out of the Basle *Opera Omnia* is that this book did not appear until more than sixty years after Ficino's decease. When the philosopher died in 1499, the greater part of his writings had already been published in separate editions, but a number of them were circulating in manuscript codices. However, before the middle of the sixteenth century the manuscript tradition had already died out, and the unprinted works escaped further notice. Consequently when in 1561 Adamo Enrico Petri wished to collect everything that had been preserved of Ficino's into two volumes he was only able to make use of the existing editions, and succeeded in utilizing only a very small part of the unpublished material, as, for example, in the Commentary on St. Paul and the Sermons. A decade later, in 1576, the same publisher issued a reprint of the work, also in two volumes, the first unchanged, the second amplified by the addition of the commentaries on the *Parmenides* and on the *Timaeus*. In conclusion, in the words of Kristeller, "*Ficinus eos libros quos maioris momenti esse putavit suo tempore imprimendos curavit. Deinde post eius mortem iidem libri saepius sunt typis repetiti, alii autem libri quamvis codicibus divulgati, in lucem non iam prodierunt. Tum editor Basileensis omnes eos libros iam ante separatim impressos in unum corpus coniunxit. Sic ultima tardae illius editionis causa ad ipsum auctoris consilium potest referri*" (p. clxxx).

From a philosophical point of view, what is the value of the material contained in this *Supplementum* for a knowledge of Ficino's thought? It is not easy to give a concise answer to this question. Only a thoroughgoing examination of the whole of Ficino's work could tell us how far the newly unearthed material enhances or modifies our estimate of the philosopher, based on the pre-existing material. And, since the same editor is preparing a comprehensive monograph on Ficino, we must await the results of his new labours. By what I can deduce from a first reading of the *Supplementum*,

¹ SUPPLEMENTUM FICINIANUM. Marsilii Ficini florentini philosophi platonici opuscula inedita et dispersa primum collegit et ex fontibus plerumque manuscriptis edidit auspiciis Regiae Scholae Normalis Superioris Pisanae Paulus Oscar Kristeller. Accedunt indices codicum, editionum, operum Ficini nec non documenta quaedam et testimonia ad eundem pertinentia. Vol. i, pp. clxxx, 141; vol. ii, pp. 382, Florentiae, in aedibus Leonis S. Olschki, mcmxxxvii.

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I tend to the belief that no really new grounds for a modification of opinion have come to light from Kristeller's erudite researches. There is little of doctrinal significance in the additions to Ficino's correspondence; they are in general brief letters from or to Ficino, which, whether owing to the philosopher's pacific temperament, or to the mediocre philosophical competence of his correspondents, bring in no speculative controversial question, and confine themselves to elementary items of information. On the other hand, a *Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum* is of great interest, and merits a comparison with Pico della Mirandola's work of the same title because it contains *in nuce* the principal arguments of which the latter avails himself in order to confute the pretended science of astrology. And, since the one is anterior to the other, a comparison between them would result in a notable diminution of the originality of Mirandola in handling this material. Some short philosophical treatises in Italian are also of noteworthy interest, being perhaps among the earliest documents of the use of the vernacular in philosophical studies. Finally, of great importance are Kristeller's biobibliographical annotations on the correspondents and on Ficino's contemporaries in general whose names recur in his works. They represent a notable contribution to the reconstruction of the cultural environment of the fifteenth century in Italy.

Another recent publication on the Italian Renaissance is an essay by Anagnine on Pico della Mirandola,¹ well-informed from the point of view of the history of philosophy, but not as well balanced in the distribution and development of its parts. The introductory chapters are good, describing the cultural environment, both mediaeval and humanistic, in which Pico developed, that is to say the universities of Padua and Paris, and, although it does not come sufficiently into the picture, the Florence of the Medici. In his analysis of the works, Anagnine attaches excessive importance to the 900 theses of the unsuccessful Roman dispute, regarding them as organic expressions of an already formulated religio-philosophical system of thought, while they are only a congeries of unconnected elements, and the "show-pieces" and paradoxical views are far more in evidence than the more thoughtful and personal themes. Hence the *Apologia* also, which Pico wrote following the condemnation by Rome of the theses, is taken far too literally by Anagnine, as a defence of a philosophical system rather than as a clever retraction in which the venom of some heretical arguments was diluted in more prolix explanations of orthodox savour. The author proceeds to deal at length with Pico's cabalistic studies, through which he skilfully traces the neo-Platonic thread from which originates the far-reaching relationship (dreamed of but not realized by Pico) between Hebrew, pagan, and Christian religious thought and the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. This is the most original part of the book, because the author has taken the trouble to go directly to Pico's cabalistic sources.

The analysis of the work *Against Astrology* is utterly insufficient, and an examination of the famous *Discourse on the Dignity of Man* is deliberately excluded from the study. In this way Anagnine seeks to react against the current interpretation of Pico as an exponent of the individualistic tendencies of the Renaissance, placing instead the universalistic-Christian conception of the Middle Ages in the forefront of his speculative conception of his author. But Anagnine does not perceive that what he gives us in the final chapter of the book as "the vision of Pico's world" has nothing personal about it, but is only the general neo-Platonic scheme common to all the

¹ E. ANAGNINE: *G. Pico della Mirandola*. Bari, Laterza 1937. (*Biblioteca di Cultura moderna*, octavo, pp. vi, 277.)

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thought of the time, and that while it constitutes the irremovable background of his philosophy, yet on the other hand the original interest of the new man is revealed in some divergent or emergent motives, one of the most significant of which is offered by the *Discourse*. Anagnine's mistake lies in having tried to trace a philosophy formed as a whole in the mould of Pico's mind—"a solid block of granite without cracks or crevices of any kind"—whereas this philosophy was a heritage of tradition and the novelty consists in the "cracks."

With regard to the treatise against Astrology, Anagnine remarks that it has been a matter for astonishment "to see Pico so imbued with the Cabal and with magic, down to 1489, transformed later about 1492, into a bitter and implacable adversary of the science of astrology, which after all was '*eiusdem farinae*' and which professed ideas not unlike those of his youthful enthusiasms on the close links between heaven and earth. Of this astrological science his own master, Ficino, was an ardent follower for some time, at least, and its cosmic universalism would seem to favour the ideas that arose in Italy at that time, where they spread widely and achieved popularity. From this attitude of wonderment to speaking of a spiritual crisis which took place in the course of these years was only a step. For the flagrant contradiction into which Pico stumbled when he denied the marvels of astrology after having formerly exalted the wonders of magic an explanation was soon found. Pico's cabalistic ardour must be no more than an error of youth, the product of an inexperienced and too enthusiastic mind. The mishaps that he incurred with his imprudent adhesion to the Cabal must have opened the eyes of one who was a noble victim of these not uncommon superstitions" (p. 238). Anagnine is right in holding this presumed conversion as a fable, but seeing that he participates in the same error as his protagonist, Soldati, that magic and astrology are on the same mental plane, he is compelled to tread on slippery ground in order to demonstrate that there is no incompatibility between the profession of magic and the refutation of astrology on the part of Pico. Now I believe I have shown that not only in the foundations of Pico's work, but following the whole course of Renaissance astrology, down to Weigel, there is a constant tendency among humanists to oppose astrology to magic, and to reject the former as the expression of an astral fatalism repugnant to the new feeling of human autonomy and accept the latter, not only as the expression of an intimate consensus between the forces of man and those of nature, but also as a means by which man could dominate nature directly, because the magical formula of which the magician holds the secret enables him to imprison and to release the immeasurable forces of the macrocosm. But Anagnine does not seem to be aware of my work, *Rinascimento, Riforma e Controriforma*, although it was an elementary obligation for him to take note of the only general work on the theme of his book published in Italy.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by Constance M. Allen.)

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The Destiny of Man. By NICOLAS BERYAEEV. Translated from the Russian by NATALIE DUDDINGTON. (London: Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press. 1937. Pp. vi + 377. 16s. net.)

The author of this remarkable book is a Christian thinker in the succession of Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, to whom Christianity is neither a parable or symbol of eternal truths essentially independent of the events which have served the purpose of bringing them home to others than philosophers; nor yet a revelation of truths inaccessible to reason, superimposed, as it were, upon a body of otherwise ascertainable truth, which it proves indeed, by the information which it imparts concerning this higher region, to be an incomplete and inadequate, but a positively incoherent or even, so far as it goes, an obviously defective account of reality; but the only solution of paradoxical and baffling problems presented by experience to the intelligence of a being disastrously fallen from his original condition and dependent upon the intervention of supernatural grace for the healing of its wounds. It is not surprising that in the work of such a man it is less easy than when dealing with that of thinkers of the types above contrasted with his for a reviewer to confine himself to matters which readers who do not share the author's religious faith would allow to be of philosophical interest; and I have found it impossible in this review to do so.

M. Berdyaev comes forward as a defender of the independence of philosophy against the encroachments of religion and of science alike, complaining that in modern times it has only escaped the former tyranny of theology to fall into a still worse slavery to "autocratic and despotic science." It is no true philosophy if it be not free to face truth, brooking no external constraint from either the one or the other. Yet, if a philosopher is a believer in a revelation, "his thought is bound to be nourished by it." It is for him, however, "not an external authority but an inner fact, a philosophical experience." The Christian thinker is not bound to make his philosophy conform to any theological system; but he owes to his religion "facts and experiences which enrich knowledge" and so "make his philosophy different from that of non-Christian thinkers."

The first chapter deals with "the Problem of Ethical Knowledge." In this "legalistic, normative ethics, for which freedom is merely the condition of fulfilling the moral law" are set aside as inadequate, because this conception of morality "leaves out of account the magic aspect of moral life." The true ethics "must deal both with the tragic and the paradoxical," for "moral life is made up of paradoxes in which good and evil are intertwined" and which "cannot be solved rationally, but have to be lived through to the end."

M. Berdyaev passes in his second chapter to discuss "the Origin of Good and Evil." This cannot, we are told, be explained apart from a prior question as to the relation between God and man, for "the ethical problem presupposes a theodicy." "The good as well as the wicked rebel against God, for they cannot reconcile themselves to the existence of evil" so that "atheism may spring from good motives." Here we begin to see how the Christian revelation illuminates for our author what else would be utterly dark to us. This it does by means of the doctrine of the creation and the fall. But this

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doctrine is misrepresented by those who envisage the whole business as "a divine comedy, a play that God plays with himself"—a view which finds in "Calvin's horrible doctrine" that "God has from all eternity predetermined some to eternal salvation and others to eternal damnation," at once its logical conclusion and its *reductio ad absurdum*. This view can, however, M. Berdyaev thinks, be avoided by invoking the suggestion—to be found in Eckhart and in Boehme—of an *Ungrund*, a Divine Nothingness, the source both in God and in man of what he describes as "meonic" freedom, since it belongs to τὸ μὴ ὄν. "Meonic freedom consented," he tells us, "to God's act of creation, non-being freely accepted being. But through it man fell away from the work of God, evil and pain came into the world, and being was mixed with non-being. This is the real tragedy both of the world and of God. God's act of creation could not avert the possibility of evil contained in meonic freedom" and "the myth of the Fall tells of this powerlessness of the creator to avert the evil resulting from freedom which he has not created." Hence "God's second act in relation to the world and to man," wherein he "appears not in the aspect of Creator but of Redeemer and Saviour, in the aspect of the suffering God who takes upon Himself the sins of the world." As the Son, God "descends into non-being, into the abyss of freedom that has degenerated into evil." "He manifests Himself not in power but in sacrifice" so as to "conquer evil meonic freedom by enlightening it from within without forcing it, without depriving the created world of freedom." "Only such an interpretation of the Divine mystery," says M. Berdyaev, "saves ethics from the danger of atheism." Against the Christian God of love and sacrifice "the moral consciousness cannot rise in the name of 'the good' as it does against the abstract monotheistic God who humiliates His creatures, and endows them with freedom in order to make them responsible for the misuse of it and to punish them cruelly."

"The absolute originality of the Christian teaching lies," according to M. Berdyaev, "in the fact that for it the sun rises equally on the evil and on the good, that the first shall be last and the last first, and that the law of righteousness does not necessarily save." The moral life must be interpreted not as conformity to a fixed norm—whether arbitrarily established by the will of God or as, on the other hand, itself binding God's will no less than ours—but as an activity in which man exhibits his freedom by co-operating with God in the creation of the good and the production of new values. Nicolai Hartmann's objection to the admission of a higher purpose realized in nature as being inconsistent with human freedom and morality is equally an objection to his own doctrine of ideal values which man is to realize in the world. Value and purpose are the creations of man and ethics must begin with the question, What is man?—to the consideration of which the third chapter is devoted.

M. Berdyaev follows in his view of man the teaching of his own "Orthodox" Eastern Church. Man is not a natural being, on whom supernatural gifts were first conferred upon him over and above his natural endowment, and then withdrawn in consequence of the Fall; nor has his original nature been totally depraved by that Fall. Originally created as a spiritual being in the image and likeness of God, the Fall dimmed without destroying that image in him, which is revived through the grace received from God through Christ, the New Adam or God-Man. In virtue of his creation in the image of God, he is not merely a creature (though he is that) but himself a creative being, sharing, as he does, in the uncreated "meonic" freedom which, as it also made his Fall possible, "accounts both for evil and for the creation of what never existed before."

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"Our conception of man," observes M. Berdyaev, "must be founded upon the conception of personality." His treatment of this conception is especially interesting. It is, he tells us, "the creator and the bearer of super-personal values, and this is the only source of its wholeness, unity, and eternal significance. But this must not be taken to mean that personality has no intrinsic value or is merely a means for super-personal values. It is itself an absolute and exalted value, but it can only exist in virtue of super-personal values." It is thus that personality differs from mere individuality. It is "impossible without love and sacrifice, without passing over to the other, to the friend, to the loved one." It is the image in man of the Christian God, who is not a single person, but a trinity of persons living in mutual love and intercommunion. The individual man has only gradually emerged from the primitive condition—symbolized in the myth of Oedipus, to which Freud attaches so far-reaching a significance—wherein there is "no conscious guilt or responsibility and he is, being not yet fully a *person*, the innocent victim of natural forces, especially of that of kindred." He owes to Christianity his final liberation from the power of these and his endowment with a moral life "independent of the tribe or of any collective unit." It is with some surprise that one finds M. Berdyaev affirming that this independence of kindred and society would be impossible except for a pre-existent soul. He does not, however, mean by this that the soul of the individual has passed through a series of previous incarnations; but that it is not merely a product of the genetic process. This does not seem to him sufficiently secured by the ordinary view of the Latin Schoolmen that it is "created at the moment of conception." He prefers to describe it as "created by God in eternity, in the spiritual world." The "new psychology" of Freud and others, concerned as it is (like the great poets and artists, and like 'thinkers' of the type of Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche) with the study of individual character, is greatly superior in depth and truth to the theories of the associationists and of Wundt, which "assumed that man was a healthy creature, mainly conscious and intellectual, and should be studied from that point of view," since it is recognized that he is, on the contrary, "a sick being with a strong unconscious life." Yet it ignores the soul and so misses the only hope of recovery for man from his sickness, which lies not in the attempt to render conscious "the carefully hidden life of sex," but in the reception from above of redeeming grace which can free man from the lower natural elements and sublimate sex into creative activity in union with God.

The second division of M. Berdyaev's book is entitled "Morality on this side of Good and Evil." "Morality in our world," he says, "implies the dualism of good and evil"; that is, as he also puts it, "dividedness and lack of wholeness." It is "the fundamental paradox of ethics" that "the moral good has a bad origin," which "pursues it like a curse." This paradox is, so M. Berdyaev holds, "brought to light by Christianity, which shows that the good understood as a law is powerless." The ethics of law are "both very human and well adapted to human needs and standards, and extremely inhuman and pitiless towards the human personality, its individual destiny and intimate life." "Throughout history man has been cruel in virtue of moral emotions and from a sense of duty." Indeed, "when he loses the instinct of cruelty, he often loses at the same time moral emotions and the sense of duty." Legal morality, "developed at a time when the community completely suppressed the individual, goes on tormenting him even after the personal conscience has awakened and the centre of moral gravity has been transferred to it." The law, however, "is necessary for the sinful world and cannot be simply cancelled." For, though "it does not know the concrete, unique, living

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personality or penetrate into its inner life," it "preserves that personality from interference and violence on the part of others: The ethics of redemption or grace cannot take the place of the ethics of law; where this is attempted (as in medieval theocracy or—in a sense—in Communism) we have despotism and the denial of freedom. It is freedom, not happiness, creativeness, not satisfaction, that man instinctively prefers and aims at. Between freedom and happiness there is an irreconcilable conflict: and the profounder insight of Dostoievsky, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard, followed by the "new" psychology, has made it impossible to be contented not only with hedonism, but even with the Aristotelian endaeonism of St. Thomas and his followers.

Christianity, which supersedes—or at least supplements—the ethics of law by the ethics of redemption, "is founded," M. Berdyaev tells us, "not upon the abstract and impotent idea of the good, which in relation to man inevitably appears as a norm and a law, but upon a living Being, a Personality, and man's personal relation to God and his neighbours." For these ethics "you must act so that the principle of your action could become an universal law; you must always act individually and everyone must act differently." Hence Christianity (according to M. Berdyaev) "does not allow a sharp division of mankind into two halves, the 'good' who are going to heaven and the 'wicked' who are going to hell." One would like to ask him what he would say of the parables of the sheep and the goats, of the wheat and the tares. But no doubt it is in its proclamation of the equality of God's dealings with the just and the unjust alike, and of the precedence of the publican and harlots over the self-righteous Pharisee, that the distinctive quality of the moral teaching of the Gospel is to be found. When M. Berdyaev wishes to contrast this with the demand that we should love "the far off," he insists that it is one's actual neighbour whom the Christian is bidden to love as himself; but he does not seem to recognize any need to reconcile this characteristic of Christian ethics with that of which he goes on to remind us, the claim that one's nearest should be even "hated" if love for them hinder the seeking of the kingdom of God. He is convinced that this kingdom is "not of this world"; that it cannot be expressed by family or state or "any social or historical form" of common life. The agelong attempt to fit it into such forms is never successful. The Gospel liberates man and leaves it to himself "to find a creative solution of the problems that continually confront him."

Thus we come to the "ethics of creativeness." Man cannot create "out of nothing" like God. His material "is borrowed from the world created by God." Creativeness is reminiscent of the vocation of unfallen man, but "since human nature is sinful, creativeness is distorted and perverted by sin, and may be evil." "It opens the way," however, "to a pure, disinterested morality,"—for even when it is evil, creativeness is disinterested—a morality whose "motive is not fear of punishment and of hell, but selfless and disinterested love of God and of the divine in life, of truth and perfection and all positive values." This creative morality "affirms the value of the unique and individual." Passions which, if sinful, "torture man and distort his life" are "the material which may be transformed into a higher qualitative content of life." Creativeness is connected with the energy of sex, to which it imparts a spiritual direction. Ethics must henceforth take account of three objects of human striving which in the present age "are acquiring an unprecedented significance." These three are *freedom, compassion, and creativeness*.

A long and interesting chapter, dealing with "concrete problems of ethics," concludes the second division of the work. It is pointed out that "my life is determined not only by the love for living beings, but also by the love for values—truth, beauty, righteousness—and these two kinds of love may come

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into conflict. The conflict is so real and so poignant that it is equally revolting when personal love is sacrificed to the love of truth and righteousness, and when truth and righteousness are sacrificed to personal love." "When love of goodness and of ideas"—though they be the ideas of God, of humanity, of righteousness—"becomes abstract and fanatical, all is lost and nothing but evil comes of it." "We must love not only the divine in man, only the truth, goodness and beauty in him, i.e. only the valuable content of personality; we must love the human as well, be merciful to this actual human being, love him for nothing. And yet human personality exists only because it has a valuable content, because there is something divine in it, because it is the image of God in man." M. Berdyaev's discussions of the state, of war, of nationalism, of capital punishment, of revolution, of communism, of socialism, of sex, of marriage, of love are full of deep thought and acute insight. His leading conviction is that personality is "the supreme moral value" and yet "does not exist apart from the super-personal and the universal, apart from the value of the idea of which it is the bearer." This idea is the "divine principle, the image and likeness of God." But "this does not in the least imply that the human is a means for the divine. For God the human personality is an end in itself, a friend from whom He expects responsive love and creative achievement. For man God is the final end, the object of his love, the One for Whose sake he performs creative acts. The paradox of the relation between the personal and the super-personal . . . is solved by the religion of the God-man, by the idea of the divinely human love—the only idea which does not destroy personality."

"Ethics," for M. Berdyaev, "must have an eschatological part, dealing with the problem of death and immortality, of hell and of the Kingdom of God." To this the third part of the book before us is devoted. As regards death, "Plato," according to our author, "was right in teaching that philosophy was the practice of death." But his "philosophic doctrine of" natural "immortality does not show the way" to the conquest of death; for "it ignores the fact of death and denies the tragedy of it." Neither does the idealism which "affirms the immortality of the impersonal or the super-personal spirit, of the idea and value, but not of the person." "If there were no death in our world"—if life in our world continued for ever—"life would be meaningless." Life is a continual "partial dying of the human body and the human soul. Death within life is due to the impossibility of embracing the fullness of being, either in time or in space." "The higher and more complex a being is, the more it is threatened with death. Mountains live longer than men, although their life is less complex and lower in quality; Mont Blanc appears to be more immortal than a saint or a genius. Things are comparatively more stable than living beings." The solution of the riddle thus propounded is that death is a necessary part of life, yet is not, as it appears to be, final. This is the teaching of Christianity. "The whole life of this world must be made to pass through death and crucifixion, else it cannot attain resurrection and eternity." "The death of the least and most miserable creature is unendurable, and if it is irremediable the world cannot be accepted or justified. All and everything must be raised to eternal life." "Life seems to conquer death through birth. But the victory of birth after death has nothing to do with personality, with its faith and its hopes; it is concerned with life of the race only." "The Stoic or the Buddhist attitude to death shows impotence in the face of it, but it is nobler than the naturalistic theories which completely ignore death." It is "Christianity alone" that "knows victory over death" from the point of view of personality.

It is, however, by no means here that "faith in immortality is always

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comforting." "It is also a source of sorrow and of an overwhelming responsibility." While unbelievers in it can "comfort themselves with the thought that in eternity there will be no judgment of meaning over their meaningless lives." "Modern rejection of hell makes life too easy, superficial, and irresponsible. But a belief in hell makes moral and spiritual life meaningless, for then the whole of it is lived under torture." "From the *objective* point of view, from the point of view of God, there cannot be any hell. To admit hell would be to deny God." But from "the *subjective* point of view, the point of view of man," hell is "given in human experience." It is "a nightmare which cannot be eternal, but is experienced by man as endless." Origen's denial of an endless hell for any creature in contrast with Calvin's doctrine of its predetermination by God in creation is a fundamental antinomy. "Human freedom is irreconcilable with a compulsory, predetermined salvation, but that same freedom rebels against the idea of hell as a predetermined doom. We cannot deny hell, because this would be contrary to freedom, and we cannot admit it because freedom rises against it." M. Berdyaev is clear that a fully developed moral consciousness must admit the existence of hell. "Moral consciousness began with God's question, 'Cain, where is thy brother Abel?' It will end with another question on the part of God, 'Abel, where is thy brother Cain?' There was a time when the intimidating idea of hell retained the herd-man within the Church; but now this idea can only hinder people from entering the Church." "The idea of everlasting torments in hell is a nightmare, and so is the idea of endless reincarnations, of the disappearance of personality, in the divine being, and even the idea of inevitable universal salvation," for which there is not even any subjective hell to be vanquished. Yet "we can and must believe . . . that the final word belongs to God." "Even if the knowledge that there shall be no hell is withheld from me, I do know . . . that there ought to be no hell, and that I must do my utmost to save and free everyone from it." "Heaven, conceived as a correlation to hell," is no more real than hell itself." "It would be poisoned by the proximity of hell with the everlasting torments of the wicked." But it is an error to suppose that the morality which transcends the opposition of good and evil must "imply indifference to good and evil or toleration of evil." On the contrary, "a morality based upon relegating the wicked to hell is a minimum and not a maximum morality; it renounces victory over evil, it gives up the idea of enlightening and liberating the wicked; it confines itself to distinctions and valuations and does not lead to any actual change and transfiguration of reality." M. Berdyaev supposes that "crucifixion, pain and tragedy will go on in the world until all mankind and the whole world are saved, transfigured, and regenerated. And if it cannot be attained in our world-aeon, there will be other aeons in which the work of salvation and transfiguration will be continued." "We must recognize both that evil is meaningless and that it has meaning." "The positive meaning of evil lies in the fact that it is a trial of freedom and that freedom, the highest quality of the creative, presupposes the possibility of evil." "The final lesson of ethics is 'Act as though you could hear the Divine call to participate through free and creative activity in the Divine work; cultivate in yourself a pure and original conscience, discipline your personality, struggle with evil in yourself and around you—not in order to relegate the wicked to hell and create a kingdom of evil, but to conquer evil and to further a creative regeneration of the wicked.'"

This account of the contents of M. Berdyaev's book will sufficiently convince the readers of *Philosophy* that it is the production of a highly original thinker of great intellectual courage and remarkable insight into what an English poet has called "the abysmal depths of personality." They will be less

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assured that its author is a consistent reasoner and that he has always resisted the temptation of passing lightly over difficulties, too close an attention to which might impede the flight of his speculative genius. But they will, I hope, have aroused in them the desire to ascertain by first-hand study of his work whether or no his present reviewer has done him an injustice by the suggestions of the last sentence. It may be added that there are not a few incidental criticisms, at once sympathetic and penetrating, of contemporary thinkers—notably of Nicolai Hartmann; and a word of praise is due to the English of Mme. Duddington's translation. On p. 25 *n.* for *arbitrio* read *arbitrio*; p. 43, for "incompatable" "incompatible"; p. 250, for "apaphatic," "apophatic."

C. C. J. WEBB.

John Locke. By R. I. AARON. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1937. Pp. ix + 328. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book, the most recent publication in the Leaders of Philosophy series, will undoubtedly take its place with Gibson, *Locke's Theory of Knowledge*, as one of the two standard English text-books on Locke. It is a most scholarly piece of work, and the well-balanced judiciousness and care with which it has been carried out almost leave a reviewer unemployed through lack of objects of criticism. In view of its clearness and thoroughness, combined with a discretion which has prevented the sacrifice of space on unimportant minutiae, the book should be specially useful for honours students at our universities, but on the one hand professional philosophers and on the other hand amateurs interested in Locke could also benefit a great deal from the perusal of it. The type of reader to whom it could not be recommended is the one who wishes to acquire knowledge of Locke without reading the latter's work, i.e. it could not well be used to serve as an easy substitute for the reading of the *Essay* itself.

The work falls into three divisions—an account of Locke's life, a commentary on the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, and a summary of his work on other subjects. The second part, however, includes nearly two-thirds of the book. The author seems sympathetic towards Locke's views except on a few points, such as his tendency to representationism, and holds a middle position between the interpretation of him as the empiricist who set out on the downward path which ended in the "awful example" of Hume and the view according to which he was at least as much a rationalist as an empiricist or even more so. I should myself be inclined to say that he emphasizes the rationalist element in Locke too little, e.g. I cannot see any evidence for the view that Locke was even inclined to a regularity theory of causation and was hovering between it and some other view. His complaint that we cannot see the logical connection between cause and effect itself implies that there is one to be seen. I think that rather more emphasis should have been laid on Locke's view that *a priori* knowledge is the discernment of a connection between our ideas in book iv as an anticipation of the modern doctrine that all *a priori* propositions are hypothetical. It is interesting to note that Professor Aaron is inclined to return to the view that Locke's attack on innate ideas was aimed primarily at Descartes and his followers.

The third part starts by discussing Locke's very incomplete ethics. In dealing with the contradiction between his hedonism and his rationalism, Professor Aaron makes the interesting suggestion that the logical outcome of his teaching is that what is good can be seen *a priori*, but God has arranged

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that it should be followed by pleasure so as to persuade men to do what is good. It is here also that the account of Locke's theory of freedom is given, though it belongs to the *Essay*. Then follow his political, educational, and theological theories. The last two in particular surprise by their modernity and must have shocked contemporaries greatly, so that they are by no means compatible with the common view of Locke as a rather timid exponent of the general views already current in his time. He was a strong opponent of blows in education except in the last extremity, and thought that a method which did not use punishment could prevail with most children, and in theology he thought that the only belief necessary for salvation was the acceptance of Christ, meaning by this Christ's view of God as "merciful." In his political philosophy he is more in accord with the views of his time, in England at least after 1688, but his reply to Hobbes gains a topical interest as an answer to the form which the totalitarian theory took in that day. As in politics, so throughout we find in Locke "that balanced and tolerant attitude to life which characterized late seventeenth-century England at its best," and there are few people who will lay down Professor Aaron's book without feeling that Locke is a greater thinker than they thought when they began.

A. C. EWING.

Plato's Conception of Philosophy. By H. GAUSS, Ph.D., Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Basle. (London: Macmillan and Co. 1937. Pp. xxii + 272. Price 6s. net.)

This book by a Swiss scholar, sponsored in a *Foreword* by Professor Taylor, forms the first of a projected series of "Studies on Plato and Platonism," destined to cover an examination (a) of the First Principles of Platonism, and (b) of Plato's logic, ethics, and social philosophy. What clearly differentiates the author's aim from the multitude of works on Platonic exegesis is his appeal to the general reader, his avowed desire to combat the prevalent Irrationalism of the present age, and, above all, his wide outlook over the history of Platonism as a dominant influence on the thought and life of more than two thousand years. Already in this opening volume Dr. Gauss gives evidence of the breadth and soundness of his scholarship; witness his frequent references to Plotinus and Proclus, as also (he is by profession an Anglican) to the Platonic factors in Christian philosophy. It is this wide reference that lends special interest to the present volume. He asks the question, What did Philosophy mean for Plato? The answer, of course, is "a way of life." Dr. Gauss takes his start from Windelband's fourfold grouping of types of philosophy as displayed in history, and considers successively whether Plato's conception can be regarded as a branch of (1) natural (i.e. scientific) Philosophy, (2) the art of practical life, (3) the handmaid of theological dogma, (4) the critical examination of reason (chs. 1-4.) He concludes that while Plato's philosophy has something in common with all these, it cannot be included under any of them. The last three chapters (5-7, esp. ch. 5) are devoted to a positive exposition of the Platonic "way of life."

The book, though the work of a foreign scholar, is written in admirable English. Though the author makes no attempt to disguise his personal adhesion to the Christian-Platonic tradition, his exposition throughout is scholarly and scrupulously fair. He has the courage of his convictions as an interpreter, as (e.g.) when he refuses to follow Burnet and Taylor in distinguishing the

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Form of Good from God. This decision will doubtless be defended in more detail in a later volume of the series. Chapter 4 contains an excellent survey of Kant's critical philosophy, in relation to its antecedents and issues. Dr. Gauss succeeds in presenting its main principles and the objections to them in language understandable by the general reader. In discussing the religious element in Plato's philosophy (ch. 3), he fails to stress what, in our opinion, is the chief difference between Plato and Christian thought, viz. that for the latter the Judaic-Christian doctrine of Creation *ex nihilo* is fundamental. Plato's Demiurge is an Artificer, not a Creator. Or if, as for Dr. Gauss, God and the Form of Good are one, emanation rather than creation is the term that would apply to its unilateral causality. Our chief criticism on the more constructive chapters (5-7) is that in insisting (rightly) on the inseparability in Plato of philosophy and life, Dr. Gauss does not mark with a firm enough hand the dependence of *praxis* upon *theoria*. The Irrationalism of to-day which he is so anxious to remedy is due largely to a reversal of this relation. Plato (and Christianity) championed the primacy of *Mary*; the modern world has plumped for *Martha*. Dr. Gauss is no Pragmatist, and wards off any such crude interpretation of Plato. But he hardly throws into strong enough relief Plato's insistence on knowledge and contemplative vision as at once the goal and the inspiration of the good life. "In Plato thought and action are always co-ordinated, not the one made subservient to the other" (77). This is surely not the case. Dr. Gauss is led by this error both to depreciate the significance of *ἐπιστήμη* in Plato's philosophy, and to maintain that the Form of Good was unknowable by the human mind. What about the vision of Absolute Beauty in the Symposium?

We cordially recommend this book to all who are interested in Plato and Platonism, and we look forward to the development of the views here outlined in the succeeding volumes of the series.

W. G. DE BURGH.

Plato To-day. By R. H. S. CROSSMAN. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 302. Price 7s. 6d.)

This clever and attractive book should be read by all those interested in the relation of Plato's theories to modern problems. They will find it full of stimulating food for thought, especially on these modern problems. But those who wish to acquire, as a desirable preliminary, a fair, accurate, and sympathetic understanding of Plato's point of view will be well advised to read it with a high degree of critical caution.

The book begins with chapters on the historical background, and on the lives and work of Socrates and of Plato up to the second Syracusan journey. This is most attractively written, as is, indeed, the whole of the book, and its main outlines are not open to serious criticism, though there are a number of debatable points of detail. This is followed by a series of chapters in which an attempt is made to say what Plato would have thought about various modern movements and institutions. There are chapters on "Plato looks at British Democracy," at British Education, at the Family, at Communism, and at Fascism.

The whole line of approach here seems to me much more questionable. One may agree fully that the final justification for the study of Plato is to help towards an understanding of our own situation. One may agree, further, that a number of Plato's general ideas, if developed and applied to our own situation, would open up interesting and suggestive lines of thought. But we have to do that for ourselves. I very much doubt whether this simple and

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direct method of transplanting Plato bodily, so to speak, into our own times and asking what he would have said about this or that is either possible or profitable, except as an amusing game of pure speculation. In the present case there is often quite as much of Mr. Crossman as of Plato in the reflections, particularly in the way of selection and emphasis. With a rather different emphasis and a different selection I would undertake, had I Mr. Crossman's literary gifts, to present a very different picture with quite as much support from Plato's words.

The book concludes with a long chapter on Why Plato Failed, and a short one on The Modern Plato. Here we have Mr. Crossman at his weakest. The last chapter, indeed, I should frankly dismiss as negligible as far as the understanding of Plato goes, though as a hit at some of Mr. Crossman's senior colleagues it makes good reading. But the chapter on why Plato failed is really the culmination of the argument, and deserves a slightly fuller treatment.

Part of the case for Plato's alleged failure is based on the results of the Syracusan experiment. But very little can really be deduced from this. It is certain that Plato would never have admitted that the conditions at Syracuse made any fair test of his ideas possible. Nor, in fact, did they. For nothing that happened at Syracuse could be intelligibly described as an application of Plato's theories to practice. Nor, in any case, could one single instance prove very much either way. There appear to have been a number of cases in which Plato's pupils played a much more successful part in the affairs of their cities than Dion did. Unfortunately we know very little about these. But they are obviously just as important for deciding how Plato's teaching would work in practice as the very special case of Syracuse. In any case, a much more careful analysis would have to be given than Mr. Crossman gives us of the nature and the causes of the failure for any conclusion to be drawn.

It is a great mistake to see the Syracusan episode out of proportion because we happen to know comparatively so much about it. Its personal interest is no doubt great. But its bearing on Plato's theories is slight. There is a further point in that connection in which Mr. Crossman seems to me to go astray. He speaks of the changes or modifications in Plato's views in his later years, and appears to base his conclusions on this point on very conjectural inferences from what happened in connection with Syracuse. He ignores the much more important direct evidence that can be derived from the *Politics* and the *Laws*. The omission of practically all mention of these two dialogues seems to me a great defect in a book that claims to be something more than a mere study of the *Republic*. Incidentally, this might have saved Mr. Crossman from making the quite baseless statement that Plato "in his later years had turned more and more to pure philosophical speculation." In fact, in the writings of these later years a far greater proportion is given to political discussion than at any other period. And there is no evidence to set against this.

The other main criticism of Plato is based on his alleged bias in favour of his own social class. He held, we are told, that his "potential rulers will mostly be found not among the peasants and artisans, but in the ranks of the gentry." And as a consequence his advocacy of an ideal aristocracy became in practice an advocacy of the claims of the existing aristocratic parties.

On the first point, I can find no evidence that Plato actually did hold this. He may have done so. It may even have been true. But that is a question of fact which has no relevance to the truth or falsehood of his fundamental position. Even if he did hold it and was wrong, the most that that could be

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said to show would be that his social prejudices prevented him from applying consistently his own principles. But the value of the principles should be discussed without reference to this. Nor can I find any evidence that Plato's theories became in fact, either for himself or his pupils, an advocacy of the claims of existing aristocratic parties. His pupils, such as Euphracrus and Lycurgus (if he really was a pupil of Plato's), seem to have worked as readily with the democratic parties as with their opponents.

I hope I am not being unfair to Mr. Crossman. But the impression he makes on me is that he is so disturbed (unnecessarily, as I should think) by the difficulty of meeting Plato's arguments that he is trying to counter them by creating prejudice against Plato on what are really irrelevant issues. This might account for the occasional introduction of depreciatory remarks (such as that Plato was ignorant of human nature) without any evidence and in apparent contradiction to what he himself says elsewhere (as when he describes Plato's view of human nature as "grimly realistic"). This is a pity, because it leads him to neglect much more fundamental points which call for discussion. He introduces one such himself right at the end of the chapter, when he raises the question of the nature of scientific knowledge, and compares it with the kind of knowledge that Plato's arguments assume to be possible. This is a really central point, and deserves much less perfunctory treatment than he gives it.

In my judgment the chief benefit that we derive in thinking about our own problems from a study of past thinkers lies in the stimulus it gives to analysis of the different elements involved and distinction of what is peculiar to one situation from the factors of more universal application. And Mr. Crossman's impatience to get on too quickly to direct application to our own situation seems to me likely to sacrifice this benefit. I should be the last to advocate a merely antiquarian treatment of Plato. But I think we ought to be able for the moment to detach ourselves from our own immediate interests and associations, and sink ourselves in his before we can learn anything of value from him. The tendency to think all the time of contemporary problems and to interpret Plato too much in terms of these leads to serious misunderstanding of him. Thus Mr. Crossman's equation of Plato's "noble lies" with propaganda as practised by modern dictators, while it has a core of truth, is really quite misleading if taken literally. Mr. Crossman's own views on contemporary problems are certainly stimulating and often illuminating, and it may well be that our time could be more profitably spent in discussing these than in trying to understand Plato. But it would be a pity that we should think we are doing the one while we are really doing the other.

G. C. FIELD.

Plato's Cosmology. By F. M. CORNFORD. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1937. Pp. xviii+376. Price 16s.)

This invaluable work is a translation, with running commentary, of the *Timaeus*, on the same pattern as the study of the *Sophist* and *Theaetetus* which Professor Cornford has already given us. It naturally challenges comparison with the great work of Professor Taylor, and one can only say that it fills a place that that work did not fill. It does not display the vast erudition in matters of detail of Professor Taylor's work, as can be seen from the fact that it gives under four hundred pages to translation and commentary combined, while Professor Taylor gave nearly seven hundred to notes and commentary alone. But that makes it much more manageable for any except

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the most advanced specialist. Further, Professor Taylor's great fertility in speculation led him in this case to put forward certain views, fundamental to the interpretation of the whole dialogue, which have seemed quite unacceptable and even fantastic to practically all other scholars. There was, therefore, urgent need for a commentary representing a more central and balanced interpretation. And this the present work supplies admirably. Its great learning, sound judgment, and attractive style make it sure of a welcome from all interested in the understanding of Plato.

It is naturally largely concerned with matters of detail, on which it would be out of place to comment here. But I must just mention the brilliant exegesis of the well-known crux, *τῶν αἰδίων θεῶν γεγονόζ ἀγαλμα*, which seems to me finally to dispose of the difficulties that have been found in the passage. On the larger questions Professor Cornford's general methods of interpretation seem to me admirable, and he is always reasonable and persuasive. But, as is only natural, I find some of his views more convincing than others.

Thus, for instance, I find the account of the significance of the Demiurge and his relation to the Forms, the discussion of the meaning of Necessity and of the status of scientific knowledge wholly sound and very illuminating. I find less light on the difficult question of the relation of the Demiurge to the Soul of the World. It seems to me necessary to regard them as really identical, and only distinguished for the purposes of the myth. But there is no definite pronouncement on this point by Professor Cornford. Nor is as much light as I should like thrown on the problem of the exact sense in which we can speak of the creation of individual souls on Plato's view.

On one or two points I should feel inclined to challenge Professor Cornford's interpretation. Thus, I believe that there is a very real sense in which it is true to say that Plato regarded space as the matter out of which the physical universe was made. There seem to me to be too many passages which imply this to be ignored. This is partly, no doubt, a matter of terminology. But not, I think, entirely. Partly as a result of his view on this point Professor Cornford holds that we must ascribe to Plato the belief in an irrational element in the World-Soul. This is an interesting suggestion which one would like to see further developed, but, at first sight at any rate, I fail to find it convincing. I think it is arguable that Plato ought to have held this, but I can find no convincing reason for believing that he actually did.

All these points, however, are questions on which difference of opinion will always be possible. And Professor Cornford is always so careful and reasonable in his views that we can learn as much from him when we differ as when we agree.

G. C. FIELD.

Philosophical Fragments, or A Fragment of Philosophy. By JOHANNES CLIMACUS; responsible for publication, S. Kierkegaard; translated from the Danish with Introduction and Notes by David F. Swenson, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota. (London, Oxford University Press; New York: American-Scandinavian Foundation. 1936. Pp. xxx + 105. Price 7s. 6d.)

Søren Kierkegaard. By THEODOR HAECKER. Translated and with a biographical note by Alexander Dru. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. 67. Price 2s. 6d.)

These two books should be commended to readers of PHILOSOPHY by someone with a knowledge of Kierkegaard more extensive and less second hand

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than any which the present reviewer can claim. There is no doubt that the former is a work of very great interest in itself to all who appreciate the significance for the religious thought of the present time of an isolated man of genius, who not only rebelled against the dominant intellectual fashions of his own day, but wrote in a tongue acquaintance with which was rare among scholars outside of Scandinavia: while the other, contains a useful account of the same remarkable person and of his teaching, with some suggestive criticism of his views.

It was, it seems, the humour of Kierkegaard to publish his thoughts to the world under fictitious names, representing himself as only their introducer to the public. Thus the *Filosofiske Smuler*, *Philosophical Crumbs* or *Fragments*, were ascribed to Johannes Climacus, whose designation, borrowed from an ascetic writer of the sixth century, seems to be intended to hint that in the book attributed to his pen the true author is rather climbing upwards towards his final purpose than as yet in actual occupation of it.

The problem with which these *Fragments* are concerned is thus stated on the title page: "Is an historical point of departure possible for an eternal consciousness? How can such a point of departure have any other than a mere historical interest? Is it possible to base an eternal happiness upon historical knowledge?" It is obvious that this is a question of the first importance for Christian theology. "For," as Kierkegaard himself observes in the course of this very book (p. 92), "it is well known that Christianity is the only historical phenomenon which, in spite of the historical, nay precisely by means of the historical, has offered itself to the individual as a point of departure for his eternal consciousness, has assumed to interest him in another sense than the merely historical, has proposed to base his eternal happiness on his relationship to something historical."

The following quotations will perhaps sufficiently indicate the contribution made by Kierkegaard in the treatise before us to the solution of the question which he has propounded in these terms.

"A simple historical fact is not absolute, and has no power to force an absolute decision. But neither may the historical aspect of our fact be eliminated, for then we have only an eternal fact. Now just as the historical gives occasion for the contemporary to become a disciple, but only it must be noted through receiving the condition from God Himself, since otherwise we speak Socratically" (this expression will shortly be explained), "so the testimony of contemporaries gives occasion for each successor to become a disciple, but only, it must be noted, through receiving the condition from God Himself" (p. 84). (The expression "speak Socratically" refers to Kierkegaard's view—expressed on p. 6 of this book—that for Socrates "every point of departure in time is *co ipso* accidental, an occasion, a vanishing moment.")

Again: "There is not and never can be a disciple at second hand; for the believer—and he alone is a disciple—is always in possession of the autopsy of faith; he does not see through the eyes of another, and he sees only what every believer sees—with the eyes of faith" (pp. 85, 86).

Yet again: "If the contemporary generation had left nothing behind them but these words: 'We have believed that in such and such a year God appeared among us in the humble figure of a servant, that He lived and taught in our community, and finally died,' it would be more than enough. . . . The testimony of the contemporary provides an occasion for the successor, just as the immediate contemporaneity provides an occasion for the contemporary" (pp. 87, 88).

And, once more: "There is no disciple at second hand. The first and the last are essentially on the same plane, only that a later generation finds its

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occasion in the testimony of a contemporary generation, while the contemporary generation finds this occasion in its own immediate contemporaneity, and in so far owes nothing to any other generation. But this immediate contemporaneity is merely an occasion, which can scarcely be expressed more emphatically than in the proposition that the disciple, if he understood himself, must wish that the immediate contemporaneity should cease, by God's having the earth" (p. 88). (The reference in the last sentence is, of course, to John xvi. 7.)

Written in 1843, in the heyday of the dominance of the Hegelian philosophy in the schools of Germany and of the lands which looked to Germany for philosophical leadership, the book before us contains many digs at the ruling system, to its birth under the shadow of which, however, Kierkegaard's own philosophy doubtless owed in the main its own markedly "dialectical" character. Even the representation of Christianity as essentially a "paradox," and so necessarily an offence to reason, demanding for its acceptance not reason but faith, while put forward in opposition to the tendency of the theology associated with post-Kantian idealism to minimize the significance of Christianity as a unique revelation of God in history, bears upon its own the unmistakable stamp of the type of thought against which it expresses a reaction. But it is none the less of great importance for the understanding of Christianity that it should be presented not only as an unveiling of the eternal nature of God in which the historical circumstances attending the revelation have only a transitory value, symbolical or illustrative, but as something without parallel or possible substitute, an Incarnation unprecedented and unrepeatable. Mr. Haecker, who is himself evidently a Roman Catholic, while emphasizing the genuine service rendered to Christian theology by Kierkegaard in his insistence on the singularity of Christian experience, points out that his presentation of Christianity in the *Philosophical Fragments* suffers from its detachment, for all the stress laid by him on historical reality, from the actual historical context afforded by Church and Sacraments; and this not only as that context appears in Roman Catholicism; for, in his recoil from the compromise with the world to which the State Church of his own country seemed to him to be committed, Kierkegaard refused on his deathbed to receive the communion from those who were to him only "the king's officials." In the *Philosophical Fragments* again, as Mr. Haecker points out, the manifestation of God in time which is the special object of Christian faith is apparently regarded as not merely paradoxical, but as catastrophic—somewhat after the fashion of Marcion—and here the line of thought represented by Karl Barth in the present generation seems inclined to follow Kierkegaard.

Professor Swenson's translation occasionally—especially in the earlier pages of the *Philosophical Fragments*—offers sentences which can scarcely be called intelligible English (e.g., on p. 8, "the Socratic self-denial to think its nothingness"), but on the whole reads well; and he deserves the gratitude of English-speaking readers for making this thought-provoking book available to them in their own language.

C. C. J. WEBB.

The Philosophical Bases of Theism. By G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., Fellow of the British Academy and Emeritus Professor of Philosophy in the University of London. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 272. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

In a generation whereof some of the most distinguished theologians, in their desire to emphasize the uniqueness of the Christian revelation, refuse

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to leave room in their defence of a religious view of the world for a *natural* theology, the reassertion in these lucid and weighty Hibbert Lectures, by a thinker of Professor Dawes Hicks's competence and distinction, of the "philosophical bases" of the belief in God as a supreme living, intelligent, and personal Being, the source of the order, beauty, and goodness to be found in nature and of the minds which apprehend these, is timely and welcome. The arguments urged in support of such a belief are none the worse for being familiar, and they are, as one would expect from the writer, so stated as to exhibit their strength in view of the objections most often brought against them by representatives of the science and thought of to-day. It is, however, to be noted that, as Prof. Dawes Hicks points out in his Preface, the problem of evil is left on one side and reserved for future treatment; while nothing is said about the problem, so intimately associated with the tradition of natural theology and with the acceptance of such a theism as is here maintained, of human immortality: for his judgment of this question we are referred to other works of our author already in print.

Professor Dawes Hicks holds that the distinctive feature of the kind of thinking which we distinguish as "philosophical" from that which we call "scientific" is that "all parts of what we take to be reality are contemplated as having a common relation to the thoughts and interests of the human conscious subject." The work of philosophy lies in the critical examination of human experience, and its "ultimate task" is "to frame a coherent representation of reality as a whole which will enable us to connect together consistently and harmoniously the several facts and aspects of our total experience." It cannot therefore ignore a feature of human life which have had throughout the whole course of man's history so far-reaching an influence on his experience as religion. Everything goes to show that religion is "a normal and universal expression of human nature" and that it is closely associated with what are generally admitted to be its greatest achievements. It is thus obviously the function of philosophy critically to examine religious experience, as it is the duty of those who set store by it to submit it to such free and open inquiry as alone can justify its pretensions to be genuine knowledge. For Prof. Dawes Hicks this inquiry must be concentrated on what he finds to be "the central affirmation of the religious consciousness, at least in modern times," namely, "the assurance of a conscious relation" of human minds "to a supreme Mind transcending the whole family of dependent minds."

If philosophy is what Professor Dawes Hicks has defined it as being, it must necessarily be in a sense "anthropomorphic"; and his second Lecture, which he calls, borrowing the title of a work by Thomas Huxley, "Man's Place in Nature," discriminates true from false anthropomorphism, and contends that the importance of the spiritual qualities by which man, and man alone among the natural objects within our knowledge, is distinguished, being "absolutely incommensurable with material magnitude," is in no way reduced by the consideration of the contrast between man's material insignificance and the immensity of the universe contemplated by astronomical science. We are invited to "acknowledge with Lotze how absolutely widespread is the *extent* of the mechanism" and "how perfectly subordinate is the *significance* of the function which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world." The unsatisfactoriness of the explanations offered by scientific naturalism of our sense either of beauty or of moral obligation is once more exposed; and the attempt of Positivism to supply in "humanity" an adequate object for the religious sentiment is acutely examined and dismissed.

Of the traditional arguments for the existence of God Professor Dawes

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Hicks regards the Cosmological Argument—which he restates in a form similar to that suggested by Professor Taylor in his “Vindication of Religion” in *Essays, Catholic and Critical*—as successful in establishing the conclusion that “the realm of nature is not the whole of Reality, that the existence of nature being contingent existence is dependent upon a mode of Being that is not contingent but necessary.” Yet, since in itself it “throws no light upon the character of this absolutely necessary Being, it prepares the way for theism, but does not, in itself, entitle us to assert that the self-explanatory ground of nature is a conscious Mind or Personality.” This can, however, be made probable by the Teleological Argument, which is not merely speculative, but takes as its starting point the examination of “the various facts and aspects of nature, inclusive of man, that fall within the sphere of our observation, and by detecting, if we can, the indications they afford of the kind of reality upon which they depend.” Finally, the argument from the beauty discovered in nature (and in this connection Professor Dawes Hicks’s reference to Mr. Shebbeare’s striking and too little known treatment of this subject is to be noted) and the argument from the character of our moral ideals are shown to support the conclusion to which the “adaptations” in nature were found to point.

Professor Dawes Hicks’s treatment of these themes, while following, as has already been said, familiar lines, is forcible and persuasive. But the examination of religious experience, which occupies the third and fourth Lectures, is less satisfactory. Much that is valuable is, indeed, to be found there. I would instance the decided refusal to depreciate or minimize the part played by reason in religion; the endorsement of Cook Wilson’s insistence on the importance of the sentiment of reverence as the distinctively religious emotion (though perhaps less weight is given than it deserves to the Oxford philosopher’s argument thence to the validity of the conception which it implies); and the account of the relation of “faith” and “knowledge.” But it is difficult not to feel that the problem of religious experience is unduly simplified for our author by his obvious lack of sympathy with the mystical type of religion. One may indeed agree with him that the “immediacy” of certain experiences is sometimes dwelt upon without sufficient discrimination of an “immediacy” which is *above* and an “immediacy” which is *below* the level of rational mediation; or again that some writers are apt to confound under the same name of “mystical” widely different types of religious experience to some of which the name is very doubtfully applicable. But one may notwithstanding suspect that the turn of mind which leads Professor Dawes Hicks to treat as meaningless any language which speaks of the relation of our spirit to the Divine Spirit in terms other than those of such mutual impenetrability as exists between two finite spirits allows him to be too content to regard such terms as wholly adequate to express even the latter relation.

So, too, the concluding Lecture of the course, which deals with the contrast of Pantheism and Theism, would be more valuable if it evinced a fuller recognition of the truth (for such it seems to the present writer) that it is not merely philosophical theory but religious experience itself that leads to dissatisfaction with a “theism” so well satisfied with this doctrine of mutual exclusion that it is never beset by the temptation to pass the line dividing it from “pantheism.”

On p. 45, l. 1, for “lonely” read “lowly.” At the bottom of p. 148 quotation marks should be substituted for brackets. In reading p. 89 one wonders who ever held the “ecclesiastical doctrine” of the “final authority” of the Thirty-nine Articles.

C. C. J. WEBB.

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The One Sure Foundation for Democracy. By STANTON COIT, D.Ph. (London: C. A. Watts & Co. 1937. Pp. viii + 55. Price 2s.)

Why is it that a real Democracy, conjoining intelligent authority of the community with individual liberty of self-development, has never been achieved? This is the problem to which Dr. Coit, in his Conway Memorial Lecture, addresses himself with all the wisdom which a long life, devoted to the theory and practical teaching of ethics, has endowed him. Though his ultimate solution for the achievement of Democracy rests upon the right feelings and desires of the peoples as a whole, he does not believe that a people possesses yet a sufficiently trained intellectual and moral insight for this task. There is an evil principle in the animal man which works against the application of that insight of true values which Democracy enjoins. A blind rush of popular power cannot succeed in overthrowing the barriers of class rule and, if it could, the proletarian government it would set up would not fulfil the moral requirements of Democracy. Moral insight, however, as a natural gift of man, needs cultivation in order to play its proper part, and Dr. Coit, who has devoted half a century to this work, records here the results of his experiences. "Man must be brought to the level of moral accountancy by educating and training, by directing his attentions from infancy systematically throughout life to moral values and their infinite importance" (p. 49). Since evil has a more assertive reality than good, this education will be directed chiefly to securing admiration for good conduct by repudiation and hatred of bad conduct. Goodness, peace, security are almost wholly negative conceptions in their first appearance and their positive significance can only be built up by slow degrees. This moral education must begin with the children and adult members of the upper classes, who must be prepared to accept as just and reasonable many radical reforms of those political and economic advantages which they have been brought up to believe as their rightful privileges. But this moral enlightenment must spread among the masses, if Democracy is to be based upon justice, not on force.

It is a powerful plea for the Kantian-Socratic method of spiritual discipline. "When such a method has been practised for a decade by all the religious and educational systems on earth, the present-day obtuseness to the mental and moral influence of social atmosphere will seem more akin to the mentality of brutes than of spiritual agents" (p. 29).

This reasoning will not, of course, seem convincing to Marxists and other economic determinists, who hold that the religious and educational systems are in the main products and supports of those social inequalities which Democracy is called upon to overthrow. To eliminate the brute, who after all has some excellent qualities and aptitudes, and substitute a purely spiritual agent, may not be practicable or even necessary. "To feed the brute," mentally and morally, may be the better policy.

J. A. HOBSON.

Hume's Theory of Knowledge. A Critical Examination. By CONSTANCE MAUND. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1937. Pp. xxi + 310. Price 12s. 6d.)

Mrs. Maund has written a careful and accurate study of Hume's epistemology. By a thorough analysis of each of his main problems she shows its real significance and the strength and weakness of Hume's solution. Where his position is weak she looks carefully for traces of an alternative and sounder view, but she never makes the mistake of improving her author out of recognition, and her criticism is always clear and unequivocal. She adds her quota to the recent revival of Hume by insisting that anyone who thinks of his

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philosophy either as mere psychological associationism or as the self-destruction of pure empiricism will miss most of his greatness. She also reinstates the *Enquiry* as a genuine and in some ways improved recasting of his views and not merely a watered-down popularization of the *Treatise*. Her book is written with unrelenting sobriety and sincerity and especially in its early chapters should interest students who wish to concentrate on Hume's permanent significance in philosophy.

Her method and approach suggest one criticism. She speaks of each mental act as having an "accusative," whose analysis is Hume's problem, and she is occasionally inclined to write as if "accusative" were not merely a preliminary description of one aspect of the problem but as if it were the name of the immediate object of the mental act. It is then an object which, because it is immediate, is always apprehended with certainty. For instance on pp. 236, 237 it is suggested that the accusative of any act indubitably exists, and the only problem is "What is its nature and its relation to other accusatives?" This tendency does not, however, damage her treatment of Hume himself, though it would suggest the need of some further clarification of her own views on epistemology.

J. D. MABBOTT.

Structure and Reality: A Study of First Principles. By D. W. GOTSHALK.
(New York: The Dial Press. 1937. Pp. xvi + 292. Price \$2.75.)

In this book, deservedly subsidized by the American Council of Learned Societies, the chief metaphysical principles are described in successive chapters upon continuants, events and relation; a discussion on space and time, causality and teleology follows; and the book ends with chapters upon "pluralistic monism" and upon "God and man."

The author is pertinaciously metaphysical, and that is highly to his credit. He writes with great superficial and much genuine clarity. He is well acquainted with contemporary philosophy, but does not make the mistake of regarding the masters of the past as outmoded. The reasonableness of the book's temper and the firm moderation of its tone are altogether admirable.

My frank recognition of these high merits will prevent me, I hope, from being misunderstood if I make certain critical comments. Mr. Gotshalk says of Whitehead, to whom he owes a great deal, that "he appears to lean a bit too much" in such-and-such a direction "to be followed completely." The same thing strikes me about Mr. Gotshalk.

At the very outset I do not find his account of continuants and events at all convincing. Mr. Gotshalk would agree, I suppose, that the problem of change and permanence is not solved at all if we are presented, on the one hand, with unaging "things" and on the other hand with "transitions"; and that is what would happen if a "continuant" were just a name for a non-historical thing or substance and an "event" were just a name for a transition, change, or process. My difficulty regarding Mr. Gotshalk's views about "continuants" is that much that he says about them seems to be of this order, although much of it is not. When he speaks of a continuant as an energy-inheritor, the natural meaning is that it is renewed from moment to moment and inherits just as a continuing flame inherits. In that case, however, a continuant would be what this author calls an "endurance," and he treats an "endurance" as an event. On the other hand, he often calls a continuant a "thing," "material" a "route" (i.e. I suppose a solid and permanent road to travel along). I do not feel comfortable about these two ways of speaking when they are taken together, and I cannot think it is a

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matter of "taste and suggestiveness," as Mr. Gotshalk says (p. 51), whether Mr. Whitehead is right in holding that "events are in some sense the ultimate substance of nature." On the contrary, this appears to me to be a primary problem of metaphysics.

I also find Mr. Gotshalk's positive account of relation very difficult (although, negatively, he is an effective critic of several other people). With him "relation" tends to mean "form" or "structure"; and that is a still more general conception implied in the very being both of continuants and of events. And surely he has forgotten his admission that relations are "inter-ingredient" when he says (p. 78) that relation is "the structure present within realities." He also appears to assume uncritically that identity is a relation (e.g. p. 79).

The next triad of chapters give him an opportunity of discussing relativity, the Heisenberg principle, and the like. They are careful particular discussions of particular problems. The central problem of causality, he thinks, is "the existential determination of sequent events and continuant states." By teleology he means primarily selectivity. It is therefore tautological to say that efficient causality is also teleological. For efficient causality is obviously selective.

The last two chapters are short. That on "pluralistic monism" (or "atomistic organicity"?) follow Mr. Morris Cohen rather closely, and the final chapter on "God and man" seems to me to be over-confident. The Whole, Mr. Gotshalk says, does not change, but has being, is infinite, individual, eternal, intelligible, perfect, and free. This Whole is God, and its changelessness is not inconsistent with the previous metaphysics because it is quite usual for a whole to possess properties that its parts do not possess.

That, no doubt, is true. A watch keeps time and its case does not. But it is unusual, to say the least, for a whole to possess no property that its parts possess, e.g. for a watch to have weight when its hands and springs have no weight at all. The Whole, on Mr. Gotshalk's showing (I prefer not to call it "God"), seems to be outside all his categories. It is not a continuant, It is not an event, and I do not see how It can be strictly a relation. An even more serious difficulty, however, is that Mr. Gotshalk appears to hold (like Mr. Whitehead) that events are "indefinite" before they occur. As he says (p. 42), "A change is a transition from indefiniteness to definiteness. Prior to a change, its novel terminus is indefinite, lying in the future. After the change the novelty is definite." But, according to Mr. Gotshalk (p. 262), "on our view Reality [i.e. I suppose the Whole] is definite." This seems to me to be a plain contradiction. The indefiniteness of the future is a metaphysical principle about existence, and cannot be abrogated in the case of the Existence of the Whole.

JOHN LAIRD.

Causation, Freedom, and Determinism: An Attempt to Solve the Causal Problem through a Study of its Origins in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. By MORTIMER TAUBE, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 262. Price 10s. net.)

This book confidently takes the tempting line of distinguishing causality altogether from necessitation (or "determinism") and holding in consequence that causality, so far from being irreconcilable with freedom, implies freedom. The argument is complicated, however, by the author's decision to set himself a double task. He is anxious to show that the greater seventeenth-century philosophers agreed with him and that later authors like Hume obscured the

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entire question by supplanting the sensible notion of active power with the unintelligible notion of determinism.

This double objective is a little trying to the reader who, even if he finds the thesis attractive and the history quite absorbing, is almost certain to have his attention distracted. Is the history true? Is the thesis sound? Does the history support the thesis? Does it matter whether it does or doesn't? For my part I have enjoyed the book very much indeed; but I doubt both history and thesis.

The history, I think, is a tendentious business. It is compelled, overfrequently, to say, "X unless he was talking nonsense must have meant so-and-so," and much of it, especially in its account of Spinoza, seems to me to consist at least as much of criticism as of exegesis.

The thesis, however, is still more important. The author decides, by a simple appeal to his own experience, that he is free and that he exercises causal power. Therefore his action cannot be fixed in advance, that is to say, determined.

This implies negatively that he knows that some of his actions are not determined; and I agree with Leibniz and (I should say) with Spinoza, that no one is entitled to base this alleged piece of knowledge on inspection of himself. We may indeed be ignorant of such determination, if it exists, but how can we *know* that it is absent? This author's contention, however, on its negative side, is still more difficult to establish. By "power" he means spontaneous power. Therefore (he holds) there can be no such thing as derived or caused power. Therefore in his experience of activity he has to hold that he can distinguish between spontaneity and all that is derived, so that he can see quite clearly that no part of his spontaneous causality is derived. And it seems monstrous to make such a claim. On the positive side he argues, very fairly, that he can distinguish between mere succession and his "causal" doings. Thus if a leaf falls while he is pushing his lawn-mower there is succession but no causality on his part with regard to the leaf. This proves a certain connectiveness in causal succession that is absent in mere succession, but cannot prove that "causation" is more than a species of succession.

It is legitimate to say that the "power" we think we are conscious that we exercise need not be uniform—although those who argue so commonly proceed to ask for a "reason" for the variation. On this important point, however, the author contradicts himself flatly. On p. 20 he says that "the concept of active power and the concept of uniformity exclude one another." On p. 123 he says that, "In itself 'a regularity view' of causation does not imply the denial of causal efficacy." At the end of his book he argues (p. 248) that the "general causal influence" of a stable environment is the probable basis of inductive argument and of the prediction of regularity in the future.

Among other points I would mention two. The first is the author's view that omniscient foreknowledge, if it existed, would imply determinism. That was what Hobbes said and Leibniz denied. The author wrongly agrees with Hobbes. For plainly if God were free he might know in advance with complete certainty what he and his universe would do, although it would also be true that God *might* act differently (i.e. would have the "power" to do so) or *might* make his universe act differently.

The second is that this author is capable of palpable misrepresentation. An egregious example is this. He tells us (p. 229) that Moore, on p. 78 of his *Philosophical Studies*, "admits ultimately that he cannot give any meaning to the term 'existence'." Returning to the question in an Appendix, Dr. Taube quotes the said page 78, and the words quoted are, "What is this common

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simple sense of the word 'exists'? For my own part it seems to me so simple that it cannot be expressed in other words except those which are recognized as its synonyms. I think we are all perfectly familiar with its meaning." It is open to Dr. Taube to say that Moore's "common simple meaning" is *not* a meaning. It is utterly false to say that Moore *admits* that the term has no meaning.

To readers of this book I think I can promise great interest, considerable profit, and little or no conviction.

JOHN LAIRD.

Types of Aesthetic Judgment. By E. M. BARTLETT, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 241. Price 7s. 6d.)

The publication of Miss Bartlett's thesis for her Doctorate will enable many students of aesthetics to profit from her clear and painstaking treatment of some of its outstanding problems; her readers will be grateful to those who made publication possible. Her study is methodological in conception, being aimed at ascertaining the correct method whereby the problems of aesthetics may be solved rather than at the working out of any new theory. In her first chapter she rightly dismisses the metaphysical method as importing prejudice into the inquiry, and only allows the metaphysical question to be raised *after* the spade-work of impartial analysis is over. Her next chapter shows equally conclusively that neither psychological theories founded on the mental reactions of the subject nor objective theories based on material objects in art or nature can claim to cover all the facts of aesthetic experience. Aesthetics must take account of features belonging to both the inside and the outside worlds, and these will be revealed by analysis of the aesthetic judgment. "The essential character of the aesthetic fact is," according to the writer, "one of judgment." She believes that subjective and objective factors in this experience will both emerge from her analysis of the logical subject and predicate in the judgment "This is beautiful." This view surely lays an altogether undue emphasis on the formulation of aesthetic judgments, and is hardly consistent with Miss Bartlett's own claim to impartiality. For why should the logical factor be more important for aesthetics than the psychological factor, than the work of art, than the object deemed beautiful in nature? It is a grave error to treat aesthetics as an offshoot of logic, and to regard propositions as being of the same importance for the former as they are for the latter discipline. I know that the fault lies by no means entirely with the author; for at London University, where she studied for her Doctorate, aesthetics still clings to the petticoats of logic, and has not yet attained the autonomous status it already enjoys at the leading Continental universities. Besides, "beautiful" is an unhappy predicate to choose because it unduly limits the range of aesthetic experience. Miss Bartlett herself recognizes (on p. 232) that in the case of her "aesthetic minimum" the judgment is not one of beauty. There are, indeed, many interesting problems arising from the verdict of taste, but the most important of these for aesthetics—I mean the question of whether a judgment of aesthetic value is normative or merely relative to individual liking—is not even mentioned in the pages of the present study. How soon will aestheticians realize that the methodological problem can never be solved in terms of *one* sovereign method; for if they start, as they should do, from aesthetic experience in all its amplitude and diversity, they are bound to apply as many methods—logical, psychological, sociological, genetic, *kunstwissenschaftlich*, and finally philosophical—as its multiform aspects demand.

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However doubtful the author's choice of method may be, it has at least the merit of acknowledging that aesthetics is concerned with material objects as well as with immaterial minds. On this basis she makes her contribution of substance to the subject. Her subsequent chapters on the aesthetic minimum, on the creative activity, on appreciation, on nature, are always stimulating and well reasoned. But I cannot accept her aesthetic minimum, which is another formulation of the idea of distance or detachment in aesthetic experience, either as a factor common to every aspect of this experience or even as the central feature of appreciation. For it seems to me to be absent from the creative or "impulsive" attitude of the artist, and to be a necessary rather than a sufficient condition of the spectator's appreciation. Space does not permit a detailed criticism of this provoking study; but there are two observations about the book as a whole that call for utterance. The writer is manifestly partial to all forms and harmonies that delight the eye or the ear; but she will never go far in aesthetics until she is prepared to acknowledge the spontaneous warmth of feeling that suffuses the cold forms of art and nature with glowing vitality, with throbbing emotion, with winged desire. Finally, let me record my dismay when I failed to find reference in the bibliography to a single foreign work on aesthetics in the vernacular. The best things done in France and Germany are still untranslated; and how can we hope to improve on the classics so long as they remain unread?

LISTOWEL.

Art and Society. By HERBERT READ. (London: Heinemann Ltd. 1937. Pp. xix + 282. Price 10s.)

The social factor in the history and development of the fine arts is one that has long been neglected by theorists in this country, and it is therefore refreshing to find that Mr. Herbert Read has followed up his admirable work in other fields of the science of art by an examination of the relationship between art and organized society. This problem he studies in four of the seven chapters in his reprinted lectures at Liverpool University, and they are the pith and marrow of the book. His grasp of the basic relation between art and society is thoroughly sound; for the aesthetic impulse is rightly regarded as an "irreducible component" of the human mind, and cannot be derived—*pace* Marx—from any of the economic or social institutions established by gregarious mammals. Society is therefore the primary environmental factor influencing the artist and so determining to some degree the character of his work. Its importance is more evident in primitive than in civilized cultures, because the march of civilization leads away from social institutions and towards the solitary depths of individual consciousness; and Mr. Read does well to devote half his sociological study to palaeolithic and neolithic art, to the art of primitive contemporaries, and to the art of childhood. But he is not sufficiently sensible to the profound differences between these types of primitive art, nor, in so limited a space, can he embrace more than a few of the collective factors whose influence at this stage in art history is so marked. The latter criticism applies equally to his two succeeding chapters on the part played by the three main historical religions in the growth of civilized art, and on art in the modern era as a luxury commodity ministering to the vanity of the rich.

The three remaining chapters are a sad anti-climax, for Mr. Read has strayed inadvertently into what still remains for him the *terra incognita* of psychological analysis. We are confronted by an unhappy conversion to the Freudian method in aesthetics; "psycho-analysis," we are told, "is also the

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key to most of the unsolved problems of art." It follows naturally that "the artist is always to be regarded as neurotic" and that the childish eccentricities of "super-realism" are the glorious apogee of modern art because they give free reign to the artist's unconscious impulses.

LISTOWEL.

The Lasting Elements of Individualism. By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING.
(New Haven: Yale University Press. London: Oxford University Press,
Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. xiv+187. Price 2 dollars; 9s. net.)

This stimulating little book is an expansion and rewriting of the first series of lectures delivered under the Mahlon Powell foundation in the University of Indiana. The first three chapters are devoted to explaining what individualism is, and to accounting for the discredit into which it has recently fallen. In the first, Professor Hocking defines individualism and liberalism, and in the course of his attempt to justify and illustrate his definitions he maintains (amongst other interesting things) that the individual is logically, though not historically, prior to the State. In the second he urges that liberalism, though "the most successful conscious political hypothesis of human history" (p. 38), has failed in three vital respects: it has been hostile to social unity; it has encouraged the belief in rights without duties; and the emotional force which it now generates in its devotees is neither sufficient in intensity nor of the right nature. In the third chapter, on the "Dialectic of Liberalism," he offers a criticism of Mill's classic statement of liberal principles, considers how far Marx would agree with the diagnosis of the preceding chapter, and proceeds, through a comparison of the two thinkers, to the conclusion that the ultimate political unit is neither the pure individual nor the social organism (in both of which he disbelieves) but individuals equipped with the "joining function" and capable therefore of building societies.

In the remaining two chapters Professor Hocking becomes more constructive, in the fourth describing two "necessities of future societies," and in the fifth attempting to reconcile these together through the conception of the "co-agent State." The first necessity is for social unity, which he thinks can be most effectively achieved in an active State, by means of what he calls the "commotive function" and in illustration he considers the communist and fascist experiments, of which the activity and commotivity are of the wrong kind and produce a unity of the wrong kind. The second necessity is for the "incompressible individual," whom communism and fascism improperly neglect, and is expressed in the demand that "every man shall be a whole man" (p. 133). In the discussion of the "co-agent State" the main idea is that of the "extrapolation of will," according to which the citizen does not so much consent to the acts of his State as initiate them, and the State is not so much his representative as an agent carrying out his wishes, and especially the fundamental wish for its own continuance. After this idea has been introduced, the bulk of the final chapter is devoted to showing how it could be realized in practice, as it already is to some extent in small societies; and to that end Professor Hocking considers "what the State might do" in relation to some of the more important practical issues of the day.

Professor Hocking's main problem is thus the old and fundamental one of reconciling the demand for a free individual with that for a strong State by showing what kind of strength in the State is compatible with freedom in the individual. But he is more sensitive than many writers to the impli-

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cations of both demands, supposing the truth to lie in some form of individualism and at the same time maintaining that in practice the chief need is for a strong State. Indeed, the most obvious interest of his book is in an attempt to re-state the individualist position in such a way as to do full justice to the defects of which we have recently become conscious. Moreover, he says much that is suggestive, if not original, in the course of the attempt. In spite of a somewhat compressed and fragmentary structure, and of an irritating allusiveness and obscurity of manner, the argument never fails to shed light on the topics with which it deals; and the illustrative material, though sometimes irrelevant, is never uninteresting. But the more constructive portions of the book are very briefly worked out, and are much less adequate than the other parts in their recognition of what human beings and societies are actually like. The "co-agent State" is admittedly only an ideal; and the attempt to show how it could be made real is hardly detailed or concrete enough to carry conviction. Nor is much attention paid to considering how in fact the "commotive function" could be exerted by (or on) ordinary men and women in untotitarian ways, or to the difficulties involved in the demand that social unity shall be achieved by means of it. In actual fact human nature is surely such that it will only be exerted by a minority of people; the majority can do no more than have it exerted on them. But if this is so, the problems of liberty and equality will arise with a force to which Professor Hocking does not do justice. Even if, *per impossibile*, the function were exerted by everybody, it would be as likely to generate conflict as unity. We are also left in some doubt about the "incompressible individual." The chief point about him seems to be that the respect for him is a necessary condition of the survival of societies; but it is also suggested that he will in any case provide a safe bulwark against the final success of totalitarian encroachments.

Defects of this nature do not of course arise to the same extent in the earlier chapters; and the whole book is so short that it is perhaps unfair to criticize it for faults of omission. But it is difficult not to regret the absence from the third chapter of any discussion of a philosophical opponent of individualism. In these days, no doubt, the more Marx is discussed by philosophers, the better; but Bosanquet, to take the obvious example, so explicitly opposes Mill, and advances views so similar in many respects to Professor Hocking's own, that a few pages about him would have considerably illuminated the argument at this important point. At the same time, the reader cannot fail to be stimulated by the whole discussion; and in so short a book it is perhaps unreasonable to look for other virtues.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

Pascal: The Life of Genius. By MORRIS BISHOP. (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1937. Pp. xi + 398. Price 12s. 6d net.)

Professor Bishop, who occupies the chair of Romance language and literature at Cornell, has evidently found a congenial task in his study of the great Port-Royalist. He divides his book into sections, each corresponding to some aspect of Pascal's career. We begin with the infant prodigy and his family. We follow his early career in physics and mathematics, his experiences in the world, his love-affair, his religious conversion, his mysticism, his philosophy, his polemical writings, and finally the story of Pascal, man and saint, closes

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when, after only 39 years of crowded life, a cerebral hemorrhage destroyed the great master brain of one of the world's major geniuses.

This is a singularly attractive book. The publishers have aided the author in making an admirable format, but the chief attraction is the skill of Professor Bishop who has made a historical study, fully documented and suited to every need of the student, as interesting as a novel. The reader who can lay aside this book after a moment's glance, must be a singularly constituted person. It is a model of what a biography should be. Professor Bishop succeeds in "getting inside" his subject. Unlike so much written to-day, this book does not seek either to laud or "debunk." It is sympathetic where sympathy is needed, critical where criticism is needed, without the sympathy or criticism getting in each other's way. Professor Bishop is not afraid of taking an independent line. Unlike most of Pascal's biographers, he believes that a genuine love-affair existed between Pascal and Charlotte Gouffier, and accepts the *Discours sur les passions de l'amour* as Pascal's work, inspired by his own experiences. The case against this view of the matter rests on the silence of some important witnesses and the improbability of an affair between a duke's sister and a poor scholar. But in view of the close friendship between the duc de Rohannez and Pascal and the subsequent career of the lady herself, which gives full evidence of an otherwise unexplained mental conflict, there is much to be said for Professor Bishop's support of Victor Cousin's suggestion of Pascal's passion for Charlotte.

Professor Bishop's account of Pascal's conversion is sympathetically objective. Such transforming experiences are ground upon which no biographer can enter. He must stand without and wonder. Pascal lived and died an orthodox Catholic, yet always expressing the Calvinistic spirit of Jansenism. His respects to the Virgin were almost perfunctory. It was Christ Himself before whom Pascal knelt with adoration. Professor Bishop says he was "a genius attempting sainthood." In the ordinary sense Pascal was not a saint. Yet the picture of the brilliant genius, slowly burning itself out as the frail body sickened and wasted, is more touching in its pathetic resignation and penitence than any story of conventional sainthood. Professor Bishop is equally happy in his delineation of the intellectual and the spiritual powers of Pascal. He gives a full account of his investigations into the mystery of the vacuum in Toricelli's tube, of his mathematical excursions, and even of his part in initiating the first omnibus service in history, when his *cinq sous* carriages were put on the streets of Paris. Pascal's genius was too many-sided to issue in a definite philosophy, such as that of Descartes, of whose meeting with Pascal we are afforded a lively description. But Pascal's influence is reappearing to-day in the philosophy of Bergson, and as Professor Bishop says, "The world is full of lovers of Pascal. Who loves Descartes? Who loves Kant?"

Of the struggle between Jansenist and Jesuit in which Pascal took so prominent a part, we have here a full account. The influence of the *Lettres Provinciales* is still felt in the traditional French suspicion of the Jesuits. Voltaire credited them with fixing the French language. They made the plain man a moralist and something of a theologian. Protestants abroad seized on so handy a weapon of controversy. Yet in them is not the innermost revelation of Pascal. What that was, no reader of Professor Bishop's altogether admirable biography will fail in some measure to apprehend.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

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Theory and Art of Mysticism. By RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE, M.A., Ph.D.
(London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1937. Pp. xvi + 308. Price 15s.)

Mysticism is closely related to religion, in that it is a vital element in all true religion, and to philosophy, in that it is intimately concerned with the nature of Being, but it is to be considered first and foremost as representing an attitude of mind, the innate tendency of the human soul to seek to realize, and to enter into relationship with, that hidden Presence which is the Source of all Being. But while mysticism represents a certain attitude towards Reality, it has always assumed that such an attitude implies also a certain Way of life, which must be followed by those who seek fellowship with the Highest. Mysticism is therefore practical and active, and also self-giving, for it ought to mean that the mystic's contact with the Divine Life results in a fuller, richer life lived in contact with other human lives. "The perfect life," said Plato, "would be a life of perfect communion with other souls, as well as with the Soul which animates the universe."

This book, by the Professor of Economics and Sociology at Lucknow University, has three main aims. It seeks to present an objective explanation of the mystical life and experience and to show the bearing of religion upon human institutions: it also seeks to give a training in the art of contemplation; and finally it seeks to show how the study of mysticism leads to an appreciation of social values. "No adequate and comprehensive theory of social progress," Professor Mukerjee writes, "can afford to neglect the consideration of religion; and sociology, which regards all phenomena of human society as its province, should no longer relegate to the philosophy of religion alone the task of attempting a comprehensive formulation of the goal of man's collective effort and aspiration" (p. 8).

The author divides the types of mystical experience into four classes: first, the emotional type of mysticism, finding its satisfaction in a personal God, and among the representatives of this class he would include Hindu mystics of the Bhakti School, the Sūfis of Islam, and Christian mystics; second, Nature mysticism, in which the personal Deity is superseded by the All-Being; third, unimpassioned mysticism, in which Reality is apprehended as absolute and modeless, and contrast between the knowing subject and the known object is lost; fourth, a type in which the quest of the soul and the quest of the Being, the way of knowledge and of love, are combined.

But the author is chiefly concerned to deal with Mysticism in its practical effect upon life, holding that it is mysticism which brings about equipoise in the inner life and enables a man to adapt himself to his environment, and everyone can and ought to be a mystic. In the author's view, mysticism is not asceticism in regard to the things of the senses, but rather consecration. He quotes Ekanath, an Indian mystic of the sixteenth century, as saying, "The senses that ascetics suppress, mystics devote to the worship of the Lord. The things of sense that the ascetics forsake, mystics offer to God. Ascetics forsake the things of sense, and, forsaking them, they suffer in the flesh; the followers of mysticism offer them to the Lord and hence they become forever emancipated" (p. 131).

Professor Mukerjee holds that monotheism, with its worship of a Personal Deity, is inadequate to meet modern needs, and notes that there is to-day in the work of such Christian thinkers as Barth, Otto, and Brunner a tendency to emphasize the sense of mystery and awe before the unsearchable Divine Majesty, which he welcomes as tending towards freedom from traditional categories and symbols. He would like to see Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism prepared to coalesce, and enrich the religious experience of the true mystics of each religion.

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Through mysticism, the author believes that the religious world-view can be reconciled with modern metaphysics. "The mystic's discovery of Reality in this world of many-changing things, his reconciliation of the monistic and pluralistic traditions, of immanence, incarnation, and transcendence can alone show the way towards the mutual participation and interpenetration of religion, metaphysics, and science" (p. 272). By mysticism alone (but chiefly by that of Mahayāna Buddhism) can metaphysics be saved from the crippling effects of the invasion of physical science, and human souls from the laws governing the motion of electrons and protons or the ceaseless flow of the evolutionary process. The Cosmic Eternal Spirit is the Reality which is outside and yet extends over time and space and the Cosmos. His persistent absorption with the Real enables the mystic to distinguish unerringly between truth and falsehood, and his inner certainty endows him with a courage and a determination that can rise superior to any bafflement and suffering, and so the mystic has often been an ethical pioneer, a religious reformer, an innovator in every sense of the word. To the mystic, social life and relations present some aspects of the absolute and eternal values, Truth, Beauty, and Goodness (which is Love), those attributes by which the Divine Reality is revealed to mankind: so fellow-man is seen to be the means by which the True Reality can be reached and served. "As the thin and shallow rivulet of man's life flows into the full ocean of God's activity, every act is done for the sake of fellow-man and inactivity becomes no leisure but meditation for the happiness of all" (p. 284). So the author's final conclusion is that between religion and society there is an endless reciprocity. The mystic vision is for ever shedding its rays upon our everyday life and experience, while the radiation of our love and thought for others is eternally renewing, with ever-growing brightness, the vital flame of vision.

This is a very interesting and suggestive book and closely reasoned. Certain of the chapters, those on Primitive Religion, Magic and Ritual, Religion and Economic Life, though interesting in themselves, have little bearing on the main thesis. Professor Mukerjee, throughout, is plainly influenced by his own personal conviction that in Buddhist mysticism it is to be found that which will bring both religion and metaphysics into the close and harmonious relationship with the social order which is to be universally desired. Communion with a personal God, he says, cannot give lasting or perfect satisfaction. But in such a communion many millions of the human race have, in fact, found complete satisfaction, and have believed, too, that thereby they have found salvation. In spite of the scholarship with which the author's thesis is maintained, his wide acquaintance with Western thought, and his sympathy with human need, the reader may well doubt whether the solution of the problems of the present age can be found in a faith which has not—and perhaps never can have—a universal appeal.

The book is well produced and fully indexed, but it lacks a bibliography, and the supply of this need would add considerably to its value.

MARGARET SMITH.

Being and Being Known: An Introduction to Epistemology and Metaphysics.
By WILLIAM CURTIS SWABEY, Ph.D. (New York: The Dial Press.
1937. Pp. xvi + 318. Price \$3.50.)

This book is written in a very pleasing style, lively but unforced, graceful but not ornate, paying sufficient attention to accuracy of expression (for the most part) without frivolous nicety, provided that its intention be, as the

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sub-title states, to supply an introduction to epistemology and to metaphysics. It should serve that purpose very well. It traverses most of the major philosophical categories, and has something pertinent to say on each of them. It briefly reviews a varied and important set of philosophical theories, some of them new, others not so new. It does not obtrude, although it lays proper emphasis upon its own point of view; and, nearly always, it has the high merit of preferring arguments to catchwords.

The general plan of the book, so far as it has one, is, firstly, to reject "naïve" and accept "critical" (or Lockean and frankly problematic) realism; secondly, to retain dualistic realism after discussing Kant's "phenomenalism," the "subjectivism" of Hume and of Mill, and various types of pragmatism; thirdly, to review the great epistemological theme of "ideas" and of "knowledge"; and, fourthly, to debate the categories of space, time, infinity, causality, substance, mind-body, and freedom in a spirit prevalingly ontological. While the last part of the book gives, in the main, special studies of these categories, an attempt is made to show that "realism" is committed to certain ontological conclusions. Thus (p. 150) "Realism, to be significant, implies a world which is *spatial* and *in space* in the ordinary meaning of these words." "Time is *really* real" (p. 165). "Physical reality, whatever it may be, is determinate" (p. 162). "The true reality is *formed matter*" (p. 216). If Heisenberg or the relativists deny any of these things, Mr. Swabey is willing to attack them vigorously.

It is more difficult to give an opinion on the merits of the book if its sub-title is too modest, and the work should be regarded as an independent contribution to its subject. Plainly the discussion is far too good to be called superficial; it is also too good to be called facile. But I think this author is capable of more solid work; and although, as I have said, he is usually accurate, he permits himself to write loosely on rather too many occasions. Thus it is hard to reconcile his view about time already quoted (p. 165) with the statement (p. 154) that the past "would seem to be a contribution of the mind itself." It is also difficult to know what Mr. Swabey means when he tells us that causality has the "genuine feature" of being "obscure to the intellect" (p. 179) and also (p. 282) that the "law of causation" is "unassailable from the standpoint of self-evidence." Again, it is hard to suppose that Mr. Swabey's view that we have each of us many selves (intellectual, emotional, social, etc.), but that the "true" self in contrast to these "aspects" is "all of them together in their proper proportions" is a weighty contribution to this part of his theme.

JOHN LAIRD.

Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason. A Study in the History of Thought. By ERNEST CAMPBELL MOSSNER. (New York and London: Macmillan & Co. 1936. Pp. xv + 271. Price 15s.)

That the author's name is unfamiliar will be explained by saying that he is an American, to whom the award of a fellowship from Columbia University has afforded opportunity for research work in this country. He is to be congratulated upon making excellent use of the award. This book is an admirably balanced, well documented, and eminently readable account of a thinker who, despite all that has been written upon him, still offers ground in his fruitful speculations for further study. As Mr. Mossner shows, Butler was distinctly a man of his age. During his lifetime two opposing tendencies to which he was alike hostile, Deism and Methodism, struggled against each

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other. Intellectually, Butler was nearer to the Deist, morally to the Methodist, but he disliked the scepticism of the one as much as the "enthusiasm" or religious exuberance of the other. The width of Butler's mind, not less than the tendencies of the age in which he lived, accounts for certain inconsistencies, or unresolved positions, in his philosophy. Butler never finally balanced the account between conscience and "reasonable self-love." On the whole, it seems that it is the latter that has the last word, yet Butler will not expressly acknowledge that fact. Similarly, Mr. Mossner thinks that Butler never faced the general relation of conscience to reason, but implicitly abandons reason by insisting that its guidance alone is insufficient, and that it needs alliance with a divinely inspired conscience.

The interplay of thought between Butler's theories and the tendencies of his times is admirably worked out by the author. Possibly he hardly allows enough to the factor of Hobbes's philosophy. No Christian apologist to-day gives much weight to "reasonable self-love," and it is difficult to believe that this conception would have had the position it occupies in Butler's thought had it not been for Hobbes. Butler had no difficulty in breaking down Hobbes's psychological hedonism, but, as is often the case, the position demolished exerted an indirect influence in the construction of the opposing view. Hobbes is far more important in the reactions he provoked than in his own philosophy. Mr. Mossner has provided us with a welcome and useful addition to the literature of Butler's philosophy. It is all the more valuable because its emphasis is upon Butler's relation to his age, rather than upon the much more familiar topic of Butler's philosophy in itself.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Theory of the Democratic State. By MARIE COLLINS SWABEY. (Cambridge, U.S.A.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. 234. Price 2 dollars 50 cents.)

In this exposition of the theory of Democracy Professor Swabey delves deeply into the roots of politics. To her Democracy is closely dependent upon the quantitative character of science. Historically it has asserted itself contemporaneously with notable advances of the scientific spirit. Those advances consist primarily in the discovery of conformations and exactitudes of structure and measurement in physical objects on the inorganic plane, and it is to this quantitative science that Miss Swabey looks for the true origin and logical defence of democratic institution. In the functional triad of democracy the central factor is equality. Though individuals differ in their capacities, physical and mental, political institutions disregard these "intensive magnitudes" in favour of a policy of counting heads. "Suppose that work, need, capacity, and meritoriousness were all taken into account in estimating the benefits to be assigned to citizens. What would be the result? To begin with, some compensative rating of degrees of want and merit, labour and aptitude, would have to be worked out. Few would qualify on all counts. Yet, how proportionately should the State reward, for instance, the unscrupulous but successful producer of economic goods, as compared with the talented artist who rarely used his talents, or as compared with the 'deserving' well-intentioned person who made a botch of everything?" (p. 179).

In its attitude towards justice the assumption of equality in its numerical side seems necessary. Though work may seem to be implied in the State's attitude towards human needs, its evident inability to estimate the value

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of individual differences of capacity and need justify this numerical treatment of equality.

Miss Swabey deals drastically with the dialectical and practical errors of Marxism, on the one hand, and biological mechanism on the other. Both are materialistic in origin and character. She appears in places to deny the assumption of evolution in any of its accepted senses, and to ally herself with that modern science which rejects causality in favour of treating nature "rather as a configuration of elements disposed in pure atomic jostlings and possessed of logical structure disclosed in relations of probability" (p. 49).

The distinctive quality for which democracy stands is for her a purely rational one. It implies a capacity peculiar to man and not derived from mere animalism. "He alone apparently has the power of responding to remote, inclusive, and non-existent objects, a capacity for universal-mindedness quite different from social-mindedness or the dog-like attachment to gregarious ends" (p. 217). Since Miss Swabey eschews any sort of psychical solipsism, it is difficult to understand how this universal-mindedness, non-existent in the anthropoid ancestors, enters the mind of primitive man. Why should not reason, logic, and a primitive scientific impulse be accredited to lower animals? Deny this and you are landed in a miracle. Miss Swabey is almost fanatical in her repudiation of any suggestion of a collective mind. For it may be utilized to support a State which encroaches upon liberty and equality in the false name of fraternity. Her individualism, though demanding equitable treatment in the equal provision of opportunities, permits no directly social motive to creep in. "The moral man, we should say, is not the socially motivated man, but the principled one who sets himself a standard and tries to live up to it" (p. 217).

"In so far as individualism signifies piggishness, pomposity, exclusive self-seeking, it may well be attacked. Yet it may equally well be defended as expressing the fact that society is composed of units, and that only as these units remain self-reliant, assertive, and responsible in their own right, does the group become so. Strong societies are made of strong individuals" (p. 224).

Democracy, as the positive constructive policy for promoting this individuality, is rightly encroaching upon many customary privileges of the classes, political and economic. But it must not by any general socialization destroy or impair those incentives to personal energy, invention, and risk-taking that are essential to material and mental progress by denying those gains which in most cases are needed to evoke and direct these creative powers.

This brief account cannot profess to do justice to the originality and skill with which Miss Swabey has tackled the many theoretical and practical problems of the democratic State. There is, however, one important theoretic topic on which I should like to comment. Her logic, mathematical in character, appears to hold that all apparently qualitative differences can ultimately be reducible to quantities. Politics, however imperfect as science, is yet science. But though the scientific impulse may have some independent character, can it be held to dominate and bring to any single standard of measurement the other interests of life, physical, moral, aesthetic? Experience attests no such dominion. Is value (as economists would have it) a purely quantitative conception? Are there not qualities, interests, desires, values that defy measured comparison. Though these vital questions do not, I think, impair the very important defence of democracy as applied to the life of the average man, treated on a basis of equality, they do come up in relation to the wider treatment of politics, economics, and ethics.

J. A. HOBSON.

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Christianity, Communism, and the Ideal Society. A Philosophical Approach to Modern Politics. By JAMES FEIBLEMAN. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 419. Price 12s. 6d.)

To offer an adequate review of this volume, which expresses confident judgments on a wider range of subjects than the title itself indicates, would demand an amount of space which its intrinsic value would not justify a reviewer in asking, or an editor in granting; and I must content myself with a brief indication of its contents, and some comments on its merits or defects. Of the six chapters, only three are immediately relevant to the purpose shown in the title. The first chapter exposes the fallacy of Nominalism, the second states the viewpoint of axiologic realism; and the fifth deals with Science and its problems, some bearing they do have, but the full development of the themes is due to a second, and not secondary, interest. The terms Nominalism and Realism are used to describe any philosophy, or tendency in a philosophy, to base knowledge on particulars, or on universals. The adjective Axiologic in the title of the second chapter indicates that ideals or values as well as ideas are included in the universals. The writer casts his net of condemnation of Nominalism very wide, and encloses some fish which we would not expect to find there. He revives in his Realism the Platonic idealism, but he does not with Plato oppose the ideas and the images as substance and shadow, but finite actuality is for him the finite fragment of the infinite possibility of the logical and axiological order, and both actuality and possibility are real. God as infinite Unity is the source, from which descend the two currents of logic and value. He identifies this philosophical with the theological trinity of Father, Word, and Holy Spirit. Truth as belonging to the logical order is not one of the values, but the good, the beautiful, and the worshipful are. Religion is adoration of the Infinite Unity, not a personal relation to a personal God. He insists that science must for its progress not only implicitly but explicitly abandon *nominalism* (empiricisms) for realism (rationalism). It is significant that he passes from biology to social science, and ignores psychology; this is in accordance with his neglect of the subjective process of thinking by which the individual subject apprehends the objective universals. While there are in these three chapters defects of judgment, they seem to me the more valuable parts of the work, and should have more interest for the readers of this journal.

It is convenient now to pass to the last chapter, which deals with the *Possibility of an Ideal Society*. Under the guidance of the Logical Ethics of Peirce, whose disciple the author seems to be, he defines the ideal society as "the unlimited community"; the moral development of the individual depends on the constant expansion of the range of his social relations, the compass of the society of which he is a member. An undiscerning and, therefore, prejudiced account is given of *nominalistic individualistic liberalism*; but a *realistic social liberalism* is admitted as at least a temporary factor of progress until the ideal is realized. Here, as elsewhere, this constant insistence on the contrast of nominalism and realism appears not as a help, but a hindrance to the argument. Elements from Christianity which may be retained in the ideal are "the infinite worth of the individual, prayer as adoration, the validity of independent reason (Christ as the *logos*), the 'fragment' version of realism, need for the doctrine of immanence, belief in the triumph of justice over force" (p. 198). From Communism may be adopted "the Marxist analysis of industrialism, the need for exact social science, the recognition of actuality as finite and irreducible, the realistic existence of ideals, the dialectic logic of actuality, society as the individual goal" (p. 272). Chapter IV seems to me to be a competent and appreciative estimate of *Karl Marx and Communism*,

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which, if the author had to make a choice, he would prefer to Fascism, on which he pronounces a deserved condemnation. Chapter III, on *Christ and Christianity*, is both incompetent and prejudiced. He imagines that he has disposed of Christian Metaphysics when he has criticized the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. He shows no trace of any knowledge of modern Christian apologetics which would make null and void some of his objections. He refers to A. E. Tayler's views as immortality at second hand (p. 375), in what to those who know that writer must appear a travesty. The account of Protestantism on pages 187-188 is nothing less than a grotesque caricature. He is equally abusive of professors of Philosophy (p. 278). His demand that mathematics should be applied to social science seems to me of very doubtful value. Again he arrogantly ignores all that has been done in this sphere (p. 323). The tone of the book makes an unfavourable impression. It is a pity that there is so much to detract from the merits of the book as an earnest and urgent plea for the recognition and application of reason and value to actuality.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

In the Realm of Mind: Nine Chapters on the Applications and Implications of Psychology. By CHARLES S. MYERS, C.B.E., F.R.S. (Cambridge: The University Press. 1937. Pp. 251. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

This volume consists of a number of essays, originally delivered as lectures or discourses, upon important topics of psychology both pure and applied. No one is better qualified to speak as an expert of the practical usefulness of psychology in vocational selection and guidance or of the human factor in accident causation than Dr. Myers. But those who know of him only, or chiefly, as the Founder and Principal of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology will discover in this book that he is an expert equally qualified to speak on topics that belong to many other and diverse fields of psychology also. There is, for example, a delightful chapter on musical appreciation, another on social psychology, and a third on international relations. More purely speculative problems are dealt with in the chapters entitled "Psychological Conceptions in Other Sciences," "The Absurdity of any Mind-Body Relation," and "The Nature of Mind." One chapter is particularly addressed to members of the medical profession, though it will no doubt be read with great interest by others. It stresses the capital importance for the physician of a sound knowledge of psychology, since he has to treat ailing human beings rather than diseases, and should reckon with their minds as well as their bodies in his treatment. Since 1933, when the Bradshaw Lecture upon which this chapter is based was delivered, Dr. Myers's contention that psychology ought to be taught to medical students has been accepted by the authorities, in that the subject is now included in the medical curriculum. *In the Realm of Mind* is a book that should be welcomed by a wide circle of readers.

F. AVELING.

Education for Citizenship. By ERNEST BARKER. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 17. Price 1s.)

Those who heard Professor Barker's lecture at the Institute of Education on June 8, 1936, will be glad to have it in print; and for others it will be no less valuable. Much has been written on this subject of late, but nothing wiser than this cautious statement. Professor Barker points out the inevitable dilemma that (i) if you educate for citizenship you educate for the State, as is evident enough in several countries; but that (ii) if you do not, you make it

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impossible for democracy to continue. He finds a partial solution in three reflections: (i) that under democracy education must be directed towards fitting the citizen, not, as Aristotle says, "to suit the form of government under which he lives," but to *be* the government ("to make, control, and inspire it"); (ii) that education for citizenship is very far from being confined to the schools; and (iii) that it is only one aspect of the education of the whole man.

F. A. CAVENAGH.

Divine Causation: A Critical Study Concerning "Intermediaries." By W. J. BEALE, M.A., B.D., D.Phil. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1937. Pp. xv + 335. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

Dr. Beale desires to discover man's earliest beliefs about causation and the Supreme Source behind it. He then deals with the interjection of intermediary beings between that Supreme Cause and its effects. His intention is to show that this is a needless addition, and one that imperils the true conception of the Supreme Cause. He begins with an inquiry into origins, which is too scantily conceived to be of much use. Moreover, the list of authorities is not well balanced, and when, for example, Lowie's *Primitive Society* is once referred to as Lawrie's and the two other occasions as Lowrie's, it would seem that the investigation has been somewhat hurried. Passing to the more detailed review of Hebrew ideas upon the subject, Dr. Beale shows himself much more at home, and this section is well conceived and carried out. The conclusion is that intermediaries are necessitated by a false idea of the Supreme Cause as spatially transcendent, whereas Dr. Beale is concerned to prove that transcendence involves immanence, and the intermediary is needless. This leads to a polemic against the idea of angels. References to them in the New Testament are rejected as due to Jewish ideas interpolated by the writers, but a good deal of special pleading is needed to show, as Dr. Beale claims to have shown, that angels were not referred to by Jesus, and that the many mentions of them in His recorded words are due to the recorders. Why it should be necessary to believe that we are the only spiritual beings created is not clear. It seems ill to accord with the idea of the resurrection of the dead to which Christianity is entirely committed. Possibly Dr. Beale believes in unemployed angels. At any rate, after reading this interesting study the reviewer still remains, like Disraeli, on the side of the angels.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Books received also:—

- M. T. ROONEY. *Lawlessness, Law and Sanction*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America. 1937. Pp. 176.
- The Analects or the Conversations of Confucius with his disciples and certain others*. Tr. by W. E. Soothill. Edited by Lady Hosie. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. lx + 254. 2s.
- J. L. HRONDAKA. *Masaryk as European*. Prague: International Philosophical Library, 1936. Pp. vii + 38. Kč. 20.
- E. SWEDENBORG. (Tr. by H. Goyder Smith.) *Angelic Wisdom concerning The Divine Love and The Divine Wisdom*. London: The Swedenborg Society. 1937. Pp. xiii + 432.
- H. VON HENTIG. *Punishment: Its Origin, Purpose and Psychology*. London: W. Hodge & Co. Ltd. 1937. Pp. 239. 12s. 6d.

NEW BOOKS

- N. O. LOSSKY. *Three Chapters from the History of Polish Messianism*. Prague: International Philosophical Library. 1936. Pp. 31. Kč. 25.
- A. C. GARNETT. *Reality and Value. An Introduction to Metaphysics and an Essay on the Theory of Value*. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 320. 12s. 6d.
- J. C. MCKERROW. *Evolution Without Natural Selection*. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1937. Pp. 63. 1s.
- S. BULGAKOV. *The Wisdom of God. A Brief Summary of Sophiology*. New York: The Paisley Press; London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 223. 6s.
- F. AVELING. *Psychology: the Changing Outlook*. London: Watts & Co. 1937. Pp. vii + 152. 2s. 6d.
- O. LJUNGSTROM. *A Philosophical Overhaul*. Lund: Printed by Håkan Ohlsson. 1937. Pp. 118.
- J. NEEDHAM. *Integrative Levels: a Revaluation of the Idea of Progress*. (Herbert Spencer Lecture 1937.) Oxford: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. 59. 2s. 6d.
- VARIOUS. *Human Affairs: An Exposition of what Science can do for Man*. Planned and edited by R. B. Cattell, J. Cohen, and R. M. W. Trävers. London: Macmillan & Co. 1937. Pp. xi + 360. 10s. 6d.
- A. TOROSSIAN. *A Guide to Aesthetics*. California: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. vii + 343. 3 dollars 25; 17s.
- M. PHILLIPS. *The Education of the Emotions through Sentiment Development*. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 318. 8s. 6d.
- C. HARTSHORNE. *Beyond Humanism*. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Co. 1937. Pp. xiv + 324. 2 dollars 50.
- A. PETZALL. *Ethics and Epistemology in John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Göteborg: Wettergren & Kerbers Förlag. 1937. Pp. 83. Kr. 3.
- Lucretius. "*De Rerum Natura*." (Tr. by R. C. Trevelyan.) Cambridge at the University Press. 1937. Pp. xv + 295. 8s. 6d.
- A. R. WHATELY. *The Focus of Belief*. Cambridge at the University Press. 1937. Pp. x + 191. 8s. 6d.
- H. V. ROUTH. *Towards the Twentieth Century. Essays in the Spiritual History of the Nineteenth*. Cambridge at the University Press. 1937. Pp. x + 392. 21s.
- M.-A. COCHET. *La Métaphysique de Paul Decoster et la Science*. Bruges: Imprimerie Sainte Catherine. 1937. Pp. 61.
- L. PRAT. *Charles' Renouvier, philosophe. Sa Doctrine—Sa Vie*. Paris: En rente aux Messageries Hachette. 1937. Pp. 302. 25 fr.
- W. M. KOZŁOWSKI. *Rapports présentés aux Congrès Internationaux de Philosophie*. Prague: Bibliothèque Internationale de Philosophie. 1935. Pp. viii + 95.
- B. JAKOVENKŮ. *La bibliographie de T. G. Masaryk*. Prague: Bibliothèque Internationale de Philosophie. 1935. Pp. vii + 92 + viii. Kč. 40.
- B. JAKOVENKO. *La bibliographie d'Edouard Beneš*. Prague: Bibliothèque Internationale de Philosophie. 1936. Pp. viii + 123 + xii. Kč. 60.
- E. BENEŠ. *Deux Conférences sur T. G. Masaryk*. Prague: Bibliothèque Internationale de Philosophie. 1936. Pp. vii + 24. Kč. 20.
- A. J. FESTUGIÈRE. *Contemplation et Vie Contemplative selon Platon*. (I.e., Saulchoir. Bibliothèque de Philosophie.) Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 493.
- MME. E. CLAPARÉDE-SPIR. *Paroles d'un Sage. Choix de Pensées d'African Spir*. Paris: Editions "Je sers"; Genève: Editions "Labor." 1937. Pp. 65.

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- Actualités scientifiques et industrielles*. Vol. 479-492. Systèmes de référence et mouvements: I. Physique classique; II. Physique relativiste. Par A. Sesmat. Paris: Herman & Cie
- L. BRUNSCHVICG. *La Physique du Vingtième Siècle et la Philosophie*. Pp. 30. 10. fr. Paris: Herman & Cie
- L. BRUNSCHVICG. *Le Rôle du Pythagorisme dans l'Evolution des Selées*. Pp. 25. 10 fr. Paris: Hermann & Cie. 1936 and 1937.
- B. JAKOWENKO. *Vom Wesen der Philosophie*. Prague: Verlag der Zeitschrift "Der russische Gedanke." 1936. Pp. vii + 55.
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- W. CLASSEN. *Thomistische Anthropologie in völkisch-politischer Sicht*. Karlsruhe: Verlag Boltze. 1937. Pp. 56. RM. 2.80
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- H. SPIEGELBERG. *Antirelativismus: Kritik des Relativismus und Skeptizismus der Werte und des Sollens*. Zürich und Leipzig: M. Niehans. 1935. 1'p. 100.
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- ISTITUTO DI PEDAGOGIA. *Miscellanea di pubblicazione in uso agli studenti per l'anno scolastico 1936-7*. "Consigli Bibliografici Ricerche." R. Università di Roma. 1937. Pp. 139. Lire 6.
- Renato Descartes: Discorso sul Metodo*. (Introduzione e commento di Adolfo Levi.) Napoli: L. Loffredo. 1937. Pp. liii + 108. Lire 8,50.
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- A. BAZALA. *Il pensiero di Masaryk*. Praga: Biblioteca Internazionale di Filosofia. 1935. Pp. vii + 44.
- G. G. LEIBNIZ. *La Monadologia*. Con Introduzione e Note di G. de Ruggiero. Bari: G. Laterza & Figli. 1937. Pp. 151. L. 70.
- B. JAKOWENKO. *Alcuni capitoli di storia della filosofia nordamericana*. Praga: Biblioteca Internazionale di Filosofia. 1936. Pp. vii + 41.
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CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

In the July issue of *PHILOSOPHY* there appeared a review of my *Philosophy of Relativity* by Mr. Herbert Dingle, who contends that this book, although "undoubtedly worth reading" for philosophers, is not a "valuable contribution" to science. The reviewer might, of course, have made it clearer that I had no intention of contributing anything at all to science, that, as explained in the Preface to the book, the exposition of the relativity-theory is given there entirely for the benefit of philosophers without mathematical training; but this I certainly would not bother mentioning if it were not for the objectionable interpretation which Mr. Dingle gives to his contention. According to him, to say that philosophical speculation about the concepts of relativity does not contribute anything to the science of physics, is the same as saying that it is irrelevant to an understanding of the nature of physical reality—in his own words, that "the relation of any scientific theory to philosophy is simply the relation of science in general to philosophy, and that is not at all affected by the advent of relativity." These words are simply not true to facts. In the history of philosophy before "the advent of relativity," the philosophies of events in spatio-temporal relations as contrasted with the philosophies of substances in mutual transactions were not, and could not be, heard of.

With regard to Mr. Dingle's specific illustrations, which are my speculations about the reality of space-time, solipsism, and motion, I should likewise disagree with him that they are irrelevant to or unaffected by relativity. To take the question of the "reality" of space-time, a philosopher of nature is bound to discuss it, since some of the physicists themselves (the operationalists) hold, in disagreement with the majority of scientists who have tried to treat scientific theories as descriptions of nature, the philosophical opinion that space-time is not an objective reality but merely a pragmatically useful scheme.¹ But there is no need to argue my point, because Mr. Dingle himself, naïvely overlooking inconsistency, admits the relevancy of science to philosophy when he says that the problem of reality is "closely connected" with the question of solipsism and that a "cardinal feature" of relativity is that it is "in conformity" with solipsism. If instead of arguing that relativity as science has nothing to do one way or another with solipsism, Mr. Dingle can argue that the two are "in conformity," then certainly I have the right to argue that they are incompatible, especially if my argument, as I am going to indicate, is the better of the two.

Mr. Dingle writes: "Relativity identifies 'another observer' with 'myself using a different co-ordinate system.' If there is another observer whose experience of mechanical events I cannot myself describe simply by changing my co-ordinates, relativity leaves him entirely out of account, however 'real' or 'independent of the mind' he may be."

If this means that relativity is in conformity with solipsism because it describes events which might be experienced by a single observer, then Mr. Dingle is wrong because he overlooks that besides mechanical events relativity describes strings of events with space-like and zero-intervals which cannot be observed by a solipsist for the simple reason that they transcend observation. In this connection it is important to understand that independently of any philosophical speculation

¹ Although it does not help Mr. Dingle's general contention, he could not refrain from a dig at my definition of reality as being independent of the mind: "Except that mind must be unreal, this tells us nothing. . . ." Even disregarding the fact that I gave my definition in a discussion of physical reality, this remark of Mr. Dingle shows an astounding ignorance of the traditional philosophical context in which "independence of mind" is taken in opposition to the subjective idealists' "dependence on mind as an idea." In this sense a mind is independent of a mind, and is real for it is not a mere idea of another mind.

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relativity as science has no discrimination in favour of time-like intervals being more real than the other two. But even if, for the sake of argument, all but mechanical events are disregarded, the existence of alternative frames of reference in Relativity is certainly incompatible with the proposed identification of "another observer" with "myself using a different co-ordinate system." For while systems are moving relatively to one another, I can use only one of them at a time. Of course, I can change from time to time my co-ordinate systems, but if I do I am not the same percipient event after such a change. And the admission of the existence of percipient events other than the one which is the solipsist's experience at the present moment is tantamount to a rejection of the thesis of solipsism.

I wish to add a word concerning Mr. Dingle's remark that my "writing, though lacking distinction, is clear." The remark is an expression either of the discredited opinion that style is separable from content or of a regrettable request for such "embellishments" as the reviewer uses himself when he writes, for example, that my book "drags relativity, so to speak, into an atmosphere in which it cannot breathe, with the result that we have two unconformable sets of ideas forced into an unnatural union."

Yours faithfully,

A. P. USHENKO.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

q

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

Professor W. T. Stace's article on "The Place of Philosophy in Human Culture" is so interesting that I regret its containing a reference to Herbert Spencer which will undoubtedly mislead all who have no acquaintance with that philosopher's works. Professor Stace says that Spencer's conception of the business of philosophy "finds no place for many of the problems which have always been regarded as essentially philosophical . . . for example, the problem whether the material world is in any way dependent for its existence upon mind," as "asserted in the past by idealistic philosophers." Spencer's philosophy certainly does find a very large place for the discussion of Idealism, for in the *Principles of Psychology*, fourth edition, well over 200 pages are devoted to the subject—being the whole of Part 7, vol. 2. Seeing that the entire work covers some 1,400 pages, it will be seen that Spencer gave more than one-seventh of his space to the question of Idealism.

Of course, the work I have mentioned forms two of the ten large volumes in which the whole of Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy is developed.

Yours very faithfully,

GEORGE EASTGATE.

28, STANLEY ROAD,
WOODFORD E.

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

Since Mr. G. R. G. Mure has evidently been at considerable pains to collect the facts relevant to his interesting study on "Oxford and Philosophy" (Vol. XII, No. 47), it may be worth while to correct a slip on pp. 295 f. It is there stated that "the first three *Tracts for the Times* were published in this year [i.e. 1833]." Actually the rate of progress was much more rapid. The first three were issued on one day—Sept. 9, 1833—and no less than twenty were out by the end of December. See, e.g., H. P. Liddon, *Life of Pusey*, iii, 473 f.

Yours faithfully,

F. L. CROSS.

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